Soviet Union

1
Soviet Union

• Foreign Affairs
• 1929 - 1941

2
Foreign Policy in the 1920s

• Memories of Civil War
• Foreign Intervention
• British, French, US, Japanese
• Capitalists fundamentally opposed to Communist
  system
• Lenin and Trotskys World View
• Marxism was a global phenomenon
• The Revolution had to be exported ASAP
• Russo-Polish War of 1920
• See-Saw War
• Both sides Overextended themselves
• Narrowly averted a disaster allowed Whites to
  Resurrect Civil War in South of Russia

3

• Comrade Lenin cleans the world of filth.
• The Promise of exporting Revolution
• COMINTERN set up in 1919 to achieve World
  Revolution

4
The Bolshevik Dilemma

• How to deal with the nations of the world
• Work to undermine them
• Or
• Develop Diplomatic relations with them
• Consider advantages/disadvantages for both of the
  them!

5
Sources Author Date Desire to Spread World Revolution Socialism in One Coutnry










6
Source 1

• Comrade Lenin cleans the world of filth.
• 1920

7
Source 2

• We have always and repeatedly pointed out to the
  workers that the underlying chief task and basic
  condition of our victory is the propagation of
  revolution at least to several of the more
  advanced countries
• Lenin, Feb 1921

8
Source 3

• We go to it because trade with Capitalist
  countries (so long as they have not altogether
  collapsed) is unconditionally necessary for us
• Lenin explaining why he was attending the
  International Conference at Genoa in 1922

9
Source 4

• The way out lies only in the victory of the
  Proletariat of the advanced countries. Viewed
  from this standpoint, a national revolution is
  not a self-contained whole it is only a link in
  the internal chain. The international revolution
  constitutes a permanent process, despite declines
  and ebbs.
• Trotsky, 1930

10
Source 5

• The ensuring of peace cannot depend on our
  efforts alone, it requires the collaboration and
  co-operation of other states. While therefore
  trying to establish and maintain relations with
  all states, we are giving special attention to
  strengthening and making close our relations with
  those which, like us, give proof of their sincere
  desire to maintain peace and are ready to resist
  those who break the peace.
• Litvinov, 1933

11
Source 6

• The USSR would never be swayed by alliances with
  this or that foreign power, be it France, Poland
  or Germany, but would always base her policy on
  self-interest
• Stalin, 1934

12
Source 7

• We toilers of the Soviet Union must count on our
  own efforts in defending our affairs and, above
  all, on our Red Army in the defence of our
  Country
• Molotov, 1936

13
Source 8

• This time we shall observe the contest between
  Germany and the Western powers and shall not
  intervene in the conflict until we ourselves feel
  it fit to do so in order to bring about the
  decision
• Litvinov to Czech FO, 1938

14
Source 9

• England and France have rejected the policy of
  collective securityand taken a position of
  non-interventionthe policy of non-intervention
  reveals an eagerness not to hinder Germany from
  embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet
  Union be cautious and do not allow Soviet Russia
  to be drawn into the conflicts by wargmongers who
  are accustomed to have others pull their
  chestnuts out of the fire.
• Stalin, 1939

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Source 10
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Development of Soviet Foreign Policy

• Phase 1 (1917 8)
• Revolutionary Period
• Phase 2 (1918 1920)
• Civil War Period
• Phase 3 (1921 1927)
• Recovery and Peace
• Phase 4 (1928 1933)
• The Left Turn
• Phase 5 (1933 1938)
• Collective Security
• Phase 6 (1938 1941)
• Self-Preservation

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Development of Soviet Foreign Policy - Phase One

• The Revolutionary Period
• October 1917
• Bolshevik Revolution
• February 1918
• Cancellation of all Foreign debts
• March 1918
• Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
• Humiliating but a price worth paying according to
  Lenin
• Allows Bolsheviks to consolidate power

18
Phase Two

• The Civil War
• 1918 - 1919
• Foreign Intervention in Civil War
• March 1919
• COMINTERN established
• Apr-Oct 1920
• Russo-Polish War
• Nov 1920
• Evacuation of Crimea

19
G. V. ChicherinForeign Commissioner 1918 - 1930

• Ex-Menshevik and Ex-Aristocrat
• Worked for Tsarist Foreign Ministry
• Educated but emotional
• Converted to Bolshevism whilst forcibly sent on
  holiday to Cure his Homosexuality Chance
  meeting with Lenin
• Pro-German
• Treaty of Brest-Litovsk
• Treaty of Rapallo
• Anti-British
• Had been imprisoned by British 1917 1918 for
  anti-war
• Disliked Curzon
• Advocated policy of engagement
• Engage Capitalists in order to stop them uniting
  against Communist Russia
• Not a member of the Politburo

20
Phase Three

• Recovery and Peace 1921 1927
• 1921
• Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement
• 1922
• Treaty of Rapallo
• 1923
• Curzon Ultimatum over Central Asian communist
  adventures
• Threatened suspension of trade agreement
• 1924
• USSR officially recognised by GB, France Italy
• Forged Zinoviev Letter
• COMINTERN urging propaganda in British Armed
  Forces
• Victorious Conservatives cold shouldered USSR for
  a year
• 1926
• Treaty of Berlin extended Treaty of Rapallo
• General Strike in Britain Comintern involvement
• Socialism in One Country idea proposed by Stalin
• 1927
• Chinese communists massacred by Chiang Kai Shek

21
Why did Soviet Foreign Policy become more
Conservative in the 1920s?

• Russian Polish War disaster
• Bolshevik Consolidation
• Internal positioning within Politburo
• Conservatives backed safe Stalin
• Leftists backed the more aggressive Trotsky
• Economic Disaster in Post World War One and Post
  Civil War Russia
• Economically backward when Tsarist
• Myriad National Identities within USSR
• Plenty to keep Red Army busy regaining the old
  borders of Tsarist Russia
• Fear of Capitalists
• Had to prepare for a re-invasion of Foreigners
• Fear of Proxy wars
• Capitalists might use Turks, Poles or Persians to
  reignite RCW
• Avoid War on Two Fronts Japan and Germany
• Unstable Borders
• Germany, China, Japan in Korea, British in India

22
Relations with Britain

• 1921 Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement
• Positive on both sides
• Pragmatic
• Conservatives suspicious of Communists
• Seizure of private property
• Curzon ultimatum 1923
• Zinoviev letter
• Arcos Raid 1927
• Soviet Trade delegation accused of spying
• Diplomatic relations suspended
• Labour shifts from positive to suspicious
• Recognises USSR 1924
• 1926 General Strike
• TUC returns 26,000 cheque
• Labelled Social Fascists by Stalin in 1930

• 1918 1922
• Lloyd George Liberal Coalition
• 1922 23
• Conservative
• 1924
• First ever Labour minority government
• 1924 1929
• Conservative
• 1929 1931
• Labour minority
• 1931 1940
• National governments

23
Relations with Germany

• Rapallo Treaty 1922
• Stresemann stabilises Eastern borders
• Helps get around T of V
• Active Comintern activity in uprisings
• 1919, 1921, 1923
• Locarno Treaties
• Worried Soviets that Germans were being
  reintegrated into Europe
• Treaty of Berlin 1926
• Included pledge of Neutrality if either were
  attacked by a Third nation

• Weak Weimar Governments
• Conservative Stresemann most positive towards
  USSR
• Germany has enough problems!
• SPD hostile to USSR due to uncompromising
  attitude of KPD
• Rising spectre of Nazis
• 1933 electoral success
• Hitler represented the final stage of monopoly
  capitalism he would inflame social tensions
  making revolution more likely in Germany - Stalin

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Phase 4 The Left Turn

• Follows Stalins Domestic U-Turn
• Ditched Bukharins Right Wing Policies
• Stalin able to dominate Politburo and Comintern
• Bukharin replaced by compliant Molotov
• Foreign Communist Party leaders replaced
• Intellectuals replaced by pliant working class
• German Communist Party Scandal Corrupt
  Thaelmann reinstated by Stalin
• Back to basics (and Anti-Trotskyite)
• Socialists labelled as Social Fascists and
  Counter-Revolutionaries
• KPD fails to help SPD as a result
• Nach Hitler Uns After Hitler Us

25
M. M. LitvinovForeign Commissar 1930 - 1939

• Chicherins deputy in 1920s
• Ex-Menshevik, Jewish
• Married to a British woman
• Talented negotiator
• Proposed Disarmament first
• Helps to defend USSR
• Helps Communist Revolutions
• Kellogg-Briand Pact
• Pro-British
• Anti-German
• Proposed Collective Security otherwise
• In favour of League of Nations
• Joins in 1934
• Not a member of the Politburo

26
Phase 5 Collective Security

• March 1934
• Trade agreement with Germany
• Sept 1934
• League of Nations - Litvinovs Collective
  Security Policy
• May 1935
• Pacts with France and Czechoslovakia
• August 1935
• COMINTERN supports Popular Fronts
• 1936 1939
• Spanish Civil War
• Nov 1936
• Anti-COMINTERN pact of Germany Japan (Italy
  1937)
• Sep 1938
• Munich agreement (USSR excluded)
• 1938/9
• Japanese military attacks in Far East (Manchukuo)
• April 1939
• Litvinov proposes triple Military alliance
  Britain, France and USSR
• May 1939

27
Spanish Civil War

• Intervention or Non-Intervention?
• Second Republic established 1931
• Republicans, Socialists, Communists, Anarchists,
  Separatists
• Traditional Nationalist Hostile
• Army, Catholic Church, Landowners, Centralists
• Nazi Germany and Italy supported Nationalists
• Britain and France wanted to let Spain sort
  itself out.
• Stalins dilemma?
• What should he do?

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Reasons to intervene

• Ideological battle
• Communism versus Fascism
• Soviet Security
• Keep Germany and Italy busy
• Help Natural anti-German ally France from being
  surrounded by Fascists
• Fight Trotskyites
• Trotskyite Communists were flocking to Spain to
  show a viable alternative form of Communism from
  Stalinism
• Military practice
• Allow hardware and tactics to be tried out on the
  battlefield
• Prestige
• Be seen as standing up to the forces of Fascism

29
Reasons not to intervene

• Strategic Concerns
• Spain is far from Soviet borders
• Reaction of Italy and Germany
• Force the two countries closer together in an
  Anti-Communist crusade
• Reaction of Britain and France
• A successful communist intervention might scare
  Britain and France closer to Germans
• Show disregard for League of Nations and of
  collective security
• Domestic Concerns
• Busy with anti-Trotskyite Purges
• Military in particular
• Five year plans less successful than hoped for
• USSR not prepared for sustained war of any kind

30
Stalins Decision

• Limited Secret Intervention
• Can help fight Fascists but avoid any blame if
  intervention fails (or succeeds)
• Particularly worried about the position of France
• Helping to keep France Democratic and not fall
  into hands of Fascists.
• NKVD directed to control Comintern activities
• Channel funds
• Ship goods secretly
• Via neutral countries
• Kindly volunteer to look after Spanish Gold
  Reserves
• Caballero Letter, 1936
• Calm down Communist demands
• No social or economic radicalism
• Foreign property to be respected
• Attract non-communist sympathisers

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Civil War within a Civil War

• Barcelona, 1937
• Safe in Republican hands but Anarchists and POUM
  (Trotskyite Communists) think that Republican
  (and Soviet) Communists are being too pragmatic
• Uprising Fighting in the Streets
• Stalin asks NKVD to crush POUM
• Feeds into Purges in USSR
• People being denounced left, right and centre
• NKVD executing anyone accused of being
  Trotskyite
• Infighting fatally weakened Republicans and
  allowed united Nationalists to ultimately triumph
  by 1939

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Was it worth it?

• Positives
• 4th largest Gold Reserves in the world
• Seen Fascist Equipment and Tactics in Operation
• Limited Trotskyism as an international
  alternative to Stalinism
• Negatives
• Failed to save Republican Spain
• Seen Fascist Equipment and Tactics in Operation
• Ruthless Communist tactics revealed to the world
• Infighting and purges discredited Communism
• Serving Officers and Diplomats were tainted by
  exposure to Trotskyite ideas
• Most executed or re-educated on return
• Experiences wasted
• Britain and France less than impressed by their
  potential ally
• Nail in coffin of Litvinovs collective security
  philosophy

34
What! No Chair for me?
35
Czechoslovakian Crisis

• Stalins last attempt at Collective Security
• Willing to consider aiding Czechs
• However,
• No Physical border with Czechs
• Polish antipathy
• French and British allied to Poles
• Allies found it frustrating dealing with one
  dictator let alone a second.
• Allies suspicious of Communist motives after
  Spanish Civil War debacle
• Mussolini was supposed to be the neutral Referee
  hostile to USSR
• Lessons learnt
• Stalin Trust no-one USSR must look after its
  own security
• Hitler The Allies are weak and divided
• Chamberlain and Briand Allies made to look
  ridiculous determination not to be pushed
  around again
• Reaffirm Polish treaties
• Further antagonises Stalin

36
MolotovForeign Commissar 1939 - 1949

• Replaced anti-German Litvinov
• Litvinov had failed to cement deal with British
  and French
• Stalin stooge
• The ultimate Yes Man
• Leader of Comintern from 1929
• Member of Politburo
• Stalins Deputy

37
The Nazi Soviet Pact

• The most startling diplomatic event of the 1930s
• One week before Second World War
• Treaty of Neutrality
• Secret Additional Protocol
• Carved up hated Poland and marked out spheres of
  influence in Eastern Europe
• Why
• Relative weakness of Russian Armed Services
• 1938 purge of Red Army
• Japan border disputes
• Open warfare in Siberia
• One enemy at a time
• Worried at being surrounded
• Relative ineffectiveness of Five year plans
• Not delivering fully advertised output
• Need more time to deal with German army
• Create a Buffer zone for added defence against
  German Army
• Not yet fully aware of capabilities of German
  Army
• Pre-Blitzkrieg
• Hopes France and Germany will fight long drawn
  out attritional war a la WWI

38
Phase 6 Nazi Soviet Love-in

• 8 May 1939
• Britain rejects military alliance with Russia
• 20th May 1939
• Germany asks for trade talks
• 27th May 1939
• Chamberlain restarts talks with Russia
• 18th July
• Soviets offer Trade deal to Germans
• 23rd July
• Britain and France ask for military talks
• Drax arrives 11th August
• 14th August 1939
• Ribbentrop asks to see Stalin personally
• 19th August
• Anglo-Soviet negotiations break down
• German Soviet Trade deal announced
• 20th August
• Hitler asks Stalin to meet Ribbentrop
• 21st August

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• The Government of the German Reich and The
  Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
  Republics desirous of strengthening the cause of
  peace between Germany and the U.S.S.R., and
  proceeding from the fundamental provisions of the
  Neutrality Agreement concluded in April, 1926
  between Germany and the U.S.S.R., have reached
  the following Agreement
• Article I. Both High Contracting Parties obligate
  themselves to desist from any act of violence,
  any aggressive action, and any attack on each
  other, either individually or jointly with other
  Powers.
• Article II. Should one of the High Contracting
  Parties become the object of belligerent action
  by a third Power, the other High Contracting
  Party shall in no manner lend its support to this
  third Power.
• Article III. The Governments of the two High
  Contracting Parties shall in the future maintain
  continual contact with one another for the
  purpose of consultation in order to exchange
  information on problems affecting their common
  interests.
• Article IV. Should disputes or conflicts arise
  between the High Contracting Parties shall
  participate in any grouping of Powers whatsoever
  that is directly or indirectly aimed at the other
  party.
• Article V. Should disputes or conflicts arise
  between the High Contracting Parties over
  problems of one kind or another, both parties
  shall settle these disputes or conflicts
  exclusively through friendly exchange of opinion
  or, if necessary, through the establishment of
  arbitration commissions.
• Article VI. The present Treaty is concluded for a
  period of ten years, with the proviso that, in so
  far as one of the High Contracting Parties does
  not advance it one year prior to the expiration
  of this period, the validity of this Treaty shall
  automatically be extended for another five years.
  
• Article VII. The present treaty shall be ratified
  within the shortest possible time. The
  ratifications shall be exchanged in Berlin. The
  Agreement shall enter into force as soon as it is
  signed.

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• Secret Additional Protocol.
• Article I. In the event of a territorial and
  political rearrangement in the areas belonging to
  the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia,
  Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania
  shall represent the boundary of the spheres of
  influence of Germany and U.S.S.R. In this
  connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna
  area is recognized by each party.
• Article II. In the event of a territorial and
  political rearrangement of the areas belonging to
  the Polish state, the spheres of influence of
  Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded
  approximately by the line of the rivers Narev,
  Vistula and San.
• The question of whether the interests of both
  parties make desirable the maintenance of an
  independent Polish States and how such a state
  should be bounded can only be definitely
  determined in the course of further political
  developments.
• In any event both Governments will resolve this
  question by means of a friendly agreement.
• Article III. With regard to Southeastern Europe
  attention is called by the Soviet side to its
  interest in Bessarabia. The German side declares
  its complete political disinteredness in these
  areas.
• Article IV. This protocol shall be treated by
  both parties as strictly secret.

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Essay Question

• Did Stalin make the correct strategic decision by
  signing the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939?
• Debate
• The failure of Collective Security in Europe in
  the late 1930s was not the fault of Stalin.
  Discuss
• Stalins Foreign Policy was an extension of his
  Domestic Politics. Discuss.