Asia Nuclear Security US Department of Energy December 5, 2006

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Asia Nuclear SecurityUS Department of
EnergyDecember 5, 2006

• Peter Hayes
• peter_at_nautilus.org
• Nautilus Institute
• San Francisco
• www.nautilus.org

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Outline of Briefing

• AES- EASSC meeting
• GNEP scenarios
• NK training
• AES workplan

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Back-Back 8 day Workshop Cycle

• East Asia Science Security (GNEP focus) 2 days
• GNEP Scenarios 1 day
• 7th Asia Energy Security national expert fuel
  cycle modeling 2 days
• DPRK renewables training 3 days
• Russia, Japan, NS Korea, China, Australia,
  United States
• Donors DOE, Korea Foundation, New Land
  Foundation, MacArthur

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Japan Three types of spent fuel storage capacity
At-reactor storage
Storage capacity 16,940 tHM/16 sites
Rokkasho reprocessing plant
Storage capacity3,000tHM (Received 1,776 tHM as
of April 2006) Construction cost \2.14Trillion
Mutsu Interim storage site
Dry storage Capacity 5,000 tHM Operation
2010 (Status Planned) Construction cost
\0.1Trillion (including dry casks)
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2024
2028
Figure 1. Cumulative inventory and management of
spent fuel in the future
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Japan Plutonium balance
Current stockpile
Figure 3. Management of plutonium (As of March
2004)
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81tPu
74tPu
81tPu
37tPu
48tPu
6tPu
Figure 4. Future plutonium stockpile until 2020
Assumption Before 2004 actual data After 2005
Demand MOX fuel From 2012, 9.3 tPu/year/plants
x18 plants Monju
re-start from 2010, 0.47tPU/year
Supply Rokkasho reprocessing plant start
from 2006
(2 -6tPu/year from 2006-2009, 8tPu/year from 2010)
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Conclusion (Suzuki-Katsuta)

• Our analysis suggests that there will be
  sufficient spent fuel storage capacity up to year
  of 2025 (low burn-up case) or 2028 (high burn-up
  case).
• There is therefore no need from this perspective
  for reprocessing until the mid 2020s.
• Without any reprocessing, there would be a need
  for up to of 30,000 tHM of AFR spent fuel storage
  capacity (six more Mutsu type facilities) by
  2050.
• But, the political constraints are severe. Spent
  fuel transfer among NPP sites and the siting of
  AFR storage facilities would both be opposed by
  local authorities.
• Also, inter-utility property rights because
  TEPCO owns the PWR spent fuel storage capacity at
  Mutsu, PWR sites, storage pools owned by some
  other utilities would be filled up by 2014,
  although Mutsu storage capacity for PWR would
  still be available. And the BWR sites will be
  filled up by 2019, since Mutsu storage capacity
  of 4,000 tHM will not be built up by then.

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Japans New National Energy Strategy (3)

• (1)   Target of energy conservation
• At least another 30 improvement of efficiency
  will be attained by 2030.
• (2)   Target of reducing oil dependence
• The ratio will be reduced from current 50 to be
  lower than 40 by 2030.
• (3)   Target of reducing oil dependence in the
  transport sector
• The percentage will be reduced from 100 to
  around 80 by 2030.
• (4)   Target on nuclear power generation.
• The ratio of nuclear power to all power
  production will be maintained or increased at the
  level of 30 to 40 or more up to 2030 or later.
• (5)   Target of overseas natural resources
  development
• Oil volume ratio will be increased from current
  18 to around 40 by 2030.
• Source New National Energy Strategy (May 2006)
• http//www.enecho.meti.go.jp/english/data/newnatio
  nalenergystrategy2006.pdf
• (Framework based on PARES study done with
  NN24-DOE support in late 90s)

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Japans GNEP RESPONSEProposed IAEA Standby
Arrangements System for Nuclear Fuel Supply (1)

• Japans strategic thinking
• Make Japan's presence in the GNEP
• Secure the position as a supplier of enriched
  uranium service in the future (do not want to
  limit future suppliers to only six nations)
• Basic concepts
• Supplementary to six country proposal
• Intend to reduce possibility of supply
  disruption in addition to preparation for
  possible disruption- need to enhance
  transparency of the market
• Six country proposal separate countries into
  have and have not. This proposal is intended
  to cover as many countries as possible as future
  suppliers.

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Japans ProposalIAEA Standby Arrangements System
for Nuclear Fuel Supply (2)

• Each country can voluntarily register the
  following supply capability at IAEA
• Natural uranium
• Uranium conversion
• Enrichment service
• Uranium fuel fabrication
• Uranium fuel stockpile
• Registration can be categorized into the
  following three groups.
• Level 1 Has commercial supply capability, but
  has not exported to international market
• Level 2 Has already exported to intl market
• Level 3 Has stockpile which can be readily
  exported

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Japans ProposalIAEA Standby Arrangements System
for Nuclear Fuel Supply (3)

• Role of IAEA
• Managing the Standby Arrangements System,
  including establishing database
• Clarifying conditions to receive fuel assurance
• Safeguards, safety, PP, export control, etc.
• Note that giving up supply capability may not
  be appropriate under the sprit of universal
  condition
• IAEA does not have any legal ownership, but will
  play important role in making arrangements
  between supplier and recipient states
• Reflecting negative response to six country
  proposal
• 6 country proposal could deny the right (Art. 4)
  of NPT
• Japans proposal does not deny such right

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Possible Multinational Approach involving Japan
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Possible Multinational Approach involving Japan
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ROK nuclear power plants deployment scenario
(cases are different replacement reactor types,
lifetime extensions)
ROK SPENT FUEL ARISINGS

• Figure 3. Installed nuclear capacity in the ROK
  (case 1)

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II. Generation of spent fuels and storage
capacities in the ROK

• Figure 7. Projection of accumulated spent fuel in
  the ROK

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II. Generation of spent fuels and storage
capacities in the ROK (cont)

• Table 5. Spent fuel inventories and storage
  capacities in the ROK as of the end of 2004

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Recent issues in the ROK spent fuel management
(cont)
The National Energy Committee (NEC), chaired by
the ROK president, established in November 2006,
will examine plans for the spent fuel management.
The Radwaste Management Division of MOCIE will
support the NEC for the work of the spent fuel
management. MOCIE appears has not shown much
interest in recycling spent fuel.
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CHINA Planning of Nuclear Power Development

• The government plans to increase
• nuclear generating capacity to 40 GWe by 2020
• with a further 18 GWe nuclear being under
• construction then which requires adding
• average of 2 GWe per year.

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3rd Generation Open Bidding

• PWRs will be the mainstream but not sole reactor
  type
• Nuclear fuel assemblies are fabricated and
  supplied indigenously
• Domestic manufacturing of plant and equipment
  will be maximized, with self-reliance in design
  and project management
• International cooperation is nevertheless
  encouraged
• Note informally, he confirmed realism of high
  growth is dubious problem of low starting base
  due to multiple technologies siting, funding
  issues unresolved decisions made at low level
  that have system-wide implications not yet
  thought through and resolved many critical issues

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Forecast of electricity generation in
Russia(Energy strategy of Russia for the period
to 2020)(approved by the Decree of the Russian
Government dated 28.08.03 ?1234-?)
Optimistic
bln.kW.hr/year
TOTAL
Medium
At NPPs
In the European part of Russia Growth of the NPP
generation share to 30 Growth coverage to 50
in average
Dimitriev, former Dep Dir RF NRC
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Volgodonsk NPP (January 29, 2005)
Intake channel covered with the ice
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Improvement of the SNF management

• Main pending issues safety ensuring in SNF
  storage and transportation from the NPP sites.
• Ways of resolution
• Implementation of the facilities for cask-type
  storage and transportation of the SNF from the
  RBMK NPPs
• Construction of the centralized dry storage for
  SNF from RBMKs and VVERs at Krasnoyarsk
• Establishment of the facilities ensuring removal
  of the SNF from the AMB reactors of Beloyarsk
  first stage
• Construction of additional SNF pit at Bilibino.

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In the version of serial construction of
commercially effective power units of next
generation with fast reactors.

• Initial phase, elaboration of commercial reactor
  conception.
• All the complex of activities with the sodium
  coolant technology confirms possibility of
  development of necessary technologies for the
  projects of commercial reactors and nuclear fuel
  cycle facilities.
• There arent constructional materials for deep
  fuel burn-out
• Theres no project for fuel production
• Implication RF participation in fast reactor
  GNEP frameworks will depend on major increases in
  funding from outside the RF

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GNEP-ASIA SCENARIOS WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS

• Australia
• TANTER, Richard, Prof-Director, Nautilus at RMIT
  University
• FALK, Jim, Prof-Director, Australian Centre for
  Science, Innovation and Society
• Canada
• WEINGARTNER, Miranda
• China
• GU, Alun, Energy and Environmental Technology
  Center, Tsinghua University
• BUCKLEY, Chris, Reporter, Reuters News Agency,
  Beijing officer
• LIU Qun, Associate Professor, National Defense
  University
• WEBER-LIU, Kosima, EEMP, The Environmental
  Education Media Project
• SAALMAN, Lora, Tsinghua Univerity
• WANG, Yanjia, Institute of Nuclear Energy
  Technology, Tsinghua University
• WANG Haibin, Tsinghua University

Japan KATSUTA, Tadahiro, Visiting Researcher
University of Tokyo SUZUKI, Tatsujiro, Senior
Research Scientist Socio-economic Research
Center Central Research Institute of Electric
Power Industry ROK SHIN, Euisoon Professor,
Energy Resources Program, Yonsei University KANG,
Jungmin, Visiting Science Fellow, CISAC, Stanford
University Russia DMITRIEV, Alexander United
States BRUCE, Scott HAYES, Peter VON HIPPEL,
David
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GNEP SCENARIOS

• Background paper circulated 14 key GNEP Issues
  in East Asia
• Participants identified five clusters of driving
  forces (highly uncertain, big impacts) to answer
  focal question
• Multilateral relationships
• The perceived need for nuclear weapons
• Financial feasibility of nuclear energy
• Renege cost among GNEP suppliers
• Economic status of GNEP suppliers

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GNEP SCENARIOS

• Clustered driving forces into 2 axes of
  uncertainty to frame the scenarios
• Whether the cost of GNEP would be borne by
  nuclear weapon states or have-not states
• Extent Asia is perceived as secure

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(No Transcript)
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Scenario I. Fading Smile
This future is one where the perception is of a
secure Asia where the cost of GNEP is borne by
nuclear weapons states

• Next US President is multilateralist, reduces
  first-strike preemptive posture, new AF with DPRK
• ROK engages DPRK
• Region is geopolitically conciliatory and secure
• Climate change impacts, regional fisheries
  collapse
• Pragmatic GNEP 2 big expansion nuclear power in
  Asia, regional grid, KEDO 2 LWRs
• Nuclear accident in Japan ends Rakkosho, crash
  East Asian H2 project
• China major economy, accepts SF, but renewables
  breakthrough, solar generated H2 takes front
  seat, nuclear power fades, and with itGNEP.

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Scenario II. Walk the Line
This future is one where the perception is of a
secure Asia where the cost of GNEP is borne by
the have-not states

• 2010 - WMD attack on LA by non-state terrorist
  group using weapon obtained from Russian
  stockpile via Pakistan drug-weapons network
• US occupies Karachi huge 1st responder task in
  LA
• US and Russia cooperate via UNSC to impose new
  GNEP framework of tight warhead, and fissile
  material controls on fuel supply and spent fuel
  from US-RF oligopoly
• 2015 sea level rise and surge floods Shanghai
  China adopts Chinese-made standardized VVER
  reactor for inland and US-RF Small modular
  reactors designed for extreme weather
• 2017 US-RF breakthrough in enrichment
  technology-gt20 cost reduction
• 2019 DPRK disarms due to RF-US-Chinese ultimatum
• 2022 China and Taipei cross-straight
  confederation
• 2025 Australia builds 5 reactors, exporting U
  to RF GNEP complex for re-export

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Scenario III. Cold War III
This future is one where the perception is of an
insecure Asia and where the cost of GNEP is
borne by the nuclear weapon states

• 2007 US-Chinese Taipei long-term nuclear
  agreement with a contract for enrichment
  consortium with fuel supply guarantees. The PRC's
  influence growsSouth Asia, Indonesia
• US, newly conservative ROK, Japan, tighten
  security bloc
• Climate change increases nuclear push in
  Australia, US
• 2011, DPRK tests again Japan proliferates
• 2015, pro-Chinese DPRK anti-Chinese ROK allies
  closely to nuclear-Japan
• Russia-Siberian energy integration with Chinese
  bloc
• 2022 Shinpo reactors export power from DPRK to
  China, Japan runs Rakkasho flat out
• 2024 Australia sells enriched U to all-comers to
  compete with RF
• 2029, Japan tests nuclear weapon, ROK and Taiwan
  announce following suit US intercedes, shares
  nuclear weapons with ROK and Taiwan

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Scenario IV.Roller Coaster
This future is one where the perception is of
an insecure world in which costs of GNEP are
borne by have-not states

• Turbulenceclimate change impacts, 2nd DPRK
  nuclear test, Japan remilitarizes, China
  responds, regional arms race, Taiwan restarts
  secret nuclear weapons program
• Iraq war goes regional, oil hits 100/barrel,
  Iran withdraws from NPT
• G7 announce nuclear power push, Indonesia and
  Vietnam announce nuclear power decisions
• Next US President announces Reactors for Peace
  initiative, commits the United States to
  provision nuclear reactor technology to foreign
  nations in return for agreement that these
  nations will not keep spent fuel.
• Russian energy conglomerate accepts spent fuel in
  exchange for exclusive rights to sell uranium to
  GNEP member nations.
• Jemaah Islamiah attempts to hijack a Japan-bound
  nuclear fuel/plutonium ship
• Saudi regime overthrown by conservative Islamic
  fundamentalists who cutback oil exports
• Popular rebellion spreads across Russia driven by
  corruption and anti-nuclear sentiment. The New
  Russian President refuses to accept nuclear
  waste.
• The United States will still not accept spent
  fuel so there is no place for the fuel to go.
• GNEP have-nots have no place to send spent fuel
  and their stockpiles rise. This leads to
  reprocessing and nuclear weapons proliferation

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The GNEP Scenario Matrix
GNEP Wild Card Curbs WMD
GNEP Fades Away, No WMD
GNEP Implodes Accelerates WMD
Competing NEPs, no GNEP gtWMD
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Scenario 1 Fading Smile

• Frame Nuclear Weapon States Pay GNEP Costs,
  Secure Asia
• Basic features multilateralist, climate change,
  technological innovation
• Narrative climate drives nuclear, accident
  drives cooperation, renewables win
• GNEP variant Pragmatic GNEP supports initial
  nuclear expansion only
• WMD Outcome no more proliferation
• Result GNEP fades away

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Scenario 2 Walk the Line

• Frame Non-Nuclear Weapon States Pay GNEP Costs,
  Secure Asia
• Basic features great power concert, terrorist
  act overcomes barriers to cooperation,
  technological innovation, expanded nuclear power
• Narrative non state actor WMD use drives US-RF
  cooperation, SF and enrichment cost reduction,
  great powers impose framework
• GNEP variant bilateral US-RF GNEP
• WMD Outcome US, RF walk and hold the line
  against WMD in key states
• Result huge wild card GNEP

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Scenario 3 Cold War III

• Frame Non-Nuclear Weapon States Pay GNEP Costs,
  Insecure Asia
• Basic features China bloc, US blocks, runaway
  climate change, nuclear competition and tests
• Narrative technology diffusion, much nuclear
  power rampant proliferation, Japan, Koreas,
  Taiwan all nuclear
• GNEP variant Competitive, self-serving nuclear
  energy partners or CNEPs, no GNEP
• WMD Outcome rampant proliferation
• Result CNEPs, costs and insecurity dominate

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Scenario 4 Roller Coaster

• Frame Nuclear Weapon States Pay GNEP Costs,
  Insecure Asia
• Basic features regional turmoil, climate change
  driven nuclear expansion
• Narrative new GNEP, much spent fuel, renege on
  take back, GNEP unravels
• GNEP variant US push-start GNEP
• WMD Outcome WMD proliferation increases
• Result GNEP implodes

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GNEP Scenarios--Conclusions

• As part of multilateral non-proliferation
  strategy based on geopolitical cooperation and
  regional conflict prevention and resolution, GNEP
  may contribute to non-proliferation outcomes by
  2030 in Asia
• As part of an unrestrained competitive nuclear
  strategy, GNEP will not exist and proliferation
  will result in Asia by 2030
• As part of multilateral world driven by climate
  insecurity and high technology innovation, GNEP
  may not be needed to avoid proliferation in Asia
  by 2030
• As part of turbulent world dominated by regional
  conflict, GNEP may increase already rampant
  proliferation in Asia by 2030

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GNEP Scenario Policy Implications

• Identify and focus on GNEP elements that support
  non-proliferation in short-medium term
• Avoid GNEP elements that may backfire either
  directly, by feeding non-prolifeation disabling
  conditions, or undermining enabling conditions
• Ensure enabling conditions for non-proliferation
  GNEP elements also in place

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Solving the GNEP Jigsaw Puzzle

• 10 robust measures across four scenarios were
• Conduct realistic nuclear growth path analysis
  (including siting, financing, institutional
  capacity, educational system, political
  restraints) in each country and exchange datasets
  and analytic assumptions for grounded policy
  analysis (every country has unrealistic
  projections now, some wildly so)
• Technological innovation for small, modular and
  cheap reactors, hedge against climate change, fit
  slum world future, also adaptive response to
  climate-driven emergency power needs
• Joint, cooperative non-coal energy RD to
  increase energy security and global-regional
  energy security strategies involving China,
  Japan, Korea, Australia, Indonesia.
• Increased role of China, India, and Japan related
  multilateral nuclear control regimes and at the
  IAEA ditto, in climate change control regimes
• Strengthened NPT (auto-sanctions if withdraw,
  fissile material controls, make GNEP supply
  guarantees conditional on application of IAEA
  Additional Protocol)
• Development of interim on-site storage options
  avoidance or postponement of MOX recycling and
  reprocessing-based fuel cycles joint RD on
  spent fuel storage and disposal options
• Reduction of vulnerability to non-state WMD
  attack
• Improved security networking--intelligence,
  policing, 1st responders
• Solution to the DPRK nuclear problem via
  engagement, dialogue, early monitor Taiwan
  closely
• Creation of overlapping cooperative security
  frameworks at regional and global level to reduce
  salience of nuclear weapons

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DPRK Energy Training

• After attending 2 day AES workshop where DPRK
  announced aim to construct 0.5 GWe of windpower,
  delegates went on field study tour to
• Demo solar Coal Biomass home outside
  Low Emissions
• Beijing Briquetting

1 day hands-on long range energy alternative
planning workshop Transfer June Stanford DPRK
Energy Expert Workshop papers
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AES Renewal 2006-7

• Proposal is to focus on Asia Nuclear Futures
• Min-OfficialBaseline, Max Nuclear Paths for each
  country
• Superimpose GNEP-driven policy measures (spent
  fuel take-back, regional enrichment scheme)
• Compare energy security with and without GNEP
  policy measures
• Workshop in China or Vietnam in 2007
• Publish Network report and Global Nuclear Futures
  Briefing Book

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DPRK Energy Training

• Participants
• KIM Myong Chol Member of PIINTEC
• O Ryong Il Translator
• RI Yong Ho Member of Energy Centre PIINTEC
• RI Song Guk Section Chief of Institute of
  Electricity Telemechanics
• JANG Chol Ho Researcher of Heat Engineering
  Institute
• Scope
• wider than in past, renewables, electric power
  grid control, key large-scale thermal combustion
  RD group
• Attitude
• open, avid to learn, not hostile
• Cost
• covered by US private donors and Korea
  Foundation no USG funds expended on DPRK
  attendance