Context and the Indexical I

1
Context and the Indexical I

• Varol Akman
• Bilkent University, Ankara
• NASSLLI02 Cognition Day
• June 30, 2002

2
Context

• A major topic to which Perry devotes considerable
  space in his books and papers
• A crucial feature of language and action
• Perrys Indexicals and Demonstratives was a
  major influence
• The indexical I the clearest (?) case of an
  indexical

3
From the textbooks

• Kamp It has been suggested that all a semantic
  theory needs to say about I is that the word
  refers in all cases in which it is used (except
  those where it appears inside direct quotation)
  to the person who uses it and that is all there
  is to it.
• In a way this is clearly right.

4
From the textbooks (cont.)

• Lyons The first-person pronoun, I in English,
  refers (normally) to the actual speaker i.e. to
  whoever is speaking at that moment.
• Gamut I live in Amsterdam is true in a given
  context just in case the individual who is
  speaking in that context does in fact live in
  Amsterdam.

5
Token-reflexivity

• Higginbotham For Reichenbach a token ? of an
  indexical or demonstrative expression had for its
  reference an object f(?), where f was determined
  by the meaning of the expression of which ? was a
  token.
• A simple example is that of tokens of the
  first-person singular pronoun I.

6
Token-reflexivity (cont.)

• I have got through my root canal.
• The semantics of that whole utterance delivers
  the meaning that the speaker of ?, namely me, has
  got through his root canal, where ? is the very
  token of the first-person pronoun that I uttered,
  the function the speaker of playing the role of f.

7
Semantic relativism

• Ungers well-known distinction between
  Contextualism vs. Invariantism
• That field is flat.
• Contextualist According to contextually relevant
  standards, that field is sufficiently close to
  being such that nothing could ever be flatter
  than it is.
• Invariantist That field is perfectly flat.

8
What is said

• For the contextualist, what is said is not
  itself a simple thing. (There is an implicit
  reference to a contextual standard.)
• For the invariantist, what is said is more
  directly related to the sounds.
• Could I be analyzed in the light of this
  important distinction? (This will be our guiding
  heuristics.)

9
Narrow vs. wide

• Does designation depend on narrow or wide
  context?
• NC facts about the utterance (a, t, l)
• WC narrow facts stuff that is relevant
• Perry The clearest case of an indexical that
  relies only on the narrow context is I, whose
  designation depends on the agent and nothing else.

10
Automatic vs. intentional

• Is designation automatic (given meaning and
  public contextual facts) or does it depend in
  part on the intentions of the speaker?
• An automatic designation uses no intentions
  (yesterday vs. that field).
• Aside What about the famous Beatles song?

11
Types of indexicals
12
Pure indexicals

• Perry The indexicals I, now, and here
  are often given an honored place as pure or
  essential indexicals.
• In the preceding table, this honored place is
  represented by the cell labeled narrow and
  automatic. However, it is not clear that now
  and here deserve this status, hence the
  asterisks.

13
Privileged status OK?

• Does I really deserve this privileged status?
• I think not...
• Caveat It turns out that many people asked this
  question and came up with interesting answers.

14
A scenario

• Suppose youre a famous movie actor. Being a
  close friend I come to your place and we put one
  of your classic movies on the video player and
  start to watch. You are playing a private eye in
  the movie. There comes a hair-raising scene where
  the psycho killer is in a hotel room and you are
  about to nail him down.

15
A scenario (cont.)

• But I dont know that yet. There is knock on door
  of the room occupied by the killer. The psycho,
  gun in hand, approaches the door to open it. Im
  very excited.
• I gasp, Gee, whos knocking at the door?
• You answer I am.

16
A scenario (cont.)

• Prior to my asking the question Whos knocking
  at the door? you left the room temporarily to
  unleash the dog in the garden. You then wanted to
  join me but suddenly found the garden entrance
  locked by the wind.
• Meanwhile, I am watching the film, unaware of
  your absence.

17
A scenario (cont.)

• After all, you were not watching the movie as
  closely as I was. Having watched it a dozen times
  you knew the whole thing like the back of your
  hand and, therefore, were attending to minor
  household chores.
• The crucial moment arrives, and the window is
  open and youre able to hear me gasping. You go
  I am, once again.

18
The DBA

• It is time to remember the DBA which is a
  time-honored principle underlying almost all of
  our practical reasoning. Heres a terse
  formulation due to Kim
• The desire-belief action principle
• If a person desires that p and believes that by
  doing A she can secure p, she will do A.

19
Defeasibility

• Defeasibility of mental-behavioral entailments
• If there is a plausible entailment of behavior B
  by mental states M1,, Mn, there is always a
  further mental state Mn1 such that M1,...,
  Mn, Mn1 together plausibly entail B (viz.
  failure to produce behavior B).

20
Defeasibility (cont.)

• Defeasibility of contextual interpretations
• If there is a plausible interpretation K of a
  certain expression in the presence of contextual
  features C1,..., Cn, there is a further
  contextual feature Cn1 such that C1,...,
  Cn, Cn1 together plausibly entail a
  different interpretation (e.g., K).

21
Other scenarios

• Porter Jack
• The silver screen
• The phony inclusive
• Delegation
• N.B. The well-known answering machine cases
  omitted (cf. Predelli).

• Rebound
• The appropriate answer
• The bat people
• Im about to be attacked

22
Porter Jack

• On a trip to Edinburgh, we ended up with a hotel
  room with a faulty window. Everyday we would
  return to our room late in the evening to find
  the window opened by the room service and
  immediately call the reception to request someone
  to close it.

23
Porter Jack (cont.)

• In the numerous occasions we have done so, we
  were invariably sent a jovial Scotsman who would
  knock on our door and announce Hello, Im your
  porter Jack.
• We loved this routine. So now when one of us
  comes home late, we always answer the query Who
  is it? by saying Hello, Im your porter Jack.

24
Porter Jack (cont.)

• Bianchi Imagines a scenario where an intruder
  first watches a man (say, the husband) leave a
  house and then rings the doorbell. A woman (say,
  the wife) answers
• Whos that?
• Honey, its me. (Or Im back.) said by the
  intruder in a voice imitating the husbands
• This intruder abuses Porter Jack!

25
The silver screen

• Consider the following exchange on late night TV
• Jay (to actor John Doe who is sporting a
  pigtail) I hear that in your upcoming movie you
  have a big surprise for your fans. Tell us about
  it!
• John (smiling) I am bald. He is playing Yul
  Brynner.

26
The phony inclusive

• Predelli Mentions an example due to Zwicky that
  the latter has dubbed the phony inclusive use of
  we.
• When a waitress says How are we today? to a
  customer, we have here a display of intention to
  contain only the addressee, and not herself.

27
The phony inclusive (cont.)

• How am I doing today?, addressed by Yeltsin (in
  bed due to a heart ailment) to a double of his
  whos just going out to meet with the North
  Korean delegation.
• This is more like Are you ready to fool them?
  Proof If there are several doubles, he might as
  well ask How are we doing today?

28
The phony inclusive (cont.)

• Kaplan I is a pure indexical something for
  which no associated demonstration is required,
  and any demonstration supplied is either for
  emphasis or is irrelevant (his italics).
• I have in mind such cases as pointing at oneself
  while saying I (emphasis) or pointing at
  someone else while saying I (irrelevance or
  madness or what?).

29
The phony inclusive (cont.)

• Now imagine a beat-up Yeltsin visiting the Madame
  Tussauds London and admiring his shining
  waxwork.
• Im the most vigorous man here. (Pointing is
  not even necessary.)

30
Word meaning

• In all fairness, it must be pointed out that
  Kaplan clarifies his position very carefully.
• His semantical theory is a theory of word
  meaning, not speakers meaning.
• This theory is based on linguistic rules known,
  explicitly or implicitly, by all competent users
  of the language.

31
Word meaning (cont.)

• The infamous semantics-pragmatics distinction?
• Stalnaker Logicians/philosophers of a
  formalistic frame of mind ignore pragmatic
  problems or push them into semantics.
• Study the actual circumstances that make
  understanding possible by all competent users of
  the language.

32
Delegation

• Bezuidenhout Suppose the heads of departments of
  a large organization are at a meeting, and are
  trying to decide which departments should take on
  which of the tasks on the chairpersons to do
  list.
• The chair reads out the first item on the list
  and one of the heads of department says Ill do
  that.

33
Delegation (cont.)

• Here it is understood that she is undertaking to
  do the task in her role as head of department.
  Presumably she will not carry out the task
  herself, but will delegate the work to one of her
  minions.
• On the other hand, if she sees a child struggling
  to lift a heavy object

34
Rebound

• My wife always instructs our daughter to finish
  her homework as soon as our daughter returns from
  school. I used to try to lessen her agony by
  (seriously) telling my wife Oh, you are such a
  despot!
• One day our daughter arrived and started to
  complain that she had a load of assignments for
  the next day.

35
Rebound (cont.)

• My wife was not yet back from work. But the
  school year was coming to a close and I was
  somewhat worried about a poor grade. So I led my
  daughter to her study.
• When my wife arrived, my daughter ran to her and
  lamented about my ruthlessness. My wife hugged
  her and retorted Oh, Im such a despot!

36
The appropriate answer

• Stalnaker If OLeary says Are you going to the
  party? and you answer, Yes, Im going, this
  is appropriate because the proposition you affirm
  is the one expressed in his question.
• On the simpler analysis, there is nothing to be
  the common content except a truth-value.

37
The appropriate answer (cont.)

• The propositions are expressed from different
  points of reference, and according to the simpler
  analysis, they are different propositions. A
  truth-value, of course, is not enough to be the
  common content.
• If he asks Are you going to the party? it
  would be inappropriate for you to answer, Yes,
  snow is white.

38
The appropriate answer (cont.)

• Now assume that OLeary and you are watching a
  film in which you are starring as a private eye
  (basically the same set-up as the earlier
  scenario).
• As it happens, you have been invited to a party
  both in the film and in real life. Then confusion
  follows.

39
The appropriate answer (cont.)

• Maybe the party is not a very definite
  description and must be made more specific, e.g.
  the party that the senator is giving. Padding
  the scenario with enough boring details, such
  (more informative) descriptions can still be
  defeated.
• The source of the problem is not the description
  but rather the indexical I.

40
The bat people

• Partee et al. The statement I am Robin is
  taken to be informative in two different ways
• 1st, when it gives a hearer a new way of rigidly
  referring to the speaker when he is not present.
• 2nd, when the hearer already has information
  about someone called Robin, but is not acquainted
  with him from his own experience.

41
The bat people (cont.)

• In the 1st case, the information stabilizes the
  character, in the 2nd case it hooks up a stable
  content to the external context of use.
• You are attending to a costume party as Robin,
  the young partner of Batman. You see Batgirl in
  the bar. You approach her and say Hi, Im
  Robin. May I buy you a drink?

42
Im about to be attacked

• Inspired by Howard Wettstein
• There has been an unsuccessful attack on
  Yeltsins life. The Russian secret service
  recorded the whole incident and hes watching it.
• Theres a certain moment he utters Im about to
  be attacked!

43
Im about to be attacked (cont.)

• There has been a successful attack on Yeltsins
  life.
• Fortunately, he was not in the car his double
  was!
• Watching his ill-fated double stop breathing,
  Yeltsin utters Now Im dead.
• ?Aside Death is not an event of life. Death is
  not lived through. LW

44
Strawson

• Wittgenstein is reported to have held that the
  use of I was utterly different in the case of
  I have a toothache from its use in the case of
  Ive got a bad tooth.
• LW thought that there were two uses of I, and
  that in one of them I was replaceable by this
  body.

45
Strawson (cont.)

• But LW also said that in the other use (the use
  exemplified by I have a toothache as opposed to
  I have a bad tooth), the I does not denote a
  possessor.
• LW referred with apparent approval to
  Lichtenbergs dictum that, instead of saying I
  think, we ought to say There is a thought.
  From Individuals

46
Geach

• Let us begin by reminding ourselves how I is
  used in ordinary life with psychological verbs.
  If PTG says I see a spider or I feel sick,
  people will ordinarily think that the speaker who
  says this, PTG, sees a spider or feels sick. The
  word I, spoken by PTG, serves to draw peoples
  attention to PTG and if it is not at once clear
  who is speaking, there is a genuine question Who
  said that? or Who is I?

47
Geach (cont.)

• Now consider Descartes saying Im getting into
  an awful muddle but who then is this I who is
  getting into a muddle? When Im getting into a
  muddle is a soliloquy, I certainly does not
  serve to direct Descartess attention to
  Descartes, or to show that it is Descartes, none
  other, who is getting into a muddle.
• We are not to argue, though, that since I does
  not refer to the man René Descartes it has some
  other, more intangible, thing to refer to.

48
Geach (cont.)

• Rather, in this context the word I is idle,
  superfluous it is used only because RD is
  habituated to the use of I in expressing his
  thoughts and feelings to other people.
• RD could quite well have expressed himself
  without using the first-person pronoun at all he
  could have said This is really a dreadful
  muddle!, where this would refer to back to his
  previous meditations.

49
Geach (cont.)

• What is going to count as an answer to the
  question What is this I? or Who then am I?
• Clear questions in certain circumstances e.g.
  if RD had lost his memory and wanted to know who
  he was (Who am I? You are RD), or if he knew
  that somebody had said Im in a muddle but not
  that it was himself (Who is this I? who said
  he was in a muddle? You did).
• From Mental Acts

50
Conclusion

• I believe that neither contextualism nor
  invariantism is a definite semantic position one
  would like to adopt.
• Once again, consider
• That field1 is flat2

51
Conclusion (Cont.)

• It is probably wiser to take a more invariantist
  stance regarding the 1st part and a more
  contextualist stance regarding the 2nd.
• This is also what we should do for I, depending
  on its contexts of occurrence. So, does I
  really deserve the honored place in the given
  table of Perry?

52
Credits

• Similar views were presented by among others
  Wettstein, Récanati, Predelli, Bianchi, and
  Corazza.
• Bianchi The reference of I is not a direct
  function of the context of utterance (the
  semantic context) its context of interpretation
  is fixed by recognising the speakers
  intentions.

53
Credits (cont.)

• Bianchi The rule associated with I seems to be
• An occurrence of I refers to the individual the
  producer of the utterance indicates as
  responsible for the utterance in the given
  context.
• We thus introduce an intentional factor in the
  very rule associated with I.

54
Credits (cont.)

• Corazza et al. The context or setting of a
  linguistic interchange plays a crucial role.
  The agent of I, like the relevant contextual
  parameters (e.g. t and l), is best understood to
  be the conventionally determined agent, and the
  agent determined by convention may well be
  distinct from either the utterer or the producer
  of the token of I.