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XML Security in IODEF

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Title: HTTP CGI Last modified by: Yuri Demchenko Created Date: 6/10/1995 5:31:50 PM Document presentation format: A4 Paper (210x297 mm) Other titles – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: XML Security in IODEF


1
XML Security in IODEF
  • INCH WG, IETF56
  • March 19, 2003
  • Yuri Demchenko ltdemch_at_NLnetLabs.nlgt

2
Outlines
  • XML Security Basics
  • XML Signature
  • XML Canonicalisation (reference)
  • XML Encryption
  • DonKey project at NLnet Labs PK Management and
    XMLSig

3
XML Schema vs DTD and XML Protocol
  • DTD is document-oriented
  • Like HTML
  • Schema is data-oriented
  • XML Signature
  • SAML
  • Basic XML Protocol(s)
  • XML-RPC
  • SOAP

4
XML Security vs traditional (network) security
  • Traditional Security
  • Host-to-host or point-to-point security
  • Client/server oriented
  • Connection or connectionless oriented
  • Generically single/common trust
    domain/association
  • XML Security
  • Document oriented approach
  • Security tokens/assertions and policies can be
    associated with the document or its parts
  • Intended to be cross-domain
  • Potentially for virtual and dynamic trust domains
    (security associations)

5
XML Signature Features
  • Fundamental feature the ability to sign only
    specific portions of the XML tree rather than the
    whole document.
  • XML document may have a long history when
    different component are authored by different
    parties at different times
  • Different parties may want to sign only those
    elements relevant to them
  • Important when keeping integrity of certain parts
    of an XML document is essential while leaving the
    possibility for other parts to be changed
  • Allows carrying security tokens/assertions on
    document/data rather than on user/client
  • Provides security features for XML based
    protocols

6
XML Signature structure
  • ltSignature ID?gt 
  • ltSignedInfogt  ltCanonicalizationMethod/gt
    ltSignatureMethod/gt  (ltReference URI?
    gt  (ltTransformsgt)?  ltDigestMethodgt  ltDigestV
    aluegt  lt/Referencegt) lt/SignedInfogt
  • ltSignatureValuegt (ltKeyInfogt)? (ltObject ID?gt) 
  • lt/Signaturegt 

7
How to Create an XML Signature
  • W3C REC http//www.w3.org/TR/xmldsig-core/
  • IETF Draft Standard http//www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc32
    75.txt
  • 1. Determine which resources are to be signed
  • 2. Calculate the digest of each resource
  • 3. Collect the Reference elements
  • 4. Signing
  • 5. Add key information
  • 6. Enclose in a Signature element

8
Determine which resources are to be signed
  • Resources are defined through a Uniform Resource
    Identifier (URI)
  • http//www.abccompany.com/xml/po.xmlsender1 -
    references a specific element in an XML file on
    the Web
  • reference document with attached signature

9
Calculate the digest of each resource
  • In XML signatures, each referenced resource is
    specified through a ltReferencegt element and its
    digest (calculated on the identified resource and
    not the ltReferencegt element itself) is placed in
    a ltDigestValuegt child element.
  • The ltDigestMethodgt element identifies the
    algorithm used to calculate the digest.
  • ltReference URI"http//www.abccompany.com/news/200
    0/03_27_00.htm"gt ltDigestMethod Algorithm"http//w
    ww.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsigsha1" /gt
    ltDigestValuegtj6lwx3rvEPO0vKtMup4NbeVu8nklt/DigestV
    aluegt
  • lt/Referencegt

10
Collect the Reference elements
  • Collect the ltReferencegt elements (with their
    associated digests) within a ltSignedInfogt
    element.
  • The ltCanonicalizationMethodgt element indicates
    the algorithm was used to canonize the
    ltSignedInfogt element. To help prevent inaccurate
    verification results, XML information sets must
    first be canonized before extracting their bit
    representation for signature processing.
  • The ltSignatureMethodgt element identifies the
    algorithm used to produce the signature value.
  • ltSignedInfo Id"foobar"gt
  • ltCanonicalizationMethod algorithm"http//www.w3.
    org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n"/gt
  • ltSignatureMethod Algorithm"http//www.w3.org/2000
    /09/xmldsigdsa-sha1" /gt ltReference
    URI"http//www.abccompany.com/news/2000/03_27_00.
    htm"gt ltDigestMethod Algorithm"http//www.w3.org
    /2000/09/xmldsigsha1" /gt ltDigestValuegtj6lwx3rvE
    PO0vKtMup4NbeVu8nklt/DigestValuegt
  • lt/Referencegt
  • lt/SignedInfogt

11
Signing
  • Calculate the digest of the ltSignedInfogt element,
    sign that digest and put the signature value in a
    ltSignatureValuegt element.
  • Signature Algorithms
  • DSA
  • PKCS1 (RSA-SHA1)
  • ltSignatureValuegtMC0ELElt/SignatureValuegt

12
Add key information
  • If keying information is to be included, place it
    in a ltKeyInfogt element. Here the keying
    information contains the X.509 certificate for
    the sender, which would include the public key
    needed for signature verification.
  • lt!ELEMENT KeyInfo (PCDATA KeyName KeyValue
    RetrievalMethod X509Data PGPData SPKIData
    MgmtData )gt
  • ltKeyInfogt
  • ltX509Datagt
  • ltX509SubjectNamegtCNEd Simon, OXMLSec Inc.,
    STOTTAWA,
  • CCAlt/X509SubjectNamegt
  • ltX509CertificategtMIID5jCCA0gA...lVNlt/X509Certif
    icategt
  • lt/X509Datagt
  • lt/KeyInfogt

13
Enclose in a Signature element
  • lt!ELEMENT Signature (SignedInfo, SignatureValue,
    KeyInfo?, Object)gt
  • lt!ELEMENT SignedInfo (CanonicalizationMethod,
    SignatureMethod, Reference)gt
  • Place the ltSignedInfogt, ltSignatureValuegt, and
    ltKeyInfogt elements into a ltSignaturegt element.
    The ltSignaturegt element comprises the XML
    signature.
  • Signature validation requires that the data
    object that was signed be accessible. The XML
    signature itself will generally indicate the
    location of the original signed object. This
    reference can
  • be referenced by a URI within the XML signature
  • reside within the same resource as the XML
    signature (the signature is a sibling)
  • be embedded within the XML signature (the
    signature is the parent)
  • have its XML signature embedded within itself
    (the signature is the child).

14
Verifying an XML Signature
  • Verify the signature of the ltSignedInfogt element
  • Recalculate the digest of the ltSignedInfogt
    element (using the digest algorithm specified in
    the ltSignatureMethodgt element)
  • Use the public verification key to verify that
    the value of the ltSignatureValuegt element is
    correct for the digest of the ltSignedInfogt
    element
  • If this step passes
  • Recalculate the digests of the references
    contained within the ltSignedInfogt element and
    compare them to the digest values expressed in
    each ltReferencegt element's corresponding
    ltDigestValuegt element.

15
Canonicalisation (1)
  • The canonical form of an XML document is physical
    representation of the document produced by the
    canonicalisation method that implies the
    following changes.
  • Encoding and characters
  • The document is encoded in UTF-8
  • Line breaks normalized to xA on input, before
    parsing
  • Whitespace outside of the document element and
    within start and end tags is normalized
  • All whitespace in character content is retained
    (excluding characters removed during line feed
    normalization)

16
Canonicalisation (2)
  • Elements and references
  • Character and parsed entity references are
    replaced
  • CDATA sections are replaced with their character
    content
  • The XML declaration and document type declaration
    (DTD) are removed
  • Empty elements are converted to start-end tag
    pairs
  • Attributes
  • Attribute values are normalized, as if by a
    validating processor
  • Attribute value delimiters are set to quotation
    marks (double quotes)
  • Special characters in attribute values and
    character content are replaced by character
    references
  • Superfluous namespace declarations are removed
    from each element
  • Default attributes are added to each element
  • Lexicographic order is imposed on the namespace
    declarations and attributes of each element

17
XPath Data Model for Canonicalisation
  • XML canonicalization is defined in terms of the
    XPath definition of a node-set.
  • If an XML document must be converted to a
    node-set, XPath REQUIRES that an XML processor be
    used to create the nodes of its data model to
    fully represent the document. The XML processor
    performs the following tasks in order
  • normalize line feeds
  • normalize attribute values
  • replace CDATA sections with their character
    content
  • resolve character and parsed entity references
  • The input octet stream MUST contain a well-formed
    XML document, but the input need not be
    validated. The declarations in the document type
    declaration are used to help create the canonical
    form.

18
Transform Algorithms
  • Canonicalisation
  • Base64
  • XPath Filtering
  • Envelope Signature Transform
  • XSLT Transformation

19
XML Signature Security Consideration
  • Transforms
  • Only What is Signed is Secure
  • Only What is Seen is Secure
  • See What is Signed
  • Check the Security Model
  • Algorithms, Key Length, Certificates, etc.

20
XML Encryption
  • Encrypt an XML Element, XML Elements content
    (Elements), XML Elements content (Character
    Data), or arbitrary data ad documents
  • Can be used for Key transport
  • Can be used in combination with XML Signature
  • More information
  • http//www.w3c.org/TR/xmlenc-core/
  • http//www.w3.org/TR/xmlenc-decrypt/
  • http//www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-eastlake
    -xmldsig-uri-04.txt

21
XML Encryption Data Model
  • ltEncryptedData Id? Type? MimeType? Encoding?gt
  • ltEncryptionMethod/gt?
  • ltdsKeyInfogt
  • ltEncryptedKeygt? extension to XMLSig KeyInfo
  • ltAgreementMethodgt?
  • ltdsKeyNamegt?
  • ltdsRetrievalMethodgt?
  • ltdsgt?
  • lt/dsKeyInfogt?
  • ltCipherDatagt envelopes or references the
    raw encrypted data
  • ltCipherValuegt?
  • ltCipherReference URI?gt? points to the
    location of the raw encrypted data
  • lt/CipherDatagt
  • ltEncryptionPropertiesgt? e.g., timestamp
  • lt/EncryptedDatagt

22
XML Encryption CipherData Element
  • Contains the encrypted octet sequence as base64
    encoded text of the CipherValue element, or
    provides a reference to an external location
    containing the encrypted octet sequence via the
    CipherReference element.
  • ltelement name'CipherData' type'xencCipherDataTy
    pe'/gt
  • ltcomplexType name'CipherDataType'gt
  • ltchoicegt
  • ltelement name'CipherValue' type'base64Binary'
    /gt
  • ltelement ref'xencCipherReference'/gt
  • lt/choicegt
  • lt/complexTypegt

23
Encryption Processing Rules
  • For each EncryptedData and EncryptedKey the
    encryptor must
  • 1. Select the algorithm (and parameters)
  • 2. Obtain and (optionally) represent the key
  • 3. Encrypt the data
  • If the data is an element or element content,
    obtain the octets by serialising the data in
    UTF-8 any other data must be serialised as
    octets
  • Encrypt the octets using the algorithm and key
    from steps 1 and 2
  • Provide type of presentation to indicate how to
    obtain and interpret the plaintext octets after
    decryption (e.g., MimeTypetext/xml or
    MimeTypeimage/png)
  • 4. Build the EncryptedType (EncryptedData or
    EncryptedKey)
  • 5. Process EncryptedData
  • If the Type of the encrypted data is element or
    element content, then encryptor SHOULD be able
    to replace the unencrypted element or content
    with the EncryptedData element.
  • If the Type of the encrypted data is element or
    element content, then encryptor MUST always be
    able to return the EncryptedData to the
    application.

24
Decryption Processing Rules
  • 1. Process the element to determine the
    algorithm, parameters and dsKeyInfo element to
    be used. If some information is omitted, the
    application MUST supply it.
  • 2. Locate the data encryption key according to
    the dsKeyInfo element, which may contain one or
    more children elements.
  • 3. Decrypt the data contained in the CipherData
    element depending on existence of CipherValue
    or CipherReference child elements
  • 4. Process decrypted data of Type 'element' or
    element 'content
  • The cleartext octet sequence (from step 3) is
    interpreted as UTF-8 encoded character data
  • The decryptor MUST be able to return the value of
    Type and the UTF-8 encoded XML character data.
    Validation on the serialized XML is NOT REQUIRED.
  • The decryptor SHOULD support the ability to
    replace the EncryptedData element with the
    decrypted 'element' or element 'content'
    represented by the UTF-8 encoded characters
  • 5. Process decrypted data if Type is unspecified
    or is not 'element' or element 'content'.

25
Available tools
  • Not many OpenSource, especially for Windows
  • Java based
  • Refer to
  • http//www.w3.org/Signature/Code
  • http//www.w3.org/Encryption/2001/Code
  • Commercial
  • MS Visual Studio
  • IBM AlphaWorks
  • Coming soon - DonKey client by NLnet Labs
  • http//www.nlnetlabs.nl/donkey/

26
DonKey Project Goal(s)
  • Open extendable system for public key and
    Identity management
  • Initial stage
  • Open global distributed system for publishing and
    retrieving named, signed public keys together
    with associated/bound information
  • Intended development
  • Identity management for federated cross-domain
    AuthN and AuthZ
  • Donkey website http//www.nlnetlabs.nl/donkey/

27
DonKey functionality
  • DonKey allows anyone to publish a named key,
    together with optional data (Donkey package)
  • Key MUST be signed, and Package MAY be signed by
    Owner
  • Donkey is NOT a permanent storage key must be
    republished to remain available
  • Donkey does NOT define a policy for key/payload
    usage
  • This is an application specific function
  • Multiple parties are allowed to publish a key
    with the same name. Applications must select the
    correct key when multiple keys match
  • Donkey allows anyone to query for a published
    key, based on the key's name (required) and
    signers (optional)
  • Donkey allows anyone to sign a published key

28
DonKey design issues Package structure
  • (Proprietary) Internal format (currently Python
    data object) but XML based exchange format
  • Package ID
  • Content
  • Header
  • Flags
  • Names
  • Owner Public Key Name, Owner Keygt must be
    unique
  • Body
  • Payload Application dependent (e.g., AA,
    Identity, SSO)
  • Signatures
  • Signed
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