06SSIW088 Electronic Combat Modeling In Distributed Simulations - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Title: 06SSIW088 Electronic Combat Modeling In Distributed Simulations


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06S-SIW-088Electronic Combat ModelingIn
Distributed Simulations

• Rob Byers
• Northrop Grumman Information Technology

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Jamming Interaction
RCS Gain

• Jammer power,
• Jammer Antenna gain

• Space Loss

• Transmitter power,
• Antenna gain

S
J

• J,S is combination of Jammer and Radar Signal at
  the receiver
• Radar signal has two way space loss
• Jammer signal has only one way space loss

SRadar Signal
JJamming Signal
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Jamming Effectiveness Example

• Jammer operating at saturation power
• Jamming/Signal (J/S) ratio is difference between
  red and blue lines
• Jamming signal decays at half the rate as radar
  signal strength
• Crossover occurs at close range when radar target
  signal is greater than jamming signal
• Jamming effectiveness probability increases as
  J/S increases
• Jamming considered effective when J/S exceeds
  threshold

J/S
Source TP 8347 Electronic Warfare and Radar
Systems Engineering Handbook, 4th Edition, Naval
Air Warfare Center Weapons Division
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The Electronic Combat Loop

• The jamming interaction is recursive
• The jammer generates an electromagnetic emission
  in response to the parameters of the tracking
  radar
• The radar changes its parameters to compensate
  for jamming
• And so on
• In simulation, the jamming electromagnetic
  emission PDU does not have to emulate the actual
  jamming method in order to trigger the
  appropriate response from the sensor/emitter

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The Issue

• DIS PDG Electromagnetic Emissions Tiger Team
  (lead Alan Berry of DMOC) is addressing jamming
  as part of proposal for Emission Consistency
• Current DIS usage and enumerations do not
  sufficiently represent the Jamming interaction
• The number, description, and associated
  enumerations of jamming methods is limited
• Jamming beam parameters may go through rapid
  changes that are not easily emulated in
  simulation

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Constraints/Guidance

• Decouple Sensors/Emitters and Jammers
• Sensor/emitter and Jammer may not share the same
  models
• it would be helpful if the jammer could direct
  the sensor to properly respond to the jamming
  effect
• absence of a sensor-side model of that technique
• sensor has a novel countermeasure technique
• Development impact should be minimized
• Minimizes the revisions necessary to existing
  code
• Avoid changes to DIS protocol should be avoided
  by incorporating the jamming approach into the
  existing structures.
• Reasonable defaults should produce a moderate
  level of fidelity for jamming and subsequent
  improvements increase that fidelity

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Current SISO-REF-010

• Field Value Emission Function
• 28 Decoy/Mimic
• 38 Barrage Jamming
• 39 Click Jamming
• 41 Frequency Swept Jamming
• 42 Jamming
• 44 Pulsed Jamming
• 45 Repeater Jamming
• 46 Spot Noise Jamming
• 64 Jamming, noise
• 65 Jamming, deception

• Field Value Beam Function
• 42 Jammer

• Incomplete list of jamming methods
• Logical Emitter/Beam Hierarchy not apparent
• Beam function provides no additional information

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Jamming Methods

• CAF DMO has identified 80 jamming methods (and
  combinations of methods)
• Every simulation may not model all methods
• Classified methods may not be available to all
  simulations

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Actual v. Functional Jamming

• Actual Jamming refers to a real-world Jamming
  Technique (e.g. Range Gate Pull-off)
• Functional jamming refers to a jamming effect
  against information target(s)
• A actual jamming technique may map to one or more
  functional effects ?
• The emitter must be able to model ALL effects
• Effectiveness models for classified jamming
  techniques need to be understood by all
  participants

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Functional Description of Jamming

• In the absence of detailed knowledge of the
  particular jamming method, knowledge of the
  jammer intent could provide enough information
  and self knowledge of the current mode of
  operation
• The simulated radars reaction to jamming will
  be governed by its mode of operation at the time
  and type of information denied

• Six Radar Modes
• Detect
• Identify
• Acquire
• Track
• Guide
• Intercept

• Four Jamming Effects
• Azimuth
• Elevation
• Range
• Velocity

15 Possible Combinations
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Response Based on Jamming Intent

• Response to jamming is based on the mode in which
  the radar is operating and the information that
  is denied
• 6 x 15 maximum of 90 unique jamming
  effects/responses
• Probably many fewer due to unlikely combinations
  and similarities in reaction

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Proposed Jamming EE PDU

• Emitter function code 42 jamming
• Beam function code 12 jammer
• The Jamming Mode Sequence will convey, via an
  enumerated value, the jamming technique being
  applied. A list of techniques and associated
  enumerations has been proposed by the B-1 program
• There are four information denial targets for
  jamming azimuth, elevation, range and velocity

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Jamming Mode Sequence

• The Jamming Mode Sequence is a 32-bit value in
  the Electromagnetic Emission PDU
• Heretofore undefined in either the IEEE 1278.1
  standard or SISO-REF-010 enumerations document.
• The proposed Jamming Mode Sequence has two
  components
• A 16-bit functional representation of the jamming
  intent which describes its effect in terms of
  information denial
• Bit 0 Azimuth
• Bit 1 Elevation
• Bit 2 Range
• Bit 3 Velocity
• Bit 4 IFF
• Bits 5-15 are undefined
• A 16-bit enumeration of the actual jamming method

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Jamming Methods
Random Range Programs (RANRAP) with Swept Square
Wave Range False Targets (RFT) Range False
Targets with Inverse Gain Range False Targets
with Swept Square Wave Range Gate Pull-Off
(RGPO) Range Gate Pull-Off with Inverse
Gain Range Gate Pull-Off with Swept Square
Wave Range Gate Pull-Off with Velocity Gate
Pull-Off Range Gate Pull-Off with Velocity Gate
Pull-Off and Inverse Gain Refraction Repeater Scin
tillation Sea-Bounced Serrodyne Skirt
Frequency Spot Noise Super Jam Sweep Swept
AM Swept Noise Swept Spot Swept Square Wave
(SSW) Terrain Bounce Velocity Bin Masking
(VBM) Velocity Bin Masking with Inverse Gain
Velocity Bin Masking with Swept Square
Wave Velocity False Targets (VFT) Velocity False
Targets with Inverse Gain Velocity False Targets
with Swept Square Wave Velocity Gate Pull-Off
(VGPO) Velocity Gate Pull-Off with Inverse Gain

• Analyzer
• Angle Gate Walk-Off
• Automatic Gain Control (AGC)
• AGC with Range Gate Pull-Off (RGPO)
• AGC with Velocity Gate Pull-Off (VGPO)
• AGC with Range and Velocity Gate Pull-Off
• Automatic Spot Noise (ASJ)
• Babble
• Barrage Noise
• Bistatic Clutter
• Broadband
• Click
• Colinear
• Comb
• Command
• Constant False Alarm Rate
• Cooperative Angle (CAJ)
• Cover Pulse
• Cross-Eye

• FM by Noise
• FM by Noise with Inverse Gain
• FM by Noise with Swept Square Wave
• Frequency Swept
• Glint Enhance
• High-Power Source Noise
• Image Frequency
• Velocity Gate Pull-Off with Swept Square Wave
• Impulse Noise
• Inverse Gain
• Jittered Pulse Repetition Frequency
• Jittered Pulse Width
• Low-Power Source Noise
• Narrowband Repeater Noise
• Noise
• Noise with Inverse Gain
• Noise with Swept Square Wave
• Partial Band
• Pseudo-random AM

Classified methods not included
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Simulated Jamming Interaction

• Jammer
• Identifies Threat
• Operator initiates actual jamming method
• Sim interprets functional jamming representation

• EE PDU
• Fundamental Parameters
• Emitter/Beam Function Code

• EE PDU
• Fundamental Parameters
• Jamming Mode Sequence
• Actual Jamming Methods (s)
• Information denial target(s)

• Sensor/Emitter
• Models effectiveness of jamming
• J/S ratio exceeds threshold
• other factors (e.g. attenna geometry) may apply
• Changes mode/parameters as appropriate

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Standard Documents Changes

• IEEE 1278.1200x
• Definition of Jamming Mode Sequence
• Definition of Jamming Fundamental Parameters
• SISO-REF-010
• Update to reflect Jamming Mode Sequence bit
  values and enumerations