UNCL-PRESENTATION-ST ANDREWS-311011

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Missing the obvious - coping with scientific
technological change in arms control negotiations
Dr John R.Walker Arms Control and Disarmament
Research Unit
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REFERENCE POINT

• A given topic might be hard to grasp,
  deliberately concealed, too mundane to be
  noticed, purposely not made public,
  unintelligible, collectively disowned, lost in
  history, beyond expression, or barred from
  appreciation.
• Brian Rappert, On Holding What isn't There

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THEMES

• The hard to grasp
• The unintelligible
• Collectively disowned
• Beyond expression

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HARD TO GRASP
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CONTENTS

• Lessons pointers from CBW arms control and
  disarmament negotiations implementation
  1968-2012.
• Missing the obvious or accidentally/intentionally
  prescient some questions.
• Addressing scientific technological change in
• The origins of the BTWC its negotiation
• The Chemical Weapons Convention
• The BTWC Protocol
• BTWC CWC Review Conferences
• Missing the obvious or accidentally/intentionally
  prescient some answers?

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LESSONS AND POINTERS

• Why look at CBW arms control and disarmament?
• Science technology necessarily underpins the
  Conventions
• Objects of verification/prohibition affected by
  ST change
• Debates framed by then current knowledge 1960s,
  70s 80s
• Conventions of indefinite duration not time
  bound
• Pace and extent of technological change
  scientific revolutions?
• Negotiations run by diplomats shaped by wider
  political factors
• Role of scientific technical expertise in
  shaping dual-use governance regime
• Nature of mechanisms agreed to deal with ST
  change coping with the unforeseen, unknowable
  known unknowns.

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THE UNINTELLIGIBLE
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MISSING THE OBVIOUS OR ACCIDENTALLY
/INTENTIONALLY PRESCIENT?

• Looking at state of BTWC CWC today were the
  negotiators prescient?
• Are the regimes robust enough to cope with ST
  change?
• What was missed, if anything?
• Were any lacunae avoidable/inevitable?
• Science advice failure or diplomatic myopia?

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THE ORIGINS OF THE BTWC

• BTWC was UK proposal in 1968 deal with BW
  separately from CW.
• Internal preparatory work led by Chief Scientific
  Advisor
• - Zuckermans key role most of the members
  were also scientists
• - avoid using bacteriological archaic term
  that could exclude viruses
• - recognised that could not prohibit specific
  microorganisms
• - provided definition for UK Working Paper
  biological agents causing death or disease by
  infection in man, animals or crops
• - clear that ban should not prevent production
  of agents for defence
• - awareness of dual-use problem capabilities
  would still exist
• - believed verification not achievable as term
  traditionally understood
• - did not consider inclusion of toxins (added
  later by US and Sweden.
• - negotiations settled on a general purpose
  criterion.

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THE BTWC 1968-1971

• Unforeseen scientific political developments
  when BTWC negotiated
• Genetic engineering
• Chemistry-biology convergence
• Neuroscience
• Nanotechnologies
• Synthetic biology
• Super Computing
• Proteomics other omics
• IGM Competition Garage Bio DIY
• End of the Cold War
• CWC would take another 20 years
• Soviet and Iraqi offensive BW programmes
• Growing importance of NAM/G77
• Bioterrorism

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (1)

• What to include? Definitions and toxicity
  determinations.
• Balancing two competing requirements meaningful
  verification coverage of dual-use industry
  without over-burdening chemical industry.
• How to classify super toxic lethal chemicals,
  other toxic chemicals and other harmful
  chemicals? What chemicals to include under
  verification.
• All too difficult dose dependent, lack of
  reliable data on LD 50s/ID50s, conflicting
  agendas.
• Focused on known CW agents and their
  intermediates and precursors.
• National Trial Inspections showed limitations
  too many relevant plants would remain outside
  scope of verification.
• Drew on BTWC General Purpose Criterion for core
  definition of chemical weapon and toxic
  chemical.
• Future peaceful uses of Schedule 1 chemicals
  medical pharmaceutical?

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (2)

• Schedules agreed, but never intended to be
  museum simplified change mechanism adopted
  not used to date purpose lost in history.
• Scientific Advisory Board to assist the DG.
• Review Conference to consider any relevant
  scientific and technological developments.
• Unforeseen developments in the 1970s 1980s
• Chemistry-biology convergence.
• Neuroscience.
• Nanotechnologies
• Synthetic biology
• Computing
• Incapacitating chemical agents - a likely route
  of evasion?
• Over focus on toxins and canister penetrants?
• Is Convention future proof?

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COLLECTIVELY DISOWNED
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THE BTWC PROTOCOL (1)

• An attempt to agree BTWC verification protocol
  1995-2001.
• Issues more political than scientific or
  technological however still had to work out
  measures that met technical challenges
• - ensure Article I definition protected
• - compile list of agents when purpose not
  always clear
• - find technically credible way of dealing with
  threshold quantities
• - develop clear definitions that would not need
  constant revision in light of scientific
  technological change
• - devise declarations applying to relevant
  activities facilities plus facility specific
  questions (equipment held) for declaration
  formats
• - meaning of work with listed agents
• - keeping Protocol relevant in light of ST
  change

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THE BTWC PROTOCOL (2)

• Provision for annual ST review
• An SAB to render specialised advice to the
  Annual Conference, the Executive Council or
  States Parties
• Five yearly Review Conferences to address ST
  issues
• Simplified amendment procedures for lists
  declaration formats to assure the viability and
  effectiveness of the Protocol
• Would Protocol have been future proof?
• Difficult to say for all aspects
• Declarations possibly most vulnerable?
• Concept of transparency thresholds ranges
  still meaningful?

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BEYOND EXPRESSION
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BTWC AND CWC REVIEW CONFERENCES

• Seven BTWC three CWC Review Conferences since
  1980.
• ST supposed to figure prominently, but hasnt
• Background papers on ST developments relevant to
  Conventions prepared by SPs Secretariats and
  others (IUPAC for the CWC)
• All Review Conferences stress importance of
  Article I the comprehensive scope of the
  prohibitions in covering all developments no
  attempt made to list all conceivable
  possibilities cf BTWC Final Declaration for Sixth
  Review Conference in 2006.
• Ducked incapacitating agents issue at 3 CWC
  Review Conferences largely political rather than
  failure to see importance
• But still tendency to view issues in near rather
  than long-term

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MISSING THE OBVIOUS OR ACCIDENTALLY
/INTENTIONALLY PRESCIENT? (1)

• So after 45 years what is the track record?
  Dealing with the not recognised, not
  significant and not acted upon
• - Key achievement conception of General Purpose
  Criterion that ensured continuing relevance in
  face of change, so anything overlooked or yet to
  be invented still covered.
• - GPC a deliberate artifice, not accidental.
• - negotiators recognised need to think and act
  on change even if political realities would make
  this difficult
• - Conventions reflect art of the possible, but
  with relatively small numbers of States.
  Technical subordinate to political

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MISSING THE OBVIOUS OR ACCIDENTALLY
/INTENTIONALLY PRESCIENT? (2)

• - reluctance to act upon ST developments
  largely political. - nature of life sciences
  C-B convergence in early 21st century beyond the
  conceivable or imaginable when negotiations
  began.
• - both Conventions provide mechanisms for
  addressing new or overlooked issues, but less
  clear capable of discriminating issues and
  non-issues.
• - grasping the here and now much easier to
  hold than conceptualising the what might be let
  alone taking pre-emptive action. Attending to
  what is absent is generally more demanding than
  attending to what is plainly manifest.
• - We remain at the whim of human frailties.
• - Keeping regimes flexible is the key to coping
  with the unknown.

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AND FINALLY