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Determining Optimal Level of Product Availability

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Title: Determining Optimal Level of Availability in a Supply Chain Author: Comtech_NB Last modified by: user Created Date: 5/1/2001 1:30:51 PM Document presentation ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Determining Optimal Level of Product Availability


1
Determining Optimal Level of Product Availability
????(2) Determining Optimal Level of Product
Availability
  • Optimal Matching of Supply and Demand (III)

?????
??????????,????CC?????-????-?????????3.0??????
1
2
Supply Chain Decision-Making Framework
Competitive strategy
Supply chain strategy
Supply chain structure
Inventory
Transportation
Facilities
Information
2
3
Levers for Increasing Supply Chain Profitability
  • Decreasing the costs of overstocking and
    understocking
  • Reducing the demand uncertainty
  • Improved forecasting to lower uncertainty
  • Quick response reduce lead time to increase
    number of orders per season
  • Postponement of product differentiation
  • Tailored sourcing

Microsoft?
3
4
BENETTON
Benetton
Benetton
4
5
BENETTON
Benetton????????????,? ???????????,?????? ?????,??
?????????? ????,????????????,Benetton?????????????
? ?,???????????????
Benetton
Microsoft?
Benetton
5
6
BENETTON
72hr
12day
6
Microsoft?
7
ZARA
Microsoft?
Microsoft?
7
zara.com
8
Whats Quick Response?
  • A widely used strategy
  • By general merchandise, soft-lines retailers and
    manufacturers
  • To reduce retail out-of-stocks, forced markdown,
    merchandising system and operating costs
  • A partnership strategy
  • Suppliers and retailers work together to respond
    more rapidly to consumer needs
  • By sharing POS information to jointly forecast
    future demand for replenishable items, and to
    continuously monitor trends to detect
    opportunities for new items
  • A JIT strategy
  • Spread through the supply chain and seamlessly
    linked at each stage by electronic data
    interchange

8
9
Basic Elements of QR
Time horizons
Information
Logistics
Supplier/ Manufacturer relationships
Manufacturing Operations
Philosophical/ Cultural change
9
10
Example US Textile and Apparel Industry in 1986
Fiber
  • Synthetics (75) highly concentrated
  • Ten firms provide more than 90 of market
  • More fragmented
  • 6,000 firms
  • 12 firms provide 1/4 of market

Fabric
Apparel
  • Extremely fragmented
  • 15,000 firms (70 employ fewer than 50 people)

Retail
  • Increasing concentration
  • Major categories
  • Department stores
  • Mass merchandisers
  • Mail order
  • Chains
  • Specialty stores

Consumer
Increasing sophistication Expectation of
variety/change Wide choice of retail outlets
10
11
The Inefficiencies
  • Long supply chain
  • From raw material to consumer purchase was 66
    weeks
  • 11weeks in-plant time
  • 40 weeks in warehouse or transit
  • 15 weeks in store
  • Problems of long supply chain
  • Expensive to finance
  • Too much or too little product was produced and
    distributed
  • 1985-1986 overall loss - 25 billion

11
12
The Response
  • Awaken the industry
  • Focus on the entire supply chain rather than
    separate functions within it
  • Targeting the common goals
  • Serve the consumer with the right products at the
    right time, and the right price
  • The total supply chain would achieve major gains
    in both efficiency and effectiveness

12
13
Expected Results through QR
Fiber, Fabric, Apparel, and Retail Inventories
(Working Weeks)
66
46
Fig. 6-15
Weeks
21
QR system
Average Cost per Unit
13
14
Example Benetton
  • Benetton deliver knitted goods in the hottest new
    colors seemingly overnight.
  • It knitted the sweaters in neutral yarn and then
    dyed them to meet market demand.
  • Putting in place fast and sophisticated retailer
    reporting systems.
  • Key technologies
  • Bar code systems
  • Computer networks
  • Automated distribution center
  • EDI or Internet-based EC
  • CIM

14
15
ECR(Efficient Consumer Response)
  • ECR is a Global Industry Strategy in which
    Retailers and Suppliers Work Together to Deliver
    Better Consumer Satisfaction and Value.

15
16
What is Efficient Consumer Response?
A strategy in which distributors and suppliers
are working closely together to maximize grocery
consumer satisfaction and minimize cost.
Timely, accurate, paperless information flow
Supplier
Distributor
Retail store
Consumer household
Smooth, continual product flow matched to
consumption
16
17
Anatomy of Efficient Consumer Response
A consumer purchases Product A from a
supermarket. The transaction is recorded by the
stores scanner.
The scanner forwards the transaction record to an
in-store computer. The Product A manufacturer,
whose computers interface with the retailers,
notes the transaction and automatically reorders
a replacement unit on a just-in-time basis.
An automatic ordering system allows the product A
supplier to match production to demand using
product movement information and forecasting.
Because production is tied directly into demand,
retailers become increasingly freed from the need
for excess inventory and warehousing of excess
inventory, thus opening the door for increased
cross-docking and direct store delivery shipments.
The retailers in-store computer acknowledges
receipt of the shipment and automatically issues
a computer-generated payment or electronic fund
transfer payment, eliminating the need for paper
invoices and streamlining the accounting process.
17
18
Efficient Consumer Response Process
Change management
Replenishment
Replenishment
Manufacturing business strategy
Retail business strategy
Integrated EDI Continuous replenishment Computer-a
ssisted ordering Flow-through distribution Activit
y-based costing Category management Flexible
manufacturing
Promotion
Promotion
Store assortments
Store assortments
Product introductions
Product introductions
Open communication
18
19
ECR Strategies Objectives
Strategies Objectives
Efficient Store Assortment Optimize the productivity of inventories and store space at the consumer interface
Efficient Replenishment Optimize time and cost in the replenishment system
Efficient Promotion/Pricing Maximize the total system efficiency of trade and consumer promotion pricing
Efficient Product Introductions Maximize the effectiveness of new product development and introduction activities
19
20
ECR Components
  • Logistics (Supply Side)
  • Continuous Replenishment
  • Cross Docking
  • Category Management (Demand Side)
  • Understanding Consumer Needs
  • Decisions Made with Data
  • Category vs. Brand Focused
  • Total Systems Approach
  • Enabling Technologies (Tools)
  • Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT)
  • Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
  • Activity Based Costing (ABC)
  • Item Coding Database Maintenance

20
21
Example Throughput Time Improvement of Dry
Grocery
CURRENT DRY GROCERY CHAIN
Supplier warehouse 38 days
Distribution warehouse (Forward buy 9 days, turn
inventory 31 days) 40 days
Retail store 26 days
Packing line
Consumer Purchase
104 days
ECR DRY GROCERY CHAIN
Supplier warehouse 27 days
Distributor warehouse 12 days
Retail store 22 days
Packing line
Consumer Purchase
61 days
21
22
ECR Requirements
  • Think Total Supply Chain
  • Multi-Function, Multi-Echelon Cooperation
  • Convert Efficiencies to Customer Value
  • Drive True Efficiency and Recognize Inefficiency
  • Emphasize on Consumer
  • Work Together to Create Demand
  • Change Business Processes
  • Identify Whats Wrong Today
  • Trust
  • To be Partners
  • Share Data

22
23
Example PGs CRP Process
Direct store level shipment
???? ?????
Stores
Store Delivery
Orders
Dedicated Carriers and Prescheduled Appointments
Demand and Inventory
Customer Distribution Centers
Ordering info
Shipping info.
Ordering info
P G Plant
Customer Headquarters
Orders
Demand and Inventory
P G Headquarters
23
24
Barriers
  • Lack of Trust
  • Lack of Fairness - Open Trading
  • No Information Sharing
  • Lack of Resource Commitment
  • Lack of Industry Standards
  • Culture (Negotiation Environment)
  • Measurement/Rewards

24
25
Quick Response Multiple Orders per Season
  • Ordering shawls at a department store
  • Selling season 14 weeks
  • Original replenishment lead time 15 weeks
  • Reduced replenishment lead time 6 weeks
  • Cost per handbag 40
  • Sale price 150
  • Disposal price 30
  • Holding cost 2 per week
  • Expected weekly demand 20
  • SD of weekly demand 15

25
26
Quick Response Multiple Orders per Season
  • Two ordering policies
  • A single order must arrive at the beginning of
    the season to cover the entire seasons demand
  • Two orders are placed in the season, one arriving
    at the beginning of the season and the other
    arriving at the beginning of the eighth week
  • Two situations
  • The buyers forecast accuracy doesnt improve for
    second order
  • The buyers forecast accuracy does improve for
    second order

26
27
Impact of Quick Response Forecast doesnt
improve for second order (SD15 )
20 ? 7 1.75 ? ? 15
209 ? 2 - 69
  • 20 ? 14 1.75 ? ? 15

Single Order Single Order Single Order Single Order Two Orders in Season Two Orders in Season Two Orders in Season Two Orders in Season Two Orders in Season
Service Level Order Size Average Overstock Expect. Profit Initial Order OUL for 2nd Order Average Total Order Ending Invent. Expect. Profit
0.96 378 97 23,624 209 209 349 69 26,590
0.94 367 86 24,034 201 201 342 60 27,085
0.91 355 73 24,617 193 193 332 52 27,154
0.87 343 66 24,386 184 184 319 43 26,944
0.81 329 55 24,609 174 174 313 36 27,413
0.75 317 41 25,205 166 166 302 32 26,916
27
28
Observations
  • Its possible to provide the same level of
    product availability to the customer with less
    inventory if a second follow-up order is allowed
  • The average overstock to be disposed of at the
    end of the sales season is less if two orders are
    allowed
  • The profits are higher if second order is allowed

28
29
Leftover Inventory vs. Number of Order Cycles per
Season
Unsold Inventory at End of Season
Number of Order Cycles per Season
29
30
Expected Profit vs. Number of Order Cycles per
Season
Expected Profit
Number of Order Cycles per Season
30
31
Forecast Improves for Second Order (SD3 instead
of 15)
20 ? 7 1.75 ? ? 3
Single Order Single Order Single Order Single Order Two Orders in Season Two Orders in Season Two Orders in Season Two Orders in Season Two Orders in Season
Service Level Order Size Average Overstock Expect. Profit Initial Order OUL for 2nd Order Average Total Order Ending Invent. Expect. Profit
0.96 378 96 23,707 209 153 292 19 27,007
0.94 367 84 24,303 201 152 293 18 27,371
0.91 355 76 24,154 193 150 288 17 26,946
0.87 343 63 24,807 184 148 288 14 27,583
0.81 329 52 24,998 174 146 283 14 27,162
0.75 317 44 24,887 166 145 282 14 27,268
31
32
Notes
  • Quick response is clearly advantageous to a
    retailer.
  • But as the retailer order size drops, the
    manufacturer sells less to the retailer. Thus,
    the manufacturer make a lower profit in the short
    term if all else is unchanged. It seems to
    benefit retailer at the expense of the
    manufacturer.

32
33
Meaning of Postponement
  • Delay the timing of the crucial processes in
    which end products assume their specific
    functionality, features, identities, or
    personality
  • Can be viewed as information strategy
  • 3 different kinds of postponement
  • pull, logistics, form

33
34
Pull Postponement
  • BTS vs BTO
  • Decoupling point the point from which the
    process switches from a build-to-stock mode to
    the build-to-order mode.
  • Meaning of pull postponement
  • Making the decoupling point earlier in the
    process.

34
35
Pull Postponement
  • Basic Elements
  • The process steps must be sequenced so that the
    less differentiating steps are performed at prior
    to the decoupling point.
  • After the decoupling point, the process steps can
    be performed flexible and fast.
  • Accurate order capture for BTO.
  • Example National Bicycle, Benetton.

35
36
?????
  • ?????(Postponement Differentiation)?
  • ??
  • ?????????????????????,????????????????,???????????
    ?????????,???????

36
37
????????
  • ????????(Resequencing)
  • ?? Benetton, postpone dyeing until after
    assembled. Cost 10 more expensive, new machine
    purchased and employee retrained.
  • ?? US disk drive manufacturing. Insert generic
    circuit board into assembly, complete much of the
    testing, remove the generic circuit board, and
    add customer-specific boards later.

37
38
????????
  • ??????(Commonality)
  • ?????????????????
  • ?? Printer manufacturing, redesign the new and
    old products to share a common circuit board and
    printhead such that final process can be delayed.

38
39
????????
  • ???(Modularity)
  • ??????????????,????????????????????????? HP
    Laser Jet
  • ?????????????????????,???????????????????print-a
    nd-pigment mixture, Levis jeans

39
40
????????
  • ???(Standardization)
  • ?????????????????.
  • ?????????(Agile Supply Networks)
  • ?????????????, ???????????????????.

40
41
??????????
  • ??????????????????
  • ???????????????????
  • ???????????????
  • ????????,?????????,?????????????

41
42
Logistics Postponement
  • Meaning
  • Redesign the tasks in the SC so that some of the
    customization steps can be performed downstream
    closer to the customers.

42
43
Concurrent and Parallel Processing
  • Concurrent and parallel processing involves
    modifying the manufacturing process so that steps
    that were previously performed in a sequence can
    be completed at the same time.
  • reduce lead time
  • reduce inventory cost
  • A key is the concept of modularity or decoupling

43
44
Requirements for logistics postponement
  • can not lead to quality degradation.
  • downstream sites have capability to perform the
    task without excessive cost and time.
  • potentially to procure the necessary components
    or modules for the customization.
  • the engineering team is able and willing to
    design products and processes to defer the steps
    effectively.

44
45
Form Postponement
  • Meaning
  • postponement is achieved through the change in
    the form of the product structure by
    standardizing some of the process steps or
    components.
  • Example HP Laser Printer.

45
46
Postponement Enablers
  • Products or processes should be modular in
    structure.
  • Design engineer should be aware of the importance
    of SCM to pursuit design for postponement
    opportunity.
  • Must involve multiple functions or organization
    in collaboration.
  • Quantify the costs and benefits to determine the
    best point for postponement

46
47
The Value of Postponement
  • Improve matching of supply and demand need to
    qualify the benefit with additional cost
  • Increase profitability differentiate after
    receiving customer order so that inventories can
    be reduced
  • Valuable for selling a large variety of products
    with demand that is independent and comparable in
    size

47
48
Value of Postponement Benetton
  • For each color
  • Mean demand 1,000 SD 500
  • For each garment
  • Sale price 50
  • Salvage value 10
  • Production cost using option 1 (thread are dyed
    and the garment was knitted) with long lead time
    20
  • Production cost using option 2 (dying was
    postponed until after the garment was knitted)
    22
  • What is the value of postponement?

48
49
Value of Postponement Benetton
  • Option 1
  • CSL (p - c) /(p - s) 30/40 0.75
  • O NORMINV(0.75, 1000, 500) 1,337 units of
    each color
  • Expected profits from each color 23,644
  • Expected overstock for each color 412
  • Expected understock for each color 75
  • 5348 sweaters are produced, expected profit of
    94,576 with an average of 1,648 sweaters sold on
    clearance and 300 customers turns away for lack
    of sweaters

49
50
Value of Postponement Benetton
  • Option 2 c 22 instead of 20
  • CSL (p - c) /(p - s) 28/40 0.70
  • OA NORMINV(0.70, 1000?4, 500? ) 4,524
    units
  • Expected profits 98,092
  • Expected overstock for each color 715
  • Expected understock for each color 190
  • Expected profit increases from 94,576 to 98,092
  • Expected overstock declines from 1,648 to 715
  • Expected understock declines from 300 to 190

50
51
Value of Postponement with Dominant Product
  • Color with dominant demand (red) Mean 3,100,
    SD 800
  • Other three colors Mean 300, SD 200
  • Option 1
  • CSL 0.75
  • Optimal production of red sweaters O
    NORMINV(0.75, 3100, 800) 3,640 expected profit
    82,831, expected overstock 659, expected
    understock 119
  • Optimal production of each other color sweater
    435 expected profit 6,458, expected overstock
    165, expected understock 30
  • Total production 4,945, expected profit
    102,205, expected overstock 1,154, expected
    understock 209

51
52
Value of Postponement with Dominant Product
  • Option 2
  • ?A 3100 3?300 4,000 ?A
  • Total production 4,457 expected profit
    99,872,
  • expected overstock 623, expected understock
    166
  • Expected profit without postponement 102,205
  • Expected profit with postponement 99,872

52
53
Meaning of Pure Postponement
  • Postponement may reduce overall profit for a firm
    if a single product contributes the majority of
    the demand, since the increased manufacturing
    expense due to postponement outweighs the small
    benefit from aggregation

53
54
Tailored Postponement Benetton
  • On the portion of the certain demand,
    postponement provides little value, thus, company
    needs to use lower cost method.
  • On the portion of the uncertain demand,
    postponement significantly improves forecast
    accuracy, thus, company is willing to incur
    higher cost to achieve the benefit.
  • Produce Q1 units for each color using Option 1
    and QA units (aggregate) using Option 2

54
55
Tailored Postponement Benetton
Manufacturing Policy Manufacturing Policy Average Profit Average Overstock Average Understock
Q1 QA Average Profit Average Overstock Average Understock
0 4524 97847 510 210
1337 0 94377 1369 282
700 1850 102730 308 168
800 1550 104603 427 170
900 950 101326 607 266
900 1050 101647 664 230
1000 850 100312 815 195
1000 950 100951 803 149
1100 550 99180 1026 211
1100 650 100510 1008 185
55
56
The Benefit of Tailored Postponement
  • Tailored postponement allows a firm to increase
    its profitability by postponing only the
    uncertain part of the demand and producing the
    predictable part at a lower cost without
    postponement

56
57
The Meaning of Tailored Sourcing
  • A combination of two supply sources one focusing
    on cost but unable to handle uncertainty well,
    and the other focusing on flexibility to handle
    uncertainty but a higher cost
  • A backup policy
  • Disadvantage increasing complexity of
    implementation

57
58
Tailored Sourcing
  • Sourcing alternatives
  • Low cost, long lead time supplier
  • Cost 245, Lead time 9 weeks
  • High cost, short lead time supplier
  • Cost 250, Lead time 1 week

58
59
Tailored Sourcing Strategies
Fraction of demand from overseas supplier Annual Profit
0 37,250
50 51,613
60 53,027
100 48,875
59
60
Tailored Sourcing Multiple Sourcing Sites
Characteristic Primary Site Secondary Site
Manufacturing Cost High Low
Flexibility (Volume/Mix) High Low
Responsiveness High Low
Engineering Support High Low
60
61
Dual Sourcing Strategies
Strategy Primary Site Secondary Site
Volume based dual sourcing (Benetton) Fluctuation Stable demand
Product based dual sourcing(Levi Strauss) Unpredictable products, Small batch Predictable, large batch products
Model based dual sourcing Newer products Older stable products
61
62
Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
Chain Profits
  • Many shortcomings in supply chain performance
    occur because the buyer and supplier are separate
    organizations and each tries to optimize its own
    profit
  • Total supply chain profits might therefore be
    lower than if the supply chain coordinated
    actions to have a common objective of maximizing
    total supply chain profits
  • Double marginalization results in suboptimal
    order quantity
  • An approach to dealing with this problem is to
    design a contract that encourages a buyer to
    purchase more and increase the level of product
    availability
  • The supplier must share in some of the buyers
    demand uncertainty

62
63
Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
Chain Profits
  • Many shortcomings in supply chain performance
    occur because the buyer and supplier are separate
    organizations and each tries to optimize its own
    profit
  • Total supply chain profits might therefore be
    lower than if the supply chain coordinated
    actions to have a common objective of maximizing
    total supply chain profits
  • Double marginalization results in suboptimal
    order quantity
  • An approach to dealing with this problem is to
    design a contract that encourages a buyer to
    purchase more and increase the level of product
    availability
  • The supplier must share in some of the buyers
    demand uncertainty
  • Buybacks by publishers
  • Tech Fiber produces jacket at v 10 and charges
    a wholesale price of c 100. Ski Adventure
    sells jacket for p 200. Demand is normal
    distributed with ?1,000 and ?300. Unsold
    jackets have no salvage value.
  • Should TF be willing to buy back unsold jackets?
    Why?
  • CSLSA 0.5, SA orders 1,000, expected profit
    76,063 TF sells 1,000 for a total profit of
    90,000. Total expected SC profit 166,063

63
64
Impact of Supply Chain Contracts on
Profitability Buyback Contracts
  • Buybacks by publishers
  • Tech Fiber produces jacket at v 10 and charges
    a wholesale price of c 100. Ski Adventure
    sells jacket for p 200. Demand is normal
    distributed with ?1,000 and ?300. Unsold
    jackets have no salvage value.
  • Should TF be willing to buy back unsold jackets?
    Why?
  • CSLSA 0.5, SA orders 1,000, expected profit
    76,063 TF sells 1,000 for a total profit of
    90,000. Total expected SC profit 166,063

64
65
The Categories of Supply Contract
  • Horizon Length
  • Pricing linear (proportional) or non-linear
    (two-part tariff) buyback, holding cost
    subsidies, payment for inability to supply
  • Periodicity of ordering fixed or random
  • Quantity commitment
  • Total minimum commitment quantity or dollar
    value
  • Periodical commitment
  • Demand commitment
  • Capacity commitment

65
66
The Categories of Supply Contract
  • Flexibility
  • Magnitude or frequency of adjustments
  • Delivery commitment
  • Lead time
  • Shipment policy
  • Quality defect rates, specifications
  • Information sharing

66
67
Supplier Selection and Contracts
  • Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
    Chain Profits
  • Buyback Contracts
  • Revenue-Sharing Contracts
  • Quantity Flexibility Contracts
  • Contracts to Coordinate Supply Chain Costs
  • Contracts to Increase Agent Effort
  • Contracts to Induce Performance Improvement

67
68
Impact of Supply Chain Contracts on
Profitability Buyback Contracts
  • Buybacks by publishers
  • Tech Fiber produces jacket at v 10 and charges
    a wholesale price of c 100. Ski Adventure
    sells jacket for p 200. Demand is normal
    distributed with ?1,000 and ?300. Unsold
    jackets have no salvage value.
  • Should TF be willing to buy back unsold jackets?
    Why?
  • CSLSA 0.5, SA orders 1,000, expected profit
    76,063 TF sells 1,000 for a total profit of
    90,000. Total expected SC profit 166,063

68
69
Impact of Supply Chain Contracts on
Profitability Buyback Contracts
  • For entire SC, SC makes 190 for each jacket
    sold, and only loses 10. Thus, the cost of
    understocking is 190, and the cost of overstock
    is 10.
  • The optimal CSL for entire SC is 0.95 and produce
    1,493 jackets. Total SC profit is 183,812.

69
70
Return Policy Buyback contracts
  • Issue of Double Marginalization
  • Wholesale price c
  • Buyback price b
  • Manufacturing salvage value sM
  • The salvage value for retailer is sb
  • Optimal order quantity O
  • Expected manufacturing profit
  • O(c-v) b ? expected overstock at retailer

70
71
Buyback Contracts
Wholesale Price c Buy-back price b Optimal Order Size for SA Expected Profit for SA Expected Returns to TF Expected Profit for TF Expected Supply Chain Profit
100 0 1000 76063 120 90000 166063
100 30 1067 80154 156 91338 171492
100 60 1170 85724 223 91886 177610
110 0 962 66252 102 96230 162482
110 78 1191 78074 239 100480 178555
110 105 1486 86938 493 96872 183810
120 0 924 56819 80 101640 158459
120 96 1221 70508 261 109225 179733
120 116 1501 77500 506 106310 183810
71
72
Buyback Contracts
  • Manufactures can use buyback contracts to
    increase their own profit as well as total supply
    chain profits. Buyback contract also encourage
    retailers increase product availability
  • Manufactures need to consider the cost associated
    with a return
  • As the cost associated with a return increases,
    buyback contracts become less attractive.
  • Applications (1) bookstores return the cover of
    the book to reduce the cost of return (2)
    manufactures use holding cost subsidies.

72
73
Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
Chain Profits Buyback Contracts
  • Allows a retailer to return unsold inventory up
    to a specified amount at an agreed upon price
  • Increases the optimal order quantity for the
    retailer, resulting in higher product
    availability and higher profits for both the
    retailer and the supplier
  • Most effective for products with low variable
    cost, such as music, software, books, magazines,
    and newspapers
  • High tech industry provides price support for
    retailers due to price drop rapidly

73
74
Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
Chain Profits Buyback Contracts
  • Downside
  • Results in surplus inventory that must be
    disposed of, which increases supply chain costs
  • Lead the retailer to exert less effort to sell
  • May increase information distortion through the
    supply chain because the supply chain reacts to
    retail orders, not actual customer demand

74
75
Revenue Sharing Contracts
  • Manufacture charges the retailer a low wholesale
    price and shares a fraction of the revenue
    generated by the retailer.
  • The retailer cost will be decreased due to lower
    overstock cost, thus, retailer will increase the
    level of product availability resulting higher
    profits for both manufacturer and retailer.

75
76
Revenue Sharing Contracts
  • Manufacturers production cost v
  • Wholesale price charged by manufacturer c
  • Manufacturer shares a fraction f of the
    retailers revenue
  • Retailer charges a retail price p and has a
    salvage value sR for unsold items.
  • The understocking cost Cu (1-f)p c
  • The overstocking cost Co c sR

76
77
Revenue Sharing Contracts
77
78
Revenue Sharing Contracts
  • Example TF charges only c 10 for each jacket,
    SA sells the jacket for p 200 and shares f of
    the revenue to TF. Demand at this price is normal
    distributed with a mean 1000 and a standard
    deviation 300. Assume that no salvage value for
    any leftover jackets.

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Revenue Sharing Contracts
Wholesale Price c Revenue-Sharing Fraction f Optimal Order Size for SA Expected Overstock At SA Expected Profit for SA Expected Profit for TF Expected Supply Chain Profit
10 0.3 1440 449 124273 59429 183702
10 0.5 1384 399 84735 98580 183315
10 0.7 1290 317 45503 136278 181781
10 0.9 1000 120 7606 158457 166063
20 0.3 1320 342 110523 71886 182409
20 0.5 1252 286 71601 109176 180777
20 0.7 1129 195 33455 142051 175506
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Revenue Sharing Contracts
  • Observations revenue sharing with a lower
    wholesale price allows both retailers and
    manufactures to increase their profit. The
    revenue sharing encourages retailers to increase
    the level of product availability
  • Applications video rental industry, such as
    Blockbuster.

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Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
Chain Profits Revenue Sharing Contracts
  • The buyer pays a minimal amount for each unit
    purchased from the supplier but shares a fraction
    of the revenue for each unit sold
  • Decreases the cost per unit charged to the
    retailer, which effectively decreases the cost of
    overstocking

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Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
Chain Profits Revenue Sharing Contracts
  • Have a similar effect as buyback contracts but
    eliminate the cost of returns
  • Lower retailer effort
  • Suited for products with low variable cost and a
    high cost of return
  • Result in supply chain information distortion
  • Enabler require an information infrastructure to
    monitor sales at retailer

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Quantity Flexibility Contracts
  • If a retailer order O units the manufacturer
    commits to supplying up to Q (1?)O and the
    retailer commits to buying q (1-?)O
  • How can quantity flexibility contracts help
    increase profitability?

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Quantity Flexibility Contracts
  • Manufacturing cost per unit v
  • Wholesale price c
  • Retailing price p
  • Retailer salvage value sR
  • Manufacture salvage value sM
  • Demand ??(???2)

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Quantity Flexibility Contracts
  • Scenario
  • Retailer orders O units, manufacture commits to
    supply Q units
  • Manufacturer produces Q units
  • Retailer purchases q units if demand R is less
    than q R units of demand R is between q and Q Q
    units if demand is higher than Q

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Quantity Flexibility Contracts
  • Expected quantity purchased by retailer
  • Expected quantity sold by retailer

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Quantity Flexibility Contracts
  • Expected overstock at retailer
  • Expected retailer profit
  • Expected manufacture profit

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Quantity Flexibility Contracts
? ? Wholesale price c Order size O Expected purchase by SA Expected sale by SA Expected profits for SA Expected profits for TF Expected supply chain profit
0.00 0.00 100 1,000 1,000 880 76,063 90,000 166,063
0.20 0.20 100 1,050 1,024 968 91,167 89,830 180,997
0.40 0.40 100 1,070 1,011 994 97,689 86,122 183,811
0.00 0.00 110 962 962 860 66,252 96,200 162,452
0.15 0.15 110 1,014 1,009 945 78,153 99,282 177,435
0.42 0.42 110 1,048 1,007 993 87,932 95,879 183,811
0.00 0.00 120 924 924 838 56,819 101,640 158,459
0.2 0.2 120 1,000 1,000 955 70,933 108,000 178,933
0.5 0.5 120 1,040 1,003 996 78,874 104,803 183,677
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Quantity Flexibility Contract
  • Common for components in the electronic and
    computer industry
  • Example
  • Benetton retailer required to place order 7
    months before delivery, but allow retailer to
    alter up to 30 quantity ordered in any color and
    assign to another color 3 months before delivery
    and allow retailer to alter up to 10 after the
    start of the season

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Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
Chain Profits Quantity Flexibility Contracts
  • Allows the buyer to modify the order (within
    limits) as demand visibility increases closer to
    the point of sale
  • Better matching of supply and demand
  • Increased overall supply chain profits if the
    supplier has flexible capacity
  • Can be effective if a supplier sells to multiple
    retailers with independent demand

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Contracts for Product Availability and Supply
Chain Profits Quantity Flexibility Contracts
  • Downsize
  • Supplier needs to have inventory or excess
    flexible capacity
  • Lower levels of information distortion than
    either buyback contracts or revenue sharing
    contracts due to aggregation of uncertainty from
    supplier
  • Lower retailer effort

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Vendor-Managed Inventory(VMI)
  • VMI manufacturer or supplier is responsible for
    all decisions regarding product inventories at
    the retailer
  • Requirements share info from retailers
  • Benefits
  • Increase profit of manufacturer
  • Improve manufacturer forecast accuracy
  • Avoid double marginalization
  • Drawbacks
  • Impact of product substitution to bring higher
    inventory in retailer

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CPFR Model
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CF
CR
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??CPFR???
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CPFR
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????,?????(Collaborative Planning, Forecasting,
and Replenishment, CPFR)
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????,?????(CPFR)
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????,?????(CPFR)
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CPFR Roadmap
  • Published by VICS (Interindustry Commerce
    Standard Association)
  • Nine steps
  • Develop guidelines for the relationships
  • Develop a joint business plan
  • Create a sales forecast
  • Identify exceptions for the sales forecast
  • Collaborate on exception items
  • Create an order forecast
  • Identify exceptions for the order forecast
  • Resolve/collaborate on exception items
  • Generate orders

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Contracts to CoordinateSupply Chain Costs
  • Differences in costs at the buyer and supplier
    can lead to decisions that increase total supply
    chain costs
  • Example Replenishment order size placed by the
    buyer. The buyers EOQ does not take into
    account the suppliers costs.
  • A quantity discount contract may encourage the
    buyer to purchase a larger quantity (which would
    be lower costs for the supplier), which would
    result in lower total supply chain costs but
    higher inventory levels and lot sizes
  • Quantity discounts lead to information distortion
    because of order batching

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Contracts to Increase Agent Effort
  • There are many instances in a supply chain where
    an agent acts on the behalf of a principal and
    the agents actions affect the reward for the
    principal
  • Example A car dealer who sells the cars of a
    manufacturer, as well as those of other
    manufacturers
  • Examples of contracts to increase agent effort
    include two-part tariffs (a franchise fee and
    sell product at cost) and threshold contracts
    (increasing margin to dealer for higher
    threshold)
  • Threshold contracts increase information
    distortion, however. One way to offer threshold
    incentives over a rolling horizon.

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Contracts to Induce Performance Improvement
  • A buyer may want performance improvement from a
    supplier who otherwise would have little
    incentive to do so
  • A shared savings contract provides the supplier
    with a fraction of the savings that result from
    the performance improvement such as lead time,
    quality
  • Particularly effective where the benefit from
    improvement accrues primarily to the buyer, but
    where the effort for the improvement comes
    primarily from the supplier

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????
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3 ??????Microsoft Office 2007?????,??Microsoft ??????????46?52?65??????
4 Benetton? ????????(http//www.benetton.com/ ),????2012/1/11????????46?52?65??????(?????????,???????????)
4 Benetton? ????????(http//www.benetton.jp/ ),????2012/1/11????????46?52?65??????(?????????,???????????)
5 Benetton? ????????(http//www.benetton.com/ ),????2012/1/11????????46?52?65??????(?????????,???????????)
5 Benetton? ????????(http//www.benetton.com/ ),????2012/1/11????????46?52?65??????(?????????,???????????)
5, 6 ??????Microsoft Office 2007?????,??Microsoft ??????????46?52?65??????
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7 ??????Microsoft Office 2007?????,??Microsoft ??????????46?52?65??????
7 ??????Microsoft Office 2007?????,??Microsoft ??????????46?52?65??????
7 zara?????????(http//www.zara.com/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/home/es/es/zara-W2011-r ),????2012/1/11????????46?52?65??????(?????????,???????????)
17 ??????Microsoft Office 2007?????,??Microsoft ??????????46?52?65??????
17 ??????Microsoft Office 2007?????,??Microsoft ??????????46?52?65??????
17 ??????Microsoft Office 2007?????,??Microsoft ??????????46?52?65??????
17 ??????Microsoft Office 2007?????,??Microsoft ??????????46?52?65??????
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17 ??????Codigofonte.net??(http//www.codigofonte.net/galeria-de-imagens/cliparts/23) ,????2012/2/20????????46?52?65??????
23 ???? ?????
23 ??????Codigofonte.net??(http//www.codigofonte.net/galeria-de-imagens/cliparts/visualizar/FABRICA2.gif),????2012/2/18????????46?52?65??????
23 ??????Codigofonte.net??(http//www.codigofonte.net/galeria-de-imagens/cliparts/visualizar/PREDIO4.jpg),????2012/2/22????????46?52?65??????
93 ??????Business Wire??(http//www.businesswire.com/multimedia/home/20040518005256/en/1088537/VICS-CPFR-Moving),????2012/2/22????????46?52?65??????
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