PSCI 355 U'S' Foreign Policy: Patterns and Processes

1
PSCI 355U.S. Foreign Policy Patterns and
Processes

• Melanson American Foreign Policy After Vietnam,
  James Jimmy Carter

2
Carter AdministrationBiography and Context

• Melanson notes that Jimmy Carters narrow
  victory over Gerald Ford in 1976 represented one
  of the most unlikely journeys in the recent
  history of American national politics (p. 89).
  Carter became the first president in a generation
  to lack congressional experience. He was the
  governor of a small southern state, Georgia.
  Melanson discusses his meteoric rise principally
  as a function of the Georgia Mafia and its
  deftness in understanding the rules created by
  election reforms in Watergates wake.
• Significance of the Iowa caucuses something
  every candidate since has similarly attempted to
  exploit.
• Significance of Carters exploitation of the new
  cynicism (supplanting CW consensus) about a range
  of institutions in American life, particularly
  the Federal government.
• Significance of Hamilton Jordans memorandum (c.
  November 1972) perhaps the strongest feeling in
  this country today is the general distrust of
  government and politicians at all levels. The
  desire and thirst for strong moral leadership in
  this nation was not satisfied with the election
  of Richard Nixon. It is my contention that this
  desire will grow in four more years of the Nixon
  administration (p. 90).

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Carter AdministrationBiography and Context

• As Watergate became public and the revelations
  that the CIA had committed a spectacular array of
  misdeeds and misconduct, Jordans memorandum
  proved true. A Washington outsider was just the
  balm Americans needed.
• Melanson notes that an efficient, manager style
  trumped the previous expansionist themes of the
  Great Society.
• The times were such that Carters lack of
  foreign-policy experience actually qualified him
  to become president due to Americans distrust of
  the post WWII leader class. (Gallup data
  demonstrated the publics expectation from 1948
  to 1972 that foreign policy be an important
  qualifier for the presidency. In fall 1976
  Gallup data showed that inflation far surpassed
  foreign policy by 78 to 6.)
• Thanks to Carters Georgia team and Zbigniew
  Brzezinskis eye for a potential candidate onto
  which the latter could hitch his star, Carter
  became part of the diminution of East-West focus
  and its replacement by the North-South focus.
  The term was interdependence or complex
  interdependence, and it stood for recognizing
  what was already happening. Namely, Third World
  proxies had tired of being used by the
  superpowers and with OPECs rise found a new
  political voice that demanded attention from the
  super and great powers.

4
Carter Administration

• Carter Biography a humble man from humble means
  who had risen to the top in the U.S. navy as a
  nuclear engineer. Following his service and his
  life-long roots to farming in Georgia he began a
  second career in public life rising to the
  Governorship in Georgia. Zbigniew Brzezinski, a
  Democratic version of Henry Kissinger was became
  Carters foreign-policy Czar. Brzezinski
  provided Carter entrée to the Trilateral
  Commission and Ivy-league academics. Thats how
  Carter became associated with a progressive
  agenda of complex interdependence and the
  rejection of unilateralismpracticed by both
  superpowersand/or effects of tight bipolarity.

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Carter AdministrationDomestic Priorities

• Melanson writes that for Jimmy Carter, the
  fundamental task of his administration was the
  restoration of faith of the American people in
  themselves, their government, and their
  governments foreign activities (p. 90).
  Carters solution was straightforward Theres
  a simple and effective way for public officials
  to regain the public trustbe trustworthy! (p.
  91).

6
Carter Administration Governance

• In sum, Melanson writes, President Carter
  believed he had inherited a nation disillusioned
  and divided by a decade of war, scandal, and
  economic dislocation. He thought himself
  uniquely well qualified to restore public trust
  and unity by personifying the best features of
  the national character, by conducting an open and
  honest dialogue with the American people, by
  framing comprehensive policies that embodied the
  public good, and by offering a foreign policy
  reflective of enduring American values (p. 95)
  In other words, he believed USFP emanated from
  democratic governance!

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Carter AdministrationGovernance The Peoples
President

• The fundamental task for Carter was the
  restoration of the faith of the American people
  in themselves, their government, and their
  governments foreign activities (p.90 my
  emphasis).
• Carter settled on a four-part strategy to achieve
  this goal.
• 1. Personify the essential decency of the
  American people

8
Carter AdministrationThe Peoples President

• Stay close to the people by establishing a direct
  relationship with them
• As did Nixon Carter perceived the corruption and
  excesses of the New Deal-Great Society
  constituencies
• Articulating a foreign policy that reflected the
  character, values, and experience of the American
  people. Clearly a link between domestic
  priorities, governance and USFP.

9
Carter AdministrationA Complex New World

• Carter, perhaps naively, offered a series of
  substantive and stylistic criticisms at the
  Nixon-Kissinger amoral Realpolitik. 1) the
  latters foreign policy was the amoral function
  of back-room deals, sleeping with the devil,
  manipulation of power, and unprincipled
  compromises. Importantly, it was undemocratic
  neither the American public nor the Congress was
  consulted that smacked of being downright
  un-American.

10
Carter Administration A Complex New World

• The US had paid excessive attention to superpower
  politics as the expense of the global south while
  simultaneously signing arms accords that set
  uneven and excessively large numbers of ICBMs
• In so doing the U.S. (and Soviets) had been
  insensitive to the legitimate desires of peoples
  in the developing world who yearned for the same
  things Americans hadpolitically, economically,
  socially, etc.

11
Carter Administration A Complex New World

• Human rights had been sacrificed in the bargain
  and to gain allegiance of some of the worlds
  most unsavory dictators (tyrants)
• Too little attention paid to the global threat of
  nuclear proliferationindeed former policies had
  hastened proliferation
• Americas democratic allies (Japan and Europe)
  had been ignored in Americas superpower approach

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Carter Administration A Complex New World
Change or Continuity?

• Melanson spends several pages citing what he
  believes is evidence of substantive changes.
  Read them and decide whether for you said
  changes constitute real, substantive,
  demonstrable change in U.S. foreign policy, or
  rhetoric, campaigns slogans, personality
  differences and so forth, that eventually run up
  against them same impediments to change a Cold
  War Consensus (elites and pubic) mandating that
  the U.S. must be involved internationally (no
  more isolationism), it must stop the tyrannical
  expansionism of Soviet Communism, to do so it
  required a significant U.S. military, diplomatic,
  and economic presence globally, the U.S. (whether
  by providence or serendipity) must lead, the U.S.
  must maintain and lead a complex alliance system
  (NATO, SEATO, CENTO, . . .) and ultimately, the
  U.S. must rely on nuclear deterrence to ensure
  the peace!

13
Carter Administration IMelansons two-part
Carter Administration

• Melanson begins by noting that contemporary
  critiques often criticized Carter for having no
  Grand Design. (Part of this was due to the open
  feuding within the administration surely not
  something unique to Carter. Melanson say that
  Carter did have a well-crafter though
  poorly-articulated Grand Design.

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Carter Administration IMelansons two-part
Carter Administration

• Grand Design a vision that entailed a stable,
  just world cemented by a mixed but increasingly
  cooperative superpower relationship steadied by
  a serious, sustained North-South dialogue that
  would help accommodate the demands of the
  developing nations for greater participation in
  international politics and economic decisions
  and anchored by a relatively less powerful but
  more mature United States that would
  constructively exploit these massive global
  changes through good example and a willingness to
  cooperate with all nations (p. 97 my emphasis).

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Carter Administration IMelansons two-part
Carter Administration

• Strategic Objectives 1) cooperate with the
  industrial democracies to develop-maintain a
  liberal-trade mechanism, coordinating effective
  trade policy vis-à-vis the USSR 2) to create a
  new complex of relationships with emerging
  economic powers (Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia
  . . .) widening Americas traditional reliance on
  the Atlantic partners 3) accommodate the
  increasingly important North-South relationships
  in order to reduce Soviet influence 4) move
  U.S. strategic limitations talks (SALT) into
  reduction talks (START) to stabilize world

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Carter Administration IMelansons two-part
Carter Administration

• Strategic Objectives 5) normalize
  Sino-American relations to stabilize superpower
  relations 6) obtain comprehensive Middle East
  peace to preclude further radicalization of the
  Arab world, thereby depriving the USSR of a
  justification to expand there 7) foster a
  peaceful transformation of South Africas
  apartheid system 8) reduce conventional and
  especially nuclear proliferation 9) enhance
  global sensitivity to human rights 10) maintain
  a defense posture capable of deterring the USSR,
  including transformation and modernization of the
  U.S. nuclear arsenal reflecting a changing world.

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Carter Administration IMelansons two-part
Carter Administration

• Strategic Objectives In addition to Zbigs
  10-point list, Carter Secretary of State, Cyrus
  Vance had his own list of five. 1) de-emphasize
  US-USSR relations as the centerpiece of US
  foreign policy 2) a new sensitivity, awareness,
  and priority to the vast complex of North-South
  and emerging issues such as proliferation 3)
  without unduly interfering with others
  sovereignty the U.S. should emphasize human
  rights 4) stylistically, the new
  administrations foreign policy should be marked
  by gravitas not flurries of activities (i.e.,
  crisis management alone) 5) procedurally make
  Congress and pubic a part of U.S. foreign-policy
  decisionmaking.

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Carter Administration IMelansons two-part
Carter Administration

• Tactics Since Carters foreign policy was
  grounded in a firm rejection of Nixon-Kissinger
  crisis management, it could hardly emulate the
  tactical approach of them (102). Instead,
  Carter emphasized openness, honesty, and
  participation in spite of the dizzying complexity
  of its foreign policy agenda sic (Ibid.).
  Carter repeatedly attempted to win public support
  for his foreign policy by contrasting its
  democratic character with the deceptive tactics
  used by both his Democrat and Republican
  predecessors.

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Carter Administration IMelansons two-part
Carter Administration

• Tactics (continued) Carter blamed, in contrast
  to previous presidents, the Cold War Consensus
  for leading to the Viet Nam War. Discuss Leslie
  Gelbs seminal book, The Irony of Vietnam The
  System Worked.

20
Carter Administration IIThe Arc of Crisis

• Melanson argues that Carter I lasted through most
  of 1978, the second year of his presidency. Then
  a series of crises occurred that caused Carter to
  change. Soviet expansion in Africa with Cuban
  troops began Carters concerns. In 1979 in
  particular, the Shah of Iran was overthrown by
  Ayatollah Khomeini resulting in another oil
  shock. The Sandinistas overthrew Somoza in
  Nicaraguaa thug to be sure, but Americas thug.
  The so-called Soviet brigade was discovered in
  Cuba. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan to protect
  a client socialist governmentsomething that
  never fitted with Afghan culture. A cascade of
  domestic results, inflation, unemployment,
  dramatically . . .

21
Carter Administration IIThe Arc of Crisis

• increased interest rates, etc. resulted.
  Finally, the never very happy foreign-policy team
  Carter had emplaced began to eat their own
  (intense rivalry between Zbigniew and Vance).
  Carter ultimately sided with his gregarious NSC
  advisor. Thus began what Melanson calls Carter
  II.

22
Carter Administration IIArc of Crisis

• Grand Design in response to 1978-79, Carters
  new grand design incorporated a more realistic
  timeline for meeting the Souths aspirations and
  being able to treat the Soviets has a mature
  superpower. In fact, it was a relapse to
  Nixon-Kissinger and their Realpolitik with
  carrots and sticks in other words, managing
  superpower relations (East-West centric).
  Complex interdependence now contemplated that
  states progress not always linear the
  aspirations in the Third World would be met in
  fits and starts!

23
Carter Administration IIArc of Crisis

• Strategic Objectives a shift back toward
  Containment trumps all else Soviet aggression
  could not be ignored as America fostered
  democracy and development elsewhere indeed,
  Soviet expansionism forestalled democracy and
  development in the South since the Soviets
  emplaced client regimes there hostile to
  democratic progress and development. Thus, the
  US would have to punish the Soviets adventurism
  their use of Cubans to accomplish same. America
  would have to prioritize the Rapid Deployment
  Force to protect Americas vital interests
  Persian Gulf.

24
Carter Administration IIArc of Crisis

• Tactics the once verboten secret channel
  diplomacy returned in earnest! The Soviets did
  not understand nuance therefore hardball was the
  favored tactic after 1978-79. The State
  Departments futurists were now frozen out of
  decisionmaking and, as had Nixon, the primacy of
  the National Security Council supplanted State.

25
Carter Administration IIHow Did Carter
Legitimate USFP?

• Recall that he initially assumed the presidency
  by alienating all Washington leaders in both
  parties. This was not because he was stupid, as
  would be easy to assume. Rather, Carter believed
  the blind devotion to presidential supremacy in
  foreign policy had led to catastrophe. (Viet Nam
  War, for instance both parties to blame.)

26
Carter Administration IIHow Did Carter
Legitimate USFP?

• In the latter parts of Carters tenure he began
  singing the praises of Americas Cold War
  Consensus (continuity that had kept America
  strong through tumultuous times). Jimmy now too
  used positive declaratory history of Americas
  early Cold War years.
• Finally Carter began to use the sort of political
  theater that Nixon-Kissinger had made famous.

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Carter Administration IIHow Did Carter
Legitimate USFP?

• In the latter parts of Carters tenure he began
  singing the praises of Americas Cold War
  Consensus (continuity that had kept America
  strong through tumultuous times). Jimmy now too
  used positive declaratory history of Americas
  early Cold War years. p. 110

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Carter Success in ConsensusPolicy Consensus

• Policy Consensus recall it involves the
  foreign-policy elites-establishment as well as
  the attentive public. Melanson argues that
  Carters volte-face from managing complex
  interdependence to neo-Containment suggests no.
  He please neither world and reestablished no new
  consensus. His initial Grand Design was years
  too early. He also failed to define strategy
  (instead just Zbigniew-Vance lists). No!

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Carter Success in ConsensusPolicy Consensus

• Cultural Consensus Carter attempted to instill
  the ethic of sacrifice (again ahead of his time)
  but failed witness Reagans campaign making fun
  of sacrifice and Americans applauding. Instead,
  it became seen as setting Americas limits,
  something no president can endure.
• Procedural

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Carter Success in ConsensusPolicy Consensus

• 3. Procedural Melanson says Carter perhaps
  worked harder than most yet only accomplished
  marginal success here. (It is unsurprising
  Carter alienated Republicanto be expectedas
  well as his own party, the Democrats. Given the
  Watergate fiasco, one could plausibly argue some
  early success but his presidency ended with him
  hiding in the Rose Garden. He did temporarily
  limit SIG lock on policy but short lived.

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The End

• Questions if Carter ultimately forsook his own
  optimistic views of the world, management style
  etc. and, instead, returned to Nixon-Kissinger
  Realpolitik, the Cold War Consensus, and so on,
  is it meaningful to say there was a Carter I and
  II? Or is it simply the case that Carter, as do
  virtually all presidents, butted up against the
  national-security bureaucracy, societal and role
  expectations . . . And therefore represents
  continuity?
• Ronald Reagan is Next
• A two-term Republican that Democrats and even
  Republicans repeatedly underestimated.