International Politics of Democracy Promotion PO229 - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Title: International Politics of Democracy Promotion PO229


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International Politics of Democracy Promotion
PO229

• Session 1 Framing the Module and Basic
  Vocabulary

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Framing the module

• United Nations Sec. Generals statement
• The when of democracy promotion.
• The who of democracy promotion.
• The where of democracy promotion.
• A roller coaster ride.
• Questions the module addresses.
• Dispelling three myths.
• Do you have any questions?

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Vocabulary

• Democratisation
• Means movement towards/in the direction of
  democracy. In practice that usually means western
  style liberal democracy. But we can challenge
  that reduction if we think other forms of
  democracy may be more appropriate

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Democratisation

• Includes both transitional phase in the
  installation of democracy, and subsequent
  progress, for example from new, fragile,
  unstable, defective or imperfect democracy,
  towards more established, stable, and more
  democratic democracy. Open question of how to
  assess democraticness or a democracys quality.

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Democratisation

• No end point no country has reached the ideal
  typical position the ideal itself may be
  dynamic, as for example new technology makes new
  forms of mass political participation possible.

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Democratisation

• Democratisation is analytically distinct from the
  political liberalisation of authoritarian
  regimes, which may not produce democracy

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Democratisation

• Democratisation is analytically distinct from
  authoritarian break down, which may not lead to
  democracy. Locating the borderline (the tipping
  point) between authoritarian break-down and
  democratic transition is somewhat arbitrary the
  one merges into the other. Of course we can only
  know if the one merged into the other with
  benefit of hindsight, i.e. after the event.

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Democratisation Backwards

• Increase in attention paid to examples of
  democratic decay and authoritarian persistence
  and revival, and, even, the diffusion of
  authoritarian and semi-authoritarian or illiberal
  rule. New theoretical perspectives required.

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Democracy Assistance

• Concessionary (i.e. grant-aided) and largely
  consensual projects and programmes. But can
  become politically contentious borderline with
  non-consensual forms of democracy promotion
  difficult to locate.

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Democracy Promotion

• All the different methods and approaches to
  promoting democracy that range from assistance
  and soft power (e.g. influence) through
  pressure to hard power (i.e. coercion,
  including for example military intervention)

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Democracy Support Supporting Democracy-Building

• Can cover assistance and also knowledge-sharing
  about democracy/democratisation and diplomatic
  engagement, but not coercion. Sometimes preferred
  by non-governmental practitioners.
• Shared democracy-building (IDEAs preference)
  echoes the evolution from foreign (economic) aid,
  thru development assistance, to internat.
  development cooperation, and now partnership for
  development.

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Regime Change

• The attempt to bring down a government (as
  distinct from changing the type of political
  regime or political rule or political system) by
  the use of military force. Born of the invasion
  of Afghanistan and Iraq by US and coalition
  forces.
• Clausewitz famously said war is a continuation
  of politics by other means. Regime change
  might be thought of as an endeavour that
  sometimes masquerades as democracy promotion but
  employs other means than assistance, most
  notably physical violence, and in the first
  instance is driven by other purposes and goals.
  It might or it might not lead to democracy.

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International Dimensions of Democratisation

• Dwells on context or environment or causes
  rather than consequences of democratisation.
  Comprises both active and passive international
  democracy promotion
• Active form comprises intentionality, i.e.
  deliberate assistance and/or promotion, by
  whatever means.
• Passive sense refers to democracy being spread or
  diffused (or the opposite) by international
  influences (positive or negative) other than
  intentional democracy promotion and democracy
  assistance. Example effects of living in a good,
  or conversely bad, neighbourhood effects of
  global economic trends.

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Towards a Borderless World?

• International itself a contested dimension
• Impact of globalisation on the national/internatio
  nal or foreign/domestic distinctions the
  transnational dimension (e.g. global civil
  society) and the mutually constitutive nature of
  the internal and the external, whereby each
  stimulates or provokes and shapes the other and
  influences its effects. Assigning causality in
  democracy promotion even more difficult than
  identifying democratisations causes.

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IPDP

• Session 2 Evolution in the State of
  Democratisation as Reality and as Subject of
  inquiry
• Aim of Lecture to introduce the apparent paradox
  that democratisation and its international
  promotion warrant close inspection even though,
  possibly, the best is already behind us.
• The rise of democracy is ' the most important
  thing to have happened in the twentieth century'
  (Amartya Sen, 1999).
• Since then the optimism has dimmed, the romance
  has faded away. Unclear whether the Arab
  awakening is coming to the rescue.

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Main points

• 1.The study of democratisation has been driven by
  events that were not foreseen in advance.
• 'the likelihood of democratic development in
  Eastern Europe is virtually nil' (Samuel P.
  Huntington, 1984). Five years later.
• 2.Although American political science tended to
  dominate the study of democratisation, especially
  early on, the best way to understand
  democratisation is to approach it in the spirit
  of politics as an open discipline.
• 'the suggestion that the student of politics is
  an eclectic is very well observed, for he draws
  on so many ways of analysis as seem to suit his
  purpose' (W. H. Greenleaf, 1968).
• A multidisciplinary approach is especially well
  suited to increase our knowledge understanding
  of democratisation, if we conceive it to be a
  multi-faceted multidimensional process, i.e.
  about something more than just refashioning the
  institutions of government.

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Main points

• 3.The fact that democratisation has had an impact
  both on politics and on the study of politics
  around the world means it should be of special
  interest to political studies and to students of
  international politics.
• 'where democracy is strong, political science is
  strong where democracy is weak, political
  science is weak' (Huntington, 1988).

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Main points

• 4. Establishing the trend the flow and the ebb
  tide of democratisation under the impact of
• revisions to our understanding of democracy,
  raising the bar
• prevalence of state fragility, collapse even, or
  at minimum weak government
• authoritarian persistence now resurgence

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Three provocative thoughts to conclude with

• 1)It is not true that trends towards greater
  freedom and democracy in the 1990s have since
  been stalled, reversed or hollowed out. On the
  contrary, what we see is a moving of the
  goalposts the actualité is being subjected to
  ever more rigorous appraisal. It is as if we were
  previously blinded by the impression of a glass
  half full. In contrast, we now focus our analysis
  more on the half empty portion of a glass that is
  being redefined in ever more expansive terms
  (Anon). Discuss.

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Three provocations

• 2). There are so many places now where
  democratisation is, or should be, placed on hold,
  or even dumped. The priorities must be building
  state and/or building nation, that is to say
  creating political and social order and the
  capacity for (better) governance. Our analytical
  frameworks explanatory theories should take
  account of the implications of this both for
  politics and for the study of politics. And there
  are implications for international democracy
  promotion too. (Anon). Discuss.

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Three provocations

• 3).Authoritarian and semi-authoritarian rule are
  back. Political science in general, and theories
  of democratisation in particular, need to adjust
  their sights and explain how this could have
  happened. And reflect and what it means for the
  future of world politics. (Anon) Discuss.

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Summary conclusion

• On the ground democratisation has evolved over
  recent decades and now faces an uncertain future.
  Does the Arab spring really make a difference?
• In the discourse our knowledge understanding
  of democratisation have made progress, but
  continue to reveal weaknesses, including a
  repeated failure to make sound prediction.
• For practitioners the policy implications of the
  above for how to (whether to?) promote or support
  democracy abroad are under major review.

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IPDP

• Session 3 Distinguishing processes of political
  change
• Aim of Lecture to alert us to the conceptual
  debate and its significance through an analytical
  review of key concepts in democratisation
  political liberalisation democratic transition
  democratic consolidation democratic reversal.

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Political change transforming the regime rather
than changing the state

• 1.Political transition or opening not same as
  democratic transition/opening
• 2.The dichotomy of 'authoritarian' versus
  democratic regime is oversimplified because it
  conceals the variety of non-democratic regime
  types and their different claims to political
  legitimacy, as well as different governance
  properties. Examples.
• 3.Non-democratic not same as pre-democratic.
  Possible significance path-dependence.

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False dichotomy

• 3.The dichotomy of authoritarian versus
  democratic regime is oversimplified because there
  can be a variety of outcomes of political
  transition from the former, apart from the
  possibility of reversion back to the same kind of
  regime.
• a) transition to a different type of
  non-democratic regime
• b) break-down of political order regime
  collapse degrades the state (Saddam Hussein).
• c) intermediate categories of regime from
  authoritarian to democratic (with adjectives
  such as semi, limited, partial, etc hybrids).
  Stable or unstable?
• d) democracy a relativistic concept, e.g.
  electoral liberal participatory deliberative.
  The differences may be as profound as the
  difference from some non-democracies.
• e) certain shared underlying features of
  non-democratic and democratic regimes may colour
  how examples of both types operate in some
  similar ways, e.g. informal institutions.
• f) The rule of law matters but is not exclusive
  to democracy and may be more a requisite than an
  inevitable part of democracy. The sequencing
  debate links state and regime.

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Transition v consolidation

• 4.Distinguishing political liberalisation from
  democratic transition (and from economic
  liberalisation).
• 5.Defining democratic consolidation.
• 6.Is the idea of post-consolidation meaningful?
  Irreversibility? Beyond the political arena?
  Scaling up?
• 7.Democratisation as variable geometry different
  flight trajectories offer an alternative view
  to linear progress marked by agreed stages and
  tipping points.
• 8. Mirror image of forward and backwards movement
  and their explanations (causes)?

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Different processes/different causes

• Distinguishing and disaggregating the process is
  important to identifying causes.
• Significant for the international promotion of
  democracy, as well as for pro-democracy actors
  and opponents of reform inside countries
• Yet whereas an extensive literature has emerged
  concerning the causes and consequences of
  democratisation, emerging types of democracy and
  issues of democratic consolidation, remarkably
  little research has been undertaken on the
  emergence or persistence of authoritarian
  regimes (Levitsky and Way, Journal of Democracy,
  13/2, 2002). This is beginning to change, but
  there is still some to go, especially regarding
  international influences.

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IPDP

• Session 4 Democracys critiques and alternatives
• Aim of Lecture to identify normative critiques
  of the very idea of democracy and by
  implication of the idea of international
  democracy promotion.
• This is more fundamental than criticising merely
  some particular theoretical version or
  interpretation of democracy. More fundamental
  than criticising just certain particular
  institutional models associated with democracy
  (e.g. presidential, or alternatively
  parliamentary). And it is more fundamental than
  criticising the democratic performance of
  countries that call themselves democracies (i.e.
  do not judge the idea of democracy by the
  so-called democracies, which might be falling
  short).

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Critiquing the idea is also

• Not the same as critiquing the motives that are
  attributed to international democracy promotion
  generally and the Wests lead in promoting
  democracy specifically (e.g. US imperialism). And
  not the same as criticising the slow pace of
  democratisation in some new democracies, or the
  unrealistic expectations that people there and/or
  in the West have about the pace of change in
  these countries.

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Also, critiquing the idea can

• Go beyond the claim that democracy does not solve
  all problems and procure every good thing that we
  want (i.e. rejecting democracy is more
  fundamental than moderating our expectations
  about what it can achieve or deliver). And it
  goes beyond the claim that democracy promotion is
  not a science but a very imperfect art (i.e. the
  need to moderate expectations about that too).
• So far all these are different arguments or
  claims.
• The following reject democracy as a political
  solution either for some or for all societies, or
  for some situations, or for some periods or
  phases in a societys development (note that
  these are all different claims too).

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Alternative values in the world and over time

• 1.Democracys values are not universal values
  (contrary to what Sen claimed in 1999). Asian
  values, authoritarian capitalism, and some
  versions of political Islam may all offer
  alternatives.
• In the past, patriarchal rule/the king equates to
  father of a family/power to rule is inherited
  (e.g. Filmer,The Natural Power of Kings,1680,
  critiqued in Lockes First Treatise). Divine
  right of kings.
• In more recent times, theocratic
  rule/theocracy/Church overrides or supplies the
  state (Iran Vatican City State), still claiming
  legitimacy based on divine source of authority.
  God is the ultimate sovereign, and not the
  people.
• Democracy respects the peoples choice, so if the
  people prefer an alternative to democracy, then
  the alternative is what they should have.

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Who and what are the people?

• 2. Power should be the preserve of true members
  of the national community. This may not mean
  everyone (i.e. non-inclusionary enfranchisement
  based on ethno-nationalist and racial or racist
  theories about blood line or colour, or gender
  and age discrimination (e.g. apartheid South
  Africa).
• 3.The people are many, but only the few are wise.
  Democracy empowers the ignorance, stupidity, and
  irrational passions of the masses. Philosopher
  kings (Plato The Republic) or the modern day
  equivalent - technocrats should rule.
• Contemporary examples include Smith and Shearman
  on responses to global warming, and recent
  debates in some European countries over handing
  power to experts to determine policy responses to
  sovereign debt crises.

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Security an overriding value

• 4. Democracy may be a nice idea, but personal
  safety, or security meaning both at home/internal
  (law and order) and external/from foreign
  aggression must come first (Thomas Hobbes
  argument for absolute, unlimited and indivisible
  power off the sovereign, in Leviathan). By
  dividing or distributing power widely in society
  and placing limits on what even a government with
  clear majority support is allowed to do, the
  ability of government to guarantee security the
  individuals basic right to life would be
  compromised, and could be fatally undermined
  especially in an age of terror(ism).

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Democracy requires unrealistic commitment

• 5.Attaining and maintaining democracy require
  qualities of self-confidence, energy and
  vigilance that human nature might not possess,
  even if people are clever.
• Soft version sustainable democracy requires
  sustained commitent by the people (J.S.Mill, A
  few words on non-intervention, 1859 ) at best
  might succumb to the appeal of populist leaders,
  who are insincere democrats.
• Hard (scary) version fear of freedom/ freedom
  an unbearable burden (Eric Fromm, 1941),
  provides the conditions for messianic rule that
  promises a holy grail. Rise of totalitarian
  dictatorship, e.g. fascism in the 1930s.

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Too expensive

• 6.Democracy costs too much, for poor countries
  anyway just think of the opportunity cost in
  terms of the basic (material) needs foregone.
  Similar arguments used recently against changing
  the voting system and electing the second chamber
  in the UK.

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Historical obsolescence

• 7. In todays increasingly globalised world the
  sites of power and leading institutions of
  governance are moving offshore, and now straddle
  territorial boundaries between countries. But
  democracy was designed for - and remains trapped
  inside - the obsolete shell of the national
  state. So it can no longer deliver what it claims
  rule by (and for) the people (discussed further
  in summer term see module programme, week 21).

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Radical views from the left

• 8. Marxist view of bourgeois democracy an
  historically transient part of the
  superstructure. Of no great value in itself (it
  is the economic base and social relations make
  history). And it is pernicious in as much as it
  is fashioned to serve/prolong class
  domination/exploitation/alienation.
• And it is destined to be superseded by communism
  (alternatively, C. B. Macpherson on democratic
  socialism of Soviet-style rule).
• 9. Anarchist rejection of the state (Tolstoy
  Proudhon etc). Democracy presupposes a state,
  and the state is the enemy of freedom. The end of
  politics means no place for democracy as we know
  it.

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Fatal links, or just remediable flaws?

• 10.(Electoral) democracy means tyranny by the
  majority. Is liberal democracy the solution, if
  it protects the rights of individuals and
  minorities (e.g. Bills of Rights)?
• 11.Democracy threatens property rights
  (Federalist Paper No. 10, debated in US in 1787).
  Seems overstated. But highlights importance of
  rule of law to encouraging wealth-creation).
• 12.Democracy perpetuates male domination
  (feminist critiques). Yes, but remediable
  (only?) by social/economic change.
• 13.Representative democracy means enslavement
  between elections(Rousseau in The Social
  Contract, Book 3, chapter 15, 1762). E-democracy
  now offers a solution?
• 14. Contradicts traditional communal rule (e.g.,
  African style, such as Botswanas kgotla). Town
  hall democracy and deliberative democracy as
  solutions?

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And democracy promotion?

• Irrespective of whether the idea of democracy is
  good or bad, and regardless of what methods are
  used to promote democracy, the international
  promotion of democracy may be a bad idea because
• 1.All national communities have a right to
  determine their own future free of external
  influence. Sovereignty limits democracy support
  to a request basis only. A matter of principle.

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And democracy promotion?

• 2.It is only the people of a society who can
  really know what that society wants, what it
  needs, what will work best, when and how to get
  it. External influence at best gets in the way,
  even when it is welcomed and is well-intentioned.
  A matter of prudence more than principle.
• 2a.Variant on above international democracy
  promotion is bound to be ethno-centric, i.e.
  promote models that reflect their country of
  origin, which may be unsuited (e.g.at the time of
  the French Revolution in 1790s Burke saw
  republicanism as anathema to English traditions
  of liberty that cherish the wisdom of the ages,
  so even if it was right for France which Burke
  denied this would mean it could not be right
  for England).

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And democracy promotion?

• 3.Governments, especially democratically elected
  ones, are obliged to place their own countries
  interests first. So beware of foreigners
  (democracy promoters) bearing gifts
  (Rousseaus Legislator argument inverted).
  Policy motives elaborated later in module).
• 4.If societies in the established democracies do
  not wish to support international democracy
  promotion then their elected governments should
  not use taxpayers money in that way (similar to
  arguments about spending on international
  development aid).

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Homo sapiens destiny is to challenge, and the
role of the academy to preserve the critical
spirit

• 5.We should keep alive the idea that faith in
  democracy could be misplaced, which means that
  the idea of democracy promotion should be
  challenged too.
• Uncritical support for democracy and/or for
  democracy promotion leads to complacency and
  susceptibility to error. If they are not
  challenged, then even the meaning as well as the
  vitality of attachment and jealous protection of
  democracy will be more easily lost in the
  established democracies (Socratic method J.S.
  Mill in On Liberty, 1859).

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Forthcoming attractions

• In the weeks ahead
• Critiques of particular motives or policy drivers
  attributed to the democracy promoters (e.g. week
  9).
• Criticisms of specific strategies, approaches,
  techniques or methods used to promote democracy,
  claiming they are ineffective or may even be
  counter-productive (see weeks 11 onwards).

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IPDP

• Session 5 Explaining the growth of democracy
  promotion
• Aim of lecture to explain how the 'international
  community' came to be more enthusiastic about
  promoting democracy by the late 1980s and took
  off in the 1990s but did not happen earlier.

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Historical Origins

• 1. Post-1945 international order states are
  sovereign non-intervention national
  self-determination (decolonisation) UN Security
  Council hamstrung by first world v second
  world rivalry.
• 2.Foreign aid in the cold war era providers
  (US, USSR, China, OPEC, Japan, UK, France,
  Germany WBankl policy rationales not democracy
  promotion.
• 3.The turning point impact of events in the
  Soviet Union after Gorbachev became leader (1985)
  and end of Brezhnev doctrine. Affects
  North-South relations as well as East-West
  relations window of opportunity for West to
  apply pressure for political change in developing
  countries without consequences for East-West
  balance of power
• 4. Third world countries became more vulnerable
  as lose second world financial, economic and
  political support also, fear aid diversion of
  Western aid to transition countries in former
  second world collapsing appeal of alternative
  ideology(communism) .
• 5. Do not underestimate domestic pressures for
  political change inside the developing world,
  provides a demand-pull complement to the supply
  side push in political development support. Gives
  legitimacy. But were domestic demands for change
  primarily aimed at political reform or at
  economic improvement?

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From Foreign (Economic) Aid to Political
Development Support

• 4.Supply side aid institutions opportunistic
  response to growing 'aid fatigue' at home.
• Origins of 'aid fatigue' in the US
  (disappearance of cold war rationale) and
  everywhere a growing frustration at aid's weak
  developmental performance notwithstanding
  introduction of economic conditionality, and
  sensitivity to domestic public concern about
  aiding corrupt and/or incompetent governments,
  while having to impose fiscal austerity at home.
• 5. Early precursors of democracy promotion
  President Carters human rights policy in late
  1970s did not last.
• 6.Political (development aid) rejuvenates aids
  moral purpose a good sell at home and costs
  less than economic development aid!

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New Thinking about International Relations

• 5.Evolving thinking about an international regime
  of rights - rights belong to people, not
  governments - and about international obligations
  the former state-based notions of national
  sovereignty are put on the defensive against the
  role of the international community in
  protecting and/or furthering the rights of
  peoples (even against their own government
  ignores or represses the peoples rights).
  Democracy an entitlement?
• Modelling a new norm of international democracy
  protection and/or promotion on the evolving
  doctrine of humanitarian intervention (which may
  even justify use of force and ignoring the
  objections of the government).
• Is it a right or an obligation of the
  international community to do this? And who/what
  is the international community same as the UN
  other organisations?

48
Conclusions

• Conclusion the collapse of the USSR and
  relaxation of former constraints on international
  diplomacy, the need for a new rationale for aid
  given the background of development failures, and
  the 'pull factor' from peoples seeking political
  change from their governments all combined to
  create a favourable environment for international
  promotion of democracy to take off in the 1990s.
  
• Advances in humanitarian intervention begin to
  look conducive to the evolution ultimately - of
  a new doctrine of democracy intervention.
• In reality this never got off the drawing board
  and eventually became dead in the water after
  the US response to 9/11. The idea that the
  international community has a responsibility
  2protect is what remains, but restricted to
  circumstances of specific human rights abuses
  (genocide war crimes, ethnic cleansing, crimes
  against humanity), does not have status of
  international law, and its application is
  frustrated by the power politics that divide
  influential states.

49
IPDP

• Session 6 the developmental case for democracy
  promotion
• Aim of Lecture to examine the intellectual
  rationales/case for promoting democracy, focusing
  today on the developmental case.
• Note this is not the same question as the
  historical origins how DP came about (see
  previous lecture),
• And note the same question as why certain actors
  embraced DP and try to do it - the actual policy
  motives (see later lecture).

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The Way We Used to Think

• The 'cruel choice' theory (1960s) pursue either
  development, or democracy, but not both.
  Investment requires abstinence from consumption,
  which is politically unpopular.
• The performance of East Asias dragons/tigers
  provides evidence that non-democracies can and do
  deliver development.
• Modernisation school of development proposes that
  political development will follow economic
  change the wealth theory of democracy (Lipset)
  then kicks in. So everything can work out fine in
  the long run.
• Bias towards strong executive government as a
  means to implement the 'Washington consensus'
  that requires structural (economic ) adjustment,
  embodied in conditional programme lending
  (1980s). No pain, no gain a hard sell,
  politically. So democracy/democratisation
  unwelcome distractions, or worse, present
  political obstructions to rational (economic)
  imperatives.

51
The Thinking Changes

• By 1990 the dominant thinking undergoing change
  in three respects
• 1.Our understanding of the relationship between
  economics and politics rejection of economic
  determinism political institutions make a
  difference.
• 2. Our understanding of the specific connection
  between economic development and political
  development political change might be necessary
  for economic progress, not an obstacle.
• 3. Our understanding of the comparative merits of
  authoritarianism and democracy as political
  agents of economic liberalisation the legitimacy
  gained from being democratically elected can help
  governments take the tough decisions that weak
  autocracies see as too risky to their political
  tenure.

52
Explaining the changed thinking

• Realisation that development needs investment in
  human capital social capital, as well as
  physical capital. They are not luxuries that
  must be denied to people in poor societies. So
  development strategy may not require or benefit
  from (politically unpopular) austerity.
• Conditional lending seen to be a failure because
  of lack of government ownership and
  non-enforceability, which pose political
  challenges (NB. an alternative explanation would
  be that the Washington consensus advice is
  inappropriate and the root cause of a countrys
  economic problems lies in the international
  economic and financial system, but this
  explanation is not acceptable to donors/the
  West).
• Lessons of experience that non-democratic
  governments that are not accountable to society
  often do not feel obliged to prioritise the
  well-being of the people, either in the short or
  the long term. Africa land of dictators was
  not developing.

53
If politics is the (source of) the problem of
weak development, then the solution must be
political too

• Different political solutions democracy/responsiv
  e government (bilateral donors) good
  governance/competent and honest government (World
  Bank).
• Reasons why democracy might be good for
  development accountable to the people, who
  demand material improvement policy feedback
  improves policy command and control might suit
  first generation economic conditionalities (e.g.
  devaluation), but second generation economic
  conditionalities benefit from a more consensual
  politics (e.g. wage de-indexation).
• Removal of doubts that democracy could harm
  development evidence that democracy does not
  destroy property/incentive to create wealth
  political parties gain politically from a
  reputation for economic competence.
• Reasons why democratically elected governments
  will/can pursue economic liberalisation rely on
  the experts for policy advice, while political
  legitimacy buys (grudging) acceptance from the
  people international financial support sugar
  coats the pill, if properly distributed (and not
  trapped by government elite) .

54
Democracy/democratisation even good for fighting
world poverty

• Reducing poverty becomes main goal of foreign
  development aid, after end of cold war.
• Poor people are the most vulnerable to bad
  governance (corruption). Democratic
  accountability should force governments to
  improve governance.
• Democracy/democratisation will make
  poverty-reduction a higher political priority,
  because poor people who may be in the majority
  - will use their vote to demand attention.
• (Liberal) democracy more permissive of
  non-governmental organisations and civil society
  groups, who will put the needs of the poor on the
  political agenda even if political parties do
  not.
• Evidence no famines in democracies with free
  media (Sen).

55
Conclusion

• Growing belief that democracy (and hence
  democratisation) can be good for development -
  development that reduces world poverty.
• Political reform of some sort especially in
  governance - may even be a necessary
  (pre)condition for development, in many places
  and in time democracy should bring better
  governance.
• Therefore supporting the spread of democracy
  (democracy promotion) and helping to improve
  governance (governance aid) should be good for
  development. And the world development aid
  industry also should help support
  democratisation.
• Criticism in reality, democratisation can be bad
  for development, if it proves very destabilising
  democratisation in practice not always empower
  the poor, and conflicts exist between economic
  liberalisation and poverty reduction development
  aid industry remains more sceptical of democracy
  than good governance.

56
IPDP

• Session 7 Arguments suggesting that democracy
  can be promoted
• Aim of the lecture to examine intellectual
  justifications for promoting democracy by
  focusing on the influences on democratisation
  that may be open to manipulation or control

57
Development not a necessary condition or a
sufficient condition for democratization

• Rise of the belief that democracy and
  democratisation are possible even where the
  economic/socio-economic circumstances are not
  especially favourable. India and other examples
  of sustained democracy 'against the
  odds/deviant democracies. Hence the
  possibility that international democracy support
  could 'make a difference' even in these
  situations, and not only where economic/socio-econ
  omic (pre)conditions/(pre)requisites' are
  already in place.
• Anyway, economic development not a sufficient
  condition for liberal democracy. So there must be
  other factors that need to be addressed, where
  maybe international support could help too.

58
Additional Independent Variables

• We become aware of some other significant factors
  that can affect the chances of success or failure
  of democratisation, and the possibility that
  these influences might be amenable to external
  influence of some sort, e.g. technical advice,
  training, material or financial assistance,
  diplomatic persuasion, pressure, etc.
• At least three candidates political
  institutions civil society political culture.

59
Political Institutions

• The 'new institutionalism' generally (1980s on)
  political decisions (and non-decisions) on choice
  of political institutions matter, can make a
  difference to political outcomes. Choices are
  possible, within reason (constrained by previous
  choices and by more objective factors). Agency
  and structure interact.
• Institutional design and engineering (division of
  powers checks and balances centralisation v
  devolution electoral system etc). Path
  dependence/stickiness suggests getting the
  choices right is important (birth defect theory).
  But constitutional processes may allow for
  change.

60

• Do international actors have the right
  knowledge/expertise to advise on appropriate
  institutional engineering? Rousseaus legislator
• How can they influence choices when these must be
  acceptable to society and the dominant political
  actors? Possibilities in occupied countries
  broken societies where there is respect for
  tried and tested experience of foreign models
  (maybe lawyers and politicians educated abroad)
  conditionality for accession to regional
  organisation, e.g.EU.

61
Formal and informal institutions

• Informal institutions harder to change, and less
  amenable to external influence, than are formal
  institutions. Examples patron-clientelism
  corruption.
• Reform of the formal institutions might change
  the informal institutions in long run, by
  altering the incentive structures to behave in
  particular ways. For example a majoritarian
  electoral system design might encourage different
  ethnic groups to cooperate in a broad-based
  political party, where a PR system might entrench
  ethnic political representation.
• But in the short-medium term, informal
  institutions can undermine or hollow out formal
  institutional reforms e.g. persistence of
  clientelism in new democracies prevents
  democratically elected governments aiming for the
  general public good. And can cause backtrack on
  the institutional reforms (i.e. no path
  dependence), e.g. Putin undoes Medvedevs modest
  reforms.

62
Political Culture

• Culture comprises attitudes, beliefs, values,
  feelings/sentiments. Political culture a sub-set
  orientations towards politics. Almond and Verba
  (1960s) on the civic culture. Third wave
  resurrects interest in the significance of
  political culture to the political system/regime.
  
• But what makes up a specifically 'civic
  culture'? And its relationship to religious
  creed, level of education and prosperity,
  historical experience?
• Can we measure it? How? Growth in attitude
  surveys (barometers) organised/funded from
  established democracies. Could be used to inform
  decisions on democracy support programmes/projects
  For example if people fear the authorities, then
  help improve the rule of law (e.g. strengthen
  mechanisms of accountability, like judicial
  independence).

63
Condition or Consequence?

• Is civic culture a prerequisite for successful
  democratization? Whose culture matters most -
  elite (leaders) or mass and when? Mass civic
  culture not necessary for transition, but
  essential to consolidation?
• Can mass civic culture be a product of democratic
  transformation, e.g. brought about by the new
  institutions of democracy ? International help,
  directly (e.g. support civic education)
  indirectly (through advice on/support for
  institutional reform, e.g. human rights
  legislation.

64
Civil society

• Civil society not a new idea. Exists between
  state and household, based on voluntary
  principle, seeking some public purpose. But
  discourse mainly in political and social theory
  (Smith, Hegel, Gramsci).
• Reawakening to its importance against a
  background of growth in organised demands for
  political reform from outside the ruling party,
  in Latin America and Central Eastern Europe,
  e.g. Solidarity in Poland. Another example of how
  real events force us to think afresh.
• But civil society is a contested concept there
  are disagreements over its function in politics
  and disagreements especially over whether its
  role pre and post democratic transition should
  differ.

65
Contested Ideas about Civil Society

• Composition all inclusive, or alternatively
  excludes civic groups hostile to liberal
  democratic values (i.e. a civic culture), in
  other words is there uncivil society too?
• Function to challenge the state?, to
  countervail/check the state? to help the state
  be more effective? a school/training ground for
  democracys leaders?
• Modern and traditional variants (ethnic, tribal,
  extended familial groups). Democracy support
  often accused of favouring the first.
• Pro-market (e.g. include business groups) v
  suspicious of market/economic liberalisation
  (organised labour anti-globalisation
  protesters). An ideological division over this.
• Boundaries with social movements (different aim
  or purpose? Different social base? Different
  methods? More transient?).

66
International Support for Civil Society

• Notwithstanding the academic arguments over civil
  society, international democracy support for it
  in both new and prospective new democracies
  became a major growth industry in 1990s civil
  society capacity-building one of the highest
  categories of spending.
• Reasons it offers an access point external
  support may essential may be the main actor
  demanding/driving reform cheap and relatively
  easy to do politically safer than backing
  political parties (if there are pro-reform
  parties) responding to demand from civil
  society.
• However the lessons of experience from two
  decades of support now tell us it can be
  problematic for both sides (as week 16 in the
  spring term will explore in detail).

67
Conclusions

• Irrespective of how developed/non developed, or
  wealthy/poor the country is, democratisation
  might still be possible
• And international actors might be able to make a
  constructive contribution to this, by seeking to
  influence the institutions, the political
  culture, the civil society.
• Economic progress later would then help to
  consolidate the democratic gains. Indeed,
  democratic transition might unlock the potential
  for economic progress, which then helps
  consolidate democracy, in a virtuous circle.

68
Caveats

• Institutional design is an imperfect art and
  models do not always travel well iron law of
  unintended consequences. Informal institutions
  and political culture may be resistant to change.
  A seeming flourishing of civil society is not
  irreversible recedes, or becomes diverted into
  pursuing narrow group interests after the
  democratic revolution .
• In the meantime, protracted economic weakness and
  failure to improve social welfare/well-being can
  undermine popular support for a new democracy and
  lead to a stalled transition or even democratic
  reverse

69
IPDP

• Session 8 Policy motivations for promoting
  democracy
• Aim of the lecture to introduce different
  perspectives on what motivates international
  democracy promotion (policy drivers, policy
  goals, policy ends).
• The why they do, rather than why they should, or
  the intellectual justifications (see previous
  weeks) .
• Put differently, what are the incentives.
• Disentangling means and ends (objectives v
  goals).
• Disentangling surface rationalisations real
  or underlying reasons.

70
Plurality of types of actor with non-identical
missions and agendas

• Foreign policy analysis gaining more
  respectability in social science.
• Cross-over with foreign affairs think-tanks,
  foreign policy institutes/foundations.
• But establishing motives not synonymous with
  foreign policy analysis of states
  inter-governmental organisations
  non-governmental organisations. And states are
  not monoliths (inter-departmental rivalries).
• Two approaches to foreign policy analysis of
  states from the inside out (endogenous source)
  from the outside in (exogenous source).
• If the real world is more interactive, tracing
  the internal mechanisms of the push me pull me
  process is the way forward to understanding
  policy, especially the evolution of policy. In
  principle it should be able to capture whether
  (and how) policy changes over time as a result of
  learning the lessons of experience about its
  effects (effectiveness), i.e. feedback loop.

71
Some Candidates

• 1.Advancing democratic values and/or human rights
  for their own sake , i.e. idealism. But possibly
  also bound up with own identity (and sense of
  mission to lead). In the US ideas of manifest
  destiny as the first free nation go back to
  early 19th century . EU has equivalent sense of
  mission to show how countries can overcome a
  history of conflict by adopting the right
  political solution. Decline in popular support
  in US for democracy promotion. Should states have
  a moral purpose in their international relations,
  anyway?
• 2.A strategic calculation to make the world a
  safer place (for self included) democratic peace
  thesis influential notwithstanding academic
  critiques ( the reasons why there is a
  coincidence more revealing than the coincidence
  e.g. it all depends on how we define the terms
  is a function of cold war is a function of
  shared prosperity and democratization is
  destabilising and can even spawn belligerence).
  Democracies initiate war on non-democracies,
  which is still a breach of international peace).

72
More recent candidates

• 3.To enhance national security against new
  security threats, especially combating
  international terrorism after 9/11.
• Cannot explain democracy promotion before 9/11.
• And is terrorism really due to lack of
  democracy? Alternative origins social grievance
  nationalism specific roots in Middle East
  politics). Increase in democratic freedoms can
  account for increase in terrorism (at home).
• Other new security threats illegal migrants
  (but do democracies manage their economies
  better?) and asylum seekers (democracies respect
  human rights) global environmental bads (but are
  democracies really more responsible in global
  environmental terms? We revisit the topic of
  climate change later in the module) health
  (would there be fewer pandemics in a world made
  up entirely of democracies?) global financial
  instability (democracies the source of recent
  instabilities!) energy security (no logical
  connection with type of regime, other than the
  evidence that national abundance in traded fossil
  fuels helps sustain regimes that are not
  (liberal) democratic, e.g. Gulf states, Saudi,
  Iran, Russia.

73
Less Reputable Candidates

• 4. Life a relentless struggle for power after
  power (Hobbes Leviathan) means the pursuit of
  power or hegemony, world domination even, either
  for its own sake or to secure own
  self-preservation in a world where others pursue
  it for its own sake. Sought through cultural
  imperialism, the export of (political) values
  i.e. American values, or western values born of
  the European Enlightenment, and not really the
  universal values they are claimed to be). Old
  ways of exercising imperialism - military
  conquest and occupation of territory or economic
  domination or financial power (e.g. worlds
  reserve currency) are more costly and less
  feasible now than in the ages of pax Britannica
  and pax Amerciana. Colonising minds just a new
  phase of neo-colonialism.

74

• 5. A public relations exercise deflect critical
  domestic or international attention from doing
  'business as usual' with tacky regimes that have
  political, economic or other assets. But in
  practice has opposite effect accusations of
  double standards and hypocrisy.
• 6.As a corollary of the 'Washington policy
  consensus' democratisation (democratic
  governance) for the sake of structural economic
  adjustment and economic liberalisation. And
  reinforces a states obligation to repay debts to
  the IFIs (unlike odious debt).
• 7. Above merges into a grander claim that
  democracy promotion is about making the whole
  world safe for capital - capitalism as an entire
  system of political economy which is the end,
  where economic liberalisation is just a means to
  help realise that end. Robinson on transnational
  corporations interest in pre-empting real
  democratic revolutions. But does capitalism and
  the pursuit of profit really need
  democracy/democratisation in China, Vietnam? US
  no longer has monopoly on TNCs.
• Critical theorists critique the promotion of
  economically liberal democracy but disagree over
  whether promotion of other ideas of democracy
  (social democracy participatory democracy, etc )
  is acceptable - and feasible.

75

• 8. The defensive turn now the rising power of
  autocracies competing for influence in the world
  means democracy promotion has to moderate its
  ambitions, however we choose to explain it
  before. It is no longer the pursuit of absolute
  power, but about slowing the decline in the
  Wests relative power. And it is not about
  seeking the triumph of certain ideas or ideology
  - neither democracy nor capitalism. Ideas and
  values revert to being just instruments in a new
  round of struggles between nations and states
  over regional and global balances of power, and
  will be either used or discarded as best serves
  the interests of the West in its power struggles.
  This new realist take on a new cold war (see
  Kagan The Return of History and the End of
  Dreams) consistent with recent criticisms of EU
  for declining commitment to international
  democracy promotion and of foreign policy
  adjustments early on in Obama presidency.

76

• Concluding Reflections
• Different answers or varying combinations of
  answer could explain pursuit of different objects
  such as human rights, democracy, and 'good
  governance'.
• Different explanations or varying combinations
  could apply to different categories of
  democracy-promoting organisation (states
  international orgs., non-governmental actors) to
  different states (US Sweden, etc., variations
  among different EU member states) and successive
  governments within the same state and even
  within the same state structure (e.g. in UK
  between FCO DFID WFD in US between State
  Dept. and USAID let alone NED) and between
  factions within individual organisations, e.g.
  idealists v career bureaucrats).

77

• The leading explanations/policy motors could
  change over time, e.g. from doing development
  in 1990s, through fighting terrorism after 9/11,
  to countering the growing international power of
  rival national states now.
• And motives can sometimes be confused or unclear,
  or persist due to inertia but cease to mean very
  much.
• So whatever explanation(s) you are attracted to,
  do what Popper says makes for a sound scientific
  method of inquiry look for evidence that would
  refute the claim, not just evidence that will
  offer support for (i.e. confirm) it. Apply the
  test that asks in principle can the claim be
  empirically falsified? , if you ever feel the
  need to avoid the temptations of conspiracy
  theory.

78
And Whatever Explanation(s) You Settle on

• At time the goals can be delusionary.
• Because policy implementation can deviate from
  the policy aims and/or motivations.
• Because policy outcomes can be unpredictable
  even perverse. The backlash against democracy
  promotion in the twenty first century suggests
  this.
• Put differently, motives may not be a very
  reliable guide to what is attempted, and an even
  less reliable indicator of what is achieved. So
  do not extrapolate results from intentions! Even
  if you believe the US aspires to global
  domination through exporting its version of
  democracy, success could be along way off in
  fact, receding as we speak!
• In theory, over time a policy-making feedback
  loop should help correct this. But our
  examination of the performance of democracy
  assistance in the spring term tells us not to
  count on it. That is to say, an experience of
  policy failures or policy mistakes does not
  always lead on to better or more successful
  policy.

79
International Politics of Democracy Promotion
PO229

• Session 9 Strategies for promoting democracy
  alternatives or complementary?

80
Aim of Lecture

• to introduce the variety of patterns of
  interaction between democratisation and external
  actors in the international system, and to draw
  attention to significant differences among
  approaches to strategies for - promoting
  democracy abroad.

81
Preliminaries

• 'More than one way to skin a cat.
• Not all cats are the same fitting the choice of
  strategy to the political situation and current
  direction of political travel in a country. For
  example one approach or set of approaches for
  toppling dictators, another for protecting a new
  democracy from internal subversion, and yet
  another for consolidating a democracy or helping
  it to become more democratic.
• Could different approaches be mutually
  reinforcing, e.g. if used in the right sequence
  over time?
• Important to distinguish between the nature of
  the relationship and the identity of the external
  actor (horses for courses).

82
Some analytical devices

• Leverage v linkage to the West (Levitsky and
  Way). Linkage creates vulnerability to leverage,
  but is argued to be more effective at securing
  the sustained democratic transformation of a
  regime.
• Soft power (of attraction) v hard power
  (military might economic incentives).
• Power continuum from assistance (consensual
  and nonviolent) and persuasion (reasoned
  argument) through influence (social learning
  acculturation conditionality to coercion - both
  military and non-military.
• Toolbox instruments diplomatic skills
  political capital financial economic
  technical threat potential military capability.

83
Analytical devices continued

• Active (intentional) v passive (unintended).
  Balance of effects.
• Active direct impact on political variables
  indirect impact on politics through affecting
  economic or other variables.
• On socialisation norm adoption v norm adaptation
  selection (filtering context matters).
• More on socialisation norm conversion
  (internalisation, i.e. become democrats by
  conviction) v logic of consequences (change the
  incentive structure so that people will now
  calculate their interests differently, e.g. by
  making offers of rewards for compliance
  sanctions penalties for non-compliance. They
  become democrats for convenience or
  democracy without dmeocrats. Promoting
  democracy by applause one application offer of
  club membership.

84
Continued

• a) By example, learning and imitation/emulation
  can be passive (unintended) but also a low-cost
  approach to active democracy promotion. Moral
  put own house in order first (both politically
  and economically?)
• d) Helping pro-democracy forces to struggle is
  this democracy assistance, or democracy
  promotion? Does the answer depend on how it is
  done (the kind of support offered) and how
  strongly the authorities object?
• Struggle can run away from/become out of control
  democracy support mission creep..
• c) Second generation (i.e. political)
  conditionalities coercive? Under what conditions
  could they be construed as such? Are political
  conditionalities the same as (self-serving)
  political strings.

85
International influences are not everywhere or
always positive

• a) Well-intentioned democracy interventions can
  backfire (examples of Trusteeships in Kosovo and
  Bosnia-H.?) or are ineffective (reasons will be
  explored in second term).
• Even (negative)political conditionalities perform
  poorly, just like first generation (economic
  conditionalities) which failed to secure policy
  ownership. But positive conditionalities
  (inducements) now back in fashion in EU relations
  with near abroad.
• b) Emergence of competition from autocracy
  promotion. Is this new kid of the block about
  supporting autocracy or about defending the
  sovereignty of autocracies?
• c) Countervailing influence of other
  international forces, developments or events. For
  example are so-called crises of capitalism more
  accurately a crisis of/for democracy (and
  democracy promotion) as well? Is global climate
  change a serious threat to democracy and
  democratization (see week 22).

86
Conclusions

• a) Different strategies to promote democracy
  abroad are conceivable all have been tried.
  Judging the right combination, at the right time,
  for the right case is very difficult. Trying to
  supporting democracy abroad is an art not a
  science.
• b)The spread of democracy has not occurred solely
  because of 'imposition' by the West.
  External/internal interactions matter.
• c) Has to be both opportunistic in responding
  quickly appropriately to (unforeseen) internal
  events and prepared to commit for the long haul.
• d) Do not assume that political conditionality is
  effective. Even economic sanctions only rarely
  deliver the desired a result.
• e) Technical assistance may not always be an
  exercise in political power, but it can become
  very political.

87
Conclusions continued

• f)The effectiveness of international democracy
  promotion should be contextualised within a
  larger set of more diverse international
  influences on the prospects for democracy.
• g) The global pathways to authoritarian/semi-autho
  ritarian resilience (and resurgence?) and their
  spread merit more attention now than in the 1990s
  and receive too little attention even now.
• h) Democracy promotion not just a transfer from
  North to South. Do not forget the regional
  dimension, which could be positive or negative,
  e.g. effects of living in a good or bad
  neighbourhood intra-regional spill-overs
  (democracy racing v destabilisation of
  democratic initiatives by subversion by a nearby
  nondemocratic regime that feels threatened).

88
Finally, true or false?

• The real contrast between democracy promotion and
  autocracy promotion is not that democracies will
  use only methods that fall short of coercion,
  whereas autocracies will happily use force.
  Instead, the real contrast is that democrats
  actually believe in the universal value of
  democracy, even when promoting democracy for
  self-regarding or instrumental reasons, whereas
  autocracies will support likeminded regimes only
  when and where they anticipate some benefit to
  themselves. Supporters of democracy and autocracy
  all dip into the same toolbox. It is just the
  ends that are different.

89
IPDP

• Session 10 Three agendas or one? Democracy,
  human rights and good governance
• Aim of the Lecture to examine the relationships
  between the 3 agendas of democratic political
  reform, human rights and 'good governance'.
• Do these provide the basis for a coherent
  strategy of international 'intervention' - a
  mutually reinforcing set of goals? Or are there
  tensions - conflicts even - among the different
  elements, which raises questions about what to
  give priority to and what are the right sequences
  to pursue.

90
1. The Democratic Political Reform Agenda

• (Western style) liberal democracy has had a
  monopoly on democracy promotion, drawing on ideas
  of civil liberties as well as political rights,
  and consonant with a market approach to economic
  organisation (i..e economic liberalism).
• More emphasis on freedom from the state (negative
  liberty) than freedom to become a full citizen
  (positive liberty),i.e. more like Locke than
  Rousseau. Formal equality of political
  opportunities not actual political equality.
  Common possession of rights based in law not
  necessarily amount to empowerment of the
  people.
• But there are other less elitist - democratic
  models to compare ,e.g. social, radical,
  participatory, deliberative, as well as other
  approaches (conceptions?) like green and
  feminist approaches. Unresolved debates how far
  compatible with liberal democracy, or illiberal,
  or not fully democratic, or anti democratic? And
  if