Title: Issues in Domestic Petroleum Pricing in OilProducing Countries
1Issues in Domestic Petroleum Pricing in
Oil-Producing Countries
- Sanjeev Gupta
- IMF
- January 27, 2004
2Introduction Why study domestic petroleum prices?
- Many oil-producing countries keep domestic prices
below free market levels - Net oil importers in some cases do not fully
reflect international prices. - The resulting subsidies can be large and are
nontransparent - Few studies have quantified these subsidies for a
wide range of countries and examined their
economic effects
3Subsidy Estimates Methodology
- Subsidies can be broadly defined as the
difference between the reduced price of a good
with government support and the price of the good
in the absence of such support. - Subsidy (M-P)C
- M free market price WDT
- W world wholesale spot price
- D marketing distribution transport costs
(importers only) - T general consumption taxes (VAT, etc.)
- P after-tax retail price
- C petroleum product consumption
4Subsidy Estimates Caveats
- Marketing, distribution, and transport costs
assumed to be the same across countries and time
periods introduces some error, esp. if pipeline
constraints create large marginal transport costs
- However, transport costs are typically only about
2 percent of after-tax retail price - Excludes implicit subsidies due to tolerance of
nonpayments - Some retail price estimates are an average for
only a month or quarter (snapshot)
5Subsidy Estimates Sample
- Subsidies calculated for 86 countries between
1996-2000 - 1999 is the latest year available for most
countries. In this year, 62 countries in sample - 15 Major Oil Exporters (of which, 13 subsidize)
- 6 Other Net Oil Exporters
- 41 Net Oil Importers
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8Subsidy Estimates Results
- Subsidies are large averaged 3.5 percent of GDP
in 1999 among major oil exporters - Among net oil importers, the average revenue from
petroleum taxation was 2.2 percent of GDP in
1999. - Subsidies positively correlated with world oil
price - Residential fuel oil and auto diesel subsidized
more heavily than gasoline
9Economic Effects of Subsidies
- Efficiency
- In the absence of price distortions, most
efficient to set domestic prices equal to the
world wholesale spot price plus marketing and
distribution costs (WD) - Caveats
- Need for government revenue may make net taxation
more efficient - Environmental externalities may argue for further
taxation (in excess of 100 percent, Parry 2001)
10Economic Effects of Subsidies
- On the other hand, large exporters may have some
monopoly power in world oil markets so that the
marginal revenue from exporting is less than the
world wholesale price plus marketing and
distribution costs
- R revenue, X exports, ?X,P price elasticity
of world oil demand, and XW total world oil
demand - Marginal revenuelt(WD) if significant share of
world market (X/ XW is high) and ? X,P is low
11Economic Effects of Subsidies
- Thus, the opportunity cost of not exporting may
be lower than the world price for OPEC as a whole
or its dominant members. - The marginal revenue for OPEC can be as low as 25
percent of the non-market-power case.
12Economic Effects of Subsidies
13Economic Effects of Subsidies
- Efficiency
- On balance, the arguments for taxation outweigh
the arguments for subsidization - Need for government revenue
- Environmental externalities
- However, most major oil exporters subsidize,
resulting in efficiency (deadweight) losses - Assuming environmental externalities, deadweight
losses amount to 0.5 to 12.4 percent of GDP - Assuming no environmental externalities,
deadweight losses amount to between 0 and 7
percent of GDP
14Economic Effects of Subsidies
- Equity
- Poorly targeted means of distributing purchasing
power to the poormajority of benefits go to the
non-poor - In Venezuela, the richest 20 percent receive 6½
times more in subsidies per person than the
poorest 33 percent (World Bank 1995) - In Ecuador, the more expensive energy products
received the highest subsidies, while household
kerosene, used by poor households, was not
subsidized (World Bank 1994) - Pro-rich bias compounded by possible smuggling
and corruption
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16Economic Effects of Subsidies
- Fiscal opportunity costs
- In subsidizing countries, the average subsidy is
larger than the average fiscal deficit or total
health spending - In Ecuador and Venezuela, the implicit subsidy
exceeds public spending on health
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19Economic Effects of Subsidies
- Cyclicality
- For net oil exporters, periods of high world oil
prices tend to be both periods of economic boom
and periods of higher domestic subsidies - Petroleum subsidies are thus procyclical,
exacerbating the effects of oil price shocks on
economic volatility
20Successful Reform
- Preconditions
- Establish social protection mechanisms to
compensate losers (Indonesia) design using PSIA - Use publicity campaigns to inform public of
trade-offs (Egypt) - Timing
- Optimal speed of reform depends on trade-off
between fiscal need and adverse social
consequences - Existence of good social protection mechanisms
allows faster reform - Political environment
- External environmentperiods of low world oil
prices may facilitate movement to automatic price
mechanisms
21Conclusion
- Major oil-exporting countries tend to be large
net subsidizers of petroleum - Subsidization does not appear to be a wise use of
resources - Reform requires careful design to overcome
political opposition