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Title: History of Philosophy A


1
History of Philosophy A
  • Lecture Two Medieval Ethics I

2
Recap
  • Last lecture we
  • Briefly went through some admin.
  • READ THE COURSE DOCUMENT
  • READ THE STUDY GUIDE
  • We talked about what seminars were for
  • We briefly introduced some information on St.
    Augustine

3
This Lecture
  • We will look more in-depth at ethics in the
    medieval world.
  • We will
  • Introduce the Euthyphro dilemma
  • Introduce Ockhams Divine Command Theory
  • Next lecture we will look at Thomist
    alternatives

4
Plato (428-348 BC)
  • Well start back in ancient Greece, with Plato.
  • Youve probably all heard of Plato
  • Born to an aristocratic family, he was a follower
    of Socrates
  • And founded one of the first organised schools
    The Academy

5
Euthyphro Dilemma
  • In Euthyphro he describes a discussion between
    Euthyphro and Socrates.
  • Just as with the extract from Augustine, the
    philosophical argument is presented as a
    dialogue.
  • Take the following examples.

6
Euthyphro Dilemma
  • If I pick up an object it is a carried object.
  • Is it a carried object because I am carrying it?
  • Or am I carrying it because its a carried
    object?
  • If I have followers, I am a leader.
  • Am I a leader because I have followers?
  • Or does I have follows because I lead people?
  • If someone loves me, I am a loved thing.
  • Am I loved thing because someone loves me?
  • Or does someone love me because I am a loved
    thing?

7
Euthyphro Dilemma
  • If I pick up an object it is a carried object.
  • Is it a carried object because I am carrying it?
  • Or am I carrying it because its a carried
    object?
  • If I have followers, I am a leader.
  • Am I a leader because I have followers?
  • Or does I have follows because I lead people?
  • If someone loves me, I am a loved thing.
  • Am I loved thing because someone loves me?
  • Or does someone love me because I am a loved
    thing?

8
Euthyphro Dilemma
  • Another example.
  • Imagine the perfect mathematician.
  • For all mathematical truths, it is the case that
    he knows them to be true.
  • But are they true because he believes them to be
    true?
  • Or does he believe them to be true because they
    are true independently of him?

9
Euthyphro Dilemma
  • Another example.
  • Imagine the perfect mathematician.
  • For all mathematical truths, it is the case that
    he knows them to be true.
  • But are they true because he believes them to be
    true?
  • Or does he believe them to be true because they
    are true independently of him?

10
Euthyphro Dilemma
  • So some sense can be made between asking whether
    something that is F is F for some reason P, or is
    P true because that thing is F.
  • With that in place, Socrates asks
  • Think about this Is the pious loved by the
    gods because it's pious, or it is pious because
    it is loved? Euthyphro 10a

11
Euthyphro Dilemma
  • The question has been taken more generally about
    what is (morally) good rather than just piety.
  • The polytheism was also dropped by medieval
    times.
  • So we end up with
  • Is something good because God says it is good,
    or does God say its good because it is good.
  • (similarly for evil things)

12
Euthyphro Dilemma
  • But why is this a dilemma?
  • The idea is that either answer you give has some
    awkward questions associated with it.
  • Say God has to say something is good because it
    is good.
  • In some sense, facts about goodness are out of
    His control.
  • In some sense, Hes constrained.
  • But how can God the omnipotent deity be
    constrained?

13
Euthyphro Dilemma
  • Imagine things are good because God says so.
  • Now goodness is somehow arbitrary.
  • God could order us all to put our right socks on
    before our left but surely its not wrong to do
    it the other way around?
  • Maybe its a bad idea to do it (what with the
    hellfire)
  • Maybe its wrong because you should obey God
  • But surely its not wrong in and of itself

14
Euthyphro Dilemma
  • Medieval philosophers took this Dilemma on board,
    and developed theories of ethics accommodating
    both answers.
  • Well start by looking at Ockhams response
  • Things are good because God says so.

15
William of Ockham (c. 1288 1347)
  • Born in Ockham, Surrey.
  • Joined the Franciscan Order of monks, before
    going to Oxford to study theology.
  • Never finished (and became known as Venerabilis
    Inceptor)

16
William of Ockham (c. 1288 1347)
  • Why?
  • Because he was charged with heresy, and travelled
    to Avignon in France where the Papal Court was.
  • The Pope was building a huge palace and library
    there.
  • Kept at the palace for four years, his accusers
    tried to make a case against him.
  • Ockham, on the other hand, came to believe the
    Pope was expounding heresy.
  • And did so even when it was pointed out to him!
  • So the Pope was a heretic in Ockhams eyes!

17
William of Ockham (c. 1288 1347)
  • Seeing how this was going to go, Ockham did a
    bunk with some fellow monks.
  • First fled to Italy, before travelling to Munich.
  • Excommunicated in 1328.
  • Switched to writing on politics.

18
Divine Command Theory
  • Ockham firmly embraces the first horn of the
    Euthyphro Dilemma.
  • Things are good because God has ordained it that
    way.
  • Things are prohibited, because God orders them to
    not be done.
  • This is called Divine Command Theory.
  • Morality depends upon the commands of the deity.
  • (sometimes called Theological Voluntarism)

19
Divine Command Theory
  • Ockham combines this with a theory about moral
    virtue.
  • For Ockham, acts themselves are morally neutral.
  • Two standard examples are
  • Walking to Church
  • Falling to your death

20
Divine Command Theory
  • I might walk to Church because Im driven by my
    love of God, my obedience to God and my desire to
    bond with my community.
  • In those circumstances the act would be morally
    praiseworthy.
  • But I might be vainglorious.
  • I might walk to Church as part of a package deal
    to make myself seem all pompous and important.
  • In those circumstances, the act would be immoral.

21
Divine Command Theory
  • Or I might fall to my death by hurling myself off
    of a cliff.
  • Suicide, of course, was (is?) a sin
  • So it might well be immoral to do that
  • But if I genuinely repented on the way down,
    Ockham says that the act is not immoral.
  • So the same acts can have the different moral
    statuses.
  • Its all about the intent of the agent.
  • Even if you dont succeed in doing an act, we can
    still judge the intent

22
Divine Command Theory
  • One of the reasons Ockham had for believing DCT
    was to do with things called universals.
  • Well encounter these more on Knowledge and
    Reality B, and theres a chapter in the
    introductory text.
  • Those medieval philosohpers who believed in
    universals believed that God needed two types of
    things to make the world
  • Objects
  • Universals

23
Divine Command Theory
  • So He made, say, two oranges.
  • They have something in common theyre both
    oranges!
  • Those who believed in universals argued that they
    literally had something in common.
  • A universal of orangeness

24
Divine Command Theory
  • So universals were some extra component in the
    world.
  • Ockham said there were no such things.
  • All God needed to do was make one object, and
    make it a certain way (a bit orangey), and
    another object, and make it the same way (also
    orangey).
  • There was no extra thing that needed to exist to
    do the job.
  • Instead they were both oranges because thats
    just the way we talked.

25
Divine Command Theory
  • But if things only share a property because of
    the way we talk, the same applies to things like
    being sinful
  • Acts, or intentions to act, are only sinful
    because of a way we talk.
  • And Ockham thought that morality should be
    defined in terms of what God orders us to do, or
    more accurately what God will send us to Hell for
    doing (or not doing).

26
Divine Command Theory
  • Your intent to do (or not do) X is immoral df
    doing (or not doing) X will be punished by God
  • Your intent to do (or not do) X is morally
    acceptable df doing (or not doing) X will not be
    punished by God

27
Divine Command Theory
  • So morality does depend wholly and solely on
    Gods edicts.
  • He really could ordain that it is immoral for you
    to put your left sock on before your right.
  • Does that mean he could ordain anything?
  • Well, almost.
  • Ockham doesnt think God can ordain that
  • Murder is morally acceptable
  • Theft is morally acceptable

28
Divine Command Theory
  • But the reason for that is because murder means
    immoral killing.
  • And if immoral means prohibited by God then
    murder means to kill someone when that killing
    is prohibited by God
  • So for God to command that this was acceptable
    would be for God to say that killing someone,
    when that killing is unacceptable to Him, is in
    fact acceptable to him.
  • Thats a contradiction!
  • God, being wholly flawless, would never make a
    mistake and ordain a contradiction

29
Divine Command Theory
  • Similar for theft.
  • A Theft df A taking of someone elses
    belongings when that act is prohibited by God.
  • So for God to make that acceptable would be for
    Him to command that taking someone elses
    belongings is acceptable only when it isnt.

30
Divine Command Theory
  • But that does mean that God could command that we
    should, say, kill all five year old children born
    in Stoke-On-Trent.
  • That isnt contradictory.
  • But then God isnt permitting murder.
  • In that circumstances God has said killing the
    five year olds is permitted (indeed, obligatory!)
  • So it isnt immoral, ergo isnt murder.

31
Divine Command Theory
  • Ockham bought wholeheartedly into this scheme.
  • He refers to Biblical examples.
  • In Exodus 322 God tells the Israelites to head
    off and despoil the Egyptians
  • But every woman shall ask of her neighbor and
    the woman who lives in her house, articles of
    silver and articles of gold, and clothing and
    you will put them on your sons and daughters.
    Thus you will plunder the Egyptians.

32
Divine Command Theory
  • You might have thought wandering around and
    nicking peoples belongings was well out of
    order.
  • But no!
  • Given Gods commands, and DCT, Ockham can make
    perfect sense of this Biblical scenario.
  • It was all kosher as God had said it was alright.

33
Divine Command Theory
  • Note, then, that Gods commands can vary.
  • He can tell some people not to take things that
    dont belong to them, and tell others its fine.
  • He can tell you that its wrong set fire to
    kittens.
  • He can tell me its all okay.

34
Divine Command Theory
  • He does have some reticence about this issue.
  • In Genesis 22, Abraham has to do in his son Isaac
    on the orders of God.
  • God then lets him off the hook.

35
Divine Command Theory
  • You mightve thought Ockham would think itd be
    fine.
  • But actually he is reticent to endorse such a
    position.
  • He says God would never counsel sin
  • But, presumably, if God had told Abraham to go
    through with it, it wouldnt have been a sin?

36
Moral Epistemology
  • Epistemology is the study of knowledge.
  • Moral epistemology is the study of how we have
    moral knowledge.
  • So how did Ockham think we acquired such moral
    knowledge?
  • Whilst it is the case that some given X is
    prohibited or made obligatory by Gods commands,
    how do we come to know this fact?

37
Moral Epistemology
  • Proponents of DCT could say that you look in the
    Bible.
  • (or the Koran, or Talmud etc.)
  • But Ockham doesnt say this.
  • Take the case of the virtuous pagan.
  • Could there be people, like Socrates and Plato,
    who were nice guys but werent Christians?
  • Many answers were put forth
  • Yes. And Christ liberated them from Hell.
    (Pre-Augustinian)
  • Yes. And theyre in Limbo. (Thomist)
  • No. What appear to be virtues in pagans arent
    really virtues. (Augustine)

38
Moral Epistemology
  • Ockham sided on the yes side.
  • There could be virtuous pagans.
  • But theyd never read the Bible to discover Gods
    commands, so how did they figure out what was
    moral?
  • By listening to their conscience.
  • This, so Ockham said, was your guide to moral
    truth.

39
Moral Epistemology
  • As everyone has a conscience, everyone can be
    virtuous whether or not theyve read the Bible.
  • And how God neednt go around whispering in
    everyones ears about what they should be doing.
  • Is this a good moral epistemology?
  • Ill let you decide.

40
God and Morality
  • With all this talk of God, youd have thought the
    Catholic Church would lap up DCT.
  • But whilst, as we shall see, medieval philosophy
    is almost entirely about God, they didnt approve
    of DCT.
  • As I said, Ockham was a heretic!
  • And DCT was generally seen as heretical.

41
Next Lecture
  • We look at some problems for DCT, and some
    reasons for why it was seen as heretical.
  • Then briefly look at an alternative ethical
    theory that takes the other horn of the Euthyphro
    Dilemma.
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