Social Value Orientation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-Analysis

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Social Value Orientation and Cooperation in
Social DilemmasA Meta-Analysis

• Daniel Balliet
• Singapore Management University
• Craig Parks and Jeff Joireman
• Washington State University

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Social Value Orientation (SVO)

• The weights people assign to self and other
  outcomes in interdependent contexts.
• Prosocials (altruists and cooperators)
• Proselfs (individualists and competitors)

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Purpose of Meta-Analysis

• Central tendency
• Variation
• Moderators
• Iterated vs. one-shot
• Give-some vs. take-some
• Paid vs. non-paid participants
• Group size

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Iterations vs. One-Shot Dilemmas

• Partner strategy may reduce SVO-cooperation
  relationship in iterated dilemmas.
• Behavioral Assimilation Prosocials conform to a
  proselfs defection during iterated social
  dilemmas (Kelley Stahelski, 1970 Kuhlman
  Marshello, 1975)

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Give-Some vs. Take-Some

• Two reasons to expect SVO may be more predictive
  of cooperation in G-S than T-S.
• Prospect Theory Losses (G-S) more important than
  gains (T-S). Therefore, defection and Cooperation
  more attractive for proselfs and prosocials,
  respectively (De Dreu McCusker, 1997)
• Equality norm more salient in take-some dilemmas
  (Van Dijk Wilke, 1995), and SVO less predictive
  when equality norm is salient (de Kwaadsteniet et
  al., 2006).

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Paid vs. Non-Paid Dilemmas

• Two reasons to expect SVO may be more predictive
  of cooperation in non-paid dilemmas.
• Payment may prime a business frame.
• This may change prosocials communal construal
  of the dilemma to a business construal, thereby
  reducing their level of cooperation.
• Payment may reduce expectations of others
  cooperation.

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Group Size

• All SVO measures include decisions while
  interacting in a dyad.
• Does this limit SVOs ability to predict behavior
  in groups of 3 or more?

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Methods and Analyses

• Criteria for Selection
• Adults
• Measure SVO (Ring or TDM)
• DV is strict social dilemma
• Analyses
• Correlation as effect size
• Prosocial vs. Proself
• Mixed-Effects models

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Results Main Effect

• Prosocial vs. Proselfs
• Q(81) 248, p lt.001
• (n 82) r .30, 95 CI, LL .26, UL .33
• Orwins fail safe N 510
• Individualists vs. Competitors
• Q(18) 33.9, p .013
• (n 19) r .27, 95 CI, LL .19, UL .34
• Orwins Fail Safe N 110

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Results Moderators

• Iterated vs. One-Shot
• Q (1) .157, p .692
• One-Shot r .31, 95 CI, LL .26, UL .35
• Iterated r .29, 95 CI, LL .24, UL .34
• Give-Some vs. Take-Some
• Q (1) 5.26, p .022
• Give r .29, 95 CI, LL .25, UL .34
• Take r .22, 95 CI, LL .17, UL .27

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Results Moderators

• Paid vs. Non-Paid Participants
• Q(2) 20.6, p lt .001
• Not Paid r .39, 95 CI, LL .33, UL .45
• Lottery r .36, 95 CI, LL .23, UL .47
• Paid r .23, 95 CI, LL .20, UL .26
• Group Size
• Slope -.007, Q(1) 4.75, p .03

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Future Directions

• Payment X SVO Implications
• Is an implicit measure of SVO needed?
• Research needed on SVO in the context of iterated
  social dilemmas.
• Forgiveness
• Why is SVO more predictive of G-S games?
• SVO in strong vs. weak situations.
• Do paid/take-some dilemmas have more uniform
  expectations, construal, and incentives for
  appropriate behavior?

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Questions?

• Balliet, D., Parks, C., Joireman, J. (2009).
  Social value orientation and cooperation in
  social dilemmas A meta-analysis. Group Processes
  and Intergroup Relations, 12, 533-547.