Terrorism and Counter-terrorism

1
Terrorism and Counter-terrorism

• POLS4985
• Summer 2011
• Gregory C. Dixon

2
Understanding what terrorism is

• The Sisyphean job of definition

3
Terrorism in the 21st Century

• Terrorism is at the forefront of security
  concerns in the West
• Terrorism is centrally placed in many policy
  debates
• Terrorism has a strong political resonance
• We seldom take time to clearly define the concept

4
Defining Terrorism

• The use of terror for political ends
• This has been used as long as humans have written
  things down
• Our oldest written epics include the use of fear
  and terror as weapons of war
• Examples of terror for political ends are common
  in history

5
Defining Terrorism

• State and non-state actors
• Terrorism is today associated with non-state
  actors
• Historically terrorism has be linked to both
  state and non-state actors
• State terrorism is a key part of some political
  systems

6
Defining Terrorism

• Domestic and international aspects matter
• Terror can be deployed at multiple levels of
  organization
• Motivation may focus action in one state or push
  for regional or global action
• Targets may have domestic and international
  impact

7
Defining Terrorism

• Politics by other means
• Terrorism usually has a clear political agenda as
  a driving element
• This can be radical, but it is still an agenda
• Terrorism may be part of a formal political
  process
• Terrorism may be a loose affiliate of a formal
  political group
• Terrorist groups may claim to represent a group
  that rejects their tactics

8
Defining Terrorism

• There is no simple, complete definition of
  terrorism
• The US Departments of State and Defense each have
  their own definitions
• Neither is the same as that used by the FBI
• The CIA uses a fourth definition
• There is no consensus on what terrorism is in a
  specific sense

9
Characteristics of Terrorism

• A political goal not addressable through existing
  institutions
• The use of unconventional violence
• Attacks on soft targets
• Perception of receptive audience
• Perception that fear in the target will produce
  change

10
Social Construction of Terrorism

• Terrorism is a socially constructed notion
• Our ideas about it change
• Cultural context impacts how people see
  terrorists
• Our attitudes are shaped by events
• Pre-9/11 terrorism was an annoyance

11
Politics and Terrorism

• Terrorism is a political tool for the
  perpetrators
• It is also a tool for its opponents
• Both sides seek to use images and ideas for their
  own ends
• PATRIOT Act contained policies that had been
  rejected for years

12
Arguments About Words

• Some scholars criticize definitions of terrorism
  as subjective and imprecise
• Enemies are terrorists
• Friends are not
• Research on social construction of the word
  terrorist argue that it has no precise usage
• Political leaders warp the words for their own
  ends

13
Complexity and Our Task

• We will accept the diversity of terrorist groups
• We will apply a broad framework of terrorism
  rather than a narrow definition
• We will accept that clear definition is probably
  impossible and proceed anyhow

14
Counting Terrorist Incidents

• Who gets attacked?
• Who does the attacking?
• We will use the National Counter-Terrorism Center
  (NCTC) Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS)
  data
• Data on all incidents worldwide from 2004

15
Prevalence of Terrorism

• This is hard to say over time
• NCTC-WITS gives us a common, clear standard, but
  is limited to the period after 2004
• Terror attacks vary, but over 10,000 per year is
  normal in the time period covered

16
Terror Attacks By Year 2004 - 2010
Incident Year Attacks
2004 3,251
2005 10,874
2006 14,370
2007 14,414
2008 11,662
2009 10,968
2010 11,595
Total 77,134
Source https//wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/
index.do?N0
17
Geographic Distribution of Attacks

• Attacks are not evenly distributed
• Middle East and South Asia experience 75 of
  attacks
• North America experiences .08
• Victims are similarly skewed
• 80 of victims are in the Middle East or South
  Asia

18
Geography of Attacks 2004 - 2010
IC Region COUNT
Africa 4425 5.74
Central and South America 3296 4.27
East Asia-Pacific 6233 8.08
Eurasia 2330 3.02
Europe 2252 2.92
Middle East and Persian Gulf 31,140 40.37
North America and Caribbean 60 0.08
South Asia 27,128 35.17
Total 77,134  
Source https//wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/
index.do?N0
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Human Impact 2004 - 2010
IC Region Attacks Dead Wounded Hostage Victims
Africa 4,425 14,992 18,513 9,053 42,558
Central and South America 3,296 2,917 4,191 2,009 9,117
East Asia-Pacific 6,233 5,040 9,563 1,481 16,084
Eurasia 2,330 2,283 5,429 241 7,953
Europe 2,252 626 4,989 49 5,664
Middle East and Persian Gulf 31,410 51,520 118,828 7,315 177,663
North America and Caribbean 60 23 93 0 116
South Asia 27,128 31,345 60,060 63,061 154,466
Total 77,134 108,746 221,666 83,209 413,621
Source https//wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/
index.do?N0
20
Perpetrators of Terrorism

• Nearly half of all attacks (48) are by groups
  with no clear philosophy
• Of groups that can be clearly defined
• Islamic extremists 27.78
• Secular political groups 22.77

21
Nature of Terror Groups 2004 - 2010
Incident Group Type COUNT  
Christian Extremist 344 0.44
Environmental/Anti-Globalization 16 0.02
Hindu Extremist 18 0.02
Islamic Extremist (Shia) 549 0.71
Islamic Extremist (Sunni) 20,689 26.68
Islamic Extremist (Unknown) 304 0.39
Jewish Extremist 53 0.07
Neonazi/Fascists/White Supremacists 9 0.01
Other Religious Extremist 4 0.01
Secular/Political/Anarchist 17,653 22.77
Tribal/Clan/Ethnic 605 0.78
Unknown 37,295 48.10
Total 77,539  
Source https//wits.nctc.gov/FederalDiscoverWITS/
index.do?N0
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Important Notes

• Moving forward, we will encounter difficult
  concepts and ideas
• Are there times when terrorism is justified?
• Do the ends justify the means?
• Are there limits in the tactics used to fight
  terrorists?
• Can a free society contain and defeat terrorism
  while remaining free?

23
No Easy Answers

• We will focus on the issues involved and the
  policy implications
• We will not answer all of the questions we raise
  to everyones satisfaction
• There will be significant disagreements as we
  move on
• There are no easy answers on these issues

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Motivation of terrorism

• Choosing terror

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Why Choose Terrorism?

• This question has two main dimensions
• Why would a group choose terrorism as a strategy?
• Why would a person join a terrorist group?
• The answers to both questions are controversial
  and important

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Can Terrorism Be Rational?

• Rational implies that a person or group can
• Clearly identify goals
• Design a strategy to achieve those goals
• Rationality is based on premises
• Assumptions about the world
• Assumptions can be wrong Information is imperfect

27
Terror as Strategy

• Terrorism can be seen as one form of political
  violence
• Unconventional conflict
• A form of compellence
• In this way of thinking terrorism is a rational
  response to circumstances
• Terrorism is a logical strategic choice

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Strategic Choice

• Groups can choose many strategies to achieve
  political ends
• Only a few choose terrorism

29
Choosing Terrorism

• Group are generally radicalized
• Revolutionary movements
• Extremist organizations
• Groups are generally weak relative to opponents
• Groups are generally small
• Opponent must be vulnerable

30
Compellence

• Compellence is using force to make another actor
  do what you want them to do
• UN forces expel Iraq from Kuwait in 1991
• Israel attacks Syrias Al Kibar nuclear reactor
  in 2007
• Viet Minh fights French colonial government in
  Vietnam
• PFLP hijacks airliners to force release of
  imprisoned members

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Terror as Compellence

• Violence against the target group can force
  changes in policy
• Attacks against oil production can lead to
  concessions from MNCs and governments
• Attacks against government forces can lead to
  concessions
• Attacks have a clear political motivation a
  change in policy by the target

32
The Logic of Terrorism

• Terrorism can work under the right conditions
• Costs and benefits of the strategy can be
  balanced
• This depends heavily on the underlying assumptions

33
Costs of Terrorism

• Costs are high
• Invites significant retaliation
• Possible loss of popular support
• International opprobrium is likely
• may bring outside support for opponents
• Elitism of terrorism alienates potential recruits
• Potential splits in movement over tactics

34
Benefits of Terrorism

• Benefits are potentially high
• Agenda setting power
• Force your issues onto opponents agenda
• Mobilize popular attention to your agenda
• International attention changes global agenda
• Creates insecurity by undermining institutions
• Provoke over-reaction by opponent
• Increase in repression violence in response
• Inspire others to join the cause

35
Weighing Costs and Benefits

• Calculations are based on assumptions of the
  group
• They can be wrong
• They can be based in radical models of the world
• The logic need not be clear to everyone
• Terrorism can be a rational strategic choice
• The logic may not appeal to those outside the
  group

36
Example PIRA

• Provisional Irish Republican Army
• Primary goal was unification of Ireland
• Secondary goal was protection of Catholics in
  Northern Ireland
• Created in 1970 in response to repression of
  Catholics in N. Ireland

37
Example PIRA

• UK was too strong to fight conventionally
• UK made itself vulnerable
• Suppression of Catholic civil rights movement in
  1966-69
• Protestant attacks on Catholics in 1969
• Idea of unification was assumed to be popular
  among Catholics

38
Example PIRA

• Attacks on N. Irish Protestant institutions
  undermined UK government
• UK initial response increased repression of
  Catholics
• Early years seemed to support terrorism

39
Example PIRA

• 1980s saw changes in tactics
• UK policy shifted toward addressing Catholic
  grievances
• IRA hunger strikes shifted political tone
• Both sides adapted to moves of the other
• By 1990s calculation had changed
• Costs were much higher
• Benefits much lower

40
State Sponsorship vs. free agents

• The role (and lack thereof) of the state in
  supporting terrorism

41
The State and Terror

• States deal with terrorism in a number of ways
• Some support it
• Some are victims of it
• Some fear it
• The relationship between the state and terrorism
  is a complex one

42
Forms of State Support

• Official support
• Unofficial support
• Official Indifference
• Involuntary hosting

43
Official Support

• The state formally recognizes the group and
  provides explicit support
• Syria and Hamas
• Iran and Hezbollah
• Formal system of support may exist
• Training facilities
• Political offices

44
Unofficial Support

• No formal admission
• State secretly supports or allows domestic actors
  to support
• Saudi Arabia and pre-9/11 al Qaeda
• Pakistan support of Jammu and Kashmir
  Hizbul-Mujahideen (JKHM) post 9/11
• Can take many forms

45
Unofficial Support

• Support can come from the government
• Support can come from non-state actors with the
  government permitting or facilitating
• Saudi groups promote Islamist organizations,
  including those with armed wings
• Jamaa i-Islami in Pakistan and Bangladesh
• American anti-communist groups supported
  paramilitary groups in Latin America

46
Official Indifference

• A state may neither help nor hinder
• State may allow terrorists to operate so long as
  no domestic laws are broken
• US hosted anti-Castro groups from Cuba
• Various states and PLO terrorists in the 1970s
• Sudanese harboring of Al Qaeda in early 1990s

47
Involuntary Hosting

• Distinct from an ongoing conflict
• A state may lack the capacity to expel, arrest,
  or eradicate terrorists on their territory
• Pakistan in tribal areas (probably)
• Somalia
• These are generally fragile or failed states

48
Why Support Terrorism?

• Terrorism can be useful
• Undermine and weaken enemies
• Promote national interests abroad
• Appeal to domestic political actors
• Provide bargaining leverage in international
  politics
• Provide external outlet for disaffected domestic
  groups

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Terrorism On the Conflict Spectrum

• Terrorism is one form of political conflict
• It fits into a larger spectrum that ranges from
  no violence at all to major power war
• As such it is part of the toolkit that states
  will consider using

50
Choices About Conflict

• States have a wide range of international policy
  options
• Among these is a subset that involves violence
• There are occasions where violence is useful
• There are times where violence is preferable
• States will evaluate these decisions as they
  evaluate other decisions

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The Logic of State Support

• Political leaders have policy goals
• Some reflect personal interests
• Staying in power
• Acquiring wealth, power, prestige, etc.
• Some reflect national interests
• Security from attack
• Expansion of national power, prestige, etc.
• Economic growth and development

52
The Logic of State Support

• There are significant costs and benefits to weigh
• There are major risks of unforeseen consequences
• If the balance holds in favor of terrorism,
  political leaders will support it

53
State-Terrorism Synergies

• Things terrorists need that states can provide
• Base of operations
• Logistical and training support
• Financial support
• Arms
• Intelligence information
• Recruits

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Example Iran

• Sponsors a range of terrorist groups
• Hezbollah
• Hamas
• Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
  (PFLP)
• Has supported more widely in the past
• Abu Sayaf (Philippines)

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Example Iran

• Began as part of the Revolution
• Islamic Revolutionary Council (1981)
• Iran uses support for propaganda
• Pan-Islamist
• Anti-Israel
• Anti-West
• Low-risk threats to wide range of regional
  competitors

56
Example Iran

• Direct strikes at the US or Israel would be
  high-risk
• Retaliation would come
• Military balance is not favorable
• Allows a valuable outlet for domestic radicals
• Supports image of Iran as leading the fight
  against its enemies

57
State Sponsorship Post 9/11

• 9/11 raised the cost of state sponsorship
• US no longer just wags a finger at you
• 9/11 showed problem of unintended consequences
• Pakistan and Afghanistan saw results of being too
  close to terrorist groups
• In general state sponsorship has declined

58
Free Agents

• Non-state terrorism with no connection to states
• Advantages
• No limits of geography
• No limits of sponsors agenda
• Reduced need to consider popular opinion

59
Free Agents

• Drawbacks of being a free agent
• No safe havens
• More complicated logistics
• Harder to recruit new terrorists
• Reduced access to information (intelligence)
• Harder to establish training and support system

60
State vs. Non-State

• For both parties, there are costs and benefits
• Groups must weigh the value of the sponsorship
• Sponsors must weigh the risks of the group
• This leads to a complex set of relationships
• In some cases the relationship may work, in
  others it does not

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Does Terrorism Work?

• Ends and means

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Terrorism is a Tactic

• Terrorism is a tactic
• It can be deployed towards many ends
• The goals of the organization matter for
  understanding their expectations
• Knowing what they want helps evaluate if they
  have achieved it

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Common Ends of Terror Groups

• Revolution
• Secession
• Irredentism
• Protection of repressed groups

64
Motivations

• Religion
• Protect or expand the faith
• Ideology
• Promote or expand an idea
• Political
• Redress grievances
• Change policy when other means have failed

65
Long and Short-Term

• Most groups have an overall goal for the
  long-term
• There are also short-term steps towards that
  larger goal
• These are often the motivation for specific acts
• Red Army Faction kidnappings in the 19790s

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Does Terrorism Work?

• In some cases
• Short-term goals have higher success rate
• But not most
• Long-term ends are seldom achieved

67
Achieving the Larger Goal

• The larger goal is rarely achieved, but
  compromise is common
• Partial success can lead to and end of the
  conflict
• Circumstances can change the nature of the
  conflict

68
Wars of National Liberation

• Wars of national liberation often use terrorism
• In some cases, these wars have been successful
• Algeria (FLN)
• Israel (Irgun Zvai Leumi)
• In others the wars led to a political process
• South Africa (ANC)

69
Wars of National Liberation

• In some cases the wars failed
• Sri Lanka (LTTE)
• In some the disruptions continue for extended
  periods
• India (Naxalites, Kashmir Groups)

70
Assessment Problems

• Deciding if terrorism works is hard
• There are many questions of what success is
• Most terrorist conflict do not have a clear
  winner
• Groups have expectations that success is
  possible, but history is mixed

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How do terrorist conflicts end?

• Endgames

72
How Do Terrorist Groups End?

• To think about counter-terrorism it helps to know
  how terrorist groups end
• We will start with some basic numbers
• RAND Corp study How Terrorist Groups End
  Lessons for Countering al Qaida
• 648 terrorist groups from 1968 - 2006

73
Ways Groups End

• Policing
• Military Force
• Splintering
• Victory
• Politiciztion

74
Policing

• Police forces target terrorist groups
• Intelligence gathering
• Infiltration
• Arrest and imprison key members of the groups
• Eventually the groups can no longer operate

75
Military Force

• Military forces target terrorist groups
• Intelligence gathering
• Special operations
• Attacks on support networks
• Killing of key members of the groups
• Eventually the groups can no longer operate

76
Splintering

• The terrorist group breaks apart through internal
  conflict
• Members disagree on strategy and/or tactics
• Disagreement leads to significant conflict
• Group splits into multiple factions
• Splintering may not end the conflict
• Splinter groups often keep fighting

77
Victory

• The terrorist group can achieve its political
  ends
• The group ends because it does not need to exist
  any longer

78
Politicization

• The groups members abandon armed struggle
• The group determines that the political process
  can be used to achieve its ends
• Groups enter the political process
• Extant political wings absorb the military wing
• The group does not end but it ceases to use
  terrorism

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The Numbers
80
Example 1 The PIRA

• Provisional Irish Republican Army
• Irredentist group
• Sectarian/Nationalist hybrid
• Non-state sponsored
• Semi-formal political branch (Sinn Fein)
• PIRA formed in split with Official IRA in 1969

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Goals of the PIRA

• Unification of Ireland
• Force exit of UK troops and police
• Bring N. Ireland in to the Republic of Ireland
• Protect Catholics in N. Ireland from Protestant
  groups
• Significant sectarian violence was experienced in
  the 1960s

82
Ending the Irish Conflict

• Negotiated settlement
• PIRA was contained, but not defeated
• Hurting stalemate led to conditions for talks
• Sinn Fein and UK and Irish governments arranged a
  power-sharing deal
• PIRA gave up armed struggle

83
Example 2 The LTTE

• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
• Secessionist group
• Nationalist group based on Tamil identity
• Ethnic (Tamil)
• Religious (Hindu)
• Non-state sponsored
• Significant diaspora community

84
Goals of the LTTE

• Creation of an independent Tamil State (Eelam) in
  Northern Sri Lanka

85
Ending the Sri Lankan Conflict

• Indian peace-keeping mission failed in 1987
• Several negotiations similarly failed
• Sinhalese majority could not accept independence
• LTTE eventually rejected autonomy within Sri
  Lanka
• Efforts to move the conflict to the political
  arena were blocked by both sides

86
Ending the Sri Lankan Conflict

• Major military campaign was launched in 2008
• In 2009 this had pushed the LTTE into a small
  area
• 100,000 plus civilians were trapped with the LTTE
• They were not allowed to leave by the LTTE
• The final phase of the conflict was bloody, but
  decisive
• Last LTTE leaders were killed attempting escape

87
Consequences of the Endgame

• LTTE was destroyed as a fighting force
• Decisive win for Sri Lankan Army
• Large numbers of civilians were killed
• International criminal investigations are ongoing
• Political freedom was significantly eroded for
  all citizens
• Tamil grievances remain unaddressed

88
No Simple Answer

• Conflicts end in many ways
• Most end in a combination of politics and
  policing
• Few end with outright victory for the terrorists
• Nearly as few end with outright victory for the
  counter-terrorist