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Pension Plan Allocation to Real Estate when Plan Trustees have Reputational Utility

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Pension Plan Allocation to Real Estate when Plan Trustees have Reputational Utility Kiat-Ying Seah and James D. Shilling National University of Singapore – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Pension Plan Allocation to Real Estate when Plan Trustees have Reputational Utility


1
Pension Plan Allocation to Real Estate when Plan
Trustees have Reputational Utility
  • Kiat-Ying Seah and James D. Shilling
  • National University of Singapore
  • DePaul University, Chicago
  • ERES 2010
  • Milan, Italy

2
Objectives
  • Tries to explain why institutions invest very
    little in real estate.
  • An entropy model where institutions care about
    what their target returns are
  • Conformity matters
  • Persistent portfolio allocation
  • Implication allocation is based on a power
    utility not on a mean-variance variety

3
Motivation
  • Reality institutions invest 2.5 to 4 of total
    assets in real estate
  • Normative studies
  • 15-20 (Fogler, 1984)
  • 43 (Webb and Rubens, 1987)
  • 19-28 (Giliberto, 1993)
  • Modelling idea - Pension plans are fiduciaries
    and care about how others assess their
    performance include Reputation in utility
    function.

4
Pension Trustees Objective function
  • Measure reputation by an entropy function
  • Objective of each plan trustee maximize
    reputation subject to a shortfall constraint

5
Allocation is a function of belief-choice
  • Optimal belief choice multinomial logit
    probabilistic choice function
  • Trustees will skew their portfolio toward assets
    with higher returns.
  • Prob of choosing a target that deviates from
    group mean is low conforming behavior.

6
Given beliefs, solve for portfolio
  • Power utility form, risk aversion is endogenous
  • What matters?
  • Target returns, W0Z
  • Surplus returns ST

Initial Funding Ratio matters
7
Data and Results
  • Data are obtained from CRSP/COMPUSTAT
  • 1990-2004.
  • Summary Statistics

8
Summary Statistics
9
Portfolio Simulations
  1. SRMP looks at total portfolio variance
  2. Entropic cares about the entire distribution

10
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11
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12
Empirical Evidence
  • Use Sharpes (1992) style methodology
  • Regress pension surplus returns on six benchmark
    returns.
  • Collect R-square statistic for each pension plan.
  • Because R-square varies from 0 to 1, transform
    this variable using the logistic transformation
    STYLE variable
  • Run the following regression
  • Style F (Target surplus return, Conformity,
    Initial Funding Ratio)

13
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14
Conclusion
  • Empirical results are the same when we include
    firm fixed effects.
  • Reputational utility causes institutions to
  • Skew portfolio away from real estate to achieve
    minimum target rate of return.
  • Achieving minimum target rate of return requires
    that pension trustees be conformists.
  • Explains herding behavior.
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