Charles Tupper Goes to Charlottetown Moore, Chapter 2

1
Charles Tupper Goes to CharlottetownMoore,
Chapter 2

• An Atlantic Union?
• Arthur Gordons vision
• Tuppers response
• Why does Tupper insist on bringing his opponents
  to Charlottetown?
• Why does Cartier refuse to invite his Rouge
  opponents?

2
Charles Tupper Goes to CharlottetownMoore,
Chapter 2

• What is Tuppers Reasoning?
• Free union issue from partisanship?
• Not in Tuppers nature
• To protect himself from Gordon?
• Tuppers no shrinking violet
• To ensure broad, popular representation?
• Tuppers no populist
• To spread the blame?

3
Charles Tupper Goes to CharlottetownMoore,
Chapter 2

• The Danger of Constitutional Politics
• Tupper saw, surely, that constitutional
  politics were certain to be divisive,
  unpredictable, and dangerous. Constitutional
  proposals, particularly those focused on new
  colonial unions, provided a leader with few
  obvious favours to dispense and no clear
  ideological cry to hold a party together. (p. 42)

4
Charles Tupper Goes to CharlottetownMoore,
Chapter 2

• The Danger of Constitutional Politics
• Not just using Archibald and McCully as allies
  against the dangerous coercive powers of the
  governors. (p. 40)
• Moores model is about minimizing losses not
  maximizing gains
• It would be better, Tupper understood, to share
  the credit than risk taking the blame.
• ...but is this really a zero-sum situation, and
  if its not, then relying on a logic of
  minimizing losses may lead us astray...

5
Charles Tupper Goes to CharlottetownMoore,
Chapter 2

• Driving a Better Bargain?
• Tupper is a Tory pro-union Can he credibly
  drive a hard bargain with Gordon?
• Archibald and McCully are sceptics
• Confederation is, a new, untried, and more
  than doubtful expediency adapted to the
  exigencies of Canadian necessities. (p. 45)

6
Charles Tupper Goes to CharlottetownMoore,
Chapter 2
Tupper
Gordon
Anti-Union
Pro-Union
The likely bargain w/o Reformers
7
Charles Tupper Goes to CharlottetownMoore,
Chapter 2

• Driving a Better Bargain?
• Tupper can say, I think your plan is great, but
  my Reformer colleagues wont be satisfied.
• Note this is not a voting model Tuppers
  leverage does not increase because hes in a
  median position but because his Reform colleagues
  are sceptical about union.

Tupper
Reformers
Gordon
Anti-Union
Pro-Union
The likely bargain with Reformers
8
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Cartiers Strategy
• Quebec delegation only one not to include
  political opponents.
• Why does Cartier act differently?

9
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Cartiers Les Bleus
• Pivotal bloc in legislative assembly
• Traditional, religious, conservative
• but Cartier appreciates modernization, markets
  dissolution would undermine economic expansion
• and sees the inherent danger of rep-by-pop as
  Upper Canada population exceeds Lower Canadas

10
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Cartiers Strategy
• Federalism an acceptable bargain
• Give in on rep-by-pop, and lose ½ seats in
  Legislative Assembly
• Gain autonomy in local matters (e.g., education)
• Clearly, an independent stand from his coalition
  partner
• John A. Macdonald We should have legislative
  union in fact, in principle, and in practice
  (143)
• Cartier That is not my policy.

11
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Dorion Les Rouges
• Drifted apart from Reformers in Upper Canada
  after the debacle of the Brown-Dorion 2-day
  cabinet
• Less rabidly anti-clerical, but still
  anti-traditional
• Can they afford to sell out on sectional
  equality too?
• What would differentiate them from the Bleus?

12
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• One possible answer to the initial question
  model
• Bargaining in 1 dimension just as with Tupper

Outcome w/o Rouge
Cartier
Macdonald
Anti-Confederation
Pro-Confederation (Legislative Union?)
13
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• One possible answer to the initial question
  model
• Bargaining in 1 dimension just as with Tupper

Outcome w/o Rouge
Outcome w. Rouge
Cartier
Macdonald
Rouge
X
Anti-Confederation
Pro-Confederation (Legislative Union?)
14
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• One possible answer to the initial question
  model
• Bargaining in 1 dimension just as with Tupper
• Is Cartier willing to adopt a united Quebec
  position alongside Rouge?
• What if Cartiers position is actually further
  from Macdonalds than depicted?
• Furthermore, what if this is a voting game, not a
  bargaining game as we have assumed? (The
  delegates to the Quebec conference did vote on
  resolutions.)

Outcome w/o Rouge
Outcome w. Rouge
Rouge
Macdonald
Cartier
X
Anti-Confederation
Pro-Confederation (Legislative Union?)
15
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• One possible answer to the initial question
  model
• Bargaining in 1 dimension just as with Tupper
• Is Cartier willing to adopt a united Quebec
  position alongside Rouge?
• What if Cartiers position is actually further
  from Macdonalds than depicted?
• Furthermore, what if this is a voting game, not a
  bargaining game as we have assumed? (The
  delegates to the Quebec conference did vote on
  resolutions.)

Outcome w/o Rouge
Outcome w. Rouge
Rouge
Macdonald
Cartier
X
Anti-Confederation
Pro-Confederation (Legislative Union?)
16
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• One possible answer to the initial question
  model
• Bargaining in 1 dimension just as with Tupper
• Is Cartier willing to adopt a united Quebec
  position alongside Rouge?
• What if Cartiers position is actually further
  from Macdonalds than depicted?
• Furthermore, what if this is a voting game, not a
  bargaining game as we have assumed? (The
  delegates to the Quebec conference did vote on
  resolutions.)

Outcome w/o Rouge
Outcome w. Rouge
Rouge
Macdonald
X
Anti-Confederation
Pro-Confederation (Legislative Union?)
17
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Another problematic answer
• Parties are shifting positions in a 2-dimensional
  policy space

Church
State
Confederation w. Legislative Union
Union Sectional Equality
18
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Another problematic answer
• Parties are shifting positions in a 2-dimensional
  policy space
• But with just 2 players, a 2-dimensional game can
  always be expressed as a uni-dimensional game,
  and this would predict median-seeking behaviour
• This is either a more complicated model than it
  needs to be or its missing something important

Church
State
Union Sectional Equality
Confederation w. Legislative Union
19
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Lets add a crucial 3rd actor the Catholic
  Church

Church
State
Union Sectional Equality
Confederation w. Legislative Union
20
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Lets add a crucial 3rd actor the Catholic
  Church

Whereas absent Rouge, and Cartier compromises
only with Church a more stable and congenial
outcome
Church
With Rouge, Cartier may have to broker a 3-party
agreement that is both uncongenial and unstable
State
Union Sectional Equality
Confederation w. Legislative Union
21
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Lets add a crucial 3rd actor the Catholic
  Church
• I dont mind this answer providing we assume that
  there are limits to which Rouge can counteract
  Cartiers strategy, e.g., the Rouge cannot
  credibly commit to offering the Church a better
  deal than Cartier can

Whereas absent Rouge, and Cartier compromises
only with Church a more stable and congenial
outcome
Church
State
Union Sectional Equality
Confederation w. Legislative Union
22
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Other models are possible consider this
  extensive form game

Support
Protect Church in Negotiations
Oppose
Cartier may have felt that Rouge would oppose
regardless, i.e., Rouge could not commit credibly
to Confederation
Oppose
Advance State in Negotiations
Support
23
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Other models are possible consider this
  extensive form game

but the Church may have been supportive as long
as Cartier protected Catholic privileges
Support
Protect Church in Negotiations
Oppose
Oppose
Advance State in Negotiations
Support
24
If Brother Andre Went to Parliament HillMoore,
Chapter 5

• Summary Conclusions
• Bargaining and voting are different
• Assumptions
• reasonable
• explicit
• Theres rarely just one right model, but some are
  better than others
• predictive
• offers leverage
• parsimonious (?)
• internally consistent