PERF: Chapter 5

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PERF Chapter 5

• Differential Police Response Evaluation

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Introduction

• Differential police response DPR
• Designed to maintain balance between too much and
  too little police allocation
• Too much waste of resources
• Too little not adequately serving public
  interests

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Implementation

• Involves systematically differentiating between
  calls for service and varying degrees of response
  based on priority system
• Who responds?
• In what form?
• How fast?

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1970s

• In 1970s police response
• Respond to every call for service
• As fast as possible
• Increased demands on police services, coupled
  with declining resources () meant more efficient
  police response required
• Better use of resources to respond quickly to
  actual emergency situations not each and every
  call

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1980s

• DPR emerged
• Became attempt at more sophisticated policing
• 2 possible police responses
• Delay officer sent to scene a few minutes or
  maybe a few hours after initial call
• Relief civilian responder might go to scene
  instead of sworn officer (insurance purposes)

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Context of DPR

• DPR emerged as police reformers and researchers
  began to acknowledge the reactive style of US
  police
• 1960s most police-citizen interaction was in
  form of calls for service
• Police and citizens only meet when something bad
  occurs
• Negative relationship

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Police - Community Relations

• In Black community the police viewed as existing
  only to arrest and cause problems for people
• Conversely, police also viewed as not responding
  adequately to Black needs
• Even victims were suspicious of police
• DPR might help change this

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Reactive Model Evaluation

• Researchers began to evaluate DPR
• Benefits far over rated
• Studies showed rapidity of police response not
  necessarily affecting apprehension rate
• Once the police are called, crime has already
  been committed, perpetrator is long gone

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Reactive Model Citizen Satisfaction

• Studies on DPR also found citizen satisfaction
  didnt hinge on rapidity of response alone
• Citizens more concerned with their own
  expectations
• If citizens desires met by police (arrest,
  report, etc.) then that increased level of
  satisfaction

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Late 1970s

• In effort to increase efficiency and citizen
  satisfaction
• Police referred callers to non-police agencies
  when appropriate
• ASPCA for animal calls, fire, ambulance
• This referring callers was prior to any actual
  administrative guidance more of an informal
  experiment

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Reformers

• Research on incident driven policing spurred
  reformers to encourage new innovations in police
  responses
• Rapidity shown not to matter so much
• This was antithesis to traditional notion of what
  made good policing
• Researchers urged more centralized police efforts
  more rational form of police response

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DPR Development

• 1980s, 2 nationwide surveys
• These surveys showed police agencies using
  variety of devices to regulate demands for
  service
• Call screening, response prioritization
• BUT, no agency used full range of response
  alternatives

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PERF

• DPR model
• 1. Incident classification system based not on
  legal categories but on needs of police in
  deciding how to respond
• 2. Time between occurrence of incident and
  reporting to police
• 3. Wide range of response alternatives

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Evaluation

• First systematic evaluation conducted in
  Wilmington Delaware
• Follow up to Split Force Experiment
• Division of patrol into 2 sections
• 1. A basic patrol responsible for responding to
  calls for service
• 2. Structured patrol force responsible for
  preventive patrol

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Split Force

• Call intake was reorganized
• More emphasis placed on call screening
• Pre-test post-test design
• No control group
• Results showed increase in crime BUT, rate
  increase was within limits of other similar
  cities
• Citizens satisfaction not affected (still high)

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DPR Field Test

• 1980s, NIJ, DPR Field Test
• Wanted comprehensive, rigorous evaluation
• 3 sites Garden Grove, CA Greensboro, NC
  Toledo, OH
• Each site attempted to reduce resources committed
  to non-emergency calls without loss of citizen
  satisfaction

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DPR Field Test Results

• Each site developed new call classification
  system, revised call intake, conducted intensive
  training and pre-testing
• Each DPR site evaluated by a team
• Each site experienced decrease in number of
  non-emergency calls for service handled by
  immediate dispatch officers

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DPR Results Continued

• At all sites non-mobile alternative responses
  accounted for 15-20 of demands for police
  service
• Up to 66 of calls met demands for alternative
  responses
• Most frequently used alternative response unit
  was telephone report (75)
• Officers left with time better spent with
  emergencies

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Aftermath

• No systematic nationwide data available but DPR
  continues to grow
• Found that citizen satisfaction with police
  services not sacrificed in DPR
• Many questions remain
• Quality of information differences between
  alternative responses compared to officer
  responses

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More Questions

• Do cold case reports take via telephone produce
  less useful information than officers responding
  in person?
• Possible to train officers to be better
  information gatherers in routine incidents?
• Long term vs. short term resolution of problems
  citizens ask police to solve
• Error rate in using alternative responses?

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Program Objectives Unintended Effects

• Objective 1 Promote greater efficiency in use
  of police resources
• Objective 2 Promote service effectiveness
• Objective 3 Promote equity of service
  distribution
• Objective 4 Increase management's control of
  patrol resource allocation