OPERATIONS SECURITY and FORCE PROTECTION

1
OPERATIONS SECURITYandFORCE PROTECTION
2
Operations Security(OPSEC)
3
DEFENSE-SENSITIVE INFORMATION

• Summer cruises
• Required training
• OPNAVINST 3432.1

4
DEFINITIONS BACKGROUND

• OPSEC is one of three components used to maintain
  the secrecy needed to achieve surprise.
• OPSEC is not a security function, but an
  operations function.
• Security programs and OPSEC are mutually
  supportive.

5
DEFINITIONS BACKGROUND

• OPSEC identifies controls information that
  indicates our
• Friendly Intentions
• Friendly Capabilities
• Friendly Activities.

6
DEFINITIONS BACKGROUND

• Security programs
• Deny classified information to adversaries.
• Physical security
• Personal security
• Information security
• Information systems security

7
DEFINITIONS BACKGROUND

• Counterintelligence programs
• Support both security and OPSEC programs by
  identifying intelligence threats and methods of
  an adversary.

8
FREEDOM OF ACTION

• By maintaining operational security of plans, we
  gain the fullest possible surprise.
• This, in turn, gives us freedom of action.

9
GOOD OPSEC

• OPSEC, properly applied
• Contributes to operational effectiveness by
• Enhancing probability of surprise.
• Causing adversaries to make bad decisions due to
  lack of critical information about our forces and
  equipment.

10
WHEN OPSEC IS REQUIRED

• OPSEC measures are required for
• Operations and activities relating to the
  equipping, preparing, deploying, sustaining,
  employment of the Navy and Marine Corps team in
  time of war, crisis, or peace.
• To protect the information in our plans and
  orders.

11
OPSEC MEASURES

• Inadequate OPSEC degrades operational
  effectiveness by hindering surprise.
• Conversely, excessive OPSEC can degrade
  operational effectiveness by interfering with
  required activities.

12
SUMMATION

• OPSEC is the control of info by
• Knowing the threat
• Knowing what to protect
• Determining risks
• Knowing how to protect information.

13
OPSEC PROCESS

• OPSEC planning is accomplished via the OPSEC
  process.
• The OPSEC process consists of 5 distinct actions
  applied in a sequential manner during OPSEC
  planning
• Identification of Critical Information
• Analysis of Threats
• Analysis of Vulnerability
• Assessment of Risk and
• Application of Appropriate OPSEC Measures.

14
OPSEC TERMINOLOGY

• CRITICAL INFORMATION
• Specific facts about friendly intentions,
  capabilities, and activities vitally needed by
  adversaries for them to plan and act effectively
  to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences
  for friendly mission accomplishment.

15
OPSEC TERMINOLOGY

• OPSEC INDICATORS
• Friendly detectable actions and open-source
  information that can be interpreted or pieced
  together by an adversary to derive critical
  information.

16
OPSEC TERMINOLOGY

• OPSEC VULNERABILITY
• A condition in which friendly actions provide
  OPSEC indicators that may be obtained and
  accurately evaluated by an adversary in time to
  provide a basis for effective adversary decision
  making.

17
OPSEC ACTION 1

• Identification of critical information
• What will our adversary want to know about our
  intentions, capabilities, and activities?
• Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)
  - What we protect from exposure to an adversary.

18
OPSEC ACTION 1 (cont)

• Critical information is a subset of EEFI.
• Only the information that is vitally needed by an
  adversary
• Identifying critical information allows us to
  focus efforts on protecting it, instead of trying
  to protect all classified or sensitive
  information.

19
OPSEC ACTION 2

• Analysis of threats
• Researching analyzing intelligence information,
  counterintelligence, reports, and open source
  information to identify who the likely
  adversaries are to the planned operation.

20
OPSEC ACTION 2, cont.

• Through this analysis, we seek answers to the
  following questions
• Who is the adversary?
• What are the adversarys goals?
• What is the adversarys strategy for opposing the
  planned operation?
• What critical information does the adversary
  already know about the operation
• What are the adversarys intelligence collection
  capabilities?

21
OPSEC ACTION 3

• Analysis of vulnerability
• Friendly actions/activities provide OPSEC
  indicators to an adversary that may be obtained
  and accurately evaluated in time to provide a
  basis for effective decision- making and action
  against us.

22
OPSEC ACTION 3, cont.

• Questions when analyzing vulnerability
• What indicators (friendly actions and open source
  information) of critical information not known to
  the adversary will be created by the friendly
  activities in preparation for the operation?
• What indicators can the adversary actually
  collect?
• What indicators will the adversary be able to use
  to the disadvantage of friendly forces?

23
OPSEC ACTION 4

• Assessment of risk
• Two components
• Analyze OPSEC vulnerabilities identified in the
  previous action and consider OPSEC measures to
  erase or counter each vulnerability
• Select specific OPSEC measures for execution
  based on a risk assessment.

24
OPSEC ACTION 4, cont.

• Assessment of risk
• These OPSEC measures reduce the adversarys
  capability to collect indicators and/or analyze
  our actions.

25
OPSEC ACTION 4, cont.

• OPSEC measures can be used to
• Prevent the adversary from detecting an
  indicator.
• Provide an alternative analysis of an indicator.
• Attack the adversarys collection system.

26
OPSEC ACTION 4, cont.

• OPSEC measures include
• Cover
• Concealment
• Camouflage
• Deception
• Intentional deviations from normal patterns
• Direct strikes against the adversarys
  intelligence system

27
OPSEC ACTION 4, cont.

• Goal of OPSEC measures
• Highest possible protection with the least impact
  on operational effectiveness.

28
OPSEC ACTION 4, cont.

• Risk assessment
• Requires comparing the estimated cost of
  implementing particular OPSEC measures to the
  potentially harmful effects on mission
  accomplishment resulting from an adversarys
  exploitation of an OPSEC vulnerability.
• In the end, can the adversary do much damage if
  we dont implement an OPSEC measure?

29
OPSEC ACTION 4, cont.

• Costs of implementing OPSEC measures
• Resources (funding/time/personnel)
• Interference with normal operations.
• Do costs outweigh the harmful effect?

30
OPSEC ACTION 4, cont.

• Typical questions for analysis
• What is the risk to our operational effectiveness
  if we implement?
• What is the risk to mission success if we dont
  implement an OPSEC measure?
• What is the risk to mission success if an OPSEC
  measure fails to be effective?

31
OPSEC ACTION 4, cont.

• The interaction of OPSEC measures must be
  analyzed.
• Certain OPSEC measures may actually create
  indicators of critical information.
• Example Camouflaging of previously unprotected
  facilities could be an indicator of preparations
  for military actions.

32
OPSEC ACTION 4, cont.

• Selection of measures must be coordinated with
  other command and control components to ensure
  actions do not compromise security.
• Conversely, deception and PsyOp plans may require
  that OPSEC measures not be applied to certain
  indicators in order to project a specific message
  to the adversary.

33
OPSEC ACTION 5

• Application of appropriate OPSEC measures
• The command implements the OPSEC measures
  selected in Assessment of Risk.
• The reaction of adversaries to OPSEC measures is
  monitored to determine effectiveness and to
  provide feedback.
• Feedback is used to adjust OPSEC measures and for
  future OPSEC planning.

34
OPSEC THE PUBLIC

• The military is held accountable for their OPSEC
  actions.
• OPSEC is not an excuse to deny the public access
  to non-critical information.

35
Review Questions Summary
36
FORCE PROTECTION
37
1983 BEIRUT BARRACKS BOMBING
38
1983 BEIRUT BARRACKS BOMBING, cont.
39
MILITARY MEMBERS ARE TARGETS
40
THREAT FACTORS

• THREAT GROUPS IN THE AREA
• POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE
• VICTIM NATIONALITIES

41
THREAT FACTORS

• PRESENT LEVEL OF ACTIVITY
• LEVEL OF SOPHISTICATION
• METHODS OF OPERATION

42
THREAT FACTORS

• LEVEL OF POPULAR SUPPORT
• COMMON TACTICS

43
GENERAL AVOIDANCE MEASURES

• AVOID TERRORIST TARGETS
• ASSOCIATION
• OPPORTUNITY
• LARGE, VULNERABLE GROUPS
• NAME
• APPEARANCE OF IMPORTANCE

44
THREAT LEVELS
45
THREAT LEVELS
HIGH
SIGNIFICANT
MODERATE
LOW
46
FORCE PROTECTION CONDITIONS (FPCONs)
47
FPCON NORMAL

• ROUTINE SECURITY MEASURES
• COMMANDERS DESIGN APPROPRIATE SECURITY MEASURES
  FOR THE LOCAL SITUATION

48
FPCON ALPHA

• GENERAL THREAT OF POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTIVITY
• NATURE EXTENT OF THREAT IS UNPREDICTABLE
• LIMIT ACCESS
• RANDOM CHECKS INCREASED

49
FPCON BRAVO

• INCREASED OR MORE PREDICTABLE THREAT
• INCREASED ID CHECK
• INCREASED INSPECTIONS
• FACILITIES
• DELIVERIES/PACKAGES
• BARRIERS EMPLACED
• TRAFFIC RESTRICTIONS

50
FPCON CHARLIE

• TERRORIST INCIDENT HAS OCCURRED OR IS LIKELY TO
  OCCUR
• CONTINUE FPCON BRAVO MEASURES
• FURTHER RESTRICTIONS
• EXTRA SECURITY DUTIES
• ACTIVITIES RESTRICTED

51
FPCON DELTA

• TERRORIST INCIDENT HAS OCCURRED OR IS LIKELY TO
  OCCUR
• MISSION ACTIVITIES DELAYED OR CANCELLED
• NONESSENTIAL ACTIVITIES AND MOVEMENTS ARE
  SUSPENDED
• RESOURCES ARE FOCUSED ON DEFENSE
• FPCON DELTA IS RARE

52
Review Questions Summary