web-key: Mashing with Permission

1
web-key Mashing with Permission
Highlights and examples from the paper, and an
open discussion

• http//waterken.sf.net/web-key/

2
Security vs. the Web

• Casualties of the username/password
• Global identification
• Sharing a resource by passing a URL
• Orthogonality
• Hypertext can refer to a resource by URL only
• Global scope
• A URL means the same thing everywhere
• Got us the Same Origin Policy

3
Security vs. the Web

• and often doesnt actually result in the
  security we wanted
• Loss of global identification
• User revolt to something you know
• Loss of orthogonality
• Pervasive prompting gt phishing
• Loss of global scope
• XSRF this global identifier means something
  different when you use it
• My Access Control List doesnt control access?

4
The Web with security

• What security properties can we add to the Web
  without breaking it and would they be useful in
  real applications?
• A URL is a lot like a reference.
• Capability-security gets its security from
  enforcing the properties of references.
• Check the protocols and clients to see if its a
  good fit.

5
The Web as capability system

• Referer header almost makes the Web a dynamically
  scoped language
• Some referential integrity from HTTPS
• Windowing API in the browser is hysterical
• Survivable, but does require some care
• Address bar shows reference bits
• Can mitigate or ignore if no ones looking

6
https//yurl.net/-/kzqxsxbub4742a

• Global Id, Orthogonality, Global Scope
• Global id Just click
• Orthogonality No prompting
• Global scope no XSRF
• Global scope no need for Same Origin
• Global id fine grained access for mashup