PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE OF SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS MECHANISMS

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PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE OF SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS
MECHANISMS

• By
• Prof. Francis A.S.T. Matambalya
• Paper Presented at ICTSD Informal Peer Review
  Meeting,
• 25th November 2005, Geneva

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I. COMMON CONCEPTUALISATION OF SAFEGUARDS

• Action taken to protect industry from an
  unexpected build-up of imports, or threatening to
  cause serious injury.
• Key Articles on Safeguards
• Article XIX of GATT 1994 Emergency Action on
  Import.
• Article 5 of AoA of the UR Special Safeguards
  (SSG).

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II. EXTENDED CONCEPTUALISATION OF SAFEGUARDS
- 1

• Several other WTO provisions have safeguard
  effect - 2
• Other Emergency Trade Measures.
• General Exceptions.
• Security Exceptions.
• Measures against Unfair Trade.
• General Waivers.
• Measures Allowing Modification of Concessions and
  Tariff Renegotiations.

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II. EXTENDED CONCEPTUALISATION OF SAFEGUARDS
- 2

• Other Emergency Trade Remedies
• Article XI Exceptions to General Elimination of
  Quantitative Restrictions contained in Article
  XI.2.
• Article XVIII (Government interventions/subsidies
  for economic development).

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II. EXTENDED CONCEPTUALISATION OF SAFEGUARDS
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• General Exceptions
• General Exceptions under GATT 1994 Article XX.
• General Exceptions under GATS Article XIV.

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II. EXTENDED CONCEPTUALISATION OF SAFEGUARDS
- 4

• Security Exceptions
• Under GATT 1994.
• Under GATS 1994.

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II. EXTENDED CONCEPTUALISATION OF SAFEGUARDS
- 5

• General Waivers
• Article XXV of GATT 1994.

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II. EXTENDED CONCEPTUALISATION OF SAFEGUARDS
- 6

• Modifications of Schedules of Tariff Concessions
  and Tariff Renegotiation
• Article XXVII Renegotiations and Modification.

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II. EXTENDED CONCEPTUALISATION OF SAFEGUARDS
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• Remedies Against Unfair Trade
• Anti-Dumping (AD) Article VI of GATT 1994.
• Subsidies and and Countervailing Measures (SCM)
  Article XVI of GATT 1994.

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III. UTILITY OF SAFEGUARDS - 1

• Market stability goals.
• Non-market goals.

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III. UTILITY OF SAFEGUARDS - 2
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III. UTILITY OF SAFEGUARDS - 3
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IV. WHY SSM?

• Many developing countries did not qualify for SSG
  provided in Article 5 of AoA.
• Existing Safeguard Instruments have limitations.
• General Council allowed formation of SSM
• SSM closely linked with Special Products.

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V. BEACONS OF SSM - 1
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V. BEACONS OF SSM - 2
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 1
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 2
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 3
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 4
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 5
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 6
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 7
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 8
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 9
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 10
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 11
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 12
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 13
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VI. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS FOR SSM - 14
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VII. SSM VOLUME TRIGGER - 1
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VII. SSM VOLUME TRIGGER - 2
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VII. SSM VOLUME TRIGGER - 3
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VII. SSM VOLUME TRIGGER - 4
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VIII. SSM PRICE TRIGGER - 1
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VII. SSM PRICE TRIGGER - 2
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VIII. SSM PRICE TRIGGER - 3
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VIII. SSM PRICE TRIGGER - 4
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VIII. SSM PRICE TRIGGER - 5
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VIII. SSM PRICE TRIGGER COMPARABLE CHANGES IN
ADDITIONAL DUTY FOR SSG
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VIII. SSM PRICE TRIGGER COMPARING CHANGES
OF ADDITIOMJAL DUTY FOR SSG AND SSM
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS