Military History of Swarming

1
Military History of Swarming
January 13, 2003 Sean J.A. Edwards National
Ground Intelligence Center Email JWICS
fredwsa_at_ngic.ic.gov, NIPRNET fredwsa_at_ngic.army.mi
l Phone - DSN 521-7577, Commercial (434)
980-7577
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General Types of Swarming
General Type
Example
Social Biological Police/Fire
Departments Terrorist Military
Smart mobs, Critical Mass, cell phone-based
social groups
Bees, wolves
Response to bank robberies, fires
Al-Qaida cells
Horse archers, U-boat wolfpacks, Spitfires
defending Britain
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Military Swarming

• Definition Swarming occurs when the scheme of
  maneuver is a convergent attack of several
  semi-autonomous (or autonomous) units on a target

• Basic characteristics
• Attrition based - light swarm units avoid close
  combat
• Attacks designed to disrupt cohesion of adversary
• More fluid with common tactics being feigned
  withdrawal, ambush, feint, ruse, infiltration
• Similar to double envelopment but not the same
• sustained pulsing, not sustained close combat
• Not a siege, involves maneuver

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Difference Between Swarming and Guerrilla Tactics

• Swarming
• Several or more units
• Sustainable pulsing
• Dispersed, non-linear

• Guerrilla tactics
• Only a few units involved
• 1 raid or ambush only
• Dispersed, non-linear

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What Can the Past Tell Us?

• When did swarming work and when did it fail?
• Are there any "dominant factors" which appear
  most frequently across many cases?
• How do swarmers do against non-swarmers?
• Does swarming work more frequently on offense
  rather than defense?
• Does swarming success vary according to terrain?
• How did swarmers satisfy their logistical
  requirements?

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Historical Cases Completed

• Scythians vs. Macedonians, Central Asian
  campaign, 329 - 327 BC
• Parthians vs. Romans, Carrhae, 53 BC
• Seljuk Turks vs. Byzantines, Manzikert, 1071
• Seljuk Turks vs. Crusaders, Dorylaeum, 1097
• Mongols vs. Eastern Europeans, Liegnitz, 1241
• Woodland Indians vs. US Army, St. Clairs Defeat,
  1791
• Napoleonic Corps vs. Austrians, Ulm Campaign,
  1805
• Boers vs. British, Majuba Hill, 1881
• U-boats vs. British convoys, Atlantic, 1939
  1945
• Somalis vs. US Commandos, Mogadishu, 1993

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Two Types of Tactical Swarming
Massed Swarm (Eurasian horse archers)
Dispersed Swarm (Somali Militia)
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Example of Massed Swarming Arsuf, 1191

• they are like tiresome flies which you can flap
  away for a moment, but which come back the
  instant you have stopped hitting at them

• Classic Marching battle
• Elusiveness based on Turkish horse archer
• Excellent leaders on both sides
• Conventional Crusader army adopts combined-arms
  box formation
• Crusader cohesion never disrupted

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Nomadic Swarmers from Central Asia
Sarmatians
Manchus
Mongols
Scythians
Huns
Avars
Parthians
Seljuk Turks
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Example of Dispersed Swarming Mogadishu, 1993

• Command and Control
• Burning tires
• Runners
• Cell phones
• Megaphones
• Smoke from crash sites
• Sound of firefights

• Elusiveness based on
• Urban terrain
• Noncombatants
• Home turf
• Roadblocks, narrow alleys equalized mobility

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Basic Pattern Analysis
Elusiveness (mobility or concealment)
Countermeasures negation
U-boat (1939-42) Seljuk Turks I
Woodland Indians Napoleonic Corps Somalis Boers
Seljuk Turks II
Mongols Scythians Parthians
Standoff firepower
Situational awareness
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Conclusions from Preliminary Research

• Feigned retreats and ambushes are common swarm
  tactics
• Swarming strategy usually based on attrition
  knockout blows rare
• Common problems are strongpoint reduction,
  fratricide
• Logistics a constraint
• Mongol toumens could not find enough forage in
  Germany or Syria
• Terrain often key to elusiveness
• Heavy woodlands, urban areas, ocean, grasslands

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Modern Concerns

• Dependence on reliable communications
• Bandwidth concerns
• Electromagnetic threats include EW, EMP
• Terrain restrictions
• Logistics swarming has never been done solely
  with ground vehicles?
• Minefields
• Unit morale

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Why is Swarming Relevant?

• Natural for future battlefield environment
• Greater dispersion
• Nonlinear
• Command and control networked, decentralized
• Small autonomous units operating independently
• Greater reliance on aerospace firepower
• Potential for medium rapid reaction forces who
  must
• avoid direct fire battles
• use standoff fires as much as possible
• rely on elusiveness for survivability

How do LAVs?
fight tanks??
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The Trend in Lethality
10M
Fighter-bombers
WW2 tank
1000K
500K
155mm Long Tom
Tank
French 75mm
100K
Rifled artillery
10K
Theoretical Killing Capacity per hour
5000
Machine gun
18th Century 12-pounder
1000
500
17th Century 12-pounder
Minie Rifle
100
Rifled small arms
16th Century 12-pounder
50
Smoothbore cannons
Flintlock
Gladius
Sarissa
Sword
Smoothbore small arms
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Hand-to-Hand Weapons
400 BC
200 BC
1000
1200
1100
100 BC
300 BC
1400
1300
1600
1500
1800
1700
2000
1900
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Historical Trend in Area per Soldier
Antiquity 10 sq. meters per man Gulf War
426,000 meters per man
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Non-linearity and Dispersion
Swarming
High
Non-linear phases
Non-linearity
Linear
Low
Dispersion
Low
High
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Concluding Remarks

• Given historical trends in dispersion, weapon
  lethality, and nonlinearity, swarming seems a
  natural fit
• Potential operational concept for rapid reaction
  missions (Halt scenario)
• Rapidly deployable joint forces will need to be
  elusive when halting heavy armor threats
• Understanding swarming will also help to counter
  adversarial swarming

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Backup Slides

• Backup

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October 17, 1805. Capitulation of Ulm
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Cases in Progress

• Magyars vs. Germans, Lechfeld, 955
• Seljuk Turks vs. Crusaders, Hattin, 1187
• Seljuk Turks vs. Crusaders, Arsuf, 1191
• Mamluks vs. Mongols, Ayn Jalut, 1260
• Conquistadors vs. Aztecs, Mexico city, 1520
• English Navy vs. Spanish Armada, 1588
• Patriot Militia vs. British, Lexington and
  Concord, 1775
• Zulus vs. British, Isandhlwana, 1879
• Chechens vs. Russians, Grozny, 1994,1999

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Historical Cases Examined
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Backup Slides

• Backup - linearity

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Linearity and Land Warfare

• Linear armies conduct offensive operations on a
  continuous front in one direction at the
  tactical-operational level
• Armies and tactical formations have become more
  linear in order to
• Maximize combat power
• Reduce their vulnerability to incoming missiles
• Decrease fratricide
• Ease command and control
• Flank or avoid being flanked
• In general, tactical deployment has evolved from
  dense phalanxes, maniples, and tercios to thinner
  and longer lines

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Non-Linearity vs. Linearity

• Non-linear warfare
• Maneuver-based
• Multi-directional fighting
• No stable front, flanks, and rear
• Units are dispersed and relatively more
  independent
• Linear warfare
• Attrition-based
• Siege like
• Methodical
• Units heavier, slower, rely on stable supply

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Linear versus Non-Linear Tactics
II
Linear
Non-Linear
II
II
II
close combat
stand-off
II
II
II
X
II
X
units on line
units converging
II
X
Phase Line Charlie
fluid approach
avenue of approach
100 km
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Linear versus Non-Linear Operational Art
Linear
Non-Linear
Avenue of Approach
X
X
airfield
X
Phase Line Charlie
Phase Line Bravo
Phase Line Alpha
Line of Contact
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
seaport
seaport
X
100 km
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The Linear Roman Legion
Each maniple consisted of 2 centuries
Hastati
1200
60 men
60 men
Maniples of 120 men
Centuries can fill in the gaps
250
120 men total 12 man front 10 man depth
Principes
250
1 Triarri maniple
Triarii
60 men 6 man front 10 man depth
Maniples of 60 men
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17th and 18th Century Linear Formations
Individual platoons
Direction of march
Platoons of the second line
Platoons of the first line
Prussian Processional March
French Battalion of Column-of-Divisions
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Linear Control Measures Today
RFL
XX
FEBA
FSCL
X
CFL
XX
ZF-2
X
ACA
X
ZF-1
PL
Delta
II
X
II
II
XX
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Non-Linearity in Military History

• Swarming operations
• Guerrilla and partisan operations
• Airborne, airmobile, and special operations
• 20th Century maneuver warfare - has introduced
  non-linear phases
• Hutier tactics
• Blitzkrieg
• Soviet Deep Operation theory
• Operational Maneuver Groups (OMGs)
• AirLand Battle

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Infiltration Tactics from the First World War
1) Hurricane artillery barrage preparation of
poisonous gas, smoke and high explosive shell
4) Regular infantry troops and reserves clear
trenches, relieve storm units
3) Support troops mop up centers of resistance
2) Storm troops infiltrate and by pass
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Blitzkrieg in the Second World War
Penetration
Linear defensive front
Encirclement
Exploitation
Penetration
34
Maneuver Warfare and Non-linearity
3) Eventual reestablishment of defensive line in
the rear
Non-linear phase
2) Breakthrough and exploitation
1) Initial assault
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Soviet Deep Battle in the Second World War
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Backup Slides

• Backup - Lethality, dispersion

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Technology and Weapon Lethality

• Impact of weapon technology usually only felt
  after a period of assimilation
• Weapon lethality remained relatively flat
  throughout history
• Artillery became the king of lethality in late
  19th century
• Breech-loading, rifling, recoil-systems,
  smokeless powder, and high explosive shells
• Technology of technology systematizes weapon
  development by the end of WW2
• Air-delivered, precision guided munitions (PGMs)
  in the late 20th century rendered concentrations
  of vehicles vulnerable
• Cluster, top-attack, self guiding IR, MW, GPS
  sensors

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The Trend in Dispersion
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Timeline of Gunpowder Weapons
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Timeline of Gunpowder Weapons II
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Quantifying Theoretical Lethality

• If one assumes that lethality is the inherent
  capability of a given weapon to kill personnel or
  make material ineffective in one hour, where
  capability includes range, rate of fire,
  accuracy, radius of effects, and battlefield
  mobility, then quantitative measures can be
  computed to compare dissimilar weapons

Weapon Killing Capacity Sword 20 J
avelin 18 Simple bow 20 Longbow 34 Crossbow
32 Arquebus 10 16th C. 12-pounder cannon
43 17th C. matchlock musket 19 17th Century
12-pounder cannon 229 18th Century flintlock
musket 47 18th Century 12-pounder cannon 3,970
Weapon Killing Capacity Minie
rifle, muzzle-loading 154 Late 19th Century
breech-loading rifle 229 Sprinfield Model 1903
rifle (magazine) 778 WW1 machine
gun 12,730 French 75mm gun 340,000 WW1
fighter-bomber 229,200 WW2 machine
gun 17,980 US 155mm M2 "Long Tom"
gun 533,000 WW2 medium tank 2,203,000 WW2
fighter-bomber 3,037,900
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Ancillary Technology
Command
Year
Logistics and Mobility
General Advances
Ox, mule, horse
Antiquity
Horse drawn cart/horse collar
1200
Portable timekeeping pieces
Late 1600s
Steam engine
1769
Military maps with contour lines
More surfaced roads
Late 1700s
Telegraph
1840
1850s
Field telephone
Internal combustion engine
1887
Quality cheap steel
Late 1800s
1914
Aerial photography
Radio effective
1940
Motor truck and tanks effective
Radar effective
1944
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Categories of Non-Linearity and Dispersion
Non-linear dispersed
Non-linear
1.
2.
Non-linearity
3.
4.
Traditional Linear
Linear with dispersed units
Dispersion
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Summary of Land Warfare Trends
Command
Examples
Linearity
Dispersion
18th Century musket infantry
Very linear, single front, units
contiguous, attacks in waves, tactics sequential
Centralized, methodical, deliberate, preplanned,
hierarchical, low articulation
Low dispersion, high density, shoulder-to-shoulder
, files of men
WW1 trench warfare
Roman legion
WW1 Storm troops using hutier tactics
Nonlinear phases with multiple fronts, attacks
in spearheads, bypass strong points encirclements,
more mixing of enemy and friendly units
Decentralized, use of mission order, reactive, hi
gh initiative, high articulation
More dispersion, squads of men, open order
formations
WW2 Panzer Divisions
OMGs, AirLand Battle
Highly dispersed, maneuver by fire, pulsing?
Longer non-linear phases?
Non-hierarchical, networked?
Future forces?
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• Backup - tactics

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Tactics and Operational Art Based on Logistics

• Tactics have evolved to cut or threaten
  vulnerable supply lines
• Turning movements
• Encirclements

Turning Movement
Encirclement
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Feigned Withdrawal
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Tactics I
49
Tactics II
Turning Movement
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Backup - Logistics
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History of Logistics

• Roman legion required 1,000 pack animals for
  transport and 12.5 oxen, 120 sheep, or 38 pigs
  for food every day
• Introduction of rapid firing small arms and
  artillery in the late 19th C. both increased
  demand and changed its nature
• The Allies in one month of WW1 fired off 2x
  ammunition used by the North in the entire four
  years of the Civil War
• Food, firewood, and fodder are 99 of supplies in
  1870, only 8 in 1940
• Transportation technology has played major role
• Baggage animal, surfaced roads, horse drawn cart,
  locomotive, motor truck, future tilt rotor?
• The locomotive is the great logistical turning
  point
• Allowed increase in size and mechanization of
  armies
• Railways became bones of strategy
• Motor trucks allow operational penetrations up to
  3-400 miles from railhead in WW2

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Backup - Dissertation
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The Armys Strategic Dilemma

• Deployment of rapid reaction forces in the first
  several weeks of a crisis that is survivable
  against heavy force
• Kosovo (1999) and the Persian Gulf War (1990) are
  two examples

Heavy forces not air deployable
No
389 C-130s
Yes
Light forces not survivable
0.10 tons
40 tons
70 tons
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The Armys Answer Future Rapid Reaction Forces

• Medium forces on the way
• 20 tons or less
• Transportable by C-130
• Globally deployable 96 hours after wheels up
• Interim force with LAVIII, MGS
• Objective force with Future Combat System
• Cannot face most enemy armor so we need new
  operational concepts
• Army transformation motivated in part by what we
  think future war will be like

Transform into Objective Force
Expand Interim Force
Design Objective Force
complete transformation
RD Plan
IOC IBCT
Start IBCT
-- RD --
--fielding --
2000
02
03
c. 2012
c. 2025
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Our Problem How Do Medium Forces Fight?

• To survive and be effective, rapid reaction
  medium units must
• avoid direct fire battles
• use standoff fires as much as possible
• rely on elusiveness for survivability
• But The Army does not have the operational
  concept to do this

How do these?
fight these??
Spam in a can?
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The Need for Rapid Reaction Force

• Halt the enemy when he invades allied territory
• Other time sensitive missions like stopping
  ethnic cleansing
• Counter enemy anti-access strategies (airland
  inside)
• Deter aggression

57
Related Research in Enhancing Rapid Reaction
Forces

• Arroyo Center high level simulation has focused
  on enhancing air-deployable forces so they can
  defeat enemy mechanized forces
• Defensive posture
• Tried making light forces lighter or heavier,
  introduced medium force
• Combination of remote indirect systems and
  organic fire works best
• Project Air Force (PAF) - seeking ways to enhance
  air powers ability to engage elusive ground
  targets
• Enhancing Aerospace Operations Against Elusive
  Ground Targets (2001)

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The Solution Must Be Joint

• The future environment and the nature of medium
  forces calls for a joint solution
• Medium ground forces needs airpower to provide
  the offensive punch (the hammer)
• Air forces need a maneuverable ground element to
  act
• As the anvil to flush out elusive targets and
  force them to mass or move
• As forward air controllers

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Dissertation Objective

• Outline operational concepts based on swarming
  for two scenarios
• Initial halt campaign a light/medium ground
  force uses swarming to stop enemy mechanized
  forces
• Dispersed operations a light/medium ground force
  uses swarming against adaptive enemies who have
  dispersed

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Methodology

1. Complete historical research add 30-50 more
   historical cases to a database and examine them
   for patterns and insights
2. Model dispersed nonlinear operations
3. Combine insights and provide a framework for two
   operational concepts based on swarming

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I. Qualitative Methods

• Gather data on 40 cases
• Identify dominant factors and constraints
• Draw inferences, eliminate hypotheses,
  pattern-match, make analytic generalizations
• Use the Qualitative Comparative Method (by
  Charles Ragin)
• Place binary data in truth tables and build a
  boolean equation

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II. Modeling

• Most models tend to emphasize attrition warfare
  and linear operations along well-defined front
  lines (based on Lanchester equations)

• EINSTein is a simple agent-based model that
  assumes land combat is a complex adaptive system
• Highlights SOPs and contingency plans when units
  lose situational awareness
• Allows tradeoffs between centralized and
  decentralized command and control structures
• Models network verse network conflicts when units
  are autonomous (more applicable to 2nd scenario)
• Explore swarming tactics (like creating a golden
  bridge, feigned withdrawals, the half moon)

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III. Create Operational Concepts

• Combine data and insights from earlier phases
• Formulate hypotheses, establish parameter values
  from qualitative data for input to computer
  simulations
• Considering tradeoffs in
• Schemes of maneuver
• Tactics, formations
• Command, control, and communications
• Behavioral rules, SOPs
• Sensor and weapon range
• Coordination of aerospace and ground elements
• Constraints (terrain, mission)
• Address concerns such as destruction in detail,
  fratricide, unit cohesion, dependence on
  communications, logistics, minefields