Title: National Series Lecture 4 National Measures Saudi Arabia
1National SeriesLecture 4 National
MeasuresSaudi Arabia
- Bradford Disarmament Research CentreDivision of
Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK
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2Outline
- Public health
- WHO Biosafety/Biosecurity Guidelines (2004)
- International Health Regulations (2005)
- Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard (2008)
- Arms control
- BTWC (1972)
- Chemical Weapons Convention (1993)
- Engagement of life scientists
- Oversight
- Codes of conduct
- Education
3National implementation
41. Public health
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5Laboratory measures
- Objective
- The WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual is a helpful
reference for states that accept the challenge to
develop and establish national codes of practice
for securing their microbiological assets, yet
ensuring their availability for clinical,
research and epidemiological purposes. - Codes of practice a codified list or
guideline or standard of required of essential
safety practices and procedures. - (WHO 2004)
6Laboratory measures
- Biosafety level (BSL) 1-2
- Access
- Authorizing access, hazard signs, and
gates/doors closed - Personal protection
- Uniforms (coveralls, glasses, and footwear),
washing hands - Procedures
- No pipetting by mouth, limited and written
procedures for clean-up, and procedures
minimizing the formation of aerosols and droplets - Laboratory working areas
- keeping neat, clean and free of potentially
dangerous material at the end of the working day - Biosafety management
- This is the responsibility of the laboratory
director - Training, evaluation, surveillance and treatment
should be provided when necessary
7Laboratory measures
- Biosafety level (BSL) 3
- BSL 1-2 applies except where modified as follows
- Biohazard symbol must include the name of the
laboratory supervisor - Laboratory protective clothing upgrade
- Open manipulations of all potentially infectious
material contained - Respiratory protective equipment may be necessary
- Biosafety level (BSL) 4
- BSL 3 applies except where modified as follows
- The two-person rule should apply, whereby no
individual ever works alone - A complete change of clothing and shoes is
required prior to entering the laboratory - Personnel must be trained in emergency extraction
procedures - A method of communication for routine and
emergency contacts
8Exercise 1
- Laboratory safety/security whose responsibility?
- Who should be responsible for laboratory safety
and security measures (scientists, PI, managers
of the institutions or government)?. How should
such processes be implemented? - Read the document (the case of Thomas Bulter -
Texas Tech University ) and report to the class
(10 min).
9Laboratory measures
- Is physical protection enough for laboratory
safety and security? - Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard
(CWA-157932008) - Flexible risk assessment approach not based on
an assumed static level of risk agents but
situational -
- Timing and scope when to review practices?
(e.g.) - Commencement of new work or changes to the
programme of work including the introduction of
new biological agents - New construction / modifications to laboratories,
plant and equipment or its operation - When considering emergency response and
contingency planning requirements
10Laboratory measures
- Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard
(CWA-157932008)
- Highlighting the role of the top manager
- Top management shall take ultimate
responsibility for the organizations biorisk
management system. - Top management includes Officers (Director
General, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Operating
Officer, Chief Financial Officer, etc.) and
Directors of the organization.
11Laboratory measures
- Laboratory Biorisk Management Standard
(CWA-157932008) - Planning for hazard identification, risk
assessment and risk control - Identifying roles, responsibilities and
authorities of actors - Personnel training, awareness and competence
- Operational control (physical and technical
procedures) - Emergency response and contingency plans
- Wider than the physical protection of agents
and toxins - Each element is detailed and instructions
provided in the document
12Public health measures
- The stated purpose of the International Health
Regulations (IHR) 2005 are -
- "to prevent, protect against, control and
provide a public health response to the
international spread of disease in ways that are
commensurate with and restricted to public health
risks, and which avoid unnecessary interference
with international traffic and trade. - (WHO 2012a)
- 3 top priorities of the IHR (WHO 2012) - States
should - Establish a functioning National IHR Focal Point
- Ensure adherence to reporting requirements and
verification of public health events. - Assess and strengthen national capacities
13Public health measures (IHR)
- 8 Core capacities required of States
- National legislation, policy and financing,
- Coordination and NFP communications,
- Surveillance,
- Response,
- Preparedness,
- Risk communication,
- Human resource, and
- Laboratory.
See Checklist and Indicators for Monitoring
Progress in the Development of IHR Core
Capacities in States Parties (WHO/HSE/IHR/2010.1.R
ev.1)
14Public health measures (IHR)
- Concern
- The IHRs do not have an enforcement mechanism (no
teeth!) against non-compliance - Rationale
- Non-compliance risks run by States
- tarnished international image
- increased morbidity/mortality of affected
populations, - unilateral travel and trade restrictions
- economic and social disruption and
- public outrage
- (WHO 2012b)
15Public health measures (IHR)
- Saudi Arabia
- The WHO Representatives Office in Saudi
Arabia supports the Government and health
authorities at central and local level in
strengthening health services, addressing public
health issues, and supporting and promoting
research for health. - Physicians, public health specialists,
scientists, social scientists and epidemiologists
provide appropriate technical support and
collaboration upon the request or acceptance of
national authorities. WHO staff in Saudi
Arabia include experts in the fields of health. - (WHO 2012c)
162. Arms control
17National implementation of an international
legal agreement
- Biological and Toxin Weapons ConventionArticle
IVEach State Party to this Convention shall, in
accordance with its constitutional processes,
take any necessary measures to prohibit and
prevent the development, production, stockpiling,
acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins,
weapons, equipment and means of delivery
specified in article I of the Convention. - Chemical Weapons Convention
- Article VII
- Each State Party shall, in accordance with its
constitutional processes, adopt the necessary
measures to implement its obligations under this
Convention. -
18National implementation of an international
legal agreement
in accordance with its constitutional process
No one size fits all
- Case of the BTWC options for States
- Existing national regulations are enough to
achieve the scope of the BTWC and no further
legislation is necessary - Certain amendments of existing laws and
regulations are necessary - An act is newly enacted specifically for the
BTWC, and - Broader legislation is enacted not only for the
BTWC but generally for anti-terrorism acts - (ROK 2003)
19National implementation of an international
legal agreement
- Saudi Arabia
- BTWC
- National legislation covers criminal code,
anti-money laundering law, Royal Decree on the
BWC, and environmental as well as export control
laws. - (VERTIC 2012)
- Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
- Single comprehensive implementation act of the
CWC has entered into force since 2005 - (OPCW)
20BTWC Saudi Arabias Submission of Confidence
Building Measures (CBMs)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
v v
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
After the ratification of the Convention in 1972,
Saudi Arabia has submitted CBMs limited in 1996
and 1997.
Table was created based on the database of the
UNOG
21Evolution of the BTWC strengthening national
measures
22From a traditional disarmament regime to a
security architecture
Evolution of the BTWC strengthening national
measures
Extending threat spectrum gt Manmade, safety and
natural threats/risks All hazard
approach Institutional evolution gt terrorism,
crime and public health sectors (e.g. UNSCR1540,
Interpol, WHO, OIE, FAO, IFBA)
23 Exercise2
- Are legal obligations sufficient to ensure an
effective security culture? - Discuss what kind of other national measures (in
parallel to laboratory security/safety at
institutions and legal obligations) should or
could be developed in order to prevent the misuse
of the life sciences in society - What kind of other social actors can play a
biosecurity role? - (10 min)
- Report to the class
243. Engagement of life scientists
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25Oversight of Research
- A possible policy process for oversight
- E.g.
- USA - The National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity (NSABB) - Israel - Steering Committee on Issues in
Biotechnological Research in the Age of Terrorism
26Codes of Conduct
- InterAcademy Panel (IAP) Statement on Biosecurity
(2005) - Endorsed by over 60 national science academies
- Defines five fundamental policies
- Awareness
- Safety and security
- Education and information
- Accountability
- Oversight.
- National example
- Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences
(2005) - A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity
- Indonesian Academy of Sciences (forthcoming)
(Sudoyo 2011)
27Education a national action plan
- A national biosecurity dual-use action plan model
- Identify what is currently taught (a survey)
- Develop a network of interested lecturers
- Develop appropriate content for courses
- Implement pilot courses
- Monitor and evaluate pilot courses
- Identify and elucidate best practice
- Institute clear, active links between industrial
partners/associates, defence agencies and
academic institutions teaching biosecurity - Develop or participate in an international
network to share best practice - Make dual-use/biosecurity education mandatory
- Monitor consequential growth of sensible codes
and oversight systems - Report on progress to BTWC and relevant
scientific meetings
28Education a national action plan
- 1. Developing an educational resource for codes
of conduct - 2. Developing capacity building programmes
- 3. Changing evaluation criteria of funding
bodies or review criteria of scientific journals - 4. Changing evaluation criteria on higher
education institutions -
- 5. Establishing a national advisory board
- 6. Legislating a biosecurity act
6
5
4
3
2
1
29National measures Areas of possible improvement
- Saudi Arabia
- Laboratory safety measures
- Efforts have been made and need to continue
alongside development of a biosecurity framework - BWC CBM Submission
- As the submission has been limited in 1996 and
1997, more active engagement can be considered by
the national focal point of the BWC. - Education and Codes of Conduct
- Implementation of the survey and the development
of a national code of conduct for biosecurity
will strengthen efforts
30References
- The references cited in this presentation may be
found in the Notes section of this slide.