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Lessons from Financial Crises Crises

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Property and other bubbles burst; macro economic downturn; risk aversion increases ... This may stifle asset markets for many years. Practical Solutions ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Lessons from Financial Crises Crises


1
Lessons from Financial Crises Crises
  • Stefan Ingves
  • Moscow
  • March 2009

2
Content of Presentation
  • Structure of Crises - in general
  • Crisis Management
  • Crisis Resolution
  • How to get out of the crisis? What have we
    learnt?
  • Some Practical Solutions
  • Conclusion

3
Structure of Crises
  • The general structure of financial crises does
    not vary much.
  • Types of crises
  • Banking
  • Currency
  • Sovereign
  • Political

4
Structure of crises
  • Weak credit granting risk concentration excess
    liquidity low risk premiums regulatory gaps
  • Property and other bubbles burst macro economic
    downturn risk aversion increases
  • Loss of confidence leads to dried-up markets,
    interbank lending and household deposits.
  • Private and public measures to reduce extent of
    crisis and to reduce costs to participants incl.
    society at large.

5
Similarities between Crises
  • Many similarities on all components of the crises
    structure Weak credit granting excess
    liquidity excessive risk appetite regulatory
    gaps property bubbles which burst in an economic
    downturn.
  • Recognized ex post
  • Moral hazard vs Had no idea!

6
New Features in Present Crisis
  • The interlinkages of markets (credit,
    securities, liquidity etc.).
  • The increasingly global character of the
    financial system.
  • The opacity of certain instruments and
    organisational structures.
  • The new business model of banks.

7
Crisis Management Generally Valid Principles
  • - Swift and forceful actions by authorities,
    often based on insufficient information.
  • Transparent and predictable solutions.
  • Openness and active communication to explain the
    situation.
  • Close coordination between authorities and
    between political parties.
  • Provide incentives (sticks and carrots) for
    private sector to act,the common good.
  • State financial support to banks non-trivial.

8
Crisis Management - Differences
  • Liquidity squeeze across markets and countries.
    Need to restore confidence (State guarantees) and
    to infuse liquidity (central bank facilities in
    local currency and in USD).
  • Coordinated actions between countries both for
    liquidity and solvency support.
  • Stigma when using certain facilities so this
    must be taken into account when constructing
    them.

9
Crisis Resolution - Similarities
  • All the basic alternatives are still valid and
    are being used
  • Private solutions Lloyds bought HBOS
  • Facilitated solutions Bear Stearns
  • Bridge bank IndyMac
  • P A Bradford
    Bingley
  • Open bank assistance IKB (Germany)
  • Nationalisation Northern Rock
  • However, crisis resolution have now been expanded
    to new categories of institutions such as
    invextment banks, insurance, Govt sponsored
    agencies.

10
Current Plans
  • Intensive international activity now going on
    May reduce risk for future crises but not for the
    current one.
  • More urgent Focus must be on restoring
    confidence so banks may fund themselves and
    expand lending again. Some of the national and
    international measures so far have not led to
    expected results since they are misconstrued
    (e.g. incorrect pricing policies for guarantees).

11
What have we learnt?
  • Basic mistakes led again to a crisis Lax
    lending flawed risk assessments concentration
    risk inadequately explored instruments and
    models. Lending based on optimistic assumptions
    on property prices.
  • Crisis resolution Tough decisions by banks and
    authorities cannot be avoided. The challenge is
    to distribute the losses so that the overall cost
    (not only financial) is minimized.

12
What have we learnt ?
  • Restoring confidence is paramount. Transparency
    is crucial Proper valuation of assets Clear
    rules and incentives for dealing with distressed
    institutions.

13
How to get out of this crisis?
  • Full transparency about balance sheets set
    realistic values.
  • More equity is needed but not enough.
  • Homeopatic palliatives should be avoided.
    (Changing accounting or prudential regulations).

14
The Swedish Model
  • Structured framework for bank resolution
  • High degree of transparency
  • Political consensus
  • Rescuing banks, not owners
  • Govt interventions in banks as needed
  • Govt upside
  • Active use of AMCs

15
Practical Solutions in Present Crisis
  • The Problem Lack of confidence
  • The Cure Restore confidence by transparency
    bank-by-bank
  • - Identify all toxic or otherwise weak assets
    and transfer them at conservative values to AMCs,
    which could be free-standing or within the bank.
  • Recapitalise the good bank and the AMC.
  • Work with outside and neutral experts on true
    valuation of toxic/weak assets. Publish the
    results.

16
Practical Solutions
  • Should the Govt buy assets or recapitalise?
  • Both. Asset transfers at conservative prices
    leads to need for recap. Bank must be adequately
    capitalized to dare to lend.
  • A tempting but unworkable method is to transfer
    assets at overly optimistic values. This may
    stifle asset markets for many years.

17
Practical Solutions
  • Choice of method for restructuring a bank
  • - Each bank needs a customized solution, but
    there should be a general framework to ensure
    fairness and predictability.
  • - Perform due diligence to assess the situation
    and needs of each bank.
  • - Use a triage method to assess a banks
    viability and restructuring alternative.

18
A Non- Solution
  • Experience has shown that some methods do not
    work, for instance
  • Cuddling shareholders or management by letting
    them hold on to a failed bank (or buying it back
    at a low price) in spite of States capital
    infusion. The banks weaknesses will not be
    rectified. This does not mean that the State as a
    major shareholder should run a bank on other than
    commercial terms and by professional staff.

19
Conclusions
  • The present crisis is different global, across
    markets, complex instruments and opaque
    valuations,
  • but proven principles for crisis resolution are
    still valid,
  • and the crisis cannot be resolved until there is
    full transparency at the micro level.
  • Bank restructuring is essentially corporate
    finance
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