Title: CRISP Requirements Discussion draft-ietf-crisp-requirements-02.txt
1CRISP Requirements Discussiondraft-ietf-crisp-req
uirements-02.txt
- Andrew Newton
- 55th IETF, November 19, 2002
- Atlanta, GA
27 Security Considerations
- Option 1 append
- This document contains requirements for the
distribution of queries against a mesh of
participants and the possible generation and
distribution of index hints both of which could
be used in the development of DDoS attacks
against the entire mesh or used to create data
mining efforts by Direct Marketers (see Section
2.4.7)
37 Security Considerations
- Option 2 append
- This document contains requirements for the
distribution of queries among a mesh of
participating service providers. Protocols
proposed to meet these requirements must be able
to protect against the use of that distribution
system as a vector of DDoS attacks or
unauthorized data mining.
43.2.4 Domain Information Lookup
- Option 1 append
- The domain information set MUST be able to
express and represent arbitrary information and
extensions on a individual registry/registrar
basis such as license agreements, authorized use
policies or extended status notifications and/or
marketing/for sale notices.
53.2.4 Domain Information Lookup
- Option 2 append
- The domain information set MUST be able to
express arbitrary textual information for
extensions on a individual service instance
basis. Examples of such information are license
agreements, authorized use policies, extended
status notifications, marketing/for sale notices,
and URI references to other sources.
63.2.9 DNS Label Referencing
- The service MUST use DNS2 to determine the
authoritative source of information about domain
names. It is the intention of this requirement
that a client be able to determine via DNS and
query the servers or set of servers of the domain
registry delegating the domain name, the domain
registrar responsible for registering the domain
name if one is applicable, and the domain
registrant of the domain name. The service SHOULD
provide procedures or mechanisms to allow this
determination if it cannot be done using DNS.
This allows the service to operate when an
operator chooses not to take advantage of DNS
label referencing and during periods of transient
or erroneous state of DNS configuration.
73.2.9 DNS Label Referencing
- Nobody disagrees with it (once it has been
explained to them) - Nobody likes how it is worded
- Nobody has suggested alternate text
82.4.7 Abusive Users
- Option 1 add
- Abusive users use the directory services of
Internet registries as a source of email
addresses, postal addresses and telephone
numbers. Often a direct marketer as associated
with junk postal mail, spam/uce and dinner time
telephone solicitations.
92.4.7 Abusive Users
- Option 2 add
- The directory services of Internet registries
are often the target of practices by abusive
users. Using information obtained from Internet
registries, abusive users undertake certain
activities that are counter to the acceptable use
of the information as intended by a registry,
registrar, or registrant. Many times, these
practices violate law in the jurisdiction of the
user, registry, registrar, or registrant. One
example is the use of Internet registry
information for the use of sending unsolicited
commercial email.
103.2.6 Escrow Support
- The service MUST provide a means to escrow data
of domain registrars to an escrow entity using a
common schema. This escrow capability SHOULD be
"off-line" and "out-of-band" from the normal
operations of the service. - Option 1
- Since 3.2.6 is out of band and out of scope
lets remove it. If an entity wishes to use the
schemas defined by crisp for escrow thats fine
but escrow has requirements unto its self that
may be in opposition to the requirements under
discussion.
113.2.6 Escrow Support
- Option 2 rewording
- The CRISP schema MAY be usable in other
protocols or support systems. As an example, a
registrar MAY choose to use the CRISP schema as
part of an off-line, out-of-band escrow service
in order to enhance the ability to reuse the
escrowed data in systems with disparate backed
servers"
123.2.6 Serialization Support
- Option 3 rewording
- The schemas used by the service SHOULD be
capable of off-line serialization. Off-line
serialization allows for implementation
independent operations such as backup and
recovery, load-balancing, etc. This MAY also
make possible data escrow capabilities and other
usages, however such usages are out of the scope
of this document.
133.1.8 Query of Access Levels
- If a query cannot yield a valid response due
to insufficient permissions, the service MUST
provide the client with an error response
indicating this condition. The service SHOULD
NOT provide a mechanism allowing a client to
determine if a query will be denied before the
query is submitted.
143.1.8 Query of Access Levels
- Option 1 reword
- If a query cannot yield a valid response due
to insufficient permissions, the service MUST
provide the client with an error response
indicating this condition. The service MUST
provide a mechanism allowing a client to
determine if a query will be denied before the
query is submitted according to the appropriate
policies of the operator.
153.1.4 Level of Access
- The service MUST allow the classification of
data as being either privileged or
non-privileged, for the purpose of restricting
access to privileged data. Note that this
requirement makes no assumption or prescription
as to what data (social or operational) might be
considered privileged, but merely provides the
ability to make the classification as necessary. - The service MUST be capable of serving both
privileged and non-privileged data. - The service MUST be capable of authenticating
privileged entities and ensuring that only those
entities have access to both privileged and
non-privileged data. - The service MUST be capable of providing
access to non-privileged data without requiring
authentication of any type (i.e. anonymous
access).
163.1.4 Level of Access
- Option 1 rework
- Implies only two levels of access. Rework so
that there may be multiple levels of access. - No text yet proposed.
173.1.9 Authentication Distribution
- The service MUST NOT require any Internet
registries to participate in any particular
distributed authentication system. The service
SHOULD allow the participation by an Internet
registry in distributed authentication by many
centralized authorities.
183.1.9 Authentication Distribution
- Option 1 reword
- The service MUST NOT require any Internet
registries to participate in specific
authentication systems. The service SHOULD allow
the participation by an Internet registry in
federated, distributed authentication system of
their choosing.
193.2.3 Domain Registrant Search
- The service MUST provide the capability of
searching for registrants by exact name match or
a reasonable name subset. This search must comply
with Result Set Limits. - The service MUST provide a mechanism to
distribute this search across all applicable
domain registries and registrars. The service
SHOULD have a means to narrow the scope of a
search to a specific TLD. The service MUST be
able to specify to the client an empty result set
should the search yield no results.
203.2.3 Domain Registrant Search
- Option 1 reword
- The service MUST provide a lightweight
mechanism to distribute this search across
applicable domain registries and registrars. The
service SHOULD have a means to narrow the scope
of a search to a specific TLD. The service MUST
provide a mechanism to restrict the scope of a
search to specific TLDs, registrars and
registries. The service SHOULD provide a
mechanism for operators to opt-out of this search
or series of searches. The service SHOULD NOT
distribute queries to operators that have opted
out. The service MUST be able to specify to the
client an empty result set should the search
yield no results.
213.2.3 Domain Registrant Search
- Option 2 modify option 1
- Rework language concerning opt-out so as not
to imply an inter-service provider protocol.
Such a protocol would be out of scope.
223.2.3 Domain Registrant Search
- Option 3 rework
- Remove second paragraph of 3.2.3.
- Add a base requirement (in the 3.1 section)
specifying that the following for referrals that
they 1) must not be generic, 2) must have
context and 3) possess the ability to pass back
CRISP-opaque tokens.
233.2.5 Nameserver Search
- The service MAY allow the ability to list all
domains hosted by a specific nameserver given the
fully-qualified host name or IP address, if
applicable, of the nameserver. The service MAY
provide a mechanism to distribute this search
across all applicable domain registries and
registrars.
243.2.5 Nameserver Search
- Option 1 remove
- 10,000 100,000 host names on one nameserver
make it useless - Allows one to recreate a non-published zone
file when lots of data mining is allowed. - Option 2 modify
- Make reference to Section 3.1.1 Data Mining.
253.2.11 Query Settlements
- Option 1 add
- Any search mechanism used to distribute a
query to all applicable domain registries and
registrars for Nameserver Search (3.2.5) or
Domain Registrant Search (3.2.3) MUST contain
provisions for cost recovery through a
settlements mechanism.
263.2.11 Query Settlements
- Option 2
- Out Of Scope
- Option 3
- Specify the use of CRISP-transparent
transaction tokens. Uses of the tokens for
financial settlement or other uses are out of
scope.