History of Ethics

1
History of Ethics

• Section 4
• John Stuart Mills Utilitarianism

2
John Stuart Mill

• Best interpreted as a rule-utilitarian, adhering
  to moral rules not as mere generalizations of
  beneficial deeds but as an ideal moral code.

3
Mills Utilitarianism

• The goal of life and also the standard of
  morality are lives of happiness, lives, that is,
  as exempt as possible from pain and as rich as
  possible in enjoyments
• actions are right in proportion as they tend to
  promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce
  the reverse of happiness (see note 1 final
  slide of this Section).

4
Mills Rule-utilitarianism

• Since it is not single actions that can be said
  to tend to promote anything, but rather types of
  actions, this account of rightness is best
  interpreted as saying that it is types of
  actions, such as actions complying with a rule or
  practice, which are made right or wrong by what
  they tend to promote.

5
To consider

• Distinguish between act-utilitarianism
  rule-utilitarianism.

6
Pleasures

• Unlike Jeremy Bentham, Mill compared pleasures by
  quality as well as quantity.
• It is far from clear that this move is consistent
  with keeping pleasure ( the absence of pain) as
  the sole criterion of a good life.

7
But

• Mill can consistently defend introducing
  secondary right-making rules, resorting to his
  primary criterion to resolve clashes between
  them.

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Proof of the Desirability of the General Happiness

• Just as the only proof that an object is visible
  is that people actually see it, the only proof
  that anything is desirable is that people
  actually desire it.
• But each person desires their own happiness, so
  happiness is a good accordingly the general
  happiness is a good for people in general (see
  note 2 final slide of this Section).
• Besides, happiness is the sole object of desire,
  for nothing is desired which is not either a
  means to happiness or a part of happiness.
• Happiness must then be the sole end of human
  action, and so its promotion is the test of
  conduct the criterion of morality (see note 3
  final slide of this Section).

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Some objections

• (1) Desirable is not comparable to visible,
  as visible just means able to be seen,
  whereas desirable means fit to be desired,
  is used of what there is reason to desire. So his
  argument seems to move fallaciously from facts
  about desire to value-claims about desirability.
• (2) Even if each person desires his or her own
  happiness, it does not follow that everyone
  desires the general happiness, let alone that the
  general happiness is desirable.

(For further objections, replies to those
objections, see Mills Proof in Sec. 4, History
of Ethics Chapter.)
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Reply to (1)

• Although Mills attempted proof confronts some
  objections, its not as obviously a fallacy as it
  seems
• (1) Being able to be desired is at least a
  necessary condition of being desirable. Further,
  if, as Mill thinks he can show, only one thing is
  actually desired, if, as nearly everyone
  assumes, something or other is desirable, then
  this will have to be the one thing that can be
  desired (for nothing else is eligible) is
  desired. So his opening move need not be
  construed as a fallacy at all, although it
  depends on the vulnerable claim that only one
  thing is actually desired.

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Reply to (2)

• (2) The relation of the general happiness of
  society to society could be regarded as analogous
  to the relation of the happiness of one person to
  that person. Since what is desirable is what
  there is reason to desire, the happiness of
  society will be even more desirable for society
  than individual happiness is for that individual.
  
• (Mill disclosed in a letter that he was not
  arguing that the general happiness will be
  desirable to each person, but rather that since
  happiness is desirable can be multiplied as the
  number of happy people increases, the aggregate
  happiness is also desirable, multiply so.)

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Obligations

• Mill well distinguishes obligations of justice,
  other moral obligations, morally desirable
  deeds that are not obligatory (that is,
  supererogatory acts).

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Mill Justice

• When discussing justice, Mill claims that
  utilitarianism embodies impartiality equality.
• His stance on impartiality can be defended, but
  only with difficulty over the charge that
  utilitarianism permits unsatisfactory
  distributions.

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Rejection of Paternalism

• But
• there is a moral case for paternalistic
  interventions, despite Mills arguments.

• In rejecting coercion except to prevent harm to
  others, Mill condemns paternalism (constraining
  someone for their own good).

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To Consider

• What is at issue when paternalism is pitted
  against autonomy?
• Explain Mills view of paternalism.

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Notes

• 1. Mill, J.S. (1910), Utilitarianism, On Liberty
  and Representative Government, Everyman edition
  (London J.M. Dent Sons, and New York E.P.
  Dutton Co.), p.6.
• 2. ibid., pp. 32-33.
• 3. ibid., p. 36.