Simulation Needs in Support of

1

• Simulation Needs in Support of
• Net Ready Key Performance Parameter (NR-KPP)
• Test and Evaluation (TE)
• Fall SIW Workshop
• ATEC Mr. Bob Aaron
• MITRE Mr. Pete Christensen

MITRE Cleared for Public Release
2
Outline

• Information Operations and Information Assurance
• JV 2020 Full Spectrum Dominance and Information
  Superiority
• IO /IA Interdependencies
• NR-KPP Four Pillars
• J-6 Interoperability, Supportability and Test
  Certification
• The Problem
• Constructive Architecture Verification Simulation
  
• Live, Virtual and Constructive C4I Test Beds
• System-of-System Analysis Methodologies
• Conclusions and Recommendations

3
What are Information Operations and Information
Assurance?

• Information Operations
• Actions taken to affect adversary information and
  information systems while defending ones own
  information and information systems.
• Information Assurance
• Information operations that protect and defend
  information and information systems by ensuring
  their availability, integrity, authentication,
  confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This
  includes providing for restoration of information
  systems by incorporating protection, detection,
  and reaction capabilities.
• Who cares?
• Joint Vision 2020 is driving a transformation in
  warfare based in part upon information and
  information technology
• IO and IA play a key roles!

4
What is Your Perspective on Information
Operations and Information Assurance??

• Changing perspectives on Information Operations
• Jan 1991 Desert Storm Reliance on record
  messages forces CENTCOM Area of Operations to
  minimize traffic
• Message traffic still clogs the airwaves,
  delivery spotty
• Today OIF E-mail is critical to combat
  operations and
• Internet Relay Chat is termed a Killer
  Application
• Changing perspectives on Information Assurance
• 1988 First widespread virus hits the Internet
• Morris Worm
• Today Robert Morris is a highly paid security
  consultant and
• Chinese are waging Cyber warfare with Trojans on
  DOD networks

5
JV 2020 Addresses Full Spectrum Dominance and
Information Superiority

• JV 2020 published June 2000
• JV 2010 operational concepts still central to the
  vision!
• Moved emphasis beyond technology
• Introduces idea of decision superiority based
  upon Information
• The Joint Force must achieve Full Spectrum
  Dominance
• US forces conduct operations in all domains
  space, sea, land, air, and information!
• JV 2020 intends to achieve Information
  Superiority through Joint Command and Control
• Which will provide increased information at all
  levels
• JV 2020 requires Full Spectrum Dominance in the
  Information Domain
• The network is not supporting infrastructure it
  is a weapons system and must be fought as such!
• Without effective IO and IA
• Full Spectrum Dominance is not achievable!

6
IO /IA Interdependencies

• Interoperability (Net Ready KPP) establishes the
  operational, systems and technical context for IO
  
• IA is achieved via Security Certification and
  Accreditation (CA) of technical safeguards which
  enables users to protect, detect, restore and
  recover and sustain Continuity of (Information )
  Operations
• E3 impacts information availability and
  integrity of IO and must be appropriately managed
  
• Spectrum Management ensures bandwidth, integrity
  and availability of IO

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What is NR-KPP?

• A top-down key performance parameter, which
  replaced the previous Interoperability KPP
• Intent of the KPP is to
• Define the Warfighters primary information
  capability needs, and
• Provide authoritative, measurable and testable
  characteristics, and/or performance metrics
  required for the timely, accurate, and complete
  exchange and use of information
• NR-KPP is applicable to
• ACAT IT and NSS Systems/Programs
• Non-ACAT IT and NSS Systems/Programs
• Fielded IT and NSS Systems/Programs

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Policies Driving NR-KPP
Acquisition Process
DODAF
Revised DoD 5000 series
DoD Architecture Framework
DOD IT Security Certification Accreditation
Process
DoDI 5200.40
Information Assurance
CJCSI 3170.01D
Joint Capabilities Integration Development
System
CJCSI 6212.01C
IT and NSS Interoperability and Supportability
9
NR-KPP Four Pillars
What does this mean to the Evaluator/Tester?
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Pillar 1 Integrated Architecture

• Includes representation of operational and
  systems interfaces and technical standards
• Provides the following information about the
  integrated system
• Definition and description of what the integrated
  system looks like and what other systems it will
  exchange data with
• Operational environment it will perform in
• Traceability to mission threads, functions and
  operational concepts
• Operational impacts of the system based on its
  demonstrated capabilities and limitations.

Common foundation for capability-related,
outcome-based IT and NSS Interoperability and
Supportability processes.
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Pillar 2 Key Interface Profiles (KIPs)

• Moving away from
• N-squared approach to interoperability
• Direct interfaces between systems
• Point-to-point information exchanges
• Moving toward
• Net-Centricity
• 1-to-N approach
• Configuration Management at the DoD level of
  selected Key Interfaces
• Interfaces whose change would have significant
  impact on the GIG

Source Jesse Pirocchi
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Pillar 3 Net Centric Operations Warfare
Reference Model (NCOW RM)

• Describes the Net-Centric Information
  Environment.
• Represents the objective end state of the Global
  Information Grid (GIG).
• Includes the defined Integrated Architectures,
  which represent a service-oriented,
  inter-networked, information infrastructure in
  which users request and receive services that
  enable operational capabilities in
• Military Ops
• DoD Business Operations
• Department-wide Enterprise Management Operations
• Purpose of NCOW RM is to provide
• Common Language
• Understanding
• Guidance
• Unity of Effort

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Pillar 4 Information Assurance
The system must fully comply with DODD 8500.1 and
DODI 8500.2 and with Phase 1 Definition of
DITSCAP (DODI 5200.40). Provide required IA
documentation to JS/J6I

• Data/Information
• Availability
• Integrity
• Authentication
• Confidentiality
• Non-repudiation

DODI 8500.2 Mission Assurance Category and
Confidentiality Level dictate minimum required
control measures.
CLASSIFICATION (U)
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J-6 Interoperability and Supportability
Certification
Net-Ready Key Performance Parameter Products
LISI Profile
Document
Supporting Architecture Products
KIP Compliance
IA Compliance
NCOW RM
T V 1
0 V 6 C
S V 1
S V 2
S V 3
S V 4
S V 5
S V 6
0 V 5
0 V 4
0 V 3
0 V 2
0 V 1
A V 1
X
X
ICD
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X BASIC
X
X
X
X
X
CDD
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X COMPLETE
X
X
X
X
X
CPD
2
2
2
2
1
X
CRD
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3 COMPLETE
3
3
3
3
3
3
ISP
Notes X Required 1 Old CRD Updates 2 New
CRDs 3 ACAT, Non-ACAT and fielded systems.
NR-KPP products produced for the CDD and CPD will
be used in the ISP.
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JITC View of theSystem Life Cycle Certification
Process
DT / Standards Conformance, OTE, and
Interoperability Certification
Capability Certification
Operational Verification
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The Problem
Information Assurance (DoD 8500.1)
IA DT
IA Cap MAC/CL
DITSCAP I/II
DITSCAP III
IATO
IA OT
ATO
CA Testing
Better Integration of NR-KPP and IA into TE
Process
ATEC TE Process (ATEC 73-1)
MS-B SER
Rock Drill
SEP/ EDP
TEMP
SEP
TEMP
SER
A
B
C
IOC
FOC
System Development Demonstration
Concept Refinement
Technology Development
Production Deployment
Operations Support
System Acquisition (DoD 5000)
FRP Decision Review
Design Readiness Review
Concept Decision
Pre-Systems Acquisition
Systems Acquisition
Sustainment
JCIDS (CJCSI 3170)
ICD
CDD
CPD
J-6 IS Cert
J-6 System Validation
J-6 IS Cert
IT NSS IS (CJCSI 6212) NR-KPP
ISP
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Need 1) Constructive Architecture Verification
Simulation

• The NR-KPP is based in large part on DoDAF
  compliant architecture products.
• These architectures can be very complex, with a
  significant number of interrelated views that can
  be difficult to interpret.
• Services are developing Operational Enterprise
  Architectures such as the Navys Force Network
  (FORCEnet) and Systems Architectures such as the
  Marine Corps Integrated Architecture Products
  (MCIAP).
• Commercial AF products are available
• Popkin Systems Architect , System Architect
  and Enterprise Architect
• Unless the architecture products are built using
  a common tool they are difficult and potentially
  impossible to verify.
• Inconsistent, inaccurate or incomplete
  architectures will be identified and affect the
  system evaluation.

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Need 1) Constructive Architecture Verification
Simulation

• The services need a readily accessible, easy to
  use architecture verification simulation that can
  be employed by all of the services and JITC to
  accomplish the following
• Identify required capabilities
• Validate DT and OT Test data requirements
• Identify operational and system threads required
  to support test
• Confirm NCOW-RM Compliance
• Confirm Core Architecture Data Model Compliance
• Develop Mission Scenario to support data
  requirements
• A readily accessible product verification tool
  can also be used for configuration management and
  to support documentation development requirements
  such as design requirements and test plans.

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Need 2) Live, Virtual and Constructive C4I Test
Beds

• All of the services, JITC and Joint Forces
  Command are developing C4I Test beds that support
  testing.
• United States Marine Corps (USMC) has developed a
  Systems Integration Facility (SIF) at the Marine
  Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (MCTSSA)
• Verified validated and accredited to support DT
  and OT
• Replicates the MAGTF C4I systems normally
  encountered at the Command Element Headquarters,
  Ground Combat Element, Air Combat Element and
  Combat Service Support Element
• Test beds although connected, tend to be limited
  in scope and are not exploited by Program
  Managers and testers to the full potential
• Given that the architectural products developed
  are robust and verified and that the data
  requirements for testing are well understood,
  linked C4I test beds would allow for a
  significant amount of test data to be generated
  continuously along the systems acquisition life
  cycle
• Potential to reduce risk, create efficiency in
  testing and better meet the warfighters
  requirements are clear.

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Need 2) Live, Virtual and Constructive C4I Test
Beds

• Linked C4I test beds could be used to accomplish
  the following
• Capabilities Development
• Conformance testing
• Key Interface Profile Testing
• Network Centric Enterprise Service (NCES) Testing
• Tactical NCES Testing
• Test Data Interoperability
• Simulate operational echelons to support test
• Stimulate system threads required to support test
• Mission Scenario Generation
• Linking these test beds and networks together
  could provide the distributed environment to
  support C4I testing and some evaluation needs
• The virtual environment and supporting models
  must be developed under the DODAF to avoid
  duplicative development and ensure
  interoperability

21
Some Test Beds for Potential Distributed Test
Environment
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MSDE Concept of Operations
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Need 3) System-of-System Analysis Methodologies

• The acquisition community is experienced with
  platform analysis methodologies for developing,
  testing and evaluating systems
• As the DoD moves from platform focused
  acquisition to capabilities focused acquisition
  and network oriented system development,
  experience with analysis methodology for
  system-of-systems needs to be as common as
  platform analysis methodologies
• This is most relevant as it relates to
  requirements development process. For instance,
  the complex relationship of the ilities
  (reliability, survivability, human factors,
  transportability, etc.) as they relate to system
  performance and system-of-system capabilities is
  seldom specified, much less analyzed from a
  system-of-system perspective. Developers need to
  understand what they are developing.
• In order guide simulation based acquisition,
  these methodologies must be developed and
  incorporated into the simulation process so real
  time analysis can occur.

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Analysis Methodology Then and
Now
Now approach centers on central
network One-to-network paradigm Multiple
interdependent architectural views
Then Based upon One to One Information Exchanges
described in A simple architectural view (OV-3)
OV-3, Operational Information Exchange Matrix
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Conclusions and Recommendations

• The expectation is that the NR-KPP and the
  technical underpinnings will continue to evolve
  and mature
• The TE Community must develop tools to support
  automated, real-time analysis of operational and
  systems architectures that will be instantiated
  to support all phases of testing
• MS in support of Net Ready will also need to
  mature to meet the needs of not just the TE
  community but also the user organizations that
  establish the NR capabilities and the operations
  and training communities
• In support of Net Centric testing, the MS
  Community must step forward to evolve existing
  standards to more effectively interface the
  Servicess C4I Test Beds and integrate the LVC
  simulations residing therein

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Conclusions and Recommendations

• In support of the Brigade/Unit of Action (UA)
  sized
• Future Combat Systems (FCS) IOT in 2016 as well
  as the FCS Limited User Tests (LUT) in 2012 and
  2014
• ATEC has defined a requirement for a Joint Task
  Force (JTF) warp-around synthetic environment
  consisting of 150,000 entities
• The TE Community will also need tools to support
  automated, real-time analysis of operational and
  systems architectures that will be instantiated
  to support all phases of testing.