E-mail%20Security

1

• E-mail Security
• PGP and S/MIME
• Certificates and PKI

2
E-mail Security

• E-mail is one of the most widely used network
  services
• killer application of the Internet
• Normally message contents not secured
• Can be read/modified either in transit or at
  destination by the attacker
• E-mail service is like postcard service
• just pick it and read it

3
Email Security Enhancements

• confidentiality
• protection from disclosure
• authentication
• of sender of message
• message integrity
• protection from modification
• non-repudiation of origin
• protection from denial by sender

4
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

• widely used secure e-mail software
• originally a file encryption/decryption facility
• developed by Phil Zimmermann
• a security activist who has had legal problems
  due to PGP
• best available crypto algorithms are employed
• available on several platform with source code
• originally free, now commercial versions exist
• not controlled by a standardization body
• although there are RFCs

5
PGP Mechanisms

• Digital Signatures (and consequently message
  authentication and integrity)
• RSA, DSS
• Message Encryption
• CAST, IDEA, 3DES (all at least 128 bits)
• symmetric keys are used once and encrypted using
  RSA or ElGamal (based on discrete logs)
• Compression using ZIP
• Radix-64 conversion (to ASCII)
• for e-mail compatibility

6
PGP Operation Digital Signatures

• Classical application of public key crypto
• This figure is actually for RSA
• for DSA refer to previous lectures
• Z is zip function
• radix-64 conversion is done after zip at sender,
  before Z-1 at receiver
• may be done only for signature or for the whole
  message

7
PGP Operation Confidentiality
EPUb, Ks

• One-time session key, Ks
• generated at random
• encrypted using a public key cryptosystem, EP
• RSA or ElGamal
• Message is compressed before encryption
• This is the default case

8
PGP Operation Confidentiality and
Authentication

• uses both services on same message
• create signature and attach to message
• compress and encrypt both message signature
• attach encrypted session key
• radix-64 conversion is for everything at the end

9
PGP Operation radix-64 conversion

• Encrypted text and signatures create binary
  output
• however email was designed only for text
• hence PGP must encode raw binary data into
  printable ASCII characters
• uses radix-64 algorithm (See appendix 15b)
• maps 3 bytes to 4 printable chars

10
PGP Operation Summary
11
PGP Key ID concept

• since a user may have many public/private keys in
  use, there is a need to identify which is
  actually used to encrypt session key in a message
• PGP uses a key identifier which is least
  significant 64-bits of the public key
• uniqueness?
• very likely, at least for a particular user ID
  (e-mail address)
• Key IDs are used in signatures too
• key ID for the public key corresponding to the
  private key used for signature
• Key IDs are sent together with messages

12
PGP Key Rings

• each PGP user has a pair of keyrings to store
  public and private keys
• public-key ring contains all the public-keys of
  other PGP users known to this user

13
PGP Key Rings

• private-key ring contains the public/private key
  pair(s) for this user,
• private keys are encrypted using a key derived
  from a hashed passphrase

14
Key rings and message generation
15
Key rings and message reception
16
PGP Key Management - 1

• From PGP documentation
• This whole business of protecting public keys
  from tampering is the most difficult problem in
  practical public key applications
• You have to make sure about the legitimacy of the
  public key of your party
• exchange public-keys manually (using CDs, etc.)
• verify fingerprint of a public key over the phone
• trust another individual who signs public keys
• public key signatures

17
PGP Key Management - 2

• Public keys could be signed by
• Certification Authorities (CA)
• trusted entities
• the mechanism of S/MIME, not in PGP
• in PGP each user is a CA
• everybody can sign keys of users they know
  directly
• other users key signatures can also be used, if
  those users are trusted
• The only ultimately trusted entity is yourself
• all other keys should either be directly signed
  by you or there should be a trusted path of key
  signatures
• you reflect your own trust assessment in your
  public key ring (no system enforcement)
• key ring includes trust indicators
• web of trust

18
PGP Key Management - 3

• A trusted signature on a public key means that
• the key really belongs to its owner
• But does not mean that key owner is trusted to
  sign other keys
• key owner can sign other keys, but their
  trustworthiness is determined by the verifier
  (the owner of the pubkey ring)
• Making sure about the legitimacy of a key and
  trusting the key owner to find out other keys are
  two different concepts
• Keys and signatures on them are generally
  obtained from PGP public keyservers
• there might be several signatures on a single key

19
PGP Key Management - 4
A public key ring owned by you
These are assigned by you
This is calculated
20
S/MIME

• Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
• A standard way for email encryption and signing
• IETF effort (RFCs 2632, 2633 for version 3.0
  RFCs 3580, 3581 for version 3.1)
• Industry support
• Not a standalone software, a system that is to be
  supported by email clients
• such as MS Outlook and Thunderbird
• S/MIME handles digital signatures
• Also provides encryption

21
Quick E-mail History

• SMTP and RFC 822
• only ASCII messages (7-bit)
• MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions)
• content type
• Almost any of information can appear in an email
  message
• transfer encoding
• specifies how the message body is encoded into
  textual form (radix64 is common)
• S/MIME Secure MIME
• new content types, like signature, encrypted data

22
S/MIME Functions

• enveloped data
• encrypted content and associated keys
• signed data
• encoded message encoded signed message digest
• clear-signed data
• cleartext message encoded signed message digest
• signed and enveloped data
• Nested signed and encrypted entities

23
S/MIME Cryptographic Algorithms

• hash functions SHA-1 MD5
• digital signatures DSS RSA
• session key encryption ElGamal RSA
• message encryption Triple-DES, RC2/40 and others
• sender should know the capabilities of the
  receiving entity (public announcement or
  previously received messages from receiver)
• otherwise sender takes a risk

24
Scope of S/MIME Security

• S/MIME secures a MIME entity
• a MIME entity is entire message except the
  headers
• so the header is not secured
• First MIME message is prepared
• This message and other security related data
  (algorithm identifiers, certificates, etc.) are
  processed by S/MIME
• and packed as one of the S/MIME content type

25
S/MIME Content Types
26
EnvelopedData

• For message encryption
• Similar to PGP
• create a random session key, encrypt the message
  with that key and a conventional crypto, encrypt
  the session key with recipients public key
• Unlike PGP, recipients public key comes from an
  X.509 certificate
• trust management is different

27
SignedData

• For signed message
• both message and signature are encoded so that
  the recipient only sees some ASCII characters if
  he does not use an email client with S/MIME
  support
• Similar to PGP
• first message is hashed, then the hash is
  encrypted using senders private key
• Message, signature, identifiers of algorithms and
  the senders certificate are packed together
• again difference between S/MIME and PGP in trust
  management

28
Clear Signing

• Another mechanism for signature
• but the message is not encoded, so an email
  client with no S/MIME support could also view the
  message
• of course the signature will not be verified and
  will be seen as a meaningless attachment
• multipart/signed content type
• 2 parts
• Clear text message
• Signature
• Lets see an example

29
S/MIME Certificate Processing

• S/MIME uses X.509 v3 certificates
• Certification Authorities (CAs) issue
  certificates
• unlike PGP, a user cannot be a CA
• each client has a list of trusted CAs
  certificates
• actually that list comes with e-mail client
  software or OS
• and own public/private key pairs and certs
• Our textbook says S/MIME key management is a
  hybrid of a strict X.509 CA hierarchy and PGPs
  web of trust
• but I do not believe that this is the case,
  because it is very hard for an average user to
  maintain the list of trusted CAs

30
S/MIME Certificate Processing and CAs

• One should obtain a certificate from a CA in
  order to send signed messages
• Certificates classes (common practice by most
  CAs)
• Class 1
• Class 2
• Class 3
• CA certification policies (Certificate Practice
  Statement)
• ID-control practices
• Class 1 only email address check
• Class 2 class1 against third party database /
  fax documents
• Class 3 class1 apply in person and submit
  picture IDs and/or paper documents

Stronger identity validation
Easier to issue
31
X.509 Certificates and PKIs

• SSL and S/MIME uses X.509 certificates
• now we will see the details of them
• later we will continue with PKIs (Public Key
  Infrastructures)

32
Certificates

• Yet another public-key distribution method
• first (conceptually) offered by Kohnfelder (1978)
  
• Binding between the public-key and its owner
• Issued (digitally signed) by the Certificate
  Authority (CA)

33
Certificates

• Certificates are verified by the verifiers to
  find out correct public key of the target entity
• Certificate verification is the verification of
  the signature on certificate
• In order to verify a certificate, the verifier
• must know the public key of the CA
• must trust the CA

34
Certificates
CA
Certified Entity
Albert Levi
Albert Levi
Albert Levi
Verifier
35
Issues Related Certificates

• CA certification policies (Certificate Practice
  Statement)
• how reliable is the CA?
• certification policies describe the methodology
  of certificate issuance
• ID-control practices
• loose control only email address
• tight control apply in person and submit picture
  IDs and/or hard documentation

36
Issues Related Certificates

• TRUST
• verifiers must trust CAs
• CAs need not trust the certified entities
• certified entity need not trust its CA
• What is trust in certification systems?
• Answer to the question How correct is the
  certificate information?
• related to certification policies

37
Issues Related Certificates

• Certificate types
• ID certificates
• discussed here
• authorization certificates
• no identity
• binding between public key and authorization info
• Certificate storage and distribution
• along with a signed message
• distributed/centralized databases

38
Issues Related Certificates

• Certificate Revocation
• certificates have lifetimes, but they may be
  revoked before the expiration time
• Reasons
• certificate holder key compromise/lost
• CA key compromise
• end of contract (e.g. certificates for employees)
• Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) hold the list
  of certificates that are not expired but revoked
• each CA periodically issues such a list with
  digital signature on it

39
Real World Analogies

• Is a certificate an electronic identity?
• Concerns
• a certificate is a binding between an identity
  and a key, not a binding between an identity and
  a real person
• one must submit its certificate to identify
  itself, but submission is not sufficient, the key
  must be used in a protocol
• anyone can submit someone elses certificate

40
Real World Analogies

• Result Certificates are not picture IDs
• So, what is the real world analogy for
  certificates?
• Endorsed document/card that serves as a binding
  between the identity and signature

41
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

• PKI is a complete system and well-defined
  mechanisms for certificates
• certificate issuance
• certificate revocation
• certificate storage
• certificate distribution

42
PKI

• Business Practice Issue certificates and make
  money
• several CAs
• Several CAs are also necessary due to political,
  geographical and trust reasons
• 3 interconnection models
• hierarchical
• cross certificates
• hybrid

43
Hierarchical PKI Example
44
Cross Certificate Based PKI Example
45
Hybrid PKI example
46
Certificate Paths
47
Certificate Paths

• Verifier must know public key of the first CA
• Other public keys are found out one by one
• All CAs on the path must be trusted by the
  verifier

48
Certificate Paths with Reverse Certificates
49
Organization-wide PKI

• Local PKI for organizations
• may have global connections, but the registration
  facilities remain local
• generally to solve local problems
• local secure access to resources

50
Organization-wide PKI
Certificate Processor/Authority
Certificate Distribution
Registration Authority


Architecture of a typical organization
-
wide PKI

51
Hosted vs. Standalone PKI

• Hosted PKI
• PKI vendor acts as CA
• PKI owner is the RA
• Standalone PKI
• PKI owner is both RA and CA

52
Hosted vs. Standalone PKI
53
X.509

• ITU-T standard (recommendation)
• ISO 9495-2 is the equivalent ISO standard
• part of X.500 family for directory services
• distributed set of servers that store user
  information
• an utopia that has never been carried out
• X.509 defines the authentication services and the
  pubic-key certificate structure (certificates are
  to be stored in the directory)
• so that the directory would contain public keys
  of the users

54
X.509

• Defines identity certificates
• attribute (authorization) certificates are added
  in 4th edition (2000)
• Defines certificate structure, not PKI
• Supports both hierarchical model and cross
  certificates
• End users cannot be CAs

55
X.509 Certificate Format
56
X.509v3 Extensions

• Not enough flexibility in X.509 v1 and v2
• mostly due to directory specific fields
• real-world security needs are different
• email/URL names should be included in a
  certificate
• key identification was missing (so should be
  included)
• policy details should indicate under which
  conditions a certificate can be used (was not the
  case in v1 and v2)
• avoidance of blind trust was not possible in v1
  and v2
• Rather than explicitly naming new fields a
  general extension method is defined
• An extension consists of an extension identifier,
  value and criticality indicator

57
X.509v3 Extensions

• Key and policy information
• subject issuer key identifiers
• indicators of certificate policies supported by
  the cert
• key usage (list of purposes like signature,
  encryption, etc)
• Alternative names, in alternative formats for
  certificate subject and issuer
• Certificate path constraints
• For CA certs and to restrict certificate issuance
  based on
• path length (restricting number of subordinate
  CAs)
• policy identifiers
• names
• Verifier could exercise its own restrictions
  during verification as well
• No blind trust to CAs