AREA SECURITY

1
AREA SECURITY
OPERATIONS
2
Military Police Functions
Area Security
Maneuver and Mobility Support Operations

• Support River Crossing, Breaching Operations,
• Passage of Lines
• Straggler Control and Dislocated Civilian
• Route Reconnaissance/Surveillance
• MSR Regulation Enforcement

• Reconnaissance Operations
• Area Damage Control
• Base/Air Base Defense
• Response Force/TCF Operations
• Critical Site, Asset, High-Risk Personnel Sec.
• Force Protection/Physical Security
• Antiterrorism

Police Intelligence Operations

• Support Intelligence Preparation of the
  Battlefield
• Police Information Assessment Process
• Active and Passive Role
• Information Collection and Dessemination
• Joint, Interagency, Multinational Coordination

Internment and Resettlement Operations

• EPW/CI Handling
• U.S. Military Prisoner Handling
• Populace and Resource Control (PRC)
• Dislocated Civilian

Law and Order (LO) Operations

• Law Enforcement
• Criminal Investigations
• US Customs Operations
• Related Law and Order Training

FM 3-19.1 PAGE 3-1
3
Outline

• Threat / Threat Purpose
• Rear Area
• Reconnaissance Operations
• Area Damage Control
• Base / Air Base Defense
• Response Force / TCF Operations
• Critical Site, Asset, High-Risk Personnel
  Security
• Force Protection / Physical Security
• Antiterrorism

4
AREA SECURITYINHERENT TASKS

• Delay
• HastyAmbush/Attack
• Movement to Contact
• Battle Handover to the TCF
• Call for Fire

5
THREAT
6
THREAT PURPOSE

• The purpose of the threat is to seize and
  maintain the initiative while degrading or
  eliminating the enemys flexibility and
  capability to sustain both close and deep fights.

FM 3-19.1 PAGE 3-1
7
REAR OPERATIONS THREAT

• LEVEL I Those which can be defeated by Base or
  Base-Cluster self-defense measures.
• LEVEL II Those which are beyond base or
  base-cluster self-defense, and can be defeated by
  response forces, normally MP with supporting
  fires.
• LEVEL III Beyond Response Force Ability, must
  commit the TCF.

8
THREAT TARGETS

• Nuclear Storage and Delivery Systems
• Command and Control Facilities
• ADA Sites
• Airfields
• Critical Support and Logistics Facilities
• Main Supply Routes
• Reserves

9
REAR AREA
10
REAR AREA LAYOUT
MAIN BATTLE AREA
X
F L O T
F E B A
X X
X
x x x
X
X X
X
BDE
DIV
CORPS
COMMZ
X X
X
X
COMBAT ZONE
11
RAOC
12
BASE/BASE CLUSTERS DESIGNATION

• UNITS DESIGNATED BY RAOC AS
• Base
• Units or multi-unit positions with definite
  perimeters.
• Base Cluster
• Grouping of bases based on mission and security
  requirements
• Lacks clearly defined perimeter

13
BASE AND BASE CLUSTERS
BASE CLUSTER DRAGON
14
Base Development Considerations

• Key Concerns
• Mutually Supporting
• Level I Defense
• 24 Hour Operations
• Fratricide Prevention
• Reconnaissance and Surveillance Execution
• Survivability Measures
• Event Mitigation Planning, I.e. Fire Fighting,
  Natural Disasters, Mass Casualty,
  Chemical-Biological Decontamination, Displacements

15
Area of Responsibility Defense Plan Development
72 Hours
Clusters Develop Cluster Plan
RAOC approves Rolls into AOR
RAOC AOR Defense Plan
Corps Order
48 Hours
24 Hours
Bases develop Base Defense Plan
CRCP
16
REAR OPERATIONSBASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANS

• REAR CP DESIGNATES COMMANDER FOR EACH BASE OR
  BASE CLUSTER
• SENIOR COMMANDER COMMANDS BASE CLUSTER
• COMMANDERS ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR
• POSITIONING UNITS IN THEIR AOR
• IPB OF THEIR AOR
• DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF-DEFENSE PLAN

17
REAR OPERATIONSBASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANS

• DEFENSE PLANS INCLUDE
• CLEAR DEFINITION OF DEFENSE C2
• DETECTION OF THREAT
• SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY
• IDENTIFICATION OF UNIT RESPONSE FORCE
• OBSTACLE PLAN
• AREA DAMAGE CONTROL
• INTERNAL ADA MEASURES
• FIRE SUPPORT

18
REAR OPERATIONSBASE (CLUSTER) DEFENSE PLANS

• FORWARDED TO MP CONDUCTING AREA SECURITY OR MMS
  IN THE BASE/BASE CLUSTER AO
• FORWARDED TO QRF
• FORWARDED TO REAR CP/RAOC/RTOC
• COORDINATED WITH ADJACENT BASES OR CLUSTERS TO
  MAXIMIZE MUTUAL SUPPORT
• COMMANDERS ESTABLISH 24 HOUR OPERATION CENTERS
  (BCOC/BDOC)
• IN THE TA BASE DEFENSE COORDINATION TEAMS
  (BDCTS) ASSIST IN REAR AREA DEFENSE PLANNING

19
Reconnaissance Operations
20
PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS/INFORMATION
REQUIREMENTS

• Examples of PIRs Any Enemy Size Force, NBC
  Contaminated Area, Assassinations, Breach of Base
  Security measures, and Criminal Activity.
• Examples of IRs Damage to roads, Locations of
  DZs/LZs, Possible Ambush Sites, Hospitals,
  External Fuel Sites, Water Sites, etc.

21
RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS
As part of their area security mission, MP serve
as the eyes and ears of the battlefield commander
by seeking out enemy and reporting information
obtained by recon patrols.
FM 3-19.1 PAGE 4-7

• ZONE RECONNAISSANCE
• AREA RECONNAISSANCE

22
FUNDAMENTALS OF RECONNAISSANCE

• REMAIN FOCUSED ON THE OBJECTIVE
• REPORT QUICKLY AND ACCURATELY
• RETAIN FREEDOM TO MANEUVER
• GAIN AND MAINTAIN CONTACT
• DEVELOP THE SITUATION RAPIDLY

23
ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

• Zone Reconnaissance is a directed effort to
  obtain detailed information concerning all route,
  obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a
  zone defined by boundaries.

24
ZONE RECONNAISSANCE

• BEST USED WHEN INITIALLY DEPLOYING INTO AN AREA
• MOST TIME CONSUMING TYPE OF RECONNAISSANCE
• COMMANDERS CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

25
3 METHODS OF ZONE RECON

• FAN
• CONVERGING ROUTES
• SUCCESSIVE SECTOR

26
FAN METHOD
RESERVE
PLANNED ROUTES
27
CONVERGING ROUTES
TO FRIENDLY LINES
ORP
28
SUCCESSIVE SECTOR
29
RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS
ZONE RECON PATROL
RECON ELEMENT
RECON ELEMENT
RECON ELEMENT
HQ
30
AREA RECONNAISSANCE

• Area Reconnaissance is a directed effort to
  obtain detailed information concerning the
  terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed
  area such as a town, ridge line, woods, or other
  feature critical to operations

31
AREA RECON

• GAIN SPECIFIC INFORMATION
• MAINTAIN SURVEILLANCE
• COMMANDERS CRITICAL INFORMATION REQUIREMENT
• SIZE OF THE ELEMENT TO UTILIZE

32
AREA RECONNAISSANCE
S
SECURITY
S
RECON ELEMENT
OBJ
RECON ELEMENT
S
S
SECURITY
S
33
RECONNAISSANCE ELEMENTS
AREA RECON PATROL
RECON ELEMENT
SECURITY ELEMENT
HQ
34
Area Damage Control
FM 3-19.1 PAGE 4-8
35
ADC

• Measures taken before, during and after
• hostile action,man-made or natural
• disasters to
• Reduce probability of damage
• Regulate MSRs
• Aid in continuation or reestablishment
• of normal operations
• Control refugees and provide local security

36
ADC Operations

• Panama
• LA Riots
• Hurricane Andrew
• West Coast Fires
• Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo

37
Base / Air Base Defense
FM 3-19.1 PAGE 4-8
38
BASE AND BASE CLUSTERS
The MP is the base and base cluster commanders
link for detection, early warning, and employment
against enemy attacks. Base defense is
the cornerstone of rear security.

FM 3-19.1 PAGE 4-8
WARRIOR BASE
LIGHTFIGHTER BASE
WARFIGHTER BASE
39
AIR BASE GROUND DEFENSE(ABGD)
Local security measures, both normal and
emergency, required to nullify and reduce the
effectiveness of the enemy ground attack directed
against USAF bases and installations.
40
ABGD OBJECTIVE
The objective of ABGD is to prevent the
degradation of sortie generation by detecting
and disrupting the enemy ground forces far
enough from the base to prevent the use of stand
off or direct fire weapons.

• ABGD Requires
• MP to have special coordination with the USAF
• MP to treat ABGD like any other base or base
  cluster

41
AIR FORCE AOR

• Air Base Perimeter and inside
• 3-5 KM out to include perimeter
• METT-TC Driven

42
ARMY AOR

• 3-5 KM forward of Air Force AOR
• Deliberate Defense Measures
• METT-TC Driven
• Command Relationship

43
AVAILABLE FORCES

• ABGD FORCES (security forces)
• RESPONSE FORCES (MP)
• TACTICAL COMBAT FORCES
• TRANSIENT FORCES

44
USAF SECURITY FORCE
WING CDR
O-7
MSN SPT CDR
O-6
GRP CDR CSP
O-4/O-6
SQN
X3
X3
K9
MORTAR
X3
FLT
X3
45
Response Force / TCF Operations
FM 3-19.1 PAGE 4-8
46
REAR OPERATIONS THREAT

• LEVEL I Those which can be defeated by Base or
  Base-Cluster self-defense measures.
• LEVEL II Those which are beyond base or
  base-cluster self-defense, and can be defeated by
  response forces, normally MP with supporting
  fires.
• LEVEL III Beyond Response Force Ability, must
  commit the TCF.

47
RESPONSE FORCES

• USUALLY MILITARY POLICE !!
• OTHER POSSIBILITIES

CHEMICAL ENGINEERS ELEMENT OF TCF HN
FORCES RECONSTITUTING UNIT TRANSITIONING
COMBAT FORCES
48
RESPONSE FORCESMISSIONS

• Movement to Contact
• Hasty Ambush
• Hasty Attack
• Delays
• Call for Fire
• Repel attacks against and defend Critical Sites

49
RESPONSE FORCE CONSIDERATIONS

• Defense Capability at Each Base
• Location of Obstacles and Mines
• Communication Procedures
• Deceptions Plan and Capability for Each Base

50
RESPONSE FORCE COORDINATION

• Location and Type of Fire Support
• Signals for FPF
• Locations of Planned Fire Missions(TRPs)
• Procedures for Contacting the BDOC
• Locations of LPs/ OPs, Patrols and
  Contact Points
• Location and Type of Aviation Support

51
TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE

• Designated by the G-3
• Normally a Combined Arms organization
• Normally the TCF receives fire support, aviation
  support and any other support needed
• Once TCF is designated it establishes liaison
  with rear CP and response force (MP)
• The TCF will develop its own IPB

FM 3-19.1 PAGE 3-9
52
TACTICAL COMBAT FORCE and THE MP

• Direct Coordination with MPs for
  Intelligence and Contingency Plans
• TCF Commitment is a Command Decision
• Command Relationship is OPCON to TCF CDR
• Battle Hand Over, Blocking Positions, and
  Passage of Lines are ImpliedTasks
• The Military Police Brigade is capable
• of conducting TCF missions only when properly
• augmented

53
Critical Site, Asset, High-Risk Personnel Security
FM 3-19.1 PAGE 4-9
54
SECURITY OF CRITICAL SITES AND ASSETS
MP performs their area security function across
the entire designated AO. When MP provides
security around a critical site or asset they
usually provide a mobile security screen, taking
advantage of its weapons/communications
platforms. FM 3-19.1 PAGE 4-9

TASKS

• PATROLS, RECONNAISSANCE
• CHECKPOINTS
• LISTENING/OBSERVATION POST
• ACCESS-CONTROL POINTS
• RESPONSE FORCE OPERATIONS
• IN-TRANSIT SECURITY FOR CP RELOCATION
• CONVOY SECURITY

55
HIGH-RISK-PERSONNELSECURITY
56
PSD Organization

• Principal and the Protective Service Detail
• PSD Team Detail Leader Personal Security
  Officer (PSO) Advance and Protective Team
  (Residence and Baggage Watch)-Individuals may
  be in several teams

57
PSD Fundamentals

• Planning -- Two Stages Written Personal
  Security Plan (Detail LDR) On-site Survey
  (ADV TM)
• Army Concept -- Based on defense in depth
  Principal Inner Cordon Middle Cordon
  Outer Cordon

58
Planning Considerations

• Threat Collection and Analysis
• Principals Itinerary
• Route Reconnaissance
• Evacuation Plan
• HN/Local Officials
• Three Areas of Protection On-foot, On-site,
  and during travel.(On-foot most critical!!!)

59
Force Protection / Physical Security
60
Antiterrorism
61
QUESTIONS ?