Title: PLANNING%20OF%20SECURITY%20SECTOR%20CAPABILITIES%20FOR%20PROTECTION%20OF%20MARITIME%20SOVEREIGNTY
1PLANNING OF SECURITY SECTOR CAPABILITIES FOR
PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
- Capt. (Navy) Ass. Prof. PhD Boyan Mednikarov
- Ass. Prof. PhD Todor Tagarev
- NATO ARW
- SCIENTIFIC SUPPORT FOR THE DECISION MAKING IN
THE SECURITY SECTOR - Velingrad, Bulgaria, 21-25 October 2006
2The main reasons for our interest in the subject
- the dynamic changes of the economic, political,
and military-strategic environment in the Black
Sea region after the end of the bi-polar world - the membership of Bulgaria in NATO
- the forthcoming accession to the EU,
- which brought the need for radical rethinking of
the views on maritime sovereignty of our country. - Broader definition of maritime sovereignty - the
state retains the right to exercise control both
on the territorial waters and the other parts of
the Black Sea where it has internationally
recognized rights. - The main task of the research - the adequate
justification of the planning of security sector
capabilities for protection of maritime
sovereignty. - Sub-tasks
- developing a model for planning the national
capabilities for maritime sovereignty protection - testing this model and putting it into practise
within the maritime institutions.
3 CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO DEFINING THE CAPABILITIES
OF THE SECURITY SECTOR
4KEY FACTORS
- Objectives in the area of maritime sovereignty,
including those to be achieved through military
means - Strategy for achieving the objectives
- Roles of the institutions, engaged in protecting
maritime sovereignty - Scenarios, describing plausible materialization
risks and threats to the national interests
related to the maritime space - Tasks to be performed in neutralizing the
plausible risks and threats (often structured in
a Universal Task List, or UTL) - Capabilities required to perform tasks for
protection of maritime sovereignty - Ways to provide these capabilities (coordination
of the development of the variety of capability
components within a selected capability model).
5FRAMEWORK PROCESS FOR CAPABILITIES DEVELOPMENT
- Formulate the policy for protection of maritime
sovereignty - Analyse the environment and assess threats to
maritime sovereignty - Analyse the status of the system for protecting
maritime sovereignty - Define and agree on planning scenarios formulate
hypotheses for the simultaneous (or near
simultaneous) occurrence of these planning
situations - Create a structured list of tasks for protection
of maritime sovereignty define the subset of
tasks that are critical for performing plausible
missions in the protection of maritime
sovereignty across scenarios - Define the full set of capabilities required to
protect maritime sovereignty - Test the set against the hypotheses on
simultaneous occurrence of two or more planning
scenarios - Distribute the required capabilities among
organisations - Assess planning risks
- Program the development of capabilities.
6 PLANNING THE CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF
MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
7TESTING THE MODEL IN PRACTICE
- 1. Formulating of the national policy for
protection of maritime sovereignty - The main problem was identified the lack of
coordination among the different institutions
responsible for the protection of the national
interests in the Black sea region. - the first step was to define the scope of the
term maritime sovereignty - the next step was to formulate the objectives of
the policy for maritime sovereignty protection,
which include the protection of all the aspects
of the national interests, the enforcement of the
provisions of international and national maritime
law, the defence of the Black Sea coast, etc.
8LEVELS OF AMBITION
- To protect the sovereignty and the territorial
integrity of the country from seaside aggression,
including neutralisation of terrorist activities
in the territorial waters - To protect the outer borders of the European
Union in the Black Sea - To prevent acts of violation of international and
national law, related to the use on the national
maritime space - To guarantee security and safety of shipping in
the territorial sea and the internal waterways - To react adequately in emergencies in the
national maritime spaces with primary goal to
prevent casualties and to minimise material
losses - To preserve the ecological balance of the sea and
safeguard its life resources - To conduct an active policy for upholding the
peace and security in the region and to enhance
the international cooperation on key humanitarian
and law enforcement issues.
9NEXT STEPS
- Analysis of the participation of the Republic of
Bulgaria in a variety of international
initiatives in the Black sea region this
analysis proved the fact that the increased
number of activities enhances the security within
the region. - Evaluation of the ways and the level of providing
resources for the maritime institutions - this
showed that the situation was not very optimistic
although it can be improved by actively utilising
the funds provided by the EU. - Analysis of the environment where the protection
of maritime sovereignty is realised. As a result,
the main threats for the sea-related national
interests of the Republic of Bulgaria were
identified.
10MAIN THREATS
- Armed aggression
- Violation of the safety of shipping and other
regulations - Trafficking in human beings and illegal
emigration by sea - Trafficking in narcotics
- Smuggling
- Trafficking in weapons and military technology,
including WMD components - Illegal or indiscriminate use of the
bio-resources of the sea - Maritime terrorism
- Piracy
- Maritime pollution
- Information security threats
- Incident on a vessel or aircraft endangering the
life of the crew/passengers - Geology-, hydro-geology-, or weather-induced
contingency
11ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE SYSTEM FOR
PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
- Bulgarian Navy and Air Force
- Border Police
- Maritime and Port Administration Executive
Agencies - Other organisations
- We can sum up that their capabilities leave a lot
to be desired.
12DEFINITION OF THE PLANNING SCENARIOS, RELATED TO
THE PROTECTION OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
12 hypotheses for the simultaneous occurrence of
the scenarios were formulated.
13FORMULATION OF STRUCTURED LIST OF THE TASKS OF
THE INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROTECTION
OF MARITIME SOVEREIGNTY
- Two existing approaches to this were analysed
- developing a universal task list (the approach
used by the Armed Forces of the US, United
Kingdom and Canada) - the approach used by the Department of Homeland
Security of the US - In result, we agreed on the following structure
of the tasks of the maritime institutions
141. Management of the Maritime Security
Organisations as part of the security sector
- 1.1. Management of the Maritime Security
Organisations (MSO) - 1.1.1. Planning the development of the Maritime
Security Organisations (MSO) - 1.1.2. Resource Management
- 1.1.2.1. Human Resource Management education,
qualification, certification - 1.1.2.2. Acquisition Management
- 1.1.2.3. Finance Management
- 1.1.2.4. Crisis Resource Management
- 1.1.3. Training and exercises of the Maritime
Security Organisations (MSO) - 1.1.4. Lessons Learned
- 1.2. Coordination, Command and Control of the
Maritime Security Organisations - 1.2.1. National and international planning for
protection of the maritime security - 1.2.2. Operations planning
- 1.2.3. Command and control of forces
- 1.2.4. Coordinate and integrate joint,
multinational and interagency support and
interaction with public organisations - 1.2.5. Conduct information operations
- 1.2.6. Deploy the command and control system
- 1.3. Support to the Maritime Security
Organisations - 1.3.1. Provide material means
- 1.3.2. Recover/maintain systems and equipment
152. Prevention
- 2.1. Identify threats
- 2.1.1. Manage intelligence activities
- 2.1.2. Collect intelligence information
- 2.1.3. Process intelligence information
- 2.1.4. Analyse intelligence information
- 2.1.5. Disseminate information on threats
- 2.1.6. Identify, inform, and report
- 2.2. Control access
- 2.2.1. Inspect vessels and cargo
- 2.2.2. Monitor zones and areas
- 2.2.3. Inspect people
- 2.3. Eliminate threats
- 2.3.1. Investigate and detain terrorist suspects
- 2.3.2. Seize dangerous materials
- 2.3.3. Explosive ordnance disposal
- 2.3.4. Detect and eliminate information incursion
163. Protection
- 3.1. Assess critical infrastructure and key
resources and sites - 3.1.1. Identify key resources and sites
- 3.1.2. Assess vulnerability
- 3.1.3. Coordinate and exchange information among
institutions, non-governmental organisations, and
businesses on key resources and sites - 3.1.4. Assess the situation
- 3.2. Protect forces and sites
- 3.2.1. Adopt measures to lower/mitigate threats
against sites - 3.2.2. Prepare/ develop the types of defence and
protection of mobile and stationary assets - 3.2.3. Disseminate key resources and objects
- 3.2.4. Detect and destroy mines
- 3.2.5. Detect and seize illegal fishing devices
- 3.3. Lower the risks to society
- 3.3.1. Safeguard public health
- 3.3.2. Provide public safety
- 3.3.3. Prepare the public
174. Response
- 4.1. Assess incidents
- 4.1.1. Investigate incidents
- 4.1.2. Assess threats and consequences
- 4.1.3. Maintain internal communication and
disseminate information on incidents - 4.2. Limit incident consequences
- 4.2.1. Manage incidents
- 4.2.2. Respond to threats
- 4.2.3. Target hardening
- 4.2.4. Search and rescue
- 4.2.5. Fire fighting
- 4.3. Impact by opponents
- 4.3.1. Track detected ships and submarines
- 4.3.2. Destroy ships and submarines
- 4.3.3. Establish defensive mine barrages
- 4.3.4. Detain ships
- 4.3.5. Antiterrorist activities
185. Recovery
- 5.1. Assist the public
- 5.1.1. Provide pre-hospital care/ support and
evacuation - 5.1.2. Provide humanitarian assistance
- 5.1.3. Provide social services
- 5.2. Restore environment
- 5.2.1. Clean up contaminated sites and areas
- 5.2.2. Dispose of materials
- 5.2.3. Conduct site remediation
- 5.2.4. Restore natural resources
- 5.3. Restore infrastructure
- 5.3.1. Restore Civil Services
- 5.3.2 Rebuild property
- 5.3.3 Restore lifelines
- 5.3.4. Restore economic institutions
19REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY
- General (for each mission)
- Management of the maritime sovereignty forces
managing force development - Coordination, Command and Control of the Maritime
Sovereignty Forces - C2 communications and information support
- Logistics support
- Force deployment
20REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY
- Prevent
- Surveillance and detection of surface,
sub-surface and aerial targets - Fusion and analysis of intelligence information
- Exchange of information and cooperation
- Target identification, dissemination and
reporting - Inspection of vessels and their cargo
- Control the traffic of vessels, cargo, passengers
and personnel in harbour areas - Investigate and detain intruders, including
terrorists, in national maritime spaces - Detect chemical, biological, radiation, nuclear,
and ecological threats and effects - Detect information incursion
21REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY
- Protect
- Defend and protect forces and areas
- Protect sites and critical infrastructure in the
coastal area - Detect and destroy mines
- Detect and seize illegal fishing gear
- Protect databases and computer networks
22REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY
- Respond
- Track detected surface and subsurface vessels and
aircraft - Destroy surface and subsurface vessels and
aircraft - Set defensive mine barrages
- React to a terrorist attack against a vessel and
a harbour facility - Rescue hostages
- Search and rescue at sea
- Fight fires at sea
- Evacuate and provide pre-hospital care
23REQUIRED CAPABILITIES FOR PROTECTION OF MARITIME
SOVEREIGNTY
- Recover
- Limit a pollution source/spill
- Decontamination of sea areas
- Assist a ship/aircraft in emergency
- Provide humanitarian assistance
24NEXT STEPS
- to suggest distribution of the capabilities among
security sector organizations taking into account
their traditions, experience, and current roles,
with a focus on cost effectiveness. - to assess the risk.
25CONCLUSIONS
- The problem with the lack of interagency
cooperation is very serious and it must be made
central for the maritime policy of the country. - The wide array of tasks related to the protection
of maritime sovereignty requires that that the
activities should be systematized and specified. - The defining of the maritime sovereignty
protection capabilities must be based on the
particular tasks carried out within the
particular scenarios. - The suggested distribution of the capabilities
reflects their current state in the maritime
institutions. - The main purpose of risk assessment is to
evaluate the extent to which the planned
capabilities will be adequate to the possible
future requirements for the maritime
institutions.