Trade Growth and Inequality

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Trade Growth and Inequality

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Title: Trade Growth and Inequality


1
Trade Growth and Inequality
  • Professor Christopher BlissHilary Term
    2004Fridays 10-11 a.m.

2
Why the Poor Stay Poor
  • Chapter 3 of the book
  • (circulated)

3
The Persistence of Poverty
  • What are the transmission properties of income at
    t to income at t1?
  • Friedman (1992) regression to the mean
  • Incomes normally distributed andPositions
    randomPositions fixed

4
Are All Agents the Same?
  • Herrnstein and Murray (The Bell Curve)
  • IncomeF(IQ)
  • They claim that technological change has been
    such thatF(IQ))/F(100) has been falling over
    time for values of IQ well below the mean100

5
Adam Smith
  • Little else is requisite to carry a state to the
    highest degree of opulence from the lowest
    barbarism but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable
    administration of justice all the rest being
    brought about by the natural course of things.
    (Lecture 1775)

6
Karl Marx
  • The country that is more developed industrially
    only shows to the less developed the image of its
    own future. (quoted by Myrdal 1968, p. 674)

7
The Kuznets Model
  • Initially population in low-level equality
  • Growth takes the form of movement to higher level
    modern productivity
  • While some move but not others, inequality
    increases
  • As all eventually modernize inequality declines

8
Problems with the Kuznets story
  • The cross-section evidence does not confirm it
  • The idea of low-level equality is also not in
    accord with the evidence
  • The curve is caused by differential adjustment
    rates why does this happen?

9
The Stiglitz MASS Model
  • Solow-Swan with many agents
  • All supply same labour and save the same
    proportion of all income

10
Stiglitz Model Result
  • Let k satisfy
  • s.Fk,1-g.k0
  • All agents converge to holding k

11
Weakening Stiglitz assumptions
  • The quantity of labour supplied by an individual
    may vary with capital owned by that agent. It
    must have a positive limit as k goes to zero.
  • The share of saving in total income may vary
    monotonically with capital owned by the agent. It
    must have a positive limit as k goes to zero.

12
Convergence and the Discount Rate
  • Utility and Consumption Discount Rates
    Distinguished
  • Endogenous Discount Rates
  • Do the poor have high discount rates?

13
Discount Rates and Dynamic Inconsistency
  • It is not necessary to assume that the poor
    discount utility at a high rate (see below)
  • Endogenous discount rates give inconsistency
    (Strotz)

14
Strotzian Inconsistency
15
Strotzian Inconsistency cont.
  • With consumption in the range 99 to 100 the
    discount factor (the weighting of future utility
    against current) is approximately 0.9 per period.
  • With consumption in the range 20 to 22 it is not
    less than 0.5 per period.
  • Viewed from time 1 the present value of utility
    for respectively I, II and III is 133.25, 132.65
    and 130.78. In each case these totals are arrived
    at using weights (1,0.9,0.81).

16
Strotzian Dynamic Inefficiency cont.
  • Now the discount factor is 0.5, hence the present
    values of the part sequences I and II are
    respectively 32.5 and 33.

17
The Elasticity of Inter-temporal Substitution
(EIS)
  • ? -c(d2U/dc2)/dU/dc
  • If dU/dc u
  • ? -c(du/dc)/u

18
The Optimal Growth Condition
  • -(du/dt)/u F1k,1 d
  • ?(dc/dt)/c F1k,1 d
  • EISgrowth consumption
  • MPK U discount rate

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24
The Diamond Capital Model
  • Consumer lives two periods
  • Supplies 1 unit of labour in Period 1
  • Divides the wage between consumption and saving
  • Aggregate saving is the economy capital stock
  • That capital plus the return is Period 2
    consumption

25
Diamond Modelkt-1 determines kt
  • Max Uct ?Uct1
  • Subject to
  • ct (1/1rt) ct1 ? kt wt
  • wt F2kt-1,1
  • 1rt F1kt,1

26
Diamond ModelThe fundamental theorem
  • Theorem
  • kt increases with kt-1
  • This makes possible multiple equilibria

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Diamond Multiplicityand Poverty Traps
  • This idea is not influential Why not?
  • Seldom realised in connection with two popular
    model features?stability of SS solutions of
    interest?simple standard functional forms

29
Diamond ModelThe Corner Steady State
  • Are there zero-capital economies?The Empty
    Quarter of Saudi Arabia?
  • Any Corner solution can be converted to a
    positive income SS by allowing production with
    zero-capital

30
Diamond ModelMultiple Solution I
  • Cobb-Douglas preferences
  • Uct,ct1 ct?.ct1 ?-1
  • Where ? gt 0.5 gives discounting
  • Then kt ?.F2kt-1,1
  • In SS k ?.F2k,1
  • Both sides increase with k.
  • Strict concavity requires F211k,1 lt 0

31
The Concavity Conditionwith Cobb-Douglas
  • With Cobb-DouglasF2k,1 A(1-a)ka
  • F211k,1 -Aa(1-a)2ka-2 lt 0
  • So in the Cobb-Douglas case we have uniqueness

32
Diamond modeland the elasticity of
inter-temporal substitution
  • With Cobb-Douglas production and a constant EIS
    there is a unique non-degenerate steady state
  • With a variable EIS this is no longer the case
    (see the next figure)

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34
Which ModelDiamond or Ramsey?
  • Diamond allows a SS poverty trap, which the
    one-agent Ramsey model excludes.
  • Diamond is most clearly appropriate for a rich
    country with large funded pension schemes.
  • In poor countries, however, parents invest for
    their children, by buying education or land.

35
Implications for Policy
  • Solow style models do not support the Kuznets
    view of inequality
  • Non-concave models permit poverty traps
  • Even when all agents converge inequality may not
    be monotonic
  • Convergence is not a justification for inaction

36
Ch. 4 Convergence in Practice and Theory
  • Cross-section growth empirics starts with Baumol
    (1986)
  • He looks at ß-convergence
  • ß-convergence v. s-convergence - Friedman (1992)
  • De Long (1988) sampling bias

37
Barro and Sala-i-Martin
  • World-wide comparative growth
  • Near complete coverage (Summers-Heston data)
    minimizes sampling bias
  • Straight test of ß-convergence
  • Dependent variable is growth of per-capita income
    1960-85
  • Correlation coefficient between growth and
    lnPCI60 for 117 countries is .227

38
Table 4.1 Simple regression result N117
F6.245
39
Correlation and Causation
  • Correlation is no proof of causation
  • BUT
  • Absence of correlation is no proof of the absence
    of causation
  • Looking inside growth regressions perfectly
    illustrates this last point

40
The spurious correlation
  • A spurious correlation arises purely by chance
  • Assemble 1000 crazy ordered data sets
  • That gives nearly half a million pairs of such
    variables
  • Between one such pair there is bound to be a
    correlation that by itself will seem to be of
    overwhelming statistical significance

41
Most correlations encountered in practice are not
spurious
  • But they may well not be due to a simple causal
    connection
  • The variables are each correlated causally with
    another missing variable
  • As when the variables are non-stationary and the
    missing variable is time

42
Two examples of correlating non-stationary
variables
  • The beginning econometrics students consumption
    functionct a ßyt et
  • But surely consumption is causally connected to
    income
  • ADt a ßTSt etwhere TS teachers
    salaries AD arrests for drunkeness

43
Regression analysis and missing variables
  • A missing variable plays a part in the DGP and is
    correlated with included variables
  • This is never a problem with Classical Regression
    Analysis
  • Barro would say that the simple regression of
    LnPCI60 on per capita growth is biassed by the
    exclusion of extra conditioning variables

44
Table 4,2 Growth and extra variablesSources
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1985) Barro-Lee data
set
45
Table 4.3 Regression resultN 73 F 8.326
R2 .4308
46
Table 4.4 Regression with One Conditioning
Variable
47
Looking Inside Growth Regressions I
  • g is economic growth
  • ly is log initial per capita income
  • z is another variable of interest, such as I/Y,
    which is itself positively correlated with
    growth.
  • All these variables are measured from their
    means.

48
Inside growth regressions II
  • We are interested in a case in which the
    regression coefficient of g on ly is near zero or
    positive. So we have
  • vgly0
  • where v is the summed products of g and ly

49
Inside Growth regressions III
  • Thus vgly is N times the co-variance between g
    and ly.
  • Now consider the multiple regression
  • gßly?ze (3)

50
Inside Growth Regressions IV
51
Inside Growth Regressions V
  • So that
  • vglY(ß)(vgg)(?)(vgz) (5)
  • Then if vglY0 and vgzgt0, (5) requires
    that either ß or ?, but not both, be negative. If
    vglYgt0 then ß and ? may both be positive, but
    they cannot both be negative. One way of
    explaining that conclusion is to say that a
    finding of ß-convergence with an augmented
    regressions, despite growth and log initial
    income not being negatively correlated, can
    happen because the additional variable (or
    variables on balance) are positively correlated
    with initial income.
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