Title: Architecture for Non-Copyable Disk (NCdisk) Using a Secret-Protection (SP) SoC Solution Michael S. Wang and Ruby B. Lee Department of Electrical Engineering, Princeton University
1Architecture for Non-Copyable Disk (NCdisk)
Using a Secret-Protection (SP) SoC Solution
Michael S. Wang and Ruby B. Lee Department of
Electrical Engineering, Princeton University
- 1. Introduction
- Problem of study Digital contents piracy
- Research Examined both software and hardware
vulnerabilities in existing copy-protection
methods. - Proposal Proposed a non-copyable disk (NCdisk)
that makes it significantly harder for digital
contents to be copied. Any digital content
written onto the NCdisk can only be read through
a predefined set of NCdisk outputs.
5. NCdisk Security Protocol We present a
security protocol to use along with the NCdisk
for an online movie download application.
- 4. NCdisk SP-based SoC Architecture
- The NCdisk concept ultimately boils down to
achieving two goals. - The first goal is to protect secret keys inside
the NCdisk. - The second goal is to protect data output such
that the original digital plaintext data is never
leaked out. - We achieve these two goals by implementing a SoC
consisting of existing disk controller
components, plus a minimal set of additions. This
new SoC can then be connected to the rest of the
existing disk components to turn an existing disk
into an NCdisk.
Manufacturer sends a blank NCdisk to Content
Provider (CP), who initializes the NCdisk.
NCdisk Architecture
Existing Hard Disk Architecture
- 2. Threat Model
- Content providers software is trusted and is
allowed to use the critical secrets but cannot
leak these secrets out. - Any other software is un-trusted and is not
allowed to use the secrets. - The attacker is able to mount software attacks.
- Probing inside a System-on-Chip (SOC) is more
difficult without destroying functionality, so it
is not in our threat model. - We also do not consider side-channel attacks.
User buys an NCdisk from store and then connects
to CP through Internet.
SP Instructions for the NCdisk Processor
SP Instruction Description
Begin_TSM (on-chip ROM ) Begins execution of TSM (enables access of TSM scratchpad memory)
End_TSM (on or off-chip) ends execution of TSM (disables access of TSM scratchpad memory)
SecureMem_Set (on or off-chip) Sets StartAddr EndAddr registers to define TSM scratchpad memory
DeviceKey_Read (on or off-chip) Load the Device Key to be used by TSM SW
- 3. NCdisk Concept
- The NCdisk is a data storage device, in which any
digital content written into the device is
automatically encrypted using a key that is
generated by the NCdisk that never leaves the
NCdisk. - All data stored on the NCdisk are encrypted. It
can only be read through a set of predefined
outputs, such that the digital plaintext form of
the data never leaves the NCdisk.
CP prepares a movie for the NCdisk
NCdisk APIs for Applications
API Functions Description
TSM_Write Write data into NCdisk
TSM_Read_Analog Output to analog channel
TSM_Read_Trusted Output to trusted display
TSM_Read_Integrated Output to internal display
NCdisk stores the downloaded movie
- Reference
- Michael Wang and Ruby Lee, Architecture of
Non-Copyable Disk (NCdisk) Using
Secret-Protection (SP) SoC Solution, Forty-First
Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and
Computers, November 4-7, 2007. - Jeffrey S Dwoskin, Ruby B. Lee, "Hardware-rooted
Trust for Secure Key Management and Transient
Trust", ACM Conference on Computer and
Communications Security, pp. 389-400, October
2007. - Jeffrey Dwoskin, Dahai Xu, Jianwei Huang, Mung
Chiang, Ruby Lee, "Secure Key Management
Architecture Against Sensor-node Fabrication
Attacks", IEEE GlobeCom 2007, November 2007.