Liberal international relations theory

1
Liberal international relations theory

• Paul Bacon
• SILS, Waseda University

2
Liberalism 1

• The liberal tradition in IR is closely connected
  with the emergence of the modern liberal state.
• The liberal intellectual revolution placed great
  importance on human reason and rationality.
• The process of modernization generated by the
  scientific revolution led to improved
  technologies, and more efficient ways to produce
  goods and master nature.

3
Liberalism 2

• Liberals have a positive view of human nature.
• Liberals believe in the power of human reason,
  and believe that rational principles can be
  applied to international relations.
• Of course, people are self-interested and
  competitive up to a point. But they also share
  many interests in common, and cooperative social
  action is therefore possible.
• This is true both domestically and
  internationally. Conflict and war are not
  inevitable human reason can triumph over human
  fear and the lust for power.

4
Liberalism 3

• Modernization increases the need for cooperation.
  
• In the long run, cooperation based on mutual
  interests will prevail.
• Belief in progress is also a core value for
  liberals.
• But how much progress? Robert Keohane is a
  cautious liberal optimist.
• Fukuyama believes that we have reached the end
  of history, as we will see later in this course.
• Progress means progress for individuals, or for
  groups of individuals.
• According to John Locke, states exist to protect
  the rights of their citizens, and to allow them
  to live their lives and pursue happiness without
  interference by other people.

5
Liberalism 4

• For realists, the state is a concentration of
  power.
• For liberals the state is a constitutional
  organization, where power is separated.
• The state establishes the rule of law and
  enforces it. It respects the rights of citizens
  to life, liberty and property.
• Bentham believed that such constitutional liberal
  states would respect and tolerate each other.
  This is because it is in the rational interests
  of constitutional states to obey international
  law.
• The German philosopher Immanuel Kant supported
  this view. He argued that constitutional states
  which respected and tolerated each other would
  eventually establish perpetual peace in their
  international relations.

6
Four strands of liberal thought

• Jackson and Sorensen, and several other writers
  identify four different strands of liberal
  theory. These are
• 1. Sociological liberalism
• 2. Interdependence liberalism
• 3. Institutional liberalism
• 4. Republican liberalism

7
Sociological liberalism 1

• Realism was the dominant theory of international
  relations for much of the twentieth century.
• After WWII and during the Cold War, the military
  competition between the two superpowers was at
  the center of attention.
• Realists, as we have seen, focus on the relations
  between sovereign states.
• Sociological liberals believe that this approach
  is too narrow and one sided. They believe that
  international relations is not only about
  state-state relations.

8
Sociological liberalism 2

• Sociological liberalism addresses an old idea in
  liberal thought.
• This is the belief that people are usually more
  cooperative and peace-loving than governments,
  and that there should be more contact between
  peoples from different societies.
• Transnational relations can often therefore be
  just as important as state-state relations.
• Transnational relations involve relations between
  individuals, groups and organizations from
  different countries.
• There are many different types of transnational
  actors and transnational relations.

9
Definitions of transnational relations

• Rosenau defines transnationalism as
• the processes whereby international relations
  conducted by governments have been supplemented
  by relations among private individuals, groups
  and societies that can and do have consequences
  for the course of events.
• Relations across state boundaries that take
  place between two or more actors, at least one of
  which is not a government actor.

10
Security Community 1

• Karl Deutsch was an influential sociological
  liberal during the 1950s.
• He developed the idea of a security community.
• He argued that in a security community, a group
  of people have become integrated, which means
  that a sense of community has developed.
• In such communities, conflicts can be resolved
  without fear of violence.

11
Security Community 2

• For Deutsch, extensive transnational ties, lead
  to peaceful relations, which create the
  conditions for a security community.
• Deutsch argued that a security community had been
  created in the North Atlantic area by the western
  countries.
• It is because of Deutschs work that it became
  common to suggest that European countries would
  never fight each other again.
• Discussion point do US/Japan relations count as
  a security community?

12
Security Community 3

• Deutsch argued that security communities are
  established as the result of a number of
  different factors
• 1. Increased social communication
• 2. Greater mobility of people from countries
  within the security community
• 3. Stronger economic ties
• 4. Greater range of mutual human transactions
• (A realist would also suggest that a shared
  common threat is important)

13
Cobwebs and billiard balls 1

• The realist model argues that states are like
  billiard balls.
• This means that they are independent,
  self-contained units.
• This phrase was suggested by Arnold Wolfers, who
  was a prominent realist during the 1950s.
• John Burton, however, argued that transnational
  relations between people from different countries
  create new forms of society.
• These exist alongside or in competition with the
  system of states.
• He claimed that all nation-states contain
  individuals and groups which share contacts and
  interests with external groups, such as religious
  groups, business groups, labor groups, etc.

14
Cobwebs and billiard balls 2

• Burton argued that we should map actual patterns
  of communication and transaction between people,
  groups and organizations around the world.
• This way, we would get a much more accurate
  account of what is happening in the world,
  because we would be mapping actual human
  behavior.
• Burton famously argued that if we do this, then
  we would end up with a cobweb of dense
  transnational interactions.
• We do not get the simple billiard ball model that
  realism wants us to see. (This can be seen in the
  diagram on page 110 of Jackson and Sorensen).

15
Identity and membership 1

• Realism suggests that we always prioritize our
  national identity and our state membership.
• But this is often not true.
• Sometimes different aspects of our identities are
  more important than others.
• For example, many of you in the room today have
  more in common with each other than you do with
  many people from your home countries.
• Sociological liberals argue that people have many
  different identities and memberships.

16
Identity and membership 2

• For example gender age nationality race
  education occupation hobbies political
  beliefs rural or urban identity and local,
  national or cosmopolitan identity.
• Sociological liberals argue that patterns of
  human relations are driven more by mutually
  beneficial cooperation than by conflict.
• Because individuals have interlocking memberships
  of many different groups, and share the same
  values, conflict will be reduced. (But note,
  Huntington and Walzer)

17
Interdependence liberalism

• Transnational relations are increasing in
  frequency.
• This means a higher level of interdependence, and
  therefore, to some extent, dependence.
• Interdependence means mutual dependence in the
  sense that peoples and governments are
  increasingly affected by what happens in other
  countries.
• Examples include terrorism, AIDS, and
  environmental degradation.
• An important idea here is interdependence
  sensitivity.

18
Is major war obsolete? 1

• Since the 1950s, modernization has seen the
  emergence of several large industrialized
  countries.
• A number of authors, such as Mueller and
  Rosecrance, argue that states have changed their
  attitude to war in the past 50 years.
• Historically, states have used military force to
  achieve territorial expansion.
• In the past, wars have been winnable at
  comparatively low cost, and clear objectives have
  been met.
• However, highly industrialized states can now
  achieve power and prosperity more cheaply and
  with less risk through other methods, such as
  economic development, and foreign trade.

19
Is major war obsolete? 2

• The costs of using force have increased, and the
  benefits have declined.
• Trade is increasingly beneficial for states.
• This is because of the changing basis of modern
  economic production.
• Before, territory and resources were the key.
• Now, the most important things for success are a
  highly qualified labor force, access to
  information, and financial capital.

20
Interdependence reduces violence

• In support of this claim, two of the most
  successful countries of the postwar period,
  Germany and Japan, have been trading states.
• These countries have not prioritized high
  military expenditure and economic
  self-sufficiency in the way that
  realist/mercantilist theory suggests that they
  ought to.
• Instead, they have intensified the international
  division of labor supporting their economic
  success, and increased their interdependence.
• A strong division of labor in the international
  economy increases interdependence between states,
  and discourages and reduces violence between
  them.
• Violence is likely to be costly in relation to
  the other options which are open to advanced
  economies.

21
Complex interdependence 1

• In Power and Interdependence (1977) Keohane and
  Nye suggest that the advanced economies are
  living in a state of complex interdependence
  (CI).
• CI, they argue, is qualitatively different from
  earlier and simpler forms of interdependence.
• In the past, international relations involved
  state leaders dealing with other state leaders.
• The use of military force was always an option.
• There was a distinction between the high
  politics of security and survival (realism) and
  the low politics of economic and social
  affairs.

22
Complex interdependence 2

• Keohane and Nye argue that this is no longer the
  case. Under conditions of CI
• 1. Transnational actors are increasingly
  important. States are often not coherent units
• 2. Military force is less useful than in the
  past. Economic and institutional instruments are
  often more useful.
• 3. Military security is less important, and
  welfare issues are seen as increasingly important.

23
Complex interdependence 3

• Keohane and Nye argue that under conditions of
  complex interdependence, international relations
  will be much more friendly and cooperative than
  realists believe.
• 1. Transnational actors such as non-governmental
  organizations and transnational corporations will
  pursue their own separate goals relatively free
  from state control.
• 2. The importance of international organizations
  will increase. This is because they provide
  opportunities for weak states to act, and also
  allow for coalition formation and agenda-setting.

24
Complex interdependence - scope

• Keohane and Nye argue that CI can be dated to
  the long-term development of the welfare state
  which began in the 1950s.
• Conditions of CI apply to the relations within
  and between the countries of western Europe and
  north America, Japan, South Korea Australia and
  New Zealand.
• The conditions of CI develop as modernization
  develops.
• Discussion point could relations of complex
  interdependence develop between Japan and China?

25
Complex interdependence - caveats

• It should be noted that realism is not obsolete.
• Realism is still useful for helping us to
  understand international relations between
  countries which are complexly interdependent, and
  countries which are not.
• Liberalism supplements realism, rather than
  replacing it.
• It is also possible, if highly unlikely, that
  force could be used to settle a dispute between
  complexly interdependent countries in the future,
  if the stakes were high enough.
• Keohane and Nye are much less idealistic than
  other writers such as Deutsch.
• Samuel Huntington argues that interdependence
  increases cultural friction.

26
Institutional Liberalism

• Institutional liberals argue that international
  institutions make cooperation easier and far more
  likely.
• An international institution is an international
  organization such as NATO or the European Union.
• It can also be a set of rules which govern state
  action in particular areas, such as aviation or
  shipping.
• These sets of rules are often called regimes.
  Often the two go together the international
  trade regime is primarily shaped by the WTO.
• However, sometimes, there are regimes without
  formal international organizations, such as the
  law of the sea.

27
Regime theory 1

• A regime is defined by Krasner as
• a set of explicit or implicit principles, norms,
  rules, and decision making procedures around
  which actors expectations convergence in a given
  issue-area.
• This definition is intentionally broad, and
  covers human interaction ranging from formal
  organizations (i.e. OPEC) to informal groups
  (i.e. major banks during the debt crisis).
• Note that a regime need not be composed of states.

28
Regime theory 2

• International institutions promote cooperation
  between states and help to reduce the lack of
  trust and fear
• These are two of the biggest problems associated
  with anarchy.
• Regime theory states that cooperation in anarchy
  is possible without a hegemon because there
  exists a convergence of expectations.
• Regimes facilitate cooperation by establishing
  standards of behavior which signal to all other
  members that individual states are in fact
  cooperating.
• When all states expect the other participants to
  cooperate, the probability of sustaining
  cooperation increases dramatically.

29
Regime theory 3

• Keohane argues that international regimes can
  therefore increase the probability of
  cooperation.
• 1. Regimes provide information about the behavior
  of others by monitoring the behavior of members
  and reporting on compliance.
• 2. By institutionalizing cooperation, regimes can
  reduce the cost of future agreements. By reducing
  the cost of reaching an agreement, regimes
  increase the likelihood of future cooperation.
  (e.g. GATT)
• 3. Regimes generate the expectation of
  cooperation among members. By creating the belief
  that interaction will continue for the
  foreseeable future, regimes increase the
  importance of reputation and allow for the
  employment of complex strategies.

30
Republican Liberalism

• Liberals believe that there are basically only
  two different types of state in the international
  system.
• These are democracies and non-democracies.
• If this is true, it follows that three types of
  dyadic relationship are possible.
• 1. Non-democracy non-democracy.
• 2. Non-democracy democracy.
• 3. Democracy democracy.
• Can you give me examples of wars for each of
  these dyadic types of international relations?

31
Democratic peace 1

• Republican liberalism is based on the claim that
  liberal democracies are more peaceful than other
  types of political system.
• Republican liberals argue that democracies do not
  fight each other.
• This is known as the democratic peace theory.
• This argument was first made by the German
  philosopher Immanuel Kant. More recently, writers
  such as Dean Babst, Michael Doyle and Bruce
  Russett have updated the theory.
• Because of democratic peace theory, liberals are
  optimistic about the long-term prospects for
  world peace.

32
Democratic peace 2

• War is one of the most serious problems in the
  international system.
• If democratic peace theory is true, then it
  provides us with a way to break the realist
  cycle.
• This also suggests that domestic politics DO
  matter. The domestic politics of a state
  dictate the international relations which that
  state is capable of engaging in.
• Moreover, the number of democracies in the world
  is increasing, and, if democratic peace theory is
  correct, this suggests that the number of
  conflicts will reduce.
• Theoretically, if all of the countries in the
  world became democratic, then the threat of war
  would disappear.

33
Reasons for the democratic peace 1

• According to Doyle, there are three reasons why
  democracies do not fight each other.
• 1. Democracies have domestic political cultures
  based on the principle of peaceful conflict
  resolution.
• Democratic governments are controlled by their
  citizens, who will not support the idea of war
  with another democratic country.
• 2. Democracies hold common moral values which
  lead to the formation of a Pacific Union or a
  zone of peace.
• This is based on the common moral foundations of
  all democracies.

34
Reasons for the democratic peace 2

• 2. continued Peaceful conflict resolution at the
  domestic level is seen as morally superior, and
  this attitude is transferred to relations between
  democracies.
• Freedom of expression and free communication
  promote mutual understanding across political
  boundaries.
• 3. Peace between democracies is strengthened by
  economic cooperation and interdependence.
• The economies of countries in the zone of peace
  are complexly interdependent (Keohane and Nye).

35
Pauls 6 arguments about democracy

• Democracies do not fight wars against each other.
  
• Democracies do not experience famines.
• Democracies do not commit democide. Democracies
  have better human rights records than
  non-democracies.
• Democracies have higher living standards than
  non-democracies.
• Democracies are more economically productive than
  non-democracies.

36
Prospects for the Zone of Peace

• The end of the Cold War contributed to what
  Samuel Huntington has referred to as the third
  wave of democracy.
• This led to initial post-Cold War optimism.
• Most liberals argue that there is a democratic
  zone of peace among the consolidated liberal
  democracies of Western Europe, North America
  Japan, korea and Australasia.
• However, the continued expansion and
  consolidation of this zone is far from assured.
• Republican liberals are optimistic, but they do
  not share Fukuyamas excessive optimism that the
  Cold War marked the victory of liberalism and the
  end of history.

37
Prospects for the Zone of Peace

• Pacific Unions do not emerge automatically. They
  must be built over time on all three of the
  foundations identified by Doyle.
• As Jackson and Sorensen note, most of the new
  democracies fail to meet at least two of the
  three conditions of the democratic peace outlined
  above.
• It is also possible that newly democratic
  countries will not consolidate their democratic
  opening, and could revert to autocracy.
• Democracies are also often said to possess a
  number of other advantages.

38
Prospects for the Zone of Peace

• Republican liberalism has a strong normative or
  moral element.
• Republican liberals believe in progress towards
  peace and cooperation in international relations
  in the long run.
• They see it as their responsibility to promote
  peace.
• There are many interesting debates about how best
  to promote democracy. (My later classes).