PowerPoint Presentation New PARADIGM presentation

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EVOLVING MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS
Col (Ret) Peter Leentjes SME - Center of
Excellence in Disaster Management and
Humanitarian Assistance
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PEACE OPERATIONS

• Establish the Environment
• Discuss Evolution in the 90s
• Principles and Policies
• Challenges for 2000-2010

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PEACEKEEPING

• Pragmatic Solution - No Legal Basis
• For 40 years peacekeeping was
• Based on resolution of interstate conflict
• Conducted post an agreement
• Separated Forces or Monitored Agreements
• Classic or Traditional Peacekeeping

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FEATURES OF CLASSIC PEACEKEEPING

• Interstate Conflict
• Governments Functioning and in Control
• Government Infrastructure intact
• Military and Police Structures operating
• Judicial Systems in place
• International Rules operable
• Minimum Contact with Population
• Minimum Involvement with Civilian Agencies

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EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING TASKS THROUGH 1990S

• Traditional peacekeeping continued
• Implementation of Complex Agreements and
  Settlements became the norm
• First Preventive Deployment
• Observation of a Non-UN Peacekeeping Force
• Regional Peacekeeping
• Co-deployment of UN with Regional Peacekeeping
  Forces
• Use of PKO forces to assist with the provision of
  Humanitarian Aid
• The exercise of more Peace Enforcement options

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FEATURES OF MODERN PEACEKEEPING

• Resolution of Intra-state Conflicts
• Governments ineffective or not in control
• Factional Political Groupings Leadership
• State Support Infrastructure broken down
• Judicial Police Breakdown
• Military factions Warlords
• Weapons proliferation
• Intermingled with Populations
• Full Range of Civilian Agencies / NGOs
• There are no rules (International legal structure
  not effective)

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Traditional peacekeeping operations of the
kind deployed during the Cold War are unlikely to
be repeated. Peacekeeping today requires not
only re-thinking the means but also the methods
of implementing mandates set out by the Security
Council. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan 1998
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CHAPTER VI VERSUS CHAPTER VII
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CHAPTER VI

• Part of the peaceful settlement of disputes
• The Security Council provides assistance at the
  request of the parties
• Council has authority to investigate
• Investigation is not normally military until
  accord is arranged then military assess role a
  peace operation could play
• Therefore a PKO under Chapter VI
• is part of the peaceful resolution of the
  dispute
• assists in consolidating the peace and building
  confidence
• forces are lightly armed for self defense

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CHAPTER VI

• As a result conditions evolved to support a
  Chapter VI operation
• Consent of the parties is required
• A cease-fire needs to be effective
• A comprehensive agreement should be signed
• Parties assist the deployment of the force
• Parties sign a SOFA (this is very important to
  establish the status of the forces there is no
  other legal basis under Chapter VI)
• Self-defense ROE are developed

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CHAPTER VIIThe Decision to Use Enforcement
Power

• Conflict is ongoing
• High risk that conflict may start again
• Parties are not in agreement
• Rogue elements are not included (increased risk
  to UN forces force protection issue)
• Risk of external intervention
• Presence of other national forces in the area
• Risky internal situation violence / human
  rights abuses / banditry / weapons
• Self defense insufficient to protect deployed
  forces
• A legal basis to protect deployed forces is
  needed (SOFA cannot be agreed)

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CHAPTER VIIThe Use of Force

• Chapter VII
• does not require active use of force
• is not necessarily a combat operation
• Provides the full range of options including up
  to and including enforcement powers
• Declaration that the conflict represents a threat
  to international peace and security
• Non use of force options ie sanctions
• Use of Armed force if necessary and as a last
  resort
• Establishes the legal context for intervention
  and the use of force

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CHAPTER VI / VII CHECKLIST
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
PKO assists in consolidating the peace
PKO enforces the will of the SC

• Parties request assistance
• Commit to peaceful resolution
• Political will of the parties
• Consent to the operation
• Effective cease-fire
• Comprehensive agreement
• Parties assist the deployment
• Signature of SOFA

• Conflict is ongoing
• Risk of renewed conflict high
• Parties not in agreement
• Risky internal situation
• Rogue elements not included
• Risk of external intervention
• Presence of foreign forces
• Self defense judged insufficient
• Legal basis for intervention needed
• SOFA

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PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Chapter VII
Chapter VI
Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression
Pacific Settlement of Disputes
Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements
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PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Peace Restoration
Collective Enforcement
Co - Deployment
Economic Assistance
Demining
Civil Police Operations
Gross Violation of Human Rights
Human Rights Monitoring
Regional Enforcement
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations
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1990 ISSUES

• Wider Range of Tasks
• Change in the Composition and Needs of Missions
• Only the Traditional Model of Peacekeeping
  Available

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SECURITY COUNCILATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS
IN THE 90s

• A wider application of the peacekeeping model
• Development of hybrid mandates

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PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Peace Restoration
Collective Enforcement
Co - Deployment
Economic Assistance
Demining
Civil Police Operations
Gross Violation of Human Rights
Human Rights Monitoring
Regional Enforcement
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations
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PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Peace Restoration
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Collective Enforcement
Co - Deployment
Economic Assistance
Demining
Gross Violation of Human Rights
Civil Police Operations
Human Rights Monitoring
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Regional Enforcement
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations
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PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Peace Restoration
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Collective Enforcement
Economic Assistance
Demining
Gross Violation of Human Rights
Civil Police Operations
Human Rights Monitoring
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Regional Enforcement
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations
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Chapter VII Tools

• Comprehensive Mandate
• Clear Military Tasks
• Robust Force Structures (Equipped and Trained)
• Effective Command and Control Structure
• Authority to Use Force Appropriately
• Robust Rules of Engagement
• Legal Basis for Intervention

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WHAT CAN THE UN DO?

• Classic Peacekeeping
• Chapter VI Reinforced with Chapter VII
  elements
• Any Operation with Sustained Combat Operations
  this requires a coalition of the willing / lead
  nation / multi national force

WHAT CAN THE UN NOT DO?
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CHAPTER VII - ENFORCEMENTOPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

• UN has no Combat Operations Capability
• Logistics
• no combat logistics system
• contractor based support
• Authority over National Forces
• authority uncertain
• inadequate command control stucture
• nations reaction to forces under threat
• Different Cultures
• military cultures
• leadership managerial backgrounds
• training standards

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OPTIONS FOR UN MANDATES

• The UN may authorize a region / coalition to
  conduct the mission
• To a regional organization
• A coalition of the willing (MNF)
• A framework / lead nation in a coalition
• To a Nation capable of executing the mission
• The UN may decide to mange the mission
• Form a UN multi-national force
• Designate a framework / lead nation concept

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AUTHORIZING MISSIONS

• The operation has a high risk of combat
  operations taking place
• UN missions take a long time to deploy and
  deployment time is critical
• Support for funding cannot be generated
• A region or coalition offers forces

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CHANGING PRECEPTS

• Revision of principles
• Sovereignty
• Consent

• Impartial status

• Broader range of tasks

• Time constraints

• Limitations on
• Resources
• Political effort
• Military sacrifice

• Humanitarian Basis
• for Intervention

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CONSENTWho Gives Consent?

• International Bodies
• UN Security Council
• UN General Assembly
• TCNs
• Third Parties
• Parties to the Conflict
• Military Organizations
• Military Factions
• Local Commanders
• Warlords

Provides Legitimacy
Strategic Level Environment
Operational Tactical Level Environment
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NO UNIQUE MILITARY SOLUTION

• End state can only be political, economic and
  social in nature

• Expensive tool

• Military can
• temporize
• maintain situation
• reduce levels of violence
• induce compliance

• Blunt instrument of political power

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

• Chapter VII Operations have become the norm
• Operations are almost always multi-dimensional,
  multi-national
• Focus has moved to integrated Political, Economic
  and Social Solutions (Mandates)
• Integration of tasks under one Mandate
• Parallel full range of Civilian Intervention
• New civil-military coordination mechanisms
• Broader Range of Military Tasks
• Complementary / competing roles for components