Trapdoor Oneway Function used in encryption etc' - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Trapdoor Oneway Function used in encryption etc'

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More 'covert' in that they set up routes as needed ... These paths are disjointed when RREQ forwarding is appropriately designed ... – PowerPoint PPT presentation

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Title: Trapdoor Oneway Function used in encryption etc'


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Trapdoor One-way Function(used in encryption
etc.)
  • Easy to set the trapdoor
  • Hard to open the trapdoor
  • But easy to open it if know the trapdoor key

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ANODR (anonymousuntraceable)
  • Add route untraceability
  • Untraceability
  • Enemies cannot follow a packet flow to next hops,
    in particular the source and the destination
  • Intrusion Tolerance
  • Ensures no single point compromise in ad hoc
    routing
  • Must capture all forwarding nodes to obtain
    source and receiver information
  • Add route pseudonym update neighborhood traffic
    mixing
  • More efficient, suitable for mobile ad hoc
    networks

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Multi-hop Broadcast-based Anonymity Model
D
S
(RtREQ Route REQuest)
(RtREP Route REPly)
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  • TBO trapdoor boomerang onion
  • TBOA KA(src)
  • TBOB KB(NB, KA(src))
  • TBOC KC(NC, KB(NB, KA(src)))
  • TBOD KD(ND, KC(NC, KB(NB, KA(src)))
  • routing picture

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New Multi-path ANODR
  • The destination normally receives multiple RREQs
  • Sends back multiple RREPs to establish multiple
    anonymous paths
  • These paths are disjointed when RREQ forwarding
    is appropriately designed
  • Help to improve performance metrics like data
    delivery ratio, end-to-end latency

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New Actual Cryptographic Operations in TBO
  • Adding real encryption functions (e.g., RC5, AES,
    3DES) in TBO processing
  • To verify that ANODRs cryptographic design works
  • E.g., random onion collision also considered
  • A new approach in network security protocol
    simulation (no previous work published)
  • A security emulation Actual cryptographic
    algorithm matters!

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Improvement on delivery fraction when multipath
is added to ANODR
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Tradeoff number of control packet for multi-path
ANODR will increase
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Average data path length with multi-path
decreases b/c a later possible shorter path maybe
found
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