New PARADIGM presentation

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EVOLVING MODERN PEACE OPERATIONS
Col (Ret) Peter Leentjes Center of Excellence
in Disaster Management and Humanitarian
Assistance
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PEACE OPERATIONS

• Examine a Model
• Establish the Environment
• Discuss Evolution in the 90s
• Principles and Policies
• Challenges and Options

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The Complex Emergency Model

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Definition
A complex emergency is a humanitarian crisis in
a country, region or society where there is a
dramatic disruption in the political, economic
and social situation, resulting from internal or
external conflict or natural disaster, seriously
disrupting the populations capacity to survive
and the national authorities capacity to
respond, and which requires a consolidated
multi-sectoral international response IASC of
the United Nations
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Modern Complex Emergencies
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Disaster Response
Humanitarian Assistance
Peace Operations
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Disaster Response
Humanitarian Assistance
Peace Operations
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Civil - Military Coordination
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PEACEKEEPING

• Pragmatic Solution - No Legal Basis
• For 40 years peacekeeping was
• Based on resolution of interstate conflict
• Conducted post an agreement
• Separated Forces or Monitored Agreements
• Classic or Traditional Peacekeeping

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FEATURES OF CLASSIC PEACEKEEPING

• Interstate Conflict
• Governments Functioning and in Control
• Government Infrastructure intact
• Military and Police Structures operating
• Judicial Systems in place
• International Rules operable
• Minimum Contact with Population
• Minimum Involvement with Civilian Agencies

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EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING CHALLENGES

• Traditional peacekeeping
• Implementation of Complex Agreements and
  Settlements
• Preventive Deployment
• Observation of a Non-UN Peacekeeping Force
• Co-deployment with Regional Peacekeeping Forces
• Provision of Humanitarian Aid
• Peace Enforcement

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FEATURES OF MODERN PEACEKEEPING

• Intra-state Conflict
• Governments ineffective or not in control
• Factional Political Groupings Leadership
• State Infrastructure broken down
• Judicial Police Breakdown
• Military factions Warlords
• Weapons proliferation
• There are no Rules
• Intermingled with Populations
• Full Range of Civilian Agencies / NGOs

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NEW YORK TIMES

• Rethinking and retrenchment are in order ...
  There should be a shift back towards more limited
  objectives like policing cease-fires. UN
  peacekeeping does what it can do very well. It
  makes no sense to continue eroding its
  credibility by asking it to do what it cannot.

New York Times - 1996
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Traditional peacekeeping operations of the
kind deployed during the Cold War are unlikely to
be repeated. Peacekeeping today requires not
only re-thinking the means but also the methods
of implementing mandates set out by the Security
Council. Secretary-General
Kofi Annan 1998
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CHAPTER VI VERSUS CHAPTER VII
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CHAPTER VI

• Peaceful settlement of disputes
• The Council provides assistance at the request of
  the parties
• Council has authority to investigate
• Investigation is not normally military until
  accord is arranged then military assess role a
  peace operation could play
• A PKO under Chapter VI is part of the peaceful
  resolution of the dispute
• PKO assists in consolidating the peace and
  building confidence
• Forces are lightly armed for self defense

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CHAPTER VI

• As a result there are conditions to a Chapter VI
  operation
• Consent of the parties is required
• A cease-fire needs to be effective
• A comprehensive agreement should be signed
• Parties assist the deployment of the force
• Parties sign a SOFA (this is very important to
  establish the status of the forces there is no
  other legal basis under Chapter VI)
• Self-defense ROE are developed

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CHAPTER VIIThe Decision to Use Enforcement
Power

• Conflict is ongoing
• High risk that conflict may start again
• Parties are not in agreement
• Rogue elements are not included (increased risk
  to UN forces force protection)
• Risk of external intervention
• Presence of other national forces in the area
• Risky internal situation violence / human
  rights abuses / banditry / weapons
• Self defense insufficient to protect deployed
  forces
• A legal basis to protect deployed forces is
  needed (SOFA cannot be agreed)

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CHAPTER VIIThe Use of Force

• Chapter VII
• does not tell you to use force actively
• is not combat operation
• Provides the full range of options including up
  to and including enforcement powers
• Declaration that the conflict represents a threat
  to international peace and security
• Non use of force options ie sanctions
• Use of Armed force if necessary and as a last
  resort
• Establishes the legal context for intervention
  and the use of force

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CHAPTER VI / VII CHECKLIST
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
PKO assists in consolidating the peace
PKO enforces the will of the SC

• Parties request assistance
• Commit to peaceful resolution
• Political will of the parties
• Consent to the operation
• Effective cease-fire
• Comprehensive agreement
• Parties assist the deployment
• Signature of SOFA

• Conflict is ongoing
• Risk of renewed conflict high
• Parties not in agreement
• Risky internal situation
• Rogue elements not included
• Risk of external intervention
• Presence of foreign forces
• Self defense judged insufficient
• Legal basis for intervention needed
• SOFA

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PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Chapter VII
Chapter VI
Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression
Pacific Settlement of Disputes
Chapter VIII Regional Arrangements
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PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Peace Restoration
Collective Enforcement
Co - Deployment
Economic Assistance
Demining
Civil Police Operations
Gross Violation of Human Rights
Human Rights Monitoring
Regional Enforcement
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations
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PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Peace Restoration
Collective Enforcement
Co - Deployment
Economic Assistance
Demining
Civil Police Operations
Gross Violation of Human Rights
Human Rights Monitoring
Regional Enforcement
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations
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1990 ISSUES

• Wider Range of Tasks
• Change in the Composition and Needs of Missions
• Only the Traditional Model of Peacekeeping
  Available

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SECURITY COUNCILATTEMPTS TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS
IN THE 90s

• A wider application of the peacekeeping model
• Development of hybrid mandates

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PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Peace Restoration
Collective Enforcement
Co - Deployment
Economic Assistance
Demining
Civil Police Operations
Gross Violation of Human Rights
Human Rights Monitoring
Regional Enforcement
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations
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PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Peace Restoration
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Collective Enforcement
Co - Deployment
Economic Assistance
Demining
Gross Violation of Human Rights
Civil Police Operations
Human Rights Monitoring
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Regional Enforcement
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations
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PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Peace Restoration
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Collective Enforcement
Economic Assistance
Demining
Gross Violation of Human Rights
Civil Police Operations
Human Rights Monitoring
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Regional Enforcement
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations
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Chapter VII Tools

• Comprehensive Mandate
• Clear Military Tasks
• Robust Force Structures (Equipped and Trained)
• Effective Command and Control Structure
• Authority to Use Force Appropriately
• Robust Rules of Engagement
• Legal Basis for Intervention

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WHAT CAN THE UN DO?

• Classic Peacekeeping
• Chapter VI Reinforced with Chapter VII
  elements
• Any Operation with Sustained Combat Operations
  this requires a coalition of the willing / lead
  nation / multi national force

WHAT CAN THE UN NOT DO?
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CHAPTER VII - ENFORCEMENTOPERATIONAL PROBLEMS

• UN has no Combat Operations Capability
• Logistics
• no combat logistics system
• contractor based support
• Authority over National Forces
• authority uncertain
• inadequate command control stucture
• nations reaction to forces under threat
• Different Cultures
• military cultures
• leadership managerial backgrounds
• training standards

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OPTIONS FOR UN MANDATES

• The UN may authorize a region / coalition to
  conduct the mission
• To a regional organization
• A coalition of the willing (MNF)
• A framework / lead nation in a coalition
• To a Nation capable of executing the mission
• The UN may decide to mange the mission
• Form a UN multi-national force
• Designate a framework / lead nation concept

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WHY AUTHORIZE

• The operation has a high risk of combat
  operations taking place
• UN missions take a long time to deploy and
  deployment time is critical
• Support for funding cannot be generated
• A region or coalition offers forces

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UN MANDATED OPERATIONS

• COALITION OF THE WILLING / MNF
• UN mandate authorizes the mission
• Lead nation generates the forces
• Lead Nation appoints Force commander
• Participating Nations pay all costs
• Lead Nation coordinates provides day to day
  political direction
• Lead Nation coordinates provides ROE
• UN FORCE
• UN sponsored mission
• UN generates the forces
• UN appoints Force Commander
• Mission paid by assessed contributions
• Political direction by UN (through DPKO)
• UN ROE

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TYPICAL COALITION / MNF MANDATE
PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Peace Restoration
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Collective Enforcement
Economic Assistance
Demining
Gross Violation of Human Rights
Civil Police Operations
Human Rights Monitoring
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Regional Enforcement
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations
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TYPICAL UN PKO FORCE MANDATE
PEACE CONFLICT WAR
PEACEKEEPING
ENFORCEMENT
Separation of Forces
Humanitarian Aid
Truce Supervision
Peace Restoration
Preventive Deployment
Disarmament
Collective Enforcement
Economic Assistance
Demining
Gross Violation of Human Rights
Civil Police Operations
Human Rights Monitoring
Supervision of Elections
Protection
Regional Enforcement
Restore Civil Institutions
Safe Areas
Transition Assistance
Ecological Disaster
Multi-dimensional - Failed State Operations
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CHANGING PRECEPTS

• Revision of principles
• Sovereignty
• Consent

• Impartial status

• Broader range of tasks

• Time constraints

• Limitations on
• Resources
• Political effort
• Military sacrifice

• Humanitarian Basis
• for Intervention

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CONSENTWho Gives Consent?

• International Bodies
• UN Security Council
• UN General Assembly
• TCNs
• Third Parties
• Parties to the Conflict
• Military Organizations
• Military Factions
• Local Commanders
• Warlords

Provides Legitimacy
Strategic Level Environment
Operational Tactical Level Environment
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NO MILITARY SOLUTION

• End state can only be political, economic and
  social in nature

• Expensive tool

• Military can
• temporize
• maintain situation
• reduce levels of violence
• induce compliance

• Blunt instrument of political power

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(No Transcript)
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OPERATIONAL PHASES
MILITARY
CRISIS
STABILISATION
CIVILIAN
5 to 10 years?
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REQUIREMENTS FOR A SUCCESSFUL PEACE OPERATION

• Legitimacy
• Consent -at key levels
• Legal Basis
• Credibility
• Credible Force
• Achievable Mandate and Military Plan
• Operating Environment
• Signed Agreement
• End State with achievable goals
• Integration of Effort with other Components

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SUMMARY OF CHANGES

• Chapter VII Operations will be the norm
• Multi-dimensional, Multi-national Operations
• Focus on Integrated Political, Economic and
  Social Solutions
• Integration of Tasks under One Mandate
• Full Range of Civilian Intervention
• New Coordination Mechanism
• Broader Range of Military Tasks
• Complementary Roles for Components