Officer Manning: Armies of the past

1
Officer Manning Armies of the past

• Successful traits
• Armies with lower ratio (133) of officer to
  enlisted had faster decision cycle
• Policies built around unit manning
• Command and instructor positions most prized,
  lasting from 3-5 years in key positions
• Unsuccessful traits
• Armies with higher ratio (113 to 16) of officer
  to enlisted had slower decision cycle at all
  levels
• Policies were individual centric leading to lower
  unit success
• Officers were rotated swiftly through many
  positions on average a new position every 10.1
  months

Insights into personnel systems (cultures) of
other armies in history objective develop
decisive leaders of character for uncertain and
complex problems
2
Officer Management Armies of the Past

• Successful traits
• Officers attended extensive military schooling
  early in career
• Most schooling comes at entry level through 4th
  year
• Courses were intellectually demanding (German
  staff college so tough that falling out was not
  seen as failure)
• Culture encouraged self-teaching, self-policing
  and professional discourse
• Accessions into officer ranks tough (up to 80
  failure rate)
• Promotions and selections
• Based on two measures, seniority and combat
  performance
• Perform or out versus up or out promotion
  system
• Decentralized at lower levels with local boards
  senior selections centralized
• Unsuccessful traits
• Officers viewed as generalists where rank meant
  assumed level of knowledge
• Careers adhered to templates and patterns with
  little flexibility based on competence
• Individual replacement rather than group
  replacement hindered cohesion
• Individual career management assumed Social
  Darwinism, equal opportunity progressive
  assumption of survival of fittest
• Careerism outcome based individuals
  psychological investment in their own career
  coupled with promotion for pay economic reward
  system
• Incentive structure focused on individual failed
  to ensure superior group performance

3
US Army Officer Trends
Officer to Enlisted Ratios
Civil War Civil War World War I World War I World War II World War II Vietnam/Cold War Vietnam/Cold War Today Today
Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted
Total Army 2,100,000   4,050,000   8,800,000   1,330,000   1,140,000  

Officers 137,254 1 14.3 250,000 1 15.2 758,620 1 10.6 172,727 1 6.7 180,094 1 5.3

Field Grade 41,176 1 47.7 32,926 1 115.4 42,307 1 190.1 73,888 1 15.7 78,082 1 12.3

General 564 1 3480 1,006 1 3777.3 1,260 1 6382 542 1 2135.2 632 1 1518.8

Infantry / Armor Force 1,606 1 14.2 6,243 1 35.3 3,966 1 20.9 3,510 1 15.7 IN 3488 1 12.1
Infantry / Armor Force 1,606 1 14.2 6,243 1 35.3 3,966 1 20.9 3,510 1 15.7 HV 3779 1 11.3
Infantry / Armor Force 1,606 1 14.2 6,243 1 35.3 3,966 1 20.9 3,510 1 15.7 ST 4224 1 11.4
Context Technology breakthrough, Communication,
Area of Operations, Doctrinal Focus, Operational
Environment, Spectrum of Conflict, Army Purpose,
Officer Development
4
US Army Officer Trends
In Foreign Successful Armies
Roman Army Roman Army French Army French Army Finnish Army Finnish Army German Army German Army Israeli Army Israeli Army
(52 AD) (52 AD) (1806) (1806) (1939) (1939) (1940) (1940) (1967) (1967)
Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted
Total Army 300,000   350,000   346,000   4,555,000   264,000  

Officers 3,817 1 77.6 4,215 1 82 10,380 1 32.3 133,970 1 33 15,000 1 16.6

Field Grade 1,980 1 149.6 1,867 1 185.2 2,147 1 156.3 16,098 1 274.6 2,358 1 105.6

General 34 1 8711.3 423 1 817.5 56 1 5993.2 4,561 1 969.3 36 1 6916.7
General 56 1 5289 423 1 817.5 56 1 5993.2 4,561 1 969.3 36 1 6916.7

Infantry / Armor Force 5,000 1 73.6 2,400 1 41.9 3,100 1 82.8 3,300 1 79.5 2,800 1 46.5
Infantry / Armor Force 5,000 1 73.6 2,400 1 41.9 3,100 1 82.8 3,300 1 79.5 2,800 1 46.5
Infantry / Armor Force (Legion)   (Brigade)   (Regiment)   (Reg't/Bde)   (Brigade)  
5
US Army Officer Trends
In Unsuccessful Armies
Prussian Army Prussian Army French Army French Army Italian Army Italian Army British Army British Army
(1806) (1806) (1940) (1940) (1940) (1940) (1940) (1940)
Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted Strength Ratio to Enlisted
Total Army 182,995   3,333,000   1,630,000   1,615,000  

Officers 23,789 1 6.7 666,600 1 4 293,400 1 4.6 177,650 1 8.1

Field Grade 8,794 1 18.1 23,498 1 113.5 67,009 1 19.9 46,000 1 31.2

General 528 1 301.5 1,843 1 1446.8 1,101 1 1214 748 1 1921.6

Infantry / Armor Force 2,800 1 18 3,800 1 14.4 4,100 1 19 2,500 1 25
Infantry / Armor Force (Brigade) 1 18 (Regiment) 1 14.4 (Regiment) 1 19 (Brigade) 1 25
6
US Army Officer Trends
Context
Criteria Civil War World War I World War II Cold War / Vietnam Today
TechnologyBreakthrough RailroadRifled Weapons Machine GunLong Range Arty Airplane as a weaponArmorNuclear Wpn HelicopterTactical Nuclear Wpn Precision Wpns
Communications TelegraphSignal FlagsCourier TelegraphLand Line TelephoneSignal Flags / Courier Wireless (Radio)TelegraphLand Line Early Satellite Burst TransmissionWireless (Radio) Digital CommoAdv Satellite Multi Media
Area of Operations(Reg/BDE Frontage) 300 m 3500 m 4-6 KM 5-9 KM Area Of OpnDefined bySituation
Doctrinal Focus Sequential employment of Arty, IN, CAV Sequential employment of Fires Maneuver Combined ArmsCoordinated with Other Services Nations Combined ArmsSimultaneous OpnWith Other Services Nations Joint OperationsInteragency Multinational Operations
OperationalEnvironment Linear BattlefieldSequential Opns ExpeditionaryLinear BattlefieldTrench Warfare Opn Stalemate Global WarMultiple TheatersOpn ManeuverSimultaneous Opns Global ResponsibilitySmall conflicts Within Nuclear parityNon-linear/Simultaneous Persistent ConflictDecline nation-stateRise non-state actorsWar among people
Spectrum ofConflict Force-on-ForceMid-Intensity Force-on-ForceMid-Intensity Force-on-ForceMid HighIntensity Conventional/UnconventionalLow-Mid-HighIntensity General Purpose Special ForcesHybrid ThreatsFull spectrum Opn
Army Purpose MobilizeFightDemobilize MobilizeFightDemobilize MobilizeFightDemobilize Large StandingArmy Forward Deployedto Deter Conflict ExpeditionaryOperating ForceGenerating Force
OfficerDevelopment Branch Branch Combined Arms Combined ArmsJoint Joint, Interagency Specialized Functional Expertise
7
Officer to Enlisted Ratios
ERA Civil War World War I World War II Vietnam/Cold War Today
Total Army 2,100,000 4,050,000 8,800,000 1,330,000 1,140,000

Officers 1 14.3 1 15.2 1 10.6 1 6.7 1 5.3

Field Grade 1 47.7 1 115.4 1 190.1 1 15.7 1 12.3

General 1 3480 1 3777.3 1 6382 1 2135.2 1 1518.8

Infantry / Armor Force 1 14.2 1 35.3 1 20.9 1 15.7 1 12.1
Infantry / Armor Force 1 14.2 1 35.3 1 20.9 1 15.7 1 11.3
Infantry / Armor Force 1 14.2 1 35.3 1 20.9 1 15.7 1 11.4
8
US Army Leader Development
Context
Criteria Civil War World War I World War II Cold War / Vietnam Today
TechnologyBreakthrough
Communications
Area of Operations(Reg/BDE Frontage)
Leader Doctrinal Focus Top Down, centralized and hierarchal control C2 system Top Down, centralized and hierarchal control C2 system Top Down, centralized and hierarchal control C2 system, later mission cmd by exception Top Down, centralized and hierarchal control C2 system 1982-86 FM 100-5 encouraged more mission cmd, but culture did not support Joint OperationsInteragency Multinational Operations, emphasis toward mission command, but still retains top-down hierarchal system
OperationalEnvironment/ opponent Linear BattlefieldSequential Opns CSA used same doctrine Linear Battlefield Germans moved from operational to tactical maneuver warfare with strusstruppen tactics Linear Battlefield Germans projected maneuver warfare in time, space and depth with mission cmd and technology Linear warfare against Soviet threat, but emerging non-state opponents using non-linear warfare US demonstrated ability to conduct maneuver warfare in OEF and OIF in initial phase Rise non-state actors war among people
Spectrum ofConflict
Army Purpose
OfficerDevelopment United States Military Academy, private Military Colleges in initial phase-focused on linear warfare United States Military Academy, private Military Colleges in initial phase, OCS/college degree, staff college. Learning was inward focused on process United States Military Academy, private military colleges, ROTC, but largely OCS w/college degree staff college Learning was inward focused on process United States Military Academy, ROTC and OCS initially, templated school system Lieutenant through colonel. Learning was inward focused on process and driven by top down POI United States Military Academy, ROTC and OCS initially, templated school system Lieutenant through colonel. Learning moving from process to classical education system focused on cognitive development
9
Sources for officer/enlisted numbers/ratios

• Center of Military History Research page,
  http//www.history.army.mil/index.html
• US Army Human Resources Command, Department of
  Defense Military Personnel as of 31 March 2010
• Department of the Army, The Personnel System In
  The United States Army, 1954 (covers Civil War
  through World War II)
• Kreidberg and Henry, History of the Mobilization
  in the United States Army, 1775-1945, 1955
• Vandergriff, Donald, Path to Victory Americas
  Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs, 2002
• Access through Army G1, LTC Daniel Shimpton, 5
  May 2010
• Dr. Blair Hayworth, US Army Center of Military
  History
• Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson, Historian USMC TECOM
• LTC Symon Tanner, British Army liaison to ARCIC
  Forward, 6 May 2010

10
Back ups
11
Use an empirical approach to understand how the
U.S. Armys personnel system (culture) evolved
over time by comparing to other armies in
snapshots of historyProvide brief insights into
personnel systems (cultures) of other armies in
history. Key trend throughout is how to develop
decisive leaders of character
12
Summary of traits

• Successful armies started officer candidate
  earlier in age, with most beginning in the ranks
  or as an officer candidate 2-4 years
• After 1871, American and Europeans tried to copy
  the German system, but many succeeded in copying
  them organizationally, but none succeeded at
  copying them culturally, but their systems lacked
  the requisite mutual trust needed to empower
  subordinates
• France fought well in WWI, adjusted to conditions
  of trench warfare, but did not learn how to adapt
  to changed conditions in the next war (precursor
  decentralized German storm tactics first used in
  1916-1918)
• Excessive politicization undermined mutual trust
• Atmosphere of mistrust and a Cartesian
  intellectual tradition (emanating from DeCartes)
  inspired a centralized officer culture that tried
  to reduce conflict to a series of predictable
  formulaic relations
• Italy had courageous individual qualities
  smothered by rigid culture leads to failures
  without reforms
• Britain excellent at basic soldiering skills with
  outstanding small unit leadership by NCOs but
  officer corps remained wedded to methodical
  frontal battles of attrition through WWII

13
Successful Armies

• The Roman Army of 216 BC to 52 AD
• The French Army of 1798-1807
• The Finnish Army of 1926-1940
• The German Army of 1809-1942
• The Israeli Army of 1948-1973

Common Features All these armies faced the
threat of a crushing defeat at the hands of well
armed numerically superior opponents, and Officer
corps open to wide population, but had high
entrance standards with strenuous measurement
tools, which resulted in small percentage of
officers to enlisted (entire force from 3-7)
and built personnel system around unit manning
14
Unsuccessful Armies

• The Prussian Army (1806)
• The French Army (1870, 1914, 1940)
• The Italian Army (1914-1942)
• The British Army (Crimea 1856, S. Africa 1898,
  WWII 1939-1942)

Common Features Confined their officer corps to
an aristocratic or privileged class-limited
talent with entrance and promotion standards
based on birth than competence maintained larger
than necessary officer corps anywhere from 15-20
percent dogmatic, non-adaptive doctrine when
faced with obvious need to change
15
Successful Armies
16
Roman Army 216 BC-52 AD

• Battle of Cannae in 216 BC forced major reforms.
  Leadership dominated Roman thought
• Publius Cornelius Scipio (Africanus after 202 BC)
  reformed officer corps with meritorious
  promotions
• Garius Marius made tactical and structural
  changes to the legion
• The entire army revolved around the legion
• It recruited, trained and promoted its own
  officers based on merit (similar to regimental
  system)
• Length of service was 20 yearsleaders within the
  Legion came from the ranks
• Legions were the basic building blocks of armies
  and were the regional specialists for operations
  other than war
• Tactical doctrine demanded that subordinates
  exhibit initiative
• Legion evolved a culture of unit cohesion and
  professionalism that gave the Romans an
  unbeatable Army for almost four centuries until
• Failed to adapt to the fighting methods of
  Germanic Tribes
• Citizens serving diminished, and use of
  mercenaries and immigrants with no vested
  interest to Rome
• Involvement of acquisition of its own supplies
  corrupted the officer corps (particularly at the
  furthest, most isolated corners of the empire)

17
Roman Military History

• Craven, Brian, The Punic Wars, Weidenfeld
  Nicolson, 1980
• Crawford, Michael, Early Rome and Italy, in The
  Oxford History of the Classical World, Oxford
  University Press, 1988
• Ferrell, Arther, The Fall of Roman Empire The
  Military Explanation, Thames and Hudson, 1986
• Gibbon, Edward, The Decline and Fall of the Roman
  Empire, Random House, Inc., 1909-1914
• Grant, Michael, History of Rome, Charles
  Scribners Sons, 1978
• Pareti, Luigi and Brezzi, Paolo and Petech,
  Luciano, History of Mankind, Cultural and
  Scientific Development Vol 2 The Ancient World,
  Harper and Row Publishers, 1965. Provides a
  detailed description of Marius reforms and
  campaigns
• Scullard, H.H., Scipio Africanus Soldier and
  Politician, Thames and Hudson, 1970
• Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War, Harvard
  University Press, January 1, 1987

18
The French Army 1798-1807

• Nation in Arms concept of mobilizing entire
  nations resources
• Allowed the French to choose from a large number
  of candidates into the officer corps
• Moral and physical energy of citizen-soldiers and
  new leaders generated by the revolution and
  magnified by successes against allied armies
• Leaders promoted by merit (e.g., Davout)
• Napoleons doctrine of the corps-de-armee
  demanded initiative by division and corps
  commanders operating over wide fronts
• General to Emperor
• Napoleon increasingly used top-down control to
  fight centralized battles (similar to modern
  concept of synchronization)
• As Emperor, he did not encourage subordinates to
  operate autonomously (away from his oversight,
  e.g., Wagram in 1809, Central Germany campaign of
  1813, Waterloo 1815)
• Result The cultural freedoms unleashed by the
  French Revolution and Napoleons background and
  genius induced him to,
• As general, promote talent based on battlefield
  performance (marshals baton in every knapsack)
• As Emperor, substitute central control
  stereotyped tactics based on massed firepower for
  talent at all levels below corps (Wagram and
  beyond)

19
French Napoleonic History

• Bertaud, J ."Napoleon's Officers", Past and
  Present, 112 (1986)
• Butler, A.R.(trans). The Memoirs of Baron De
  Marbot Late Lieutenant in the French Army,
  Longmans, Green Co, London, 1897
• Chandler, D. The Campaigns of Napoleon,
  Macmillian Publishing, London, 1965
• Chandler, D. On the Napoleonic Wars, Stackpole
  Books, London, 1994
• Connelly, O. Blundering to Glory Napoleons
  Military Campaigns, Scholarly Resources Inc,
  Delaware, 1984
• Ellis, G. The Napoleonic Empire, Macmillian
  Press, London, 1991
• Elting, J.R. Swords Around a Throne Napoleon's
  Grande Armee, Macmillian, London, 1988
• Epstein, R.M. "Patterns of Change and Continuity
  in Nineteenth-Century Warfare.", Journal of
  Military History, 56, (July 1992)
• Haythornthwaite, P.J. The Naploeonic Source Book,
  Arms and Armour, London, 1990
• Lyons, M. Napoleon Bonaparte And the Legacy of
  the French Revolution, MacMillan Press, London,
  1994.
• Lynn, J "Towards and Army of Honour The Moral
  Evolution of the French Army, 1789-1815", French
  Historical Studies, 16, (Spring 1989)
• Marbot, M.D. Memoirs du General Baron de Marbot,
  III,Paris, Plon, 1892
• Marshall-Cornwall, J. Napoleon As a Military
  Commander, Clowes and Son Ltd, London, 1965
• Morris, W. Napoleon Warrior and Ruler, Putnam's,
  London, 1896
• Petre, F. Loraine. Napoleon at Bay, Greenhill
  Books, London, 1994 (first published 1914)
• Rothenberg, G. The Art of Warfare in the Age of
  Napoleon, University of Indiana Press, 1978
• Weigley, R.F. The Age of Battles, Pimlico,
  London, 1991. 

20
The Finnish Army, 1926-1940

• Origin of doctrine and personnel management
  systemsGerman Army
• Destroyed the numerically superior invading
  Soviet Army in 1939
• Small unit leaders employed maneuver warfare
  doctrine within larger framework of commanders
  intent, schwerpunkt and mission orders
• The officer corps made up 3 of the force
• Commanders NCOs held leadership and command
  positions for long periods of time 3 to 5 years,
  in some cases even longer
• Promotions and selections were decentralized to
  regimental level
• Based on rigorous testing and performance in
  training exercises
• Extraordinary training of the enlisted ranks,
  NCOs and officers
• In one battle an NCO leading a 100 man detachment
  defeated a Soviet battalion
• Strong regimental system (Army composed mainly of
  National Guard)
• Swiss model (units from same town, district)
• Mobilization plan required reserves to be well
  trained as small regular army
• Results
• Finns achieved the highest exchange ratio in
  WWII101 against the Soviets
• Standards of Finnish officer and NCO accession
  process were even higher than the German system

21
Finnish Military History

• Condon, Richard, The Winter War Russia Against
  Finland (History of 2nd World War),
• Edwards, Robert, The Winter War Russia's
  Invasion of Finland, 1939-1940 , Peguin Books,
  1992
• Engle, Eloise and Paananen, Lauri, The Winter
  War The Soviet Attack on Finland 1939-1940,
  Stackpole Books (January 1992)
• Trotter, William, Frozen Hell The Russo-Finnish
  War of 1939-1940, Algonquin Books , January 2000
• Interviews with Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson, Historian,
  USMC TECOM

22
German/Prussian Army (1809-1942)

• Gerhard Scharnhorst (leading Prussian reformer
  after 1806) believed Leadership
• Accession to officer corps should be determined
  by merit not social class (not completely
  achieved)
• Standards for obtaining a commission should be
  strenuous (achieved-25 made it)
• Officer selections and promotions were
  decentralized to the regiment and regimental
  commander (achieved)
• Office candidate first served in the regiment as
  an ensign
• Candidate required to pass demanding three day
  examination
• Candidates character had to be approved by a
  board of regimental officers
• Rigorous but fair standards ensured that officers
  could focus on their profession
• Percentage of officers to force was 3-5
• 3-track officer system General staff, regimental
  (line) and technical
• Education and personnel system focused inward on
  character development and the art of war at the
  tactical and operational levels, but not at the
  strategic level of war
• Result
• Institutionalized excellence at the tactical and
  operational levels of war, great for wars
  confined to Europe (victories Danish War of 1864,
  Austria in 1866 and France 1870)
• Weak strategically and disastrous at the grand
  strategic level of national conflict as evidenced
  by WWI and WWII (made enemies faster than they
  could kill them)

23
German Military History

• Barry, Quintin, The Franco-Prussian War 1870-71
  Volume 1 the Campaign of Sedan Helmuth Von
  Moltke and the Overthrow of the Second Empire,
  Helion Company, 2007
• Corum, Robert, The Roots of Blitzkrieg Hans von
  Seeckt and German Military Reform, University of
  Kansas Press, 1992
• Horne, Alistor, The Fall of Paris The Siege and
  the Commune, 1870-71. Penguin Books, 1981
• Howard, Michael Eliot, The Franco-Prussian War
  The German Invasion of France, 1870-1871,
  Routledge, 2001
• Millman, Richard, British Foreign Policy and the
  Coming of the Franco-Prussian War. Clarendon
  Press. 1965
• Ollivier, Emile, Translated by George Burnham
  Ives. The Franco-Prussian War and Its Hidden
  Causes, Little, Brown, and Company, 1912
• Stone, David, Fighting for the Fatherland The
  Story of the German Soldier from 1648 to the
  Present Day, Conway. 2006
• Stone, David, First Reich Inside the German Army
  During the War with France, 1870-71, Brasseys,
  2002
• Wawro, Geoffrey, The Franco-Prussian War The
  German Conquest of France in 1870-1871, Cambridge
  University Press, 2003
• Werstein, Irving, The Franco-Prussian War
  Germany's Rise as a World Power, J. Messner. 1965
• Wetzel, David, A Duel of Giants Bismarck,
  Napoleon III, and the Origins of the
  Franco-Prussian War, University of Wisconsin
  Press, 2003

24
The Israeli Army of 1948-1973

• High initiative, decentralized officer culture
  evolved out of commando operations of 1948
• Up through 1967, most senior tank officers served
  as commandos in 1948 or earlier
• Commando heritage evolved naturally into an
  effective maneuver warfare doctrine copied from
  the German army between 1948 and 1956, reached
  fruition in 1967 and was sufficiently intact to
  recover in 1973
• Officer accession (up through 1973) focused on
  battlefield leadership
• All officers began in enlisted rankstop soldiers
  became NCOs and top NCOs became officers
• NCO Squad leaders course considered one of the
  toughest in the world
• Officers emerged from a unit cohesion system that
  kept crew and squads together from beginning of
  service
• Rigorous selection process limited officer corps
  to 7-8 percent of the force
• Officer assignments prioritized by success and
  initiative exhibited in combat operations
• Priorities by initiative highest to fighter
  pilots, then paratroopers, then tankers, then so
  on down to supporting branches
• Twenty-year career norm, officers served in few
  assigned positions
• Most served in combat arms then moved over to
  supporting arms
• Promotions through Lt. COL selection for
  command delegated to the brigade commander
• Results
• Up to 1967, IDF achieved quick mobilization and
  quick victories with low casualties
• Lost initiative during opening days of 1973 War,
  but recovered and quickly isolated Arab
  adversaries
• Changed officer accession system approach to
  provide larger pool of officers in reaction to
  high officer casualties in 1973witnessed marked
  downturn in performance in the 1982 Lebanon
  invasion and subsequent Intifada

25
Israeli Military History

• Author interviews with Martin van Creveld,
  October 1997
• Author interviews with Dr. Ben Uzi, Israeli Army
  March 2010
• Boyd, John, Patterns of Conflict. 1986. accessed
  5 February 2005
• Rothenburg , Erich Gunther, The anatomy of the
  Israeli army The Israel Defence Force, 1948-78,
  Praeger, 1997
• Schiff, Zeev, History of the Israeli Army,
  Sidgwick Jackson Ltd, March 5, 1987
• Van Creveld, Martin, Command in War, Harvard
  University Press, January 1, 1987
• Van Creveld, Martin, The Sword and the Olive A
  Critical History of the Israeli Defense Force,
  Public Affairs 1st edition July 2, 2002

26
Unsuccessful Armies
27
Prussian Army of 1806

• Need to change faced with doctrinal changes
  unleashed by the French Revolution Napoleons
  operational level brilliance, the Prussians
  formalized Frederick the Greats centralized
  concepts of operations and tactics without his
  brilliance
• Debate was discouraged, even frowned upon
• An enormous social gap between officers and
  enlisted men
• The dry rot revealed itself at Jena-Auestadt (Oct
  1806) when the Prussian Army collapsed and fled
• Officer accessions, promotions and development
• Drawn largely from Prussian nobility
• Selection promotions based on connections, not
  performance
• Professional education did not exist
• Symbols glorifying bravery and elan preferred
  over professionalism
• Result German reformers realized that an Armys
  performance depended on
• Having a professional system of education and
  development to analyze lessons from military
  history
• A culture that encourages debate and intellectual
  ferment that is needed to evolve these lessons
  into new ideas (and technologies) needed to fight
  the next war
• A system of selection of promotion of officers
  that stresses ability and performance rather than
  family connections
• Evolutionary byproduct a culture of trust and
  mutual respect

28
The French Army 1870-1914, 1919-1940

• The Revolution democratized the French officer
  corps which continued throughout the 19th and
  20th Centuries
• But the trust and mutual respect that united the
  German officers never evolved in the French
  officer corps due to a system that promoted the
  individual at the cost of the whole
• The failure of 1870 was an obsession with
  colonial warfare that made those at the top
  successful prior to 1870, and unable to cope with
  the new German method of war
• Fatal weaknesses of the French officer corps of
  1940 can be seen in many events or attitudes
  prior to WWII
• Lack of mutual respect, careerism and corruption
  (e.g., Dreyfus Affair before WWI)
• Alienation of the careerist military from the
  regime of the 1930s
• Lack of solidarity with subordinates,
  particularly enlisted men (1920s and 1930s)
• Suppression of internal debate (DeGualle)
• Officer bloat (20 of total force) caused many
  officers to serve as NCOs
• Inability to deal with unexpected situations
  (Metz and Sedan in 1870, Battle of Frontiers 1914
  and the German breakthrough 1940)
• Centralized control and authoritarianism crushed
  the initiative of subordinates and blocked
  cooperation between branches of army
• Cartesian Outlook shaped education and thinking
  by attempting to impose order, method and routine
  on the chaos of war
• Result
• A culture that discourages discussion, debate and
  intellectual ferment risks turning inward by
  imposing the unquestioned assumption on the
  lessons of history and new technologies to
  reinforce old ideas
• Example, the French obsession with the doctrine
  of methodical battle after WWI (RMA)
• Example, Maginot line (Star Wars)

29
French Military History

• Numerous interviews with Dr. Bruce Gudmundsson on
  French Military culture. Dr. Gudmundsson founded
  and ran the USMC School of Advance Warfare (SAW)
  course of majors in the early 1990s, and is
  currently a historian for the USMC TECOM
• Cook, Don, Charles De Gaulle A Biography, G.P.
  Putmans Sons, 1983
• De Gaulle, Charles, The Army of the Future,
  Hutchinson, 1940.
• Doughty, Robert, From the Offense a Outrance to
  the Methodical Battle, in Maneuver Warfare an
  Anthology, Richard Hooker, editor, Presidio
  Press, 1993. Also, Vandergriff interviews with
  Dr. Robert Doughty September and November 1997
• Doughty, Robert, Seeds of Disaster The
  Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939,
  Archon Book, 1985
• Horne, Alistair, The Price of Glory Verdun 1916,
  Penguin Books, 1962
• Lottman, Herbert, Petain, Hero or Traitor The
  Untold Story, William Morrow Company, Inc. 1985
• Shirer, William, The Collapse of the Third
  Republic An Inquiry into the Fall of France in
  1940, Simon Schuster, 1969

30
Italian Army 1914-1942

• Possessed the same doctrine as the Germans
  (copied their manuals verbatim), but failed to
  create an officer corps that could execute it
• Up through WWII, officers were selected from the
  aristocratic class, and the separation between
  them and the enlisted ranks was considerable
• officers were not united by a tradition on
  professional matters
• Measures of performance, such as examinations,
  did not determine promotions, which were made by
  a centralized selection board in Rome, usually
  with considerable political or family influence
• An excess of either cleverness (intelligence)
  or zeal was bad form
• Combat experience came from beating primitive
  tribal adversaries in colonial wars, where there
  was no pressure to develop military art of
  combined arms warfare
• Result
• The culture of the Italian Army in 1939 was
  incapable of executing Maneuver Warfare
• They professed Speed and Initiative in their
  doctrine, but they practiced centralized control
• Why? Hierarchal, stand-offish relationships
  paralyzed commanders and subordinates by
  introducing complex layers of bureaucratic
  procedures
• Why? Formal requirements of protocol impeded
  frank communications
• Careerism increased risk averse behavior which
  curtailed freedom of action

31
Italian Military History

• Cloutier, Patrick, The Italian Royal Army In
  Mussolinis Wars, 1935-1945, republished 1987 to
  2010, available as download from www.lulu.com
• Gooch, John, Mussolini and his Generals The
  Armed Forces and Facist Foreign Policy,
  1922-1945, Cambridge Military Press, 2007
• Nicolle, David, The Italian Invasion of Abyssinia
  1935-36, Osprey Publishing, October 1997
• Sweet, John, The Mechanization of Mussolinis
  Army, 1920-1940, Stackpole Military History,
  December 30, 2006
• Trye, Rex, Mussolinis Africa Korps The Italian
  Army in North Africa, 1940-1943, Axis Europa
  Books 1999
• Walker, Ian, Iron Hulls Iron Hearts Mussolinis
  Elite Armored Divisions in North Africa, The
  Crowood Press , July 15, 2006

32
British Army 1856, 1898, 1939-42

• Regime was not interested in its Army officer
  corps during 19th Century
• Did not need a professional army to protect its
  elites from social revolution, like colonial
  powers
• Based its foreign policy on a maritime strategy
  the colonial threats to its empire
• While they maintained one of the finest
  regimental systems from the time of Cromwells
  army in the 1600s, its officer system
• Recruited and selected officers from the
  aristocratic class up until WWII, but when
  offices were needed for WWI and WWII, they
  expanded the officer corps too quickly
• Regimental systems decentralized promotions to
  the lower levels (good), but selection was
  influenced more by aristocratic background and
  wealth than by competence
• De-emphasized education in the art of war,
  because the Army was viewed as a gentlemans
  profession (club)
• Fixation on colonial threats coupled by
  gentlemanly amateurism created conditions
  fostering a rigid doctrine with close
  (centralized) control
• Authoritarian mentality of aristocratic tradition
  impeded learning by making it difficult to admit
  mistakes
• Reports by junior officers were discarded after
  the Boer War and WWI
• Results Regimental system built solid unit
  cohesion and a strong NCO corps that never broke
  in combat, but could not evolve with war or adapt
  during war
• Balaklava (1856), small unit NCOs withstood
  encirclement by superior numbers of Russian
• Rorks Drift (1898), encircled company beat off
  3,000 combat veterans, highly disciplined and
  motivated Zulus
• N. Africa (1941-1942), maintained cohesion and
  avoided collapse despite repeated tactical and
  operational errors when facing Rommel

33
British Army History

• Based on numerous discussions of British Army
  history with LTC Symon Tanner, British Army
  liaison to ARCIC Forward
• Chandler and Beckett, The Oxford History of the
  British Army, Oxford Military Press, 2003
• Clayton, Anthony, The British Officer Leading
  the Army from 1660 to Present, Longman, 2007
• Griffith, Paddy, Battle Tactics of the Western
  Front The British Armys Art of Attack
  1916-1918, Yale University Press, 1996
• Hastings, Max, The British Army A Definitive
  History of the 20th Century, Imperial War Museum,
  2008
• Miller, Stephen, Volunteers in the Veld
  Britains Citizen Soldiers and the South African
  War 1899-1902, Campaigns and Commanders, 2007
• Strachen, Hew, Big Wars and Small Wars The
  British Army and the Lessons of the 20th Century,
  Routledge, 2006
• Strawson, John, Beggars in Red The British Army
  1789-1889, Pen Sword, 2003

34
Mobilization doctrine

• Need for massive mobilization shapes todays
  personnel management policies
• up or out promotion system in order to keep
  officers fit and young
• Need a place to keep everyone in order to move
  them up
• Numbers of officers kept top heavy to provide
  pool to lead new formations in time of
  mobilization
• Large and many headquarters to oversee process
  and adherence to doctrine, and provides place to
  put people (institutionalized over time)
• Legacy of General George Marshalls view of the
  world
• Remains organized to fight a linear war on the
  attritional model for WWII
• Despite attempts at it, remains focused on
  individual vice unit replacement

35
Up or Out Promotion System

• Navy personnel act of 1916 first introduced up or
  out promotion system, but failed because Navy had
  small officer corps (it requires a large, top
  heavy system to work)
• Officer Personnel Act of 1947 (based on
  testimonies by Eisenhower, Marshall and Bradley),
• Significantly increased the size of the officer
  corps at the middle and senior grades for
  mobilization
• Embraced the up or out promotion system to
  develop generalists while keeping the officer
  corps vigorous and youthful
• Established the all or nothing 20 year
  retirement system
• 1970 War College Study of Professionalism stated
  that the up or out promotion system,
• contributed significantly to much of the
  undesirable and unethical conduct of its
  officers
• seniors sacrificed integrity on the alter of
  personal success
• junior officers perceived a preoccupation with
  insignificant statistics
• Debate began in 1974 over up or out that led to
  the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act
  (DOPMA) of 1980, Senator Sam Nunn argued against
  it,
• The up or out promotion system forced too-many
  experienced officers out
• The number of officers at middle and upper
  levels were too high
• But, the Services wanted up or out
• The theory behind up or out,
• If the system works properly, there will always
  be more officers qualified for promotion than
  there are vacancies available
• Permits selectivity, the selection of the best
  qualified
• By forcing officers up they would receive
  exposure to numerous jobs that could apply to a
  meaningful way in senior leadership positions
• Maintains a vigorous and youthful officer
  corps, physically able to deal with the demands
  of combat

36
References

• Authors Note I found it necessary to revisit
  the research I did for Path to Victory Americas
  Army and the Revolution in Human Affairs due to
  many factors that influence the evolution of the
  Armys personnel system influence Army ROTC. I
  added to the research I was in the progress of
  making for Raising the Bar (2006) and Manning the
  Legions (2008). I also found that I had to update
  my knowledge of Army doctrine (new FMs written
  during General Shinsekis tenure at Chief of
  Staff (1999-2003) or as a result of his
  Transformation efforts, laid new foundation and
  guidance for Army ROTC. General Schoolmaker
  assumed the duties of Army Chief of Staff in July
  2003 and has driven even more leadership-centric
  guidance, some documents such as Adapt or Die
  provided excellent direction for where the
  officer accession programsROTC, USMA and
  OCSshould go to develop an adaptive leader.
  Recently, I was involved in the ARCIC (TRADOC)
  Human Dimension study, as well as the 2010
  writing and publication of the Army Capstone
  Concept. My research and sources involved 10
  areas and continue to evolve to this day
• The history of the evolution of the U.S. Army and
  Army ROTC
• A study of the U.S. Army officers corps study of
  warfare and its influence
• A study of the evolution of the U.S. society and
  its influence on Army ROTC
• The theories of leadership
• An analysis of education and training approaches
  to teach cognitive skills
• The history of political correctness
• Reviews of psychology, sociology, anthropology,
• The evolution of the influence of management
  science on leadership and academic development in
  the United States
• A review of my research I had done for Learning
  From Others The Officer Development Approaches
  of Armies through History. In this book, which I
  never finished, I had examined the cultures of
  the armies Ancient Rome, Britain, France,
  Germany, Israel, and Italy throughout periods of
  time to give insights to the officer development
  practices of other nations. For this, I am
  greatly indebted to Dr Bruce I Gudmundsson, Dr.
  John Sayan and William S. Lind for their patience
  and time in teaching and checking my attempts at
  the French and German languages. Bruce also
  directed me to many European military history web
  sites.
• A study and understanding of the evolutions of
  war, particularly into the Fourth Generation of
  Warfare. I am indebted to Colonel T.X. Hammes
  USMC, Mr., William S. Lind, Dr. Chet Richards,
  Franklin C. Spinney, Greg Wilcox LTC U.S. Army
  retired, and Colonel G. I. Wilson USMC
• I am indebted to Dr. Jonathan Shay for teaching
  me how to understand the value of trust in
  military organizations and being a missionary
  in the effort to reform the military personnel
  system.
• I am also indebted to my former boss, Lieutenant
  Allen Gill for our great conversations on
  leadership, how to develop it, how to create it
  in our type of academic environment, talks on
  strategy, how the Army works, and just great
  stories about people. LTC Gill has allowed
  Georgetown ROTC to evolve into a Learning
  Organization.
•  

37
References

• Listed below are a compilation of all the
  sources, including web sites. I am indebted to
  the staffs of The Archives of the United States
  The Library of Congress The Eisenhower Library
  U.S. Army Command General Staff College, The
  Lauinger Memorial Library, Georgetown University
  The U.S. Army War College, not only for their
  assistance, but for the maintenance of some great
  sources through web sites that saved so much
  time.
•  
• At this time I am also completing a roll up of
  the hundreds of notes that I have taken since
  June 1998, as well as compiling informal surveys
  I recently conducted.

38
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•  

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