International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Regime

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International Cooperation and the Global Refugee
Regime

• Alexander Betts
• University of Oxford

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Structure of Paper

• 1) The Global Refugee Regime
• 2) The North-South Impasse
• 3) The Conditions for International Cooperation
• 4) Wider Implications

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Cross-Issue Persuasion

• the conditions under which actor A can persuade
  actor B that issue-area X and issue-area Y
  are linked as a mean of inducing actor B to act
  in issue-area X on the basis of its interest in
  issue-area Y

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1) The Global Refugee Regime
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Elements of the Regime

• Origin Inter-War Years
• 1951 Geneva Convention definition of a refugee
  and rights to which entitled
• UNHCR as the organization created to uphold and
  oversee implementation

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Contributions to Protection

• -Two ways in which states can contribute to
  refugee protection
• 1) Asylum (provision of protection to refugees
  who reach their territory)
• 2) Burden-Sharing (provision of protection to
  refugees who are on the territory of another
  state) e.g. Resettlement/Financial contributions

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Two Different Problems

• Asylum
• Strong normative framework
• Drive by reciprocity/legitimacy
• Burden-sharing
• Weak normative framework
• Driven by interests/power

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2) The Cooperation Problem
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The Regime as Prisoners Dilemma

• Dominant Literature
• -Collective action failure
• -Refugee protection as a global public good
• -The refugee regime as Prisoners Dilemma

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The Regime as Suasion Game

• PD assumes states have symmetrical power and
  interests
• In the refugee regime states interests and power
  relations diverge
• The refugee regime as a Suasion Game

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The North-South Impasse

• Features
• Overwhelming majority of refugees in the South
• The half complete regime
• Consequences
• Protracted refugee situations
• Inadequate protection

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3) Explaining Cooperation
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Four Case Studies

• ICARA I and II 1981 and 1984 failure
• CIREFCA 1987-1995 success
• Indochinese CPA 1988-1996 success
• Convention Plus 2003-5 failure
• -different outcomes
• -different institutional designs

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Interests in Other Issue-Areas

• Contributions not on the basis of altruistic
  concern for refugees
• Interests in other issue-areas security,
  migration, trade, development, peace-building
• The belief that those wider issue-areas were
  connected to refugee protection

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Conceptualising the Role of Other Issue-Areas

• Dominant literature issue-linkage
• -Focused on instrumental bargaining
• -Focused on formal linkage
• Alternative conception cross-issue persuasion
• when actor A persuades actor B that
  issue-area X and issue-area Y are linked as a
  mean of inducing actor B to act in issue-area
  X on the basis of its interest in issue-area Y

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Conditions for Cross-Issue Persuasion

• 1) Structure
• -Institutional interconnections (contractual)
• -Ideational interconnection (causal)
• 2) Agency
• -Recognise
• -Communicate

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ICARA I and II (1981 and 1984)

• Overview
• -African states seeking burden-sharing
• -Pledging conferences for infrastructure projects
• -Few contributions/little legacy
• Cross-Issue Persuasion
• -Northern interest in durable solutions
  Southern states interest in development
  assistance.
• -Weak institutional and ideational
  interconnections to development.

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CIREFCA (1987-1994)

• Overview
• -successful example of international cooperation
• -aftermath of civil conflict
• Cross-Issue Persuasion
• -EEC donors interest in trade, security, human
  rights
• -Central America states development, security
• -Strongly connected by institutions and ideas

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Indo-Chinese CPA (1988-1996)

• Overview
• -3-way agreement to address boat people issue
• -Successful end to mass exodus
• Cross-issue persuasion
• -Wider interests USA/Vietnam/ASEAN
• -Refugee protection structurally connected to
  foreign policy concerns through ideas

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Convention Plus (2003-5)

• Overview
• -attempt create normative framework for
  burden-sharing
• Cross-issue persuasion
• -North interests migration/security
• -Southern interests development
• -Weak institutional and ideational basis

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Wider Implications

• Structural interconnections as a structural
  resource of power (creation and use)
• Relevance for weaker actors Southern states
  IOs NGOs Private sector
• Other issue-areas Health energy development
  assistance climate change.

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