The Future of Nuclear Power: Renewal or Rerun David Lochbaum Director, Nuclear Safety Project Februa

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The Future of Nuclear PowerRenewal or
Re-run?David LochbaumDirector, Nuclear Safety
Project February 25, 2008
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Agenda(Not Hidden)
Reactor design issues Undetected design
errors 21st century threats New design
problems New design solutions New reactor
licensing Nuclears past (really passed or just
paused?)
Slide 2
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BackgroundNuclear Safety Limbo
UCSs recent report concluded that NRCs
regulations are generally adequate. The safety
bar is okay too many reactors too often are
doing the limbo below it.
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NRCs Double Standard
Examples (very abridged list) PWR containment
sumps (GSI-191), Thermo-Lag and Hemyc fire
barriers, uncontrolled and unmonitored leaks of
contaminated water
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Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs
In May 1996, the NRC reported that the Millstone
nuclear plant had long been operating outside of
their design bases. Follow-up NRC inspections
and efforts documented that Millstone was not
alone.
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Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs
The NRC documented that hundreds of design errors
in new plants were not detected until after the
reactors had operated for years and years. Why
did the design reviews, pre-operational testing,
and subsequent surveillance tests and inspections
ALL fail to detect these hundreds of design
errors?
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Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs
How were they detected? Fewer than half were
reported found due to intentional, active
looking. Luck seems to play a big role.
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Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs
Lest anyone think that the design errors merely
involved green paint vice red paint, Licensee
Event Reports (LERs) are submitted for issues
above a safety significance threshold and
accident sequence precursors are an even higher
threshold.
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Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs
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Old Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs

• If new nuclear power reactors are built and
  operated in the US, the design review,
  pre-operational testing, and post-licensing
  surveillance testing and inspection processes
  must produce the following outcomes
• Significantly fewer design errors detected AFTER
  the reactors commence operation
• Significantly shorter residence periods for
  undetected design errors.
• Fewer undetected design errors and shorter
  hiding times translate into safer, more
  economical nuclear energy.

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21st Century Threats,18th Century Defenses
Following the 9/11 tragedy, the NRC undertook
what it termed a top to bottom review of
security for nuclear power reactors. Shortfalls
identified by that review were addressed by Order
and revised regulations. Curiously, a review
triggered by terrorists using suicide aircraft
attacks resulted in Orders and regulations which
assume a zero percent chance of aircraft attack.
Like Paul Revere and the Minute Men, nuclear
power reactors only defend against attacks by
land and by sea.
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21st Century Threats,18th Century Defenses
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21st Century Threats,18th Century Defenses
Nearly 25 years ago, the NRC chartered an
industry panel to examine design changes that
would make nuclear power reactors less vulnerable
to sabotage. The panel identified many feasible
design changes none of which have been
incorporated into advanced reactor designs like
the AP-600, AP-1000, ABWR, etc. To the extent
practical and feasible, nuclear power reactors
built in the 21st century must be designed
against 21st century, not 18th century, threats.
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New Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs?
AP-1000 To save money, vendor cut way back on
concrete and steel. The result is a ratio of
containment volume to thermal power below that of
todays PWRs, thereby increasing the risk of
containment over-pressurization and failure in
event of a severe accident. PBMR To save even
more money, vendor replaced containment structure
with less-robust confinement structure that
will protect the public from an accident unless
there is an accident.
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New Reactor Designs,Bad Reactor Designs?
Generation IV While the Gen IV reactor designs
remain largely conceptual, these concepts rely on
two shaky foundation supports (1) need for
uninvented, super-resistance materials, and (2)
fuel reprocessing and fast breeder reactors.
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New Reactor Designs,Good Reactor Designs?
The EPR design appears to be the safest and most
secure design among the new reactor designs.
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New Reactor Designs,Good Reactor Designs?
The EPR design is resistant to aircraft hazards.
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New Reactor Designs,Good Reactor Designs?
Even the spent fuel pool is resistant to aircraft
hazards.
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New Reactor Designs,Good Reactor Designs
If another nuclear power reactor is built in the
US, it must be protected from aircraft hazards to
the maximum extent by design features and to the
minimum extent by compensatory measures by
workers (i.e., fire hose brigades).
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New Reactor Licensing

• The old reactor licensing process featured two
  steps
• NRC issuance of a construction permit based upon
  review of preliminary design information
• NRC issuance of an operating license based upon
  review of final design information
• The new reactor licensing process features a
  single step NRCs authorization to build and
  then operate the reactor.

Slide 20
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New Reactor Licensing

• The old reactor licensing process featured
  information on a specific reactor design to be
  constructed at a specific site.
• The new reactor licensing process is
  bifurcated
• The NRC certifies a new reactor design without
  any clue where that reactor might be constructed
  and operated.
• The NRC approves a site for a nuclear reactor
  without any clue of which specific design might
  be constructed.

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New Reactor Licensing
One-step reactor licensing is at best
misleading and at worst an outright lie. By
splitting the new reactor licensing process into
two separate and distinct parts, the NRC
essentially and we believe intentionally
eliminated meaningful public participation. Who
is going to intervene in the certification
process for a reactor that may or may not be
built in their backyard? Who can intervene in the
site permitting process for an unspecified
reactor? No one. By design.
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Public Participation
No evidence has been found to support industry
statements that citizen opposition and regulatory
changes have been the primary causes for rising
costs, and construction delays. US House
Committee on Government Operations
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Nuclear Numbers
Nuclear reactors ordered 253 Construction
permits issued 175 Operating licenses issued
130 Operating licenses ended 26
Sources NEI NRC
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Nuclear Numbers
45 of the reactors issued construction permits by
the NRC (AEC) were not completed. At least not as
nuclear reactors. The Midland and Zimmer plants
were completed as fossil-fueled generators.
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Walking a Nuclear Tightrope
Walking a Nuclear Tightrope Unlearned Lessons
from Year-plus Reactor Outages released by UCS on
September 18, 2006.
Full report and the 51 year-plus reactor outage
case studies available at http//www.ucsusa.org/
clean_energy/nuclear_safety/unlearned-lessons-from
.html
41 of the nuclear power reactors licensed by the
NRC (AEC) experienced year-plus outages to
restore safety levels 10 reactors did it twice!
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Industry Participation
To the contrary, FPC Federal Power Corporation
statistics show that mismanagement is more of a
determinant than regulatory changes and citizen
opposition. US House Committee on Government
Operations
Mismanagement was a problem during
construction. Mismanagement was a problem during
operation. Mismanagement will be a challenge
during construction and operation of new reactors
time will tell whether that challenge will be
successfully met.