Presentation by the Ministerial Task Team to the Portfolio Committee.

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Presentation by the Ministerial Task Team to the
Portfolio Committee.

DEPARTMENT OF

SOUTH AFRICAN CORRECTIONAL Parliament
Cape Town 20 February 2007 POLICE SERVICE
SERVICES
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PURPOSE OF THE REPORT.

• To report to the portfolio Committee the outcome
  and the findings of the investigation conducted
  by the Ministerial Task Team surrounding the
  circumstances of the escape of awaiting trial
  offender Ananias Mathe from the Pretoria C-Max
  Correctional Centre.

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TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR C-MAX INVESTIGATION TASK
TEAM.

• To thoroughly investigate the circumstances
  leading up to and around the escape of inmate
  Ananias Mathe from Pretoria C-Max Correctional
  Centre on Saturday 18 November 2006, through
  interviews of inmates and members, including
  where appropriate, the use of polygraph testing
  and investigation of the facility and the escape
  route.
• To make findings and recommendations on
• possible disciplinary steps,
• possible criminal charges,
• improvements to physical security,
• improvements on monitoring and internal controls,
  
• improvement of immediate post escape or escape
  attempt investigation by DCS,
• improvements in relation to the security
  competencies and vetting of C-Max personnel and
  any other matters that they identify as
  warranting recommendations.

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TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR C-MAX INVESTIGATION TASK
TEAM.

• To submit an interim report on its findings and
  recommendations to the Minister of Correctional
  Services by 4 December 2006 and
• To submit a final report by not later than 31
  January 2007.

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COMPILATION OF THE C-MAX MINISTERIAL TASK TEAM.
The high level task team consisted of investigators from the National Intelligence Agency, South African Police Services and Correctional Services
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METHODOLOGY.

• A) Investigative Team
• The Investigative Team was tasked with conducting
  interviews and obtaining statements of DCS
  officials and inmates. The team was further
  tasked to conduct polygraph tests on DSC
  officials and a lifestyle analysis of the DCS
  officials who were on duty on the day of Mathe's
  escape.

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METHODOLOGY (Cont.).

• B) Security Systems and Audit Team
• The Security Systems and Audit Team was tasked
  with conducting a security appraisal of the state
  of security at C-Max in Pretoria. The focus was
  on perimeter security, manning levels and the
  electronic security systems. The team visited
  Kokstad (Ebongweni), Bloemfontein (Mangaung) and
  Makhado (Kutama Sinthumule) maximum correctional
  facilities in order to use these as a
  benchmarking tool in making a comparative
  security analysis with Pretoria C-Max
  correctional Centre.

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METHODOLOGY (Cont.).

• C ) Policy and Standing Operational Procedure
  Team
• The Policy and Standing Operational Procedural
  Team was tasked with identifying the relevant
  policies and standing operational procedures
  relevant for the execution of duties by DCS
  officials based at C-Max, in order to assess the
  level of compliance with these.

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SCOPE OF INVESTIGATIONS.

• The team focused on the events prior to the day
  of the actual escape.
• The events on the actual day of the escape.
• Possible post-escape aiding.

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INVESTIGATIONS TECHNIQUES.

• Conducted 40 structured interviews.
• Obtained 29 sworn statements.
• Conducted lifestyle analysis of DCS officials.
• Conducted Polygraph testing of some officials.
• Conducted communication analysis.

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EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL ESCAPE.

• Ananias Mathe made four attempts to escape
• The first attempt happened on 30 April 2006 when
  he caused damage to Cell 90 in Section A5.
• The second attempt occurred from Cell 29, Section
  A6.
• The third attempt, from Cell 25, Section A6
  followed the same modus operandi as the attempted
  escape from Cell 29 in Section A6.
• The fourth attempt from cell 49, Section A6 (13
  November 2006) made use of the same modus
  operandi used in Cell 25, Section A6.

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EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL ESCAPE (Cont.).

• On 13 November 2006 at about 2400 the
  responsible official was summoned to the C-Max
  Correctional Centre as a result of Mathe having
  damaged Cell 49 in Section A6, in which he was
  held.
• An instruction was issued that Mathe be removed
  from Cell 49 to Cell 4 in Section A6.

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EVENTS PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL ESCAPE (Cont.).

• During the morning meeting of the shift reporting
  for duty at 0700, all officials were informed of
  the damage caused by Mathe to Cell 49 of Section
  A6 and that for this reason he was placed in Cell
  4, Section A6 on the same night.
• A search was conducted on the morning of 14
  November 2006 Cell 4 of Section A6 (Mathes
  cell) the upper catwalk window inside the cell
  was allegedly loose by approximately 2mm and it
  was allegedly reported to the security Manager.
• Telephone records also indicated that the entries
  made in the prescribed telephone recording
  register of phone calls made by offender Mathe at
  A6 section were not correlating with the actual
  records obtained from Telkom.

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EVENTS ON THE DAY OF THE ESCAPE.

• The shift pattern on 18 November 2006 consisted
  of a 0600 1400, a 1400 2200 (First
  Watch), a 2200 0600 (Second Watch) as well as
  a day shift that commenced from 0700 1600.
• Four(4) officials reported for duty at A6 Section
  and they were responsible for the daily routine
  of unlocking, inmate showering, breakfast,
  exercise, lunch, supper and locking of inmates
  between 0730 and 1500.

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PERSONNEL DISTRIBUTION.

• The personnel distribution on the day and time of
  the alleged escape was as follows
• Member in charge.
• Main gate (Portal area).
• Phase 1 (Section A5 and A6).
• Phase 2 (Section A1, A2, A3 and A4).
• Tower posts 2 and 5.
• A - Catwalk (Only one official).

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UNMANNED POSTS.

• The following posts were not manned
• Watch towers 1,3 and 4.
• C-Catwalk (Member on A-Catwalk also had to patrol
  the C-Catwalk).

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DISCOVERY OF MATHES ESCAPE.

• At approximately 2150 whilst on A-catwalk duty
  an official discovered that the cell monitoring
  window of Mathe's cell was removed and lying next
  to its opening.
• Official in charge was immediately notified and
  the escape alarm was raised.
• An EST officials had discovered the broken window
  leading from the catwalk onto the roof.
• A rope and iron bars were discovered in close
  proximity to Tower 2.

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ROUTE OF ESCAPE.

• Two possible routes of escape was investigated
• The probable route.
• The alternative route.

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PROBABLE ROUTE OF ESCAPE.

• Mathe forcibly removed the cell monitoring
  window.
• Mathe forced him through the opening onto the
  catwalk and/or was aided by being pulled up on to
  the catwalk.
• Mathe moved down the catwalk towards the door
  that leads to the roof of the exercise area.
• Mathe removed a number of louvre window panes.
• Mathe climbed through the frame of the window.

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PROBABLE ROUTE OF ESCAPE (Cont.).

• Mathe moved over the roof of the exercise area.
• Mathe possibly jumped onto the ground.
• Mathe headed towards Tower 2.
• Mathe probably scaled the perimeter wall close to
  Tower 2 and/or exited through an unmanned Tower
  2.
• Mathe finally made his escape over the chain link
  fence.
• Mathe was picked up by a getaway vehicle in close
  proximity to the Correctional Centre.

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ALTERNATIVE ROUTE OF ESCAPE.

• Mathe was removed from his cell, possibly by the
  official in charge of A6 Section.
• Mathe was escorted from section A6 through the
  passage leading past Section A5 to A1.
• Mathe had to be loaded by some means of transport
  at the portal main gate or escorted through the
  C-Max perimeter exit point.
• Mathe if escorted by foot had to be loaded by
  vehicle in the main parking area.
• Mathe should have been offloaded close to the
  correctional centre or the city centre.
• Mathe was picked up by a getaway vehicle in close
  proximity to the Correctional Centre/City Centre.

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POLICY AND STANDING OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES.

• Operational security measures
• Non-compliance with procedures such as the
  reporting of security breaches, key control
  measures, shift handing over procedures and
  catwalk patrol.
• Completion of Journals search register
  telephone register
• Non Compliance with set Institutional Orders.
• Stereotype entries.
• Entry times.
• Handover Procedure -Non Compliance with set
  Institutional Orders.
• Auditing and Inspecting of Journals - Poor/Lack
  of Managerial Supervision.

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NON-HUMAN FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TOWARDS THE
ESCAPE.

• The prevailing weather conditions at the C-Max
  Correctional Centre between 1500 and 1800 were
  characterized by a heavy downpour of rain. This
  heavy rain falling on the corrugated roof
  structure in combination with the broadcast of
  the match on the radio hampered audibility and
  visibility.
• Critical areas such as the catwalk passages, the
  towers and the perimeter area lack any form of
  electronic movement, monitoring and detection
  system.

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FINDINGS.

• The following areas of non compliance were
  identified
• The responsible official failed to conduct proper
  and regular visits to all sections and posts.
• This failure to visit Sections and Posts has
  resulted in a delay in the detection, discovery
  and raising of the escape alarm that could have
  either prevented the escape or ensured the
  immediate arrest of Mathe.

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FINDINGS (Cont.).

• The members did not comply with the key control
  procedure and shift handing over procedure to the
  Official in Charge of the Second Watch on 18
  November 2006.
• The official on the catwalk failed to inspect
  whether the damage to the catwalk view mirror
  above Mathe's cell was either repaired or
  remained damaged.
• The catwalk members failure to properly perform
  his duties has resulted in a delay of the
  discovery of the escape and the alarm being
  raised earlier.

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FINDINGS (Cont.).

• The non-compliance with regard to the execution
  of duties in relation to the Tower 2 observations
  during the First Watch on 18 November 2006 has
  aided in the escape of Mathe.
• The official failed to properly perform her
  duties, which has resulted in her not detecting
  the escape on the rooftop while approaching Tower
  2 in the execution of the escape. This failure
  resulted in a delay of the escape alarm being
  raised and the possible immediate re-arrest of
  Mathe.
• DCS officials have in certain instances
  fraudulently manipulated entries and
  non-compliance with the completion of the Daily
  Activity Registers, Section Journal, Movement
  Control Registers and the Head of Centre Journal
  on 18 November 2006 and before. This
  non-compliance and fraudulent manipulation of the
  official documentation could also be viewed in
  some instances as a deliberate attempt to have
  covered up the discovery of the escape.

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RECOMMENDATIONS OF TASK TEAM.

• That internal disciplinary procedure/action be
  instituted for non-compliance with duties that
  aided the escape of Mathe.
• The immediate institution of a dedicated team to
  assess and oversee the viability of the latest
  technological security system and security
  organizational models as well as the
  implementation thereof.
• That NIA and SAPS Crime Intelligence further
  investigate the possible corruption and bribery
  of DCS officials that could have aided in the
  escape of Mathe.
• That SAPS pursue criminal charges against the DCS
  officials who through gross negligence aided in
  the escape of Mathe.

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