Where%20to%20from%20here%20??

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Where to from here ??

• The emerging electricity lines industry in New
  Zealand

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This slide added later

• This Presentation was made to the Small Line
  Company Managers meeting in Wellington on
  Wednesday, 15 March 2000.
• Please feel free to share this Presentation with
  your Board and senior managers, but restrict
  circulation to within that group.
• Please forward any requests for this Presentation
  by external parties directly to me for
  consideration.

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Discussion Topics
Brief history of NZ industry
Recent events in the NZ industry
Present status of the NZ industry
4
Discussion Topics
Emerging global trends
Possible scenarios for the NZ industry
Regulation in more detail
Big issues the NZ industry might face
Amalgamations in more detail
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A brief historyof the NZ industry
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Industry beginnings

• Supply in the early 1890s was largely vertically
  integrated - ownership was predominantly private
  or borough council.
• Rapid growth in the number of these entities as
  the agricultural-based economy discovered the
  benefits of electricity.
• Legislative emphasis was on exclusively
  empowering the Crown to develop hydro generation
  capacity.

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Steps toward unification

• First step toward unified supply industry was the
  Electric Power Boards Act of 1918.
• Provided for the establishment of bodies
  corporate elected by rate-payers to supply
  electricity within a licensed area.
• However, two types of bodies emerged
• Electric Power Boards which tended to be in rural
  areas with undefined ownership.
• Municipal Electricity Departments which tended to
  be in urban areas and were owned by Councils.
• Key exception was the Auckland EPB, the only EPB
  in a major urban area.

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Further consolidation

• Number of EPBs and MEDs grew from 66 in 1919 to
  a peak of 94 in 1938.
• Also saw the almost total decline of private
  electricity companies.
• Crown had a virtual monopoly on generation, with
  all other capacity requiring the Ministers
  approval.
• Emergent structure was essentially vertically
  integrated, viz...

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Further consolidation
Generation transmission
State Hydro
EPB MED
Distribution energy supply
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Rationalisation

• First attempt was actually in 1921.
• Minister tried to persuade the PN Borough to
  become an inner area of the MOEPB - took 75
  years to resolve.
• Rationalisation of the supply industry dominated
  Governments energy thinking from 1945 to about
  1973, with 3 significant investigations
• Electricity Gas Consolidation Act 1956.
• Stanton Commission of 1959.
• Electricity Distribution Commission 1968.

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Further rationalisation

• Despite these attempts at rationalisation, only a
  few amalgamations occurred
• Petone Lower Hutt Gas Board merged into Hutt
  Valley around 1959.
• Opunake and South Taranaki merged in 1963.
• Wairere merged into Waitomo in 1976.
• Local government reform in 1989 resulted in a few
  small Council electricity departments
  amalgamating into the surrounding EPBs.
• Further reduced the number of distribution
  entities from 60 in 1988 to 52 by 1990.

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Further rationalisation

• Energy Companies Act 1992 required EPBs and
  MEDs to become limited companies, to define
  their owners, and to behave as profitable
  businesses.
• Commercial drivers further reduced numbers to 39
  by mid-1996.
• Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998 required
  separation of lines and energy businesses.
• Resulted in more amalgamations of line
  businesses, reducing the number to 31 at the
  present day.

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Present status ofthe NZ industry
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Present structure

• At last count the lines industry comprised the
  following players
• 31 line companies
• 1 national transmission company
• About 1,538,000 line customers of which 50 are
  connected to the 3 largest suppliers (United,
  Vector and Orion).

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Present structure
Generation
Ownership
Transmission
Distribution
Contracts
Retailing
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What is drivingthe NZ industry
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Industry drivers

• Strong demands for secure supply.
• Increasing focus on asset management practices.
• Technology.
• Consumer awareness.
• Concern over recent profits.
• Competition for investment funds.
• Restrictions on land use and access.
• Political intervention, including the present
  inquiry into the industry.

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Comment

• Politics will be a major driver of electricity
  lines industry - electricity always has been a
  bit of a political football, but it will probably
  be even more so now.
• Previous National government had a very much
  laissez-faire approach.
• Coalition government has demonstrated a very
  interventionist approach already in other sectors
  such as Social Welfare, Broadcasting, Workplace
  Insurance, Education and Health.
• Very likely that the electricity sector will be
  subject to similar intervention.

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National government

• Preference for private ownership.
• Strong dislike of Trusts.
• Desire for increased competition.
• Move toward price regulation.
• Preference for amalgamation.

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Coalition government

• Strong opposition to privatisation.
• Little concern for shareholder wealth.
• Opposed to utilities making profits.
• Strong preference for social objectives.
• Preference for vertical integration.
• Little regard for business costs.
• Failure to understand knowledge economy.
• Preference for government service provision as
  well as funding.
• Aversion to high salaries.
• Preference for ad-hoc intervention.

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Emerging globaltrends issues
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Comment

• Many events in the NZ industry are mirrored by
  global utility events.
• Time lag with some issues - NZ may either be a
  bit ahead or a bit behind.
• May provide learning opportunities where we are a
  bit behind.
• Key global issues are

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Key global issues

• Increasing competition in energy retailing.
• Increasing price regulation.
• Portfolio approach to investment.
• Separation of line energy businesses.
• Integration of gas electricity.
• Emergence of multi-utility businesses.
• Changing political climates and risks.

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Price regulation

• We will look later at how price regulation was
  applied in the UK in the 1990s.
• For now, we note that the price controls in 1995
  and 1996 alone cost the distribution industry
  about 2 billion.
• Recent events in Canada and the UK indicate that
  regulation is really starting to bite hard
• TransAltas sale of their lines business in
  Alberta to Utilicorp because of reduced allowable
  return.
• United Utilities and Hyders sale of their
  energy businesses to off-set decreased line
  revenues (also because of competition).

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Increasing competition

• Retailing is subject to increasingly tight
  margins.
• Driving the industry toward vertical integration
  to obtain price stability, more so forward
  integration by the generators.
• Happened here with the Big 4 generators.
• Happened in the UK with PowerGen and British
  Energy in particular.
• Competition based on differentiation.
• Almost choose energy retailer based on what other
  commodities are desired eg. Sky TV.

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Portfolio approach

• Began when US utilities facing lack-lustre
  domestic earnings took advantage of the
  privatisations in the UK, Argentina and Victoria.
• Recent about-face in the US buy-up with PowerGen
  buying Louisville Gas Electric and actively
  seeking further US investments.
• Sort of happening in NZ with AGL, but government
  policy is unlikely to see this become the norm.

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Separation

• Separation of lines and energy was enforced by
  law in NZ about 18 months ago.
• Fundamentally re-shaped the NZ industry.
• UK industry is voluntarily separating energy from
  lines, providing the generators with
  opportunities to forward integrate and secure
  retail markets
• PowerGen bought East Midlands energy business.
• British Energy have bought Hyders energy
  business, and are tipped to be a leading bidder
  for United Utilities energy business.

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Separation

• In the US, PGE are expanding into energy
  businesses beyond their legacy market around San
  Francisco.
• Key driver for them is moving into unregulated
  markets and prudently managing the down-side
  risks (a key strategy is backward integration
  into gas and coal).
• Suggests that voluntary separation could have
  happened in NZ if retail competition intensified
  enough to make energy businesses unprofitable for
  anyone other than generators.

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Integration

• Began in NZ in 1959 when gas merged with
  electricity in the Hutt Valley, so the idea is
  certainly not new.
• Certainly a major focus of retailers such as
  Contact, NGC and Fresh Start who have access to
  gas reserves.
• Been a big focus of utilities such as SEEBoard
  (Beacon Gas) and TU (Lone Star Gas).
• Less obvious is the integration of pipes and
  wires into combined businesses
• Powercos acquisition of Hawera Gas.
• Southpowers acquisition of Enerco.

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Multi-utilities

• Privatisation in the UK appeared to kick this one
  off around 1990.
• Two apparent strategies.
• Penetration within a geographical area
• North West Waters acquisition of NORWEB to
  become United Utilities.
• Hyders acquisition of Welsh Water and SWALEC,
  and subsequent amalgamation of operations.
• Extension beyond a geographical area
• Scottish Powers acquisition of MANWEB and
  Southern Water.

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Multi-utilities

• Uncommon in the US, Australia or NZ because water
  and waste assets tend to be owned by public
  bodies.
• Some indication from the former government that
  water and waste assets in NZ could be privatised
  in the medium term.
• Penetration into communications sector in urban
  areas
• United Utilities and ScottishPower.
• Texas Utilities
• Downtown Utilities in Sydney, Melbourne and
  Brisbane.

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Political risk

• Risk of ad-hoc political interference increasing
  the risks of investing in a jurisdiction.
• This risk increases the ß in the CAPM, requiring
  greater returns on capital to be made.
• We probably now need to think of NZ as being
  politically risky in terms of utility
  investments.
• One US utility with many global interests has
  already expressed reservations about investing in
  NZ.

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Where is it all going ?

• Emerging global trend appears to be separation of
  lines and retailing.
• Actually happening in the very broadest sense of
  regulated and unregulated businesses ie.
  separating the pipes and wires from competitive
  businesses.
• Key drivers
• Increasing price regulation of pipes and wires
  businesses.
• Decreasing margins in commodities such as
  electricity, gas and phone traffic.

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Where is it all going ?

• Different drivers and competencies will be
  required in each business
• Regulated businesses will need to
• Ruthlessly control costs to deliver increasing
  returns.
• Reduce costs beyond the scope of internal
  efficiencies, leading to further amalgamations.
• Identify arbitrage opportunities, where
  individual regulatory jurisdictions will allow
  returns on funds greater than the global cost of
  capital.

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Where is it all going ?

• Unregulated businesses will need to...
• Prudently manage down-side risks associated with
  commodity trading.
• Invest in markets where demand exceeds supply.
• Control margins by investing in commodity
  sources, particularly up-stream gas, coal and
  water.

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Big issues the NZ industry might face
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Big issues

• Foreign investment.
• Increased scrutiny.
• Price regulation.
• Further amalgamations.

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Foreign investment

• Foreign investment will very probably decline,
  for four key reasons
• Coalition government opposition to profits going
  off-shore.
• Halt to further privatisations of generation.
• Movement of the electricity lines sector toward a
  low return - high risk position (perhaps more
  political risk than commercial risk).
• Public perception that profit is bad and evil.
• Having said that, NZ will still be closely
  watched by many foreign utilities such as
  Utilicorp, GPU, TU, and AGL.

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Increased scrutiny

• Likely to occur in two forms
• Increased scrutiny from special interest groups
  who know that the Government will take up their
  cause.
• Possibly further increases in disclosure to
  government agencies - either more detail, or more
  often.

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Price regulation

• Signaled by the former government.
• Forms a significant part of the present inquiry.
• Likely to occur in one form or another, and will
  very probably see a substantial reallocation of
  benefits from shareholders to customers.
• Will be discussed in detail later on.

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Further amalgamations

• Logical step for those lines companies that have
  exhausted internal cost savings.
• Previous government was keen to see more
  amalgamations in order to reduce the industry
  cost base.
• Exact stance of the Coalition on line company
  amalgamation is uncertain.
• Will be discussed in detail later on.

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Where might theNZ industry go
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Possible scenarios

• Status-quo
• Walk shorts sandals.
• Portfolio.
• Bare bones.
• Big brother.

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Status-quo

• Description
• Similar to the present industry.
• Characterised by
• Much the same structure as at present.
• May provide for line companies to resume energy
  retailing simply on a tit-for-tat basis from the
  Coalition government.
• Tinkering with some peripheral legislation, such
  as the Workplace Insurance and the Employment
  Contracts.
• No fundamental changes.

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Walk short sandals

• Description
• Return to the walk shorts sandals days of the
  1970s.
• Characterised by
• Focus on engineering excellence for its own
  sake.
• Possible loss of customer focus.
• Erosion of shareholder wealth.
• Lack of investor interest in industry.
• Probable departure of non-technical people.

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Portfolio

• Description
• Lines businesses become investments within global
  portfolios that are bought and sold as returns
  and risks vary in relation to investor criteria.
• Characterised by
• Clear focus on increasing earnings over time.
• Regular changes of ownership.
• Strong emphasis on cost control.
• Strong overseas presence.
• Possible increase in listed companies.

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Bare bones

• Description
• Price regulation that could cut deeply into
  overall cost structures.
• Characterised by
• Tough price regulation.
• Ruthless emphasis on cost control.
• Probable exit of investors, similar to
  TransAltas decision to divest their lines
  business in Alberta.
• Possible de-listing of listed lines companies.
• Limited funds for reinvestment in networks.
• Possible decline in supply reliability over the
  long-term due to limited funding.

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Big brother

• Description
• Tough information disclosure, possibly as a
  substitute for price regulation, possibly as well
  as.
• Characterised by
• Extreme requirements for information disclosure,
  possibly including ad-hoc government
  intervention.
• Possible focus on regulatory body rather than the
  electricity customer.
• Significant resources dedicated to disclosure
  process.

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Regulationin more detail
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Price regulation

• Objective of regulation is to restrain profits
  and to maintain service levels in the absence of
  a competitive market.
• Four main forms of regulation
• Sliding scale
• Rate of return
• Price cap
• Discretionary

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Price regulation

• Characteristics of a robust regulatory regime
• Allows fair, reasonable and sustainable returns
  to utility owners.
• Provides consistent investment signals for both
  owners and managers.
• Provides incentives for efficient operation.
• Allows pass-through of unavoidable costs.
• Risks should be symmetrical.
• Protects customers from excessive profits.
• Provides guaranteed minimum service standards
  (either directly or indirectly).

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Sliding scale

• Popularised by the London gas companies around
  1875, also adopted by the New York Telephone
  Company in 1896.
• Adopts a series of ROR bands in which percentage
  adjustments to subsequent years revenues are
  made.
• Generally has an intermediate band in which the
  full profit passes to the company.
• Above the intermediate band, revenues are
  adjusted downward, whilst below the band revenues
  are allowed to be increased.

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Sliding scale

• Example below taken from the NYTC.

Rate of return, R ()
Adjustment to revenue ()
Over 15
Decrease by 0.5 x (R-15)
Between 13 and 15
No adjustment
Under 13
Increase by 0.5 x (13 - R)
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Rate of return

• Developed around 1907 by Tom Edison and
  J.P.Morgan, who felt the industry would be better
  served by regulated geographical franchises
  rather than a free-for-all.
• Still the predominant form of utility regulation
  in the US.
• Provides for imprudent expenditure to be excluded
  from the rating base.
• Huge legal battles with state regulatory
  commissions over what assets can be included in
  the rating base.

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Price cap

• Also known as incentive or CPI - X.
• Developed by Prof. Stephen Littlechild in the UK
  in the late 1980s, and now adopted in most
  jurisdictions that regulate privatised utilities.
• For X gt 0, it requires a reduction in revenue in
  real terms.
• Based around a review period, with the
  possibility of mid-term adjustments.
• Generally allows pass-through of unavoidable
  costs.

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Price cap

• Potential for price cap regulation to become
  asymmetrical through use of discretionary powers
  that restrict up-side gains with no similar
  protection from down-side losses.
• Note that any recouping of excess profits may
  lead to what is effectively a rate of return
  regime.
• Improvement initiatives maybe with-held until the
  start of the next review period to ensure that
  shareholders receive benefits for a longer period.

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Discretionary

• Provides for ad-hoc control of utility pricing
  with input from key interest groups.
• Common in continental Europe.
• Generally no defined criteria
• May approximate rate of return regulation in that
  excessive profits would be prevented.
• Probably symmetrical in that excessive losses
  would also be prevented.
• Potential for government interference would
  presumably increase risks and hence ß.

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Summary
Regime
How it works
Sliding scale
Regulates revenue based tightly on return.
Rate of return
Regulates return based on return.
Price cap
Regulates revenue based loosely on return.
Discretionary
Regulates return based on multiple factors.
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Advantages
Regime
Advantages
Sliding scale
Cater for a wide range of returns across an
industry.
Provides incentives for efficiency
Rate of return
Limits returns only, rather than unnecessarily
squeezing operations
Focuses on the parameter seen by the customer
(price)
Price cap
Provides incentives for efficiency
Discretionary
Easily applied
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Disadvantages
Regime
Disadvantages
Sliding scale
Possible argument over inclusion in the rating
base, and what is a suitable return.
Rate of return
Argument over inclusion in the rating base, and
what is a suitable return.
Price cap
May bite too deep if returns are already low.
Review period provides incentive to delay
efficiency gains.
Risks can be asymmetric.
Discretionary
Destroys investment environment
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The UK experience

• Both distribution and transmission are subject to
  price cap regulation (as are water, wastewater,
  gas, phone, railways and airports).
• Initial regulation began in 1990, soon after
  privatisation.
• Actually allowed price increases ie. X lt 0.
• Review in 1995 where X was set between 11 and
  17.
• Reviewed again in 1996 where X was set between
  10 and 13.

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The UK experience

• These price controls reduced each RECs revenue
  by about 100 million from that of previous
  years.
• The control was set at CPI - 3 for the 1997,
  1998 and 1999 year with further controls being
  signaled for the 2000 year.
• Initial transmission price control was set to CPI
  ie. X 0.
• Was then set to CPI - 3 for the 1993, 1994, 1995
  and 1996 years.

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The UK experience

• Set to CPI - 20 for 1997.
• Set to CPI - 4 for the 1998, 1999 and 2000
  years, with further controls being signaled.

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Making it work in NZ

• NZ industry differs from many other regulatory
  jurisdictions in that there is a wide mix of
  ownership demanding vastly different returns on
  capital.
• Applying a single regulatory CPI - X regime could
  prove disastrous, and would need to be done on a
  case-by-case basis.
• Case in point would be an efficient Trust-owned
  lines business from which a low return is
  demanded.

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Making it work in NZ

• Uniform CPI - X could reduce funds available for
  re-investment in supply security rather than
  merely reducing profits, thereby jepodising the
  very customers that regulation was intended to
  protect.
• Issues to be resolved could include
• Deciding how to group lines companies into X
  bands (or whether it should even be
  individually).
• Deciding what X to apply to each band.
• Deciding on a suitable review period, and what
  mid-term adjustments would be permissible.
• Definition of pass-through costs eg. Transpower.

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Making it work in NZ

• Rate of return regulation could have merit by
  restricting returns to WACC on ODV.
• Could provide an incentive for efficient
  re-investment in supply, especially if
  imprudently spent funds were excluded from the
  rating base.
• Conversely, there is no incentive to improve
  operational efficiencies, as these become
  pass-through costs.
• Reduce attractiveness of external investment in
  companies by restricting earnings growth.

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Making it work in NZ

• Sliding scale with a fixed review period may have
  merits in that wide-ranging returns could be
  addressed.
• Specifically, companies whose return is much less
  than WACC could be allowed to increase revenue to
  maintain their capital base.
• Would provide incentives for efficiency gains,
  but only up to a point.
• Would require clear definition of the rating
  base, however the ODV process should address that
  issue.

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Amalgamationin more detail
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Comment

• Hot topic - has been for quite a few years, and
  probably will be for the next few years.
• Just about everybody has spoken to their
  immediate neighbors and beyond to attempt
  amalgamations of various sorts.
• Reasonably safe to say that the limiting factor
  has been the 3Ps.
• Personalities (mainly Directors and Trustees).
• Politics (local body).
• Parochialism (community pressure).

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Different levels

• Three key levels of amalgamation
• Strategic alliance.
• Joint management.
• Merged ownership.
• Essential precursor is extracting all internal
  efficiencies first, which most NZ lines companies
  have now done.
• Some have investigated the Strategic Alliance
  approach, with the general conclusion being that
  the benefits are very minimal.
• Activity mainly focusing on Joint Management.

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Different levels
Combined costs (vertical scale exaggerated)
Strategic alignment
Totally amalgamated organisations
Totally separate organisations
Joint management
Limit of internal efficiencies
Internal focus
External focus
Degree of amalgamation
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Different levels

• Activities occur at 3 reasonably distinct levels
  in the utility industry
• Ownership
• Management
• Service delivery
• Key feature is contestability...
• Most maintenance and construction work is
  contestable, with the outcome being lower costs.
• Some ownership is contestable, with the outcome
  being increased earnings.
• Management is also contestable in theory, with
  the outcome being lower costs and higher earnings.

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Different levels
Ownership
Minimal competition exists here
Minimal separation here
Management
No competition exists here yet
Reasonable separation here
Service delivery
Very competitive market exists
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Benefits

• Obvious objective of amalgamation is to increase
  the shareholders long-term wealth.
• Five key categories of amalgamation benefits
• Cost savings.
• Revenue enhancements.
• Process improvements.
• Financial structure.
• Tax effects.
• Discuss each of these benefit categories in a
  general business sense, and then discuss how each
  of them might work in the specific context of the
  NZ lines industry.

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Cost savings

• Most obvious category of benefits.
• Arises from eliminating facilities, jobs and
  related expenses by consolidation or improved
  scale.
• Usually the easiest to estimate of the five
  categories of synergy.
• Often referred to as hard synergies, and have a
  high certainty of being achieved.
• Cost savings are likely to be highest when the
  acquirer and target are in the same industry with
  geographically close markets.

76
Cost savings

• Forms the majority of synergies, under the
  following broad categories
• Governance
• Management
• Planning
• Operations
• Fault restoration
• Maintenance
• Network assets
• Facilities.

77
Revenue enhancements

• Possible for an amalgamated business to achieve a
  higher revenue growth than either business could
  have achieved independently.
• Primary means would be applying a targets premium
  product to the acquirers distribution channel.
• Very difficult to estimate - many external
  factors such as customer response to new products
  or services.
• Consider evaluating but probably exclude from the
  final synergy estimate.

78
Revenue enhancements

• Unlikely that an amalgamated lines business could
  increase revenues beyond what the two separate
  businesses could have unless some cross-boundary
  connection allows a premium to be charged for
  alternative supplies.
• Not to be confused with acquisition of a
  high-growth target (which would increase revenues
  regardless of any acquisition).
• Price regulation will very likely be a key
  revenue issue.

79
Process improvements

• Creates synergy by transferring best practice and
  core competencies between the acquirer and the
  target.
• Acquirer may be seeking the targets processes,
  procedures and controls rather than their
  products or markets.
• Acquirer may also identify an undervalued
  business that can be enhanced by the acquirers
  processes and procedures.
• Consider evaluating but probably exclude from the
  final synergy estimate.

80
Process improvements

• Unlikely that any one lines business has
  processes superior enough to merit acquiring them
  solely for that reason.
• Generally high level of communication between
  lines companies at operational levels has meant
  that best practice is generally discussed and
  shared openly.

81
Financial structure

• Capital restructuring to lower the overall WACC
  can be undertaken independently of any
  amalgamation, hence should not be used to justify
  an amalgamation.
• It may be possible to take advantage of a targets
  more favorable cost of debt.
• May also be possible to pool working capital and
  surplus cash.
• Probably should be included in the synergy
  estimate if benefits can be calculated accurately
  enough.

82
Financial structure

• Previously stated that amalgamations should not
  be used as a justification for financial
  restructuring if the opportunity already exists.
• Cost of lines business equity varies minimally
  throughout NZ, however use of debt financing has
  created a noticeable spread in WACC.
• May be possible to create some synergy through
  refinancing at the lower WACC (in reality, it may
  lower a debt financing rate by a fraction of a
  percent).

83
Tax effects

• Often difficult to assess, but generally fall
  into two broad categories
• One-off tax costs such as capital and transfer
  duties, or the inability to carry forward tax
  losses.
• On-going tax costs.
• Goal is to obtain a lower tax rate for the
  amalgamated business.
• Global acquisitions may provide opportunities to
  move tax liabilities to low-tax jurisdictions.
• Definitely evaluate and include in the final
  synergy estimate.

84
Tax effects

• Obviously little opportunity for exploiting low
  tax jurisdictions in the global sense.
• Unlikely that the amalgamated business would
  achieve a more favorable tax position.
• One-off tax issues can be very significant,
  especially if capital repayments to shareholders
  are involved.
• Best seek specialist tax advice very early in the
  process to identify the tax implications of each
  amalgamation option.

85
Summary
Category
Certainty
Magnitude
Impact
Cost savings
High
High
Positive
Revenue enhancements
Low
Low
Positive
Process improvements
Low
Low
Positive
Financial structure
Low
Low
Positive
Tax benefits
High
High
Negative ?
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Concluding remarks
87
Concluding remarks

• Industry has seen significant change over the
  last few years, probably as much as in the
  previous century.
• More change is very likely in the immediate term,
  some of which may make more sense politically
  than commercially.
• Some changes may provide opportunities for
  well-placed lines businesses to move ahead.
• The only certainty is more change !!!

88
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