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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist?
1. Wittgenstein as a Visual Thinker 2. Some
Remarks on the Wittgenstein Corpus 3. Interposed
Question What Is Common-Sense Philosophy? 4. Why
Does It Matter Whether Wittgenstein Was a
Common-Sense Realist? 4.1. The Iconic Turn
Aspect 4.2. The Boghossian Formula 5.
Common-Sense Realism in The Blue Book 6.
Common-Sense Realism in On Certainty 6.1.
Wittgenstein on Moore 6.2. Boghossian on On
Certainty 6.2.1. Wittgenstein Not a
Constructivist 7. Common-Sense Philosophy in
the Philosophical Investigations 8. Conclusion
8.1. Boghossian on Observational Propositions
8.2. Wittgensteins Common-Sense Realism
Weakened by His Insufficient Grasp of
the Visual
5th Visual Learning Conference Budapest, Nov.
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
1. Wittgenstein as a Visual Thinker
Wittgenstein was not only a visual thinker, but
also a thinker who in his later years came close
to developing a philosophy of visual thinking.
The position he was grop-ing for corresponds to
the common-sense view we think in images no less
than in words, and both mental and physical
images signify by resembling.
5th Visual Learning Conference Budapest, Nov.
1415, 2014
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
1. Wittgenstein as a Visual Thinker
Wittgenstein was not only a visual thinker, but
also a thinker who in his later years came close
to developing a philosophy of visual thinking.
The position he was groping for corresponds to
the common-sense view we think in images no less
than in words, and both mental and physical
images signify by resem-bling.
Nyíri, Wittgensteins Philosophy of Pictures,
2001 Nyíri, Image and Metaphor in the Philosophy
of Wittgenstein, 2010
5th Visual Learning Conference Budapest, Nov.
1415, 2014
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
1. Wittgenstein as a Visual Thinker
Wittgenstein was not only a visual thinker, but
also a thinker who in his later years came close
to developing a philosophy of visual thinking.
The position he was groping for corresponds to
the common-sense view we think in images no less
than in words, and both mental and physical
images signify by resembling.
Nyíri, Wittgensteins Philosophy of Pictures,
2001 Nyíri, Image and Metaphor in the Philosophy
of Wittgenstein, 2010
Wittgenstein a visual thinker think of his
innumerable drawings Think of his early picture
theory of language Wittgenstein a philosopher of
visual thinking The Blue Book pictures of
which we should say that we understand them
immediately, without any further interpretation
The Brown Book pictures playing an essential
role in our system of communication PI, Part
II our direct reactions to picture-objects

BrB
PI, Part II
5th Visual Learning Conference Budapest, Nov.
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
1. Wittgenstein as a Visual Thinker
Wittgenstein a philosopher of visual thinking
PI, 42224, discussing the picture the
simile of the human soul there is a picture
in the foreground, but the sense lies far in the
background that is, the application of the
picture is not easy to survey. The picture is
there and I do not dispute its correctness. But
what is its application? Think of the picture of
blindness as a darkness in the soul or in the
head of the blind man.
MS 116, p. 325, May 1944
5th Visual Learning Conference Budapest, Nov.
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
2. Some Remarks on the Wittgenstein Corpus
What did the later Wittgenstein as a matter of
fact publish? His lectures and dictations were a
form of publication BlB, BrB ? Preliminary
Studies for the Philosophical Investigations
is entirely misguided and misleading.
In 2001 I wrote the later Wittgenstein at no
stage of his thinking possessed a unified
philosophy. He had sig-nificant insights, but no
clear views as to what his prob-lems actually
were, or what he was striving to achieve.
Part II was never intended by Wittgenstein as a
sequel to Part I of PI, and the designa-tion
Part II has been in fact dropped in the
SchulteHacker edition. But MS 144 is still
spe-cial Fair manuscript copy containing Part
II of the Investigations. 1949 (von Wright)
Witt-genstein regarded the typescript for Part
II as a more finished product than the other
type-scripts which he had dictated after the
typescript for Part I (von Wright) carefully
selected excerpts , originally gathered as
readings for Norman Malcolm and his students when
vis-iting Cornell in 1949 (Stern) to show
Malcolm his current work (HackerSchulte).
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
2. Some Remarks on the Wittgenstein Corpus
with very partial antecedents in MS 137,
1948/49
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
2. Some Remarks on the Wittgenstein Corpus
MS 137, p. 16a, 1948/49
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
2. Some Remarks on the Wittgenstein Corpus
On Certainty (MS 174), 137
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
3. Interposed Question What Is Common-Sense
Philosophy?
Common sense is an ever-evolving product of
history, in the constitution of which both the
science, and the philosophies, of earlier ages
play a significant part
it is current science that pro-vides valid data
about the world and constructs workable theories
to incorporate those data
common-sense philosophy is not the philosophy of
the common man in the street, but rather the
philos-ophy that makes sense to educated
non-philosophers
but it is philosophy, as building both on current
science, and on the history of philosophy, that
tells us what the world is like (gives us a
world-view)
5th Visual Learning Conference Budapest, Nov.
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
4. Why Does It Matter Whether Wittgenstein Was a
Common-Sense Realist? 4.1. The
Iconic Turn Aspect 4.2. The Boghossian
Formula
Boghossian on the analytic tradition supporting
constructivists
No feasible realist epistemology possible as
long as the linguistic bias is not overcome
2006
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
5. Common-Sense Realism in The Blue Book
a host of philosophical difficulties which
threaten to break up all our commonsense notions
about what we should commonly call the objects of
our experience. We are tempted to think that in
order to clear up such matters philosophically
our ordinary language is too coarse a kind of
parable illustrating the difficulty we are in,
and also showing the way out of this sort of
difficulty We have been told by popular
scientists that the floor on which we stand is
not solid, as it appears to common sense, as it
has been discovered that the wood consists of
particles filling space so thinly that it can
almost be called empty. This is liable to perplex
us To say that the floor is not solid is to
misuse language. the common-sense philosopher
not the com-mon-sense man, who is as far from
realism as from idealism apparent analogy, and
again the lack of analogy, which causes our
trouble. And it is this troublesome feature in
our gram-mar which the realist does not notice.
There is no common sense answer to a
philosophical problem. One can defend common
sense against the attacks of philosophers only by
solving their puzzles, i.e., by curing them of
the temptation to attack common sense not by
restating the views of common sense. A
philosopher is not a man out of his senses, a man
who doesn't see what everybody sees nor on the
other hand is his disagreement with common sense
that of the scientist disagreeing with the coarse
views of the man in the street.
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
6. Common-Sense Realism in On Certainty 6.1.
Wittgenstein on Moore 6.2. Boghossian on On
Certainty 6.2.1. Wittgenstein Not a
Constructivist
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
6. Common-Sense Realism in On Certainty 6.1.
Wittgenstein on Moore
From G. E. Moore, Proof of an External World
(1939) I can prove now, for in-stance, that two
human hands exist. How? By holding up my two
hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture
with the right hand, "Here is one hand", and
adding, as I make a certain gesture with the
left, "and here is another". the proof which I
gave was a perfectly rigorous one the premiss
I expressed by showing you my hands, making
certain gestures, and saying the words "here is
one hand, and here is another.
From the Introduction of OC In 1949 Mal-colm
acted as a goad to Wittgensteins interest in
Moore's 'defence of common sense', that is to say
his claim to know a number of propositions for
sure, such as "Here is one hand, and here is
another", and "The earth existed for a long time
before my birth", and "I have never been far from
the earth's surface". The first of these comes in
Moore's 'Proof of the External World'. The two
others are in his 'Defence of Common Sense'
Wittgenstein had long been interested in these
5th Visual Learning Conference Budapest, Nov.
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
6. Common-Sense Realism in On Certainty 6.1.
Wittgenstein on Moore
Wittgensteins main (often quite tentative)
points in OC Moore misuses language when he
says he knows certain basic facts. It is a
system of propositions we adhere to some of
these propositions play a central role (are the
hinges on which the system turns 83 The truth
of certain empirical propositions belongs to our
frame of reference) the system is rooted in our
practice, our form of life. 354 Doubting and
non-doubting behaviour. There is the first only
if there is the second. 370 absence of doubt
belongs to the essence of the language-game
114 If you are not certain of any fact, you
cannot be certain of the mean-ing of your words
either. 76 statements which one cannot make
signif-icantly
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
Boghossian The social construction theorist
wants to emphasize the contingency of the facts
we have constructed, to show that they neednt
have obtained had we chosen otherwise.
6. Common-Sense Realism in On Certainty 6.1.
Wittgenstein on Moore 6.2. Boghossian on On
Certainty 6.2.1. Wittgenstein Not a
Constructivist
Boghossian on Rorty on Wittgenstein Rorty
echoes Wittgenstein who says in his On Certainty
611. Where two principles really do meet which
cannot be reconciled with one another, then each
man declares the other a fool and a heretic. He
insists, however, that all this rhetorical heat
simply covers up the fact that there is no
system-independent fact in virtue of which one
epistemic system could be said to be more correct
than any other.
OC, 617 Certain events would put me into a
position in which I could not go on with the old
language-game any further. In which I was torn
away from the sureness of the game. Indeed,
doesn't it seem obvious that the possibility of a
language-game is conditioned by certain facts?
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
7. Common-Sense Philosophy in the Philosophical
Investigations
if things were quite different from what they
actually are if rule became exception and
exception rule this would make our normal
language-games lose their point ( 142 source
TS 227a, 194445) ? in-sertion What we have to
mention in order to explain the significance, I
mean the importance, of a concept, are often
extremely general facts of nature such facts as
are hardly ever mentioned because of their great
generality (proximate source TS 228, 1945 or
46).
Traces of realism?
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
7. Common-Sense Philosophy in the Philosophical
Investigations
"So you are saying that human agreement decides
what is true and what is false?" It is what
human be-ings say that is true and false and
they agree in the language they use. That is not
agreement in opinions but in form of life ( 241
manuscript source MS 129, p. 35, 1944). If
language is to be a means of communication there
must be agreement not only in definitions but
also (queer as this may sound) in judg-ments.
This seems to abolish logic, but does not do so.
It is one thing to describe methods of
measurement, and another to obtain and state
results of measurement. But what we call
"measuring" is partly determined by a certain
constancy in results of measurement ( 242
manuscript source MS 129, p. 128, 1944).
Relativism, perhaps. But not social
constructivism in Boghossians sense
Traces of realism?
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
7. Common-Sense Philosophy in the Philosophical
Investigations
What people accept as a justification shows how
they think and live ( 325 manuscript source
MS 130, p. 9, 1946). Justification by experience
comes to an end ( 485 manuscript source MS
115, p. 100, 1933).
Relativism, perhaps. But not social
constructivism in Boghossians sense
PI, Part I, a patchwork of passages written
over widely disjunct segments in time
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
7. Common-Sense Philosophy in the Philosophical
Investigations
philosophica1 problems arise when language goes
on holiday ( 38 manuscript source MS 142, p.
33, Nov.Dec. 1936) lt was true to say that
our consid-erations could not be scientific ones.
Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment
of our intelligence by means of language ( 109
manuscript source MS 142, p. 102, Nov.Dec.
1936). A simile that has been absorbed into
the forms of our language produces a false
appearance, and this disquiets us ( 112
manu-script source MS 142, p. 106, Nov.Dec.
1936). the language of every day. Is this
language somehow too coarse and material for what
we want to say? Then how is another one to be
constructed? ( 120 final source TS 227b, p.
86a, 194445).
common-sense philosophy in what sense?
philosophy as therapy vs. philosophy as the
misuse of language
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
7. Common-Sense Philosophy in the Philosophical
Investigations
Philosophy may in no way interfere with the
actual use of language it can in the end only
describe it ( 124 manuscript source MS 110,
p. 188, 1931). The philosopher treats a
question like an illness ( 255, HackerSchulte
transl. manuscript source MS 116, p. 323,
1945). What looks like an explanation here
in truth just exchanges one way of talking for
another which, while we are doing philosophy,
seems to us the more apt ( 303, HackerSchulte
transl. source MS 227a, p. 188, 194445).
common-sense philosophy in what sense?
philosophy as therapy vs. philosophy as the
misuse of language
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
8. Conclusion 8.1. Boghossian on
Observational Propositions 8.2.
Wittgensteins Common-Sense Realism Weakened
by His Insufficient Grasp of the Visual
Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge, p. 64 For any
observation-al proposition p, if it visually
seems to S that p and circum-stantial conditions
D obtain, then S is prima facie justifed in
believing p.
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
8. Conclusion 8.1. Boghossian on
Observational Propositions 8.2.
Wittgensteins Common-Sense Realism Weakened
by His Insufficient Grasp of the Visual
Wittgenstein recoiled from allotting weight to
single observations, because ulti-mately, and
esp. in Part I of the PI, he did not succeed in
making a proper con-nection between the visual
the image and the verbal the text. Making
that connection would have involved arriving at
an appropriate theory of metaphors, and thus
accepting that science and indeed philosophy can
and do legitimately ex-pand our ordinary
language-games.
Common-sense visualism implies realism and
hard-core realism is not feasible without
visualism.
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Kristóf Nyíri Was Wittgenstein a Common-Sense
Realist ?
www.hunfi.hu/nyiri nyirik_at_gmail.com
5th Visual Learning Conference Budapest, Nov.
1415, 2014