Terrorism and the Defense of the Food System

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Terrorism and the Defense of the Food System

• Food Systems and the Environment
• Spring 2007 Environmental Lecture Series
• 3 April 2007
• Amherst, Massachusetts
• Francis (Frank) F. Busta, Director
• National Center for
• Food Protection and Defense
• University of Minnesota - Twin Cities Campus
• 200 Dinnaken Office Building925 Delaware Avenue
  S.E.,
• Minneapolis, MN 55455  USAPhone [phone]
  
• http//www.ncfpd.umn.edu

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Terrorism and the Defense of the Food
SystemFrancis F. Busta, Director National
Center for Food Protection Defense,
Minneapolis, MN, USA

• Intentional contamination of the food supply
  poses a real and potentially catastrophic threat
  to society. Overall, it has the potential to
  result in disastrous and far-reaching effects,
  including direct morbidity and/or mortality,
  disruption of food distribution, loss of consumer
  confidence in the food supply, business failures,
  trade restrictions, and ripple effects on the
  economy. Key interrelated factors specific to
  food and the food system create this unusual
  vulnerability.
• The efficiency of the food system enables
  products derived from a wide range of global
  sources to be mass-produced in a single location
  and, due to the speed of national and global
  just-in-time supply chains, distributed rapidly.
  The food industrys routine food safety measures
  are not designed to protect against high-impact
  deliberate contamination. When contamination
  occurs, identification of its nature and extent
  may take days or even weeks. Unintentional
  foodborne illness can further complicate
  recognition of intentional contamination events.
• The food/agriculture sectors infrastructure must
  be strengthened to mitigate potential harm
  resulting from deliberate contamination, thereby
  making the food system less vulnerable to attack.
  Initiatives include the development of specific
  countermeasures to minimize or eliminate
  vulnerabilities, as well as the development of
  practical solutions that enhance the capability
  to rapidly identify, contain, respond, and
  recover from intentional contamination, both real
  and threatened. These activities must encompass
  the entire farm-to-table food system, from
  pre-farm inputs through retail sale to
  consumption at the consumer level.

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Overview

• The Food System as a Target
• Intentional contamination in the past
• Overview of the food system complexity/vulnerabi
  lity of supply chain
• Potential impact of food system attacks
• Principles and perceptions
• NCFPD Research Education Efforts

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Current Events Context

• Global warming
• Avian influenza spreading rapidly
• Pandemic human influenza concerns mounting
• Nations capability to respond to natural
  disasters
• Increased chatter on general terrorism threats
• Health care crisis looming
• Budget deficits mounting
• Why are we worried about defense of the food
  system?

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Food Contamination History

• Historical military weapon (troops/civilians)
• Athenian poisoning of Kirrha (590 B.C.)
• WWII Japan in China/Manchuria with Bacillus
  anthracis, Shigella spp, Vibrio cholerae,
  Salmonella paratyphi, and Yersinia pestis
• Terrorist/criminal acts in the U.S. and abroad
• Rajneeshee cult contamination of ten salad bars
  with S. typhimurium (1984, 751 ill)
• Lab technician poisoning of 12 co-workers with
  Shigella dysenteriae laced pastries (1996)

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Grocery store worker accused of poisoning
beef Thursday, February 13, 2003 Posted 504 PM
EST (2204 GMT)
GRAND RAPIDS, Michigan -- A former supermarket
employee was indicted on charges of poisoning
about 200 pounds of ground beef with insecticide
and sickening more than 40 people.
Italy on alert for water poisoner Italian police
have launched a search to track down a mystery
poisoner who has been injecting a soapy liquid
into plastic bottles of mineral water.
61 Students felled by rat poison in central
China Monday, September 29, 2003 Dozens of
elementary school students and teachers in Hunan
Province were hospitalized after ingesting rat
poison with their school breakfasts in an
apparent deliberate mass poisoning, state media
said Sunday.
350 Iraqi Policeman Suffer Food PoisoningOctober
11, 2006BAGHDAD, Iraq -- Authorities arrested
the head of the mess hall where at least 350
Iraqi policemen suffered food poisoning, and a
military spokesman said Monday that it was likely
the poisoning was intentional.
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Intelligence on Food Terrorism
Terrorist groups have a lesser interest in
biological materials and are most interested in
chemicals such as cyanide salts to contaminate
food and water supplies CIA Testimony to
Congress 2002
Documents Seized in Afghanistan (Tarnak Farms)
Indicate Interest
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Government Accountability Office

• Recently identified the food system as a high
  risk area for homeland security in its January
  2007 report, High Risk Series An Update
  (GAO-07-310).

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Recent Rand Report

• In terms of modalities, one can expect to see an
  ongoing emphasis on coordinated bombingspossibly
  interspersed with the adoption of less
  conventional tactics such as radiological
  releases and the deliberate contamination of the
  food supply or agriculture.

Libicki, Chalk Sisson, 2007 Exploring
Terrorist Targeting Preferences RAND Corp.
www.rand.org pp. 71
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Recent Rand Report

• Attacks against the agricultural sector may pose
  the most serious threat given their ease of
  execution and potential socioeconomic fallout
  food processing and packing plants are especially
  at risk.

Libicki, Chalk Sisson, 2007 Exploring
Terrorist Targeting Preferences RAND Corp.
www.rand.org pp. 84
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Challenges of Food Defense

• Food supply chain the most complicated supply
  chain known
• Globally dispersed, privately held and highly
  dynamic
• Food a potentially desirable terrorist vehicle
• Unintentional contamination already highlights
  the challenges

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U.S. Global Food SystemStrength and Risk

• Food sector a huge economic engine 1.24
  trillion/year
• One in six jobs
• Highly concentrated Vast transportation systems
  
• Food system complexity makes contamination a real
  risk
• 2,128,000 farms
• 30,000 food manufacturing sites (94,000
  foreign)
• 19,567 re-packers/packers (87,000 foreign)
• 224,300 retail food stores
• 565,000 food service outlets
• Everyone eats everyone a target

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? MillionForeign Farms
2.1 MillionU.S. Farms
30,000 U.S.Processing Sites
94,000 Foreign Processing Sites
19,000 DomesticPackers/Repackers
87,000 ForeignPackers/Repackers
224,000 RetailFood Stores
935,000 RetailFood Outlets
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Food Agriculture Infrastructure

• The most complicated supply chain in existence
• Globally dispersed
• Privately held
• Highly integrated
• Flexible
• Dynamic
• Innumerable potential points of
  disruption/contamination
• Inherently systems based

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Supply Chain Complexity
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Ingredients
USDA inspected beef
bleached wheat flour mono- and diglycerides malted
barley flour diacetyl tartaric acid
esters thiamine ethanol riboflavin sorbitol
Niacin polysorbate 20 folic acid potassium
propionate reduced iron sodium stearoyl
lactylate Water corn starch corn syrup ammonium
chloride sesame seeds ammonium sulfate soybean
oil calcium peroxide Yeast ascorbic
acid Salt azodicarbonamide calcium
sulfate enzymes calcium carbonate calcium
propionate calcium silicate wheat gluten soy
flour baking soda
Milk milkfat Water cream sodium
citrate salt sodium phosphate sorbic
acid artificial color cheese culture acetic
acid soy lecithin Enzymes starch
Sauce Soybean oil pickles distilled
vinegar Water egg yolks High fructose corn
syrup Sugar onion powder corn
syrup Spice spice extractives Salt xanthan
gum mustard flour Prop. glycol alginate sodium
benzoate potassium sorbate mustard bran garlic
powder hydrolyzed proteins caramel
color Paprika Turmeric calcium disodium EDTA
Cucumbers water Vinegar Salt calcium
chloride Alum natural flavorings polysorbate
80 turmeric
Grill Seasoning Salt Pepper cottonseed
oil soybean oil
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The Consumer Assumes A Safe and Plentiful Food
Supply

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  Principles of Delivery  

• The delivery of the food supply is highly
  dependent on the many facets of the food system
  and supply chain
• No longer a simple system

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Fresh-cut lettuce distribution chain
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U.S. Global Food SystemStrength and Risk
Grains
Oils
Cheese
Juices
Vegetables
Bananas
Cocoa
Seafood
Processed Meat
Spices
Fresh Meat
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Imported Foods

• 60 billion in ag imports
• 150,000 foreign facilities registered
• 3 of imported food is inspected at the border
• Borders are porous

Over 90 of green onions and 48 of cucumbers
sold in the United States were from Mexico in 2005
Mexican trucks make about 4.5 million border
crossings each year, according to US government
figures. DOT 6-24-05
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Food System Imported Shrimp

• Majority of shrimp for the U.S. is imported
• International sources serve multiple regions
• Intentional contamination overseas might or might
  not be intended for the U.S.

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Thailand Shrimp Exports
18,409 Metric Tons/year
100,342 Metric Tons/year
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Agriculture Attack Impacts

• Primarily an economic threat with major
  confidence in government impact
• Nationally distributed target with global trade
  significance
• Local through national economic dislocations with
  rapid onset and slow recovery
• Cascading economic, psychological sociological
  effects
• UK and Dutch FMD outbreaks registered significant
  post-traumatic stress disorder rates

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Food Attack Impacts

• Both a significant public health and economic
  threat
• Access to sufficient calories not a likely issue
  in developed nations, could be one in poorer
  nations.
• Globally distributed target
• Psychological impact of personal threat vector
  for delivery of agents
• Will my cookie kill me as a Weapon of Mass
  Destruction threat

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Consumer Perceptions

• Consumers believe terrorism events will occur in
  the near term
• Food attacks are the least anticipated, but
  consumers would spend the most on preventing
• Consumers place burden on the government first,
  industry a close second, for food defense

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  Principles Perception    

• Systems thinking is imperative
• Principles are fundamentally same
• Must recognize similarities differences

• Food Quality
• Food Safety
• Food Defense
• Food Protection
• Animal Protection
• Crop Protection

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  Principles Perception    

• Symmetrical
• vs.
• Asymmetrical

• Food Quality
• Food Safety
• Food Defense
• Food Protection
• Animal Protection
• Crop Protection

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Threats Come in Various Forms

• Mother Nature
• Disgruntled employees
• Violent activist groups
• Criminals/subversives
• International/government supported or directed
  groups or individuals terrorists

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Problem - Past Frame of Reference

• Product consistency, cost, stability
• Free of pathogens foreign material
• Oblivious to intentional contamination
• Stable raw material supply
• Reliable and accessible vs. transient workers

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Challenges of a Food Situation

• Food supply system is extremely complex
• Global challenge acknowledged
• Food as a desirable terrorist vehicle
• Intentional vs. accidental contamination
• New paradigm for threats to food safety and
  defense management

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Multiple Food System Vulnerabilities

• Opportunities for contaminant access
• Lack of subsequent adequate inactivation
  treatment
• Large volume and/or maximum mixing
• Product environment for agent growth/preservation
• Rapid distribution to consumers
• Rapid consumption by consumers
• Possible disproportionate consumption by high
  risk populations

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Differentiating Accidental/Normal from
Intentional Contamination

• Types of information, reports, situations
• Types of agents
• Concentration of agents
• Choice of targets
• Scale/number of targets
• Recognition of illness, cause, response

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• Defending the safety of the food systemthrough
  research and education

Frank Busta , Director NCFPD http//www.ncfpd.umn
.edu
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Collaborating Across Agencies
State/Local Agencies
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Broad Academic Collaboration
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Diverse Industry and Association Collaboration
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NCFPD Mission

• Reduce the likelihood of an attack
• Improve the nations ability to respond
  effectively
• Reduce the consequences of an attack

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NCFPD Goals

• Reduce the potential for catastrophic food system
  events by
• Rendering targets unattractive
• Rapidly and accurately detecting attacks
• Responding effectively to minimize consequences
• Rapidly delivering effective recovery efforts
• Training new scientists and professionals
• Partnering and collaborating to ensure success

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NCFPD Primary Themes

• Supply Chain Resiliency
• Public Health Response
• Economic Models for Evaluating Interventions

System Focus

• Rapid Detection
• Decontamination
• Inactivation
• Disposal

Agent Focus

• Disseminating NCFPD Products
• Training Scholars and Professionals
• Risk Communication

Training Focus
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Supply Chain Goals
System Focus

• Tools for the private sector to assess and
  improve their own capabilities to
• Prevent food system events
• Respond to food system events
• Recover from food system events
• Guidelines/standards to simplify implementation
  of best practices for supply chain protection

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Public Health Goals
System Focus

• Realistic models for food system events and
  public health response capability to enable
• Improved interventions/countermeasures
• More rapid surveillance
• More effective policies and training across the
  food and public health systems
• Performance standards for surveillance outbreak
  response at the state and local level

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Models of Food System Events

• Realistic models of key event attributes
• Consumer exposure and outcome
• Impact on public health infrastructure
• Economic impact of an event
• Impact of various interventions
• Demonstrates massive impact from food event
• Requires extensive collaboration with private
  sector, states and federal agencies to be
  relevant

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Time from Symptoms to Outbreak Complaint/Recogniti
on
System Focus
EDITS2002
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Botulism Outbreak Example
System Focus
Event

• August 25, Church supper
• 15 (40)/38 ill
• August 29, 4 men admitted to hospital
• Diagnosis delayed by 1-7 d in 4 persons
• Outlier sought treatment 4x over 3 days before
  diagnosis
• Kalluri P, et al. CID
• 2003371490-1495

Event recognized
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Economics Goals
System Focus

• Quantitative evaluation of the total economic
  consequences at the firm, community, sector,
  regional and national level
• Tools to optimize investments for mitigation of
  food system events
• Consumer and private sector validation of
  appropriate investments in the food system

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Consumers Believe Food Safe, But Not Secure
System Focus
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Public Says Spend More for Food Defense and to
Prevent Chemical-Biological Attacks
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NCFPD Primary Themes
System Focus

• Rapid Detection
• Decontamination
• Inactivation
• Disposal

Agent Focus
Training Focus
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Detection Goals
Agent Focus

• Detection platforms for the unique needs of the
  food system, including
• In-line processing
• Mobile deployment
• Private and public sector laboratories
• Detection platforms built on multiple technical
  strategies
• Integration of existing technologies into rapid
  systems
• Development of new platforms for real time
  detection
• Development of new platforms for rapid, high
  sensitivity/specificity

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Dairy Detection Where To Test?
Agent Focus
Dairy Farms 116,874
Supply Plants 101
Cheese Plants 402
Distributing Plants 265
Flavor Suppliers 32
Ice Cream Plants 94
Vitamin Suppliers 11
Bulk Condensed Milk 66 Plants
Intentional contamination of ONE BATCH at any one
of these points could result in catastrophic
public health and economic harm
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Electronic detection of membrane dissolution

• Bio-recognition membrane separates fluidic sample
  from electrodes
• Specific target cleaves membrane (ex. protease
  activity)
• Sample flows into electrodes and changes
  resistance drastically
• Ideally ? transduction/amplification (enzyme
  activity)
• Zero power consumption until target detection
• Applicable widely to bio-sensing

S. S. Sridharamurthy, et al. Lab on a Chip 2006,
vol. 7, pp. 840-842
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Inactivation/Decontamination Goals
Agent Focus

• Near-term actionable decontamination procedures
  for food system facilities in case of an event
• Mid-term safer/more effective decontamination
  technical strategies for food system facilities
• Food processing protocols to mitigate the public
  health implications of potential contamination
  agents

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Disposal Goals
Agent Focus

• Near-term actionable disposal protocols for
  contaminated food in case of an event
• Environmental safety
• Regulatory/community considerations
• Mid-term safer/more community acceptable
  strategies for disposal of contaminated food

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NCFPD Primary Themes
System Focus

Agent Focus

• Disseminating NCFPD Products
• Training Scholars and Professionals
• Risk Communication

Training Focus
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Education Goals
Training Focus

• A comprehensive educational program that
  addresses the educational content needs for food
  defense
• A learning community of experts in the fields of
  education, security, food supply and public
  health
• Educational needs assessment across the food
  supply chain
• Educational resources developed by others, vetted
  by education team and enhanced utilization
• New courses, certificates and continuing
  education content to close gaps in food defense
  education

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Risk Communication Goals
Training Focus

• Best practices, key messages and metamessaging
  strategies and subject matter experts for
  different scenarios
• Curriculum, training materials and programs to
  train risk communicators for food system
  catastrophic events
• Capabilities for real time risk communication
  support in the case of an actual event

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Goal Reduce outrage so people dont take
unnecessary precautions
High
Crisis Communication
Fear (Outrage)
Public Relations
Precaution Advocacy
Low
High
Danger (Hazard)
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Goal Increase concern for a real hazard to
motivate preventive action
High
Outrage Management
Crisis / Emergency Communication
Fear (Outrage)
Public Relations
Low
High
Danger (Hazard)
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Goal Acknowledge hazard, validate concern,
give people ways to respond
High
Outrage Management
Fear (Outrage)
Public Relations
Precaution Advocacy
Low
High
Danger (Hazard)
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Summary

• Great need for research and education to defend
  the safety of the food system
• Cross cutting systems approach to drive unique
  benefits in food system defense
• Fundamental research program reinforced by
  stakeholder relevant, applied research programs
• Diverse and strong partnerships to deliver user
  relevant science to security solutions
• Clear technology transfer plans for research
  products

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Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper.
You can make a hundred brilliant saves but the
one shot that people remember is the one that
gets past you.

• Paul Wilkinson, Daily Telegraph, London, 9/ 1/ 92

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• Defending the safety of the food systemthrough
  research and education

Frank Busta , Director NCFPD http//www.ncfpd.umn
.edu