Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Counter to Urban Swarm Tactics, Techniques and Procedu

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Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
Counter to Urban Swarm Tactics, Techniques and
Procedures The Human Element and Complex
Cultural Network Dave Dilegge Adroit Systems
Inc. Urban Operations Journal www.urbanoperations.
com
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Briefing Outline

• Introduction
• Urban Threat TTP
• Urban ISR Shortfalls
• The Complex Cultural Network
• The Urban Civil Awareness Program
• Conclusions

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Introduction Terms of Reference

• Massed Swarm single body disassembles to
  conduct convergent attack (Edwards Rand)
• Dispersed Swarm dispersed body converges
  without forming single mass (Edwards Rand)
• Compound combination of massed and dispersed
  (Huber USA CSI)

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Introduction

• Assumptions
• Adaptive, thinking enemy
• All blocks of the Three Block War
• High tech vs. selective tech
• Fence sitting population
• Tech improvements integrated packages into
  DOTMLPF and policy
• Adaptive, thinking friendly force

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Introduction

• Maneuver approach to urban operations (USECT)
• Contrasts attrition (or direct) approach
• Focused on operational level of war
• Application of operational art by a JFC
• Understand
• Shape
• Engage
• Consolidate
• Transition

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An Aside ISR Smart Swarm

• Before adding new technological ISR swarming
  capabilities we must swarm on
• The current efforts and programs
• Operators requirements

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Urban Threat TTP

• Somalia 1992-94
• Chechnya 1994-96
• North Korea ?
• Iraq ?

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Urban Threat TTP Somalia

• Thousands of fighters on call
• Heavily armed disciplined (SNA)
• Information operations
• Good ISR
• Good OPSEC
• Attack the weak link ambush UN forces
• Swarm Blackhawk Down

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Urban Threat TTP Somalia
Bottom line Me and Somalia against the world.
Me and my clan against Somalia. Me and my family
against the clan. Me and my brother against my
family. Me against my brother.
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Urban Threat TTP Chechnya

• Thousands of fighters on call
• Heavily armed disciplined
• Information operations
• Good ISR
• Good OPSEC
• Attack the weak link ambush Russian forces
• Swarm Presidential Palace and Grozny 2

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Urban Threat TTP Chechnya
Bottom line Me and Chechnya against Russia. Me
and my clan against Chechnya. Me and my family
against the clan. Me and my brother against my
family. Me against my brother.
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Urban Threat TTP North Korea

• Compound conventional and asymmetric
• WMD
• Offense in South Korea
• Defense in North Korea
• Transition?

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Urban Threat TTP North Korea

• Bottom Line
• Ugly winnable with high causalities and
  collateral damage
• Still need to win the consolidation and
  transition

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Urban Threat TTP Iraq

• Compound conventional and asymmetric
• WMD?
• Defend Baghdad, other urban areas?
• Transition?

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Urban Threat TTP Iraq

• Bottom Line
• Possible compound urban warfare
• Iraqis are not Chechens - war won
• Potential for high casualty rate and collateral
  damage
• Still need to win the consolidation and
  transition

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Urban ISR Shortfalls

• Defense Intelligence Urban Operations Working
  Group (OSD C3I) Roadmap
• Defense intelligence and operators
• Incorporated into DoD Urban Ops Roadmap
• Top Five
• HUMINT
• Cultural Intelligence
• Imagery Mapping Base 1m unclassified
• Operator/Intelligence Integration/Interface
• Urban IPB Knowledge Management Tool

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Urban ISR Shortfalls

• These findings supported by
• 1994 Defense Science Board study
• 1998 J-8 MOUT assessment
• 1998 DIA Urban Operations Conference AAR
• 2000 GAO Report on DoD Urban Ops Capabilities
• 2000 DoD Response to GAO Report
• 2000 DSC Urban Ops ISR Study

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Complex Cultural Network

• Long term commitments rely on good will of
  populace
• Humanitarian component inherent in all ops
• Lack of timely, relevant information on dynamic
  social and cultural situation
• Existing collection, analytical and
  dissemination capabilities cannot satisfy need
  for soft infrastructure information

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Complex Cultural Network

• Provides
• Access to non-traditional in-country
  information sources
• Allows decision-makers to get under the
  surface of an AO down to street level if needed
• Two-way street info passed up to assess
  operational effects

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Complex Cultural Network

• Digital big tent mutually supporting network
• Geo-referenced up-to-date information
  (time-stamped)
• Accessible globally 24/7
• Scalable
• Standard format customized content
• Seamless data, voice and video
• Multidirectional information dissemination

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Complex Cultural Network

• Provides process and tools that encourage data
  input from all vested parties
• On-scene reach back to government and
  non-government sources
• Users
• Military
• Interagency
• Coalition/allies
• Intelligence community
• NGOs

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CCNThe Network

• DoD Accredited
• GIS Encryption

• Cell Phones
• PDAs
• Laptops
• Deployable and
• Fixed Workstations
• Radio

Virtual Knowledge Base
Portal
SBU-Level Security
Wire/ Wireless Interface
?

• The foundation of the CCN enterprise
• Spatially referenced
• Multimedia
• -Text files, data
• -Images
• -Video
• -Voice
• -Geo-Referenced
• Object-oriented
• Relational
• Robust Communications
• -Network Infrastructure

Collaborative Virtual Field Environment

• Big Tent
• Digital CMOC
• Mutually
• Supporting
• Network

CCN Analytical Team
Other Analytical Sources

• State
• DoD
• Intelligence
• Academia
• Justice
• NGOs

Other Shared Databases

• State
• DoD
• Intelligence
• Academia
• Commercial

Analysts shepherd the data into the virtual
knowledge base which is then geo-referenced and
customized to the user employing software tools
(Amazon.com).
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Complex Cultural Network

• Technology considerations
• Security
• Bandwidth
• Interface
• Collaborative
• COTS

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Urban Civil Awareness Program

• Based on USMC Vietnam Combined Action Program
  (CAP)
• Integration of local law enforcement/militia
  with a squad of Marines (15)
• CAP-like programs proven successful previously
  in Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic
  Counterinsurgency
• Extends beyond small unit patrols and offensive
  actions

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Urban Civil Awareness Program

• One integrated unit, U.S. forces live and
  operate in assigned area with counterparts
• Unified combat operations
• Military training
• Civil affairs
• Security operations
• Separates insurgents from safe haven, logistics,
  and information

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Urban Civil Awareness Program

• Combines networked U.S. firepower and C3I with
  local knowledge
• Demonstrates U.S. not going away
• Builds a relationship between populace and
  U.S. forces and by extension, U.S. national goals
• Allows for own swarming capability of multiple
  Urban CAP units

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Urban Civil Awareness Program

• ISR value added
• Lessons enemys home field advantage
• Fills HUMINT void by nature of daily contact
  with populace in operating area
• Cues traditional ISR swarm
• Allows focus of effort
• Networked and linked to JFC provides bigger
  picture with own eyes and ears in the streets

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Questions or Comments?

• Complex Cultural Network
• Urban Civic Awareness Program
• Dave Dilegge
• [phone]
• DDilegge_at_alexandria.adroit.com
• www.urbanoperations.com