Open Society Institute

1

• Open Society Institute
• Academic Fellowship Program
• Unholy Alliances How Transnational Crime and
  Terrorism Networks Make Common Cause?
• 29 May, 2008
• Research in progress seminar

Presenter Lyubov Mincheva Associate Professor
of Political Science, Department of Political
Science
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BACKGROUND

• The Unholy Alliances project was initiated in
  2005. It is a joint research initiative carried
  out by the Department of Political Science at the
  University of Sofia (IRIS) and, the Center for
  International Development and Conflict
  Management at the University of Maryland.
  Co-principal investigators are Prof. Lyubov
  Mincheva and Prof. Ted Robert Gurr.
• The project uses quantitative and qualitative
  data. Quantitative data is provided by two
  projects, carried out at the University of
  Maryland, including the Minorities at Risk (MAR)
  and the Minorities at Risk Organizational
  Behavior (MAROB).
• Visit http//www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/
• Case studies are prepared at the University of
  Sofia.

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Why this research question?

• All counter-terrorism is aimed at dealing with
  the armed threat as and when it arrives. The
  emphasis in counter-terrorism is always on the
  arrest or killing of terrorists But this is
  obviously not enough to counter those
  organizations which have managed to cross the
  economic divide and appear to prosper no matter
  what is done to reduce their numbers by
  conventional methods Jail or kill some terrorist
  leaders while leaving their economic base intact
  and the organization will simply change direction
  and grow once again Destroy the economic base
  and the terrorist group will wither and die.
• James Adams. (1986). The Financing of Terror.
• This study is about the political economy of
  militant identity movements / groups.

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Theoretical model CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE AS A
COLLECTIVE ACTION

• We look at organized crime as a profit-driven
  collective behavior, shaped by the interaction of
  market opportunities and constraints and
  performed within fluid criminal networks.
• Constraints
• (complex transnational commodities exchange)
  (interdiction by security forces)
• Opportunities
• Networks
• Mobilization, control of resources
• Criminal enterprise motivation profit
  maximization risk reduction
• Terrorists objectives insurgency funding
  profit making
• Patterns of terrorist involvement in criminal
  enterprise cooperation
• direct involvement
• Trends in development of patterns of terrorist
  involvement in crime enterprise direct
  involvement, rather than alliances of convenience

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HYPOTHESES, CASE STUDIES

• Previous research has tried to develop a
  theoretical framework and test it on cases where
  the two types of global bads crime and
  terrorism - intersect. We proposed three major
  factors conditioning the interaction of the
  political and the criminal. They are these
• 1. The occurrence of armed conflict, which
  provides incentives and opportunities for
  interdependence.
• 2. Market constraints that facilitate or impede
  complex transnational exchange of illegal
  commodities.
• 3. The existence of trans-state identity
  movements - nationalist, ethnic and/ or
  religious, which provide settings conductive to
  collaboration.
• The case studies reviewed included the
  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and
  their financial connections to the coca cartels
  as well as the financing of the Provisional IRA.
• The indebt research completed by this time
  includes three case studies from our native
  region. One examined the activities of the Kosovo
  Liberation Army offspings. The other looked at
  the activities of the Middle Eastern Islamists in
  Bosnia. The third was focused on the activities
  of the Kurdistan Workers Party in Turkey (PKK).

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PATTERNS OF TERRORISM-CRIME CONNECTIONS
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Comparative case studies findings

• Four major findings stand out in view of the
  accomplished comparative case studies research.
  They are these
• Driven by economic and commercial reasons
  related to ongoing violent conflict
  (ethno)national movements are interested in the
  establishment of collaborative relations with
  trans-state terrorist and criminal networks.
  However the rule is that ad hoc collaborations
  are not likely to change the nationalist
  objectives pursued by nationalist movements.
• Successful (ethno)nationalist identity movements
  gradually lose interest in the establishment of
  alliances with criminal networks as sources of
  funding. The rule is that successful political
  militants rather choose to become self-funded.

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Comparative case studies findings cont.

• 3. The ethnonationalist movements per se are not
  responsible for the involvement in criminal
  activities, or for the export of violence across
  border. Rather, the actors of cross-border
  violence and illicit activities are small but
  effective paramilitary units. Depending on
  circumstances they select to pursue either
  political or criminal objectives, or both at one
  time.
• 4. Paramilitary units frequently select to
  operate in sovereignty-free zones along or close
  to border areas. The latter are known as
  criminal enclaves or black spots and they
  indicate that state structures are weak while
  state institutions - corrupt.

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Supporting evidence the Militant Albanians

• The first paramilitary unit of the ethnic
  Albanian separatist movement is said to be the
  Kosovo Liberation Army, which emerged in 1995. It
  was a paramilitary unit which operated as a
  dispersed guerrilla movement.
• The Albanian nationalist movement evolved in
  campaigns of sporadic terrorism since the
  establishment of Kosovo as a protectorate in
  1999. And while most prominent KLA commanders
  shifted to conventional politics, KLA gave birth
  to new paramilitary organizations. Among them are
  the Liberation Army of Preshevo, Bujanovac and
  Medvedja (UCPMB) the National Liberation Army
  (NLA) the Albanian National Army (ANA) the
  National Unification Front (NUF) the Black
  Shaddow.

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Supporting evidence the Militant Albanians
cont2

• The KLAs initial funding is said to have come
  from various sources. The KLA benefited from the
  1997 spring uprising in Albania. Information also
  suggests that al Qaeda provided financial aid and
  organized rival mujahideen from Islamic countries
  in Kosovo.
• However the Albanian militants seem to have
  received major financial support from the Balkan
  wide network of Albanian criminal clans known as
  fares. Analysts argue that those clans were able
  to flourish because of the decay of state power
  in neighboring Albania. They are dispersed in
  Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania, and are involved
  in smuggling of arms and men across boundaries.

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Supporting evidence the Militant Albanians
cont3

• The ethnic Albanian criminal clans have been
  intensely involved in drug trafficking. They
  acquire Afghan-cultivated heroin from Turkish
  (possibly Kurdish) criminal organizations and are
  also involved in cocaine trafficking with some
  South American countries.
• The fares dominate local sales of drugs in
  Central and North Europe, and are highly
  competitive and very aggressive. A Western
  intelligence official in Kosovo observed that
  The rebels in Macedonia, former KLA freedom
  fighters in Kosovo, and extremist Albanians in
  southern Serbia are all part of the network of
  Albanian and Kosovar Albanian families who
  currently control criminal networks even in
  Switzerland, Austria, Germany and elsewhere
  (Free Republic, 02/17/2002).

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Supporting evidence the Militant Albanians
cont4

• Regular access to European markets is
  complemented by regular access to suppliers. A
  recent report by Europol notes that Albanian
  production of marijuana is increasing and that
  the country is increasingly a transshipment site
  for various types of drugs (Europol, 2004 2).
  The proceeds of drug trafficking are partly
  re-invested in weapons commerce aimed at arming
  KLA and its splinter terrorist groups.
• So the Albanian terrorist groups and the mafia
  are bound in a political-criminal syndicate.
  Criminologist Xavier Raufer describes it as
  follows In the Albanian world you have clans
  and in those clans you have a mix of young men
  fighting for the cause of national liberation, .
  belonging to the mafia . It is impossible to
  distinguish between them (Raufer, 10 Sept.
  2004).

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Supporting evidence the Bosnian Muslims

• The case of the Bosnian Muslims is different. The
  Bosnian government has sought financial
  assistance from the Islamic world between 1992
  and 1995 to secure the Bosniaks physical
  survival. Why? One reason was the outbreak of the
  war in Bosnia staged on the Bosnian Muslim
  government on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs and
  Croats following the EC recognition of this
  republic as an independent state. A second reason
  was the arms embargo imposed on Yugoslavia in
  1991. It ensured weapons superiority for the
  Bosnain Serbs, supported by the Serbs of the
  former Yugoslav Army. So the military weakness of
  the Bosnian Muslims would have destined them to
  ethnic cleansing and genocide.
• The major suppliers of weapons and funds were
  Arab relief organizations, private Islamic
  organizations and Middle Eastern arms dealers.
  States too joint the process. Most active were
  Iran, Turkey and Malaysia. Some arms suppliers
  were in East Europe, - Croatia, Poland, East
  Germany and Russia.

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Supporting evidence the Bosnian Muslims2

• The most significant contribution coming from the
  Middle East was not weapons but rather the flow
  of money and human resources. Mujahideen started
  arriving to the country in 1992. They formed the
  El Midzahid battalion. Local Bosnians complained
  that they did more harm than help, because they
  were fighting for Islam, not for Bosnia. Yusuf
  Abderahman, an Al Anbaa journalist says if
  there is a war and we see a Muslim with a problem
  we must fight. Yes, it is jihad.
• However the Bosnian government made it clear that
  Islam is a national not a religious identity and
  objective for the Bosniaks. Bosnian President
  Izetbegovic repeatedly said that Bosnia needed
  arms, not fighters. And Foreign Minister Haris
  Silajdzic repeatedly asked Islamic countries to
  channel their help through the UN Security
  Council.

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Supporting evidence the Bosnian Muslims3

• The mujahideens left Bosnia at the end of the
  war. However their participation in the war had a
  significant long term impact on the development
  of Bosnian society and politics. It led to the
  extension of the transborder Islamic network to
  Bosnia and its possible usage by al Qaeda
  activists. It also led to the fusion of the local
  and global Islamic network.
• The local agents of the Islamic network are the
  Party of Democratic Action as well as the
  Islamic Community. The global actor is the
  transnational Islamic advocacy network. Local
  offices of global Islamic charities allegedly
  maintaining links to terrorists include the al
  Haraman Islamic Foundation the Benevolence
  International Foundation the Human Appeal
  International the International Islamic Relief,
  etc. They have been strictly controlled after
  9/11 and some have been even closed down.

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Supporting evidence the Bosnian Muslims4

• Local radical Islamist networks of followers of
  Wahhabism have been reported around Bihac and
  Maglaj. And global charitable organizations
  operating in Bosnia are suspected to financing
  terrorist activities outside the country.
• Foreign intelligence services have warned that a
  number of individuals of North African and Middle
  Eastern descent known to maintain tight
  connections with al Qaeda are present in Bosnia.
  It is suspected that there might be connections
  between local radical Islamist cells and the
  Algerian terrorist network in Europe, the
  Algerias Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
  which emphasizes out of Algeria terrorist
  operations. The groups has established a Salafist
  cells thoughout Europe and is known to be the
  largest, most cohesive and dangerous terrorist
  organization in the al-Qaeda network.
• NATO soldiers have reportedly discovered a
  terrorist training camp in central Bosnia.
  However this information was not confirmed.

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Supporting evidence the Bosnian Muslims5

• Yossef Bodansky, Director of the Task Force on
  terrorism of the US Congress has alleged that
  there is a terrorist network in Bosnia composed
  of several well trained groups that are directly
  responsible to bin Laden. The cells are said to
  use Bosnia as a training ground and a gateway to
  send militants to west European countries or to
  shelter them on their way to the east.
• So to recapitulate, the Bosnian case illustrates
  how a national liberation movement has given
  birth to a trans-state identity network currently
  conductive to collaboration between the political
  and the criminal.

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Supporting evidence the Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK)

• As with previous groups the PKK too has emerged
  as ideologically driven organization. And, its
  motivation for terrorism-crime connections varied
  over time. Established as a Marxist-Leninist
  organization, the group is at times pragmatically
  driven. It has forged alliences with
  narco-traffickers. And, not least the group is a
  hybrid terrorist and criminal organization
  because its members are directly involved in
  illegal business.
• The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
  Turkish Daily Press argue that the PKK is a clear
  example of the interconnected nature of terrorism
  and transnational crime.

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Supporting evidence the Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK)2

• The political economy of the PKKs revolutionary
  war on Turkey is complex. It includes state
  support on behalf of states such as Syria, Iran
  and Iraq, which provided weapons, sanctuary and
  funding to the PKK. It also includes support
  provided by other terrorist organizations. To be
  mentioned here are the Palestinian Liberation
  Organization the Armenian Secret Army the Red
  Army Faction, the Hawks of Thrace a Greek
  terrorist organization.
• PKK has also established ideologically driven
  economic alliances with the Kurdish diaspora in
  Europe who raised funds for the PKK through
  festivals and shows, as well as from sales of
  publications. It is estimated that the annual
  revenue coming from the Kurdish cultural centers
  approximates 20 million. And another 30
  million comes from donations from Kurdish
  families in Europe.

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Supporting evidence the Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK)3

• The PKK has also established alliances with
  criminal groups for pragmatic reasons. The PKK
  has established relationships with Kurdish and
  Turkish businesses throughout Europe. Small
  companies are one source of terrorist income. PKK
  is said to be taxing such enterprises.
• And, the PKK is also a political-criminal
  syndicate itself. The organization is involved in
  drug trafficking and money laundering of its
  profits. According to the Turkish Ministry of
  Foreign Affairs the PKK is involved in all phases
  of drug trafficking, including production,
  storage, transportation and marketing.

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Supporting evidence the Kurdish Workers Party
(PKK)4

• How much does the PKK earn annually? We assume
  that about 40 million would be a realistic
  estimation of the PKK annual revenue from illegal
  drug trade at the beginning of this decade.
• There is also evidence that the PKK is involved
  in other profitable illegal activities, such as
  arms smuggling, abduction of children and human
  trafficking. The arms smuggling activities of the
  PKK is mostly relevant for the 1990s.
• The groups scope of interest has been
  significantly reduced since the arrest in 1999 of
  Abdullah Ocalan, the PKKs leader. Since then the
  PKK - as suggested by Haut is adopting patterns
  of behavior similar to the Philippine based
  Abu-Sayyaf group. The organization eschews civic
  and cultural activities and concentrates on
  criminal activities to sustain a small but
  threatening military presence.

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Quantitative evidence How common are the
political criminal linkages?

• A survey of the criminal activities of ethnic and
  religious minorities in the expanded Middle East
  region has been done as part of the Minorities at
  Risk Organizational Behavior (MAROB). This study
  has identified 112 political organizations being
  active between 1980 and 2004. See
  www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/
• A total of 29 communally based organizations both
  used violence as a strategy, and operated across
  borders. These are the entities that meet our
  broad criteria of international militant
  (terrorist) networks. Of these 29 organizations,
  9 also engaged in criminal activities.

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Table 5. List of organizations who have engaged
in transnational political violence and criminal
activities
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And these are the country years of different
kinds of criminal activities in which these 29
groups engaged.

• Table 4. Criminal activities by country years

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Quantitative evidence How common are the
political criminal linkages?- cont.

• MAROB has also looked more closely at the Kurdish
  organizations active in Iran, Iraq, Syria and
  Turkey. The study indicated that a very large
  number of the Kurdish organizations possess
  violent means Kurdish organizations have been
  coded militant 80 of country-years.
• The study also indicated that the Kurdish groups
  used violence during 54 of all organization
  years but they used terrorism only 14 of the
  time.

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Table 3. Kurdish organizations using terrorism
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Conclusion

• In all that has been written on terrorism, I
  have not discovered any serious study which deals
  with where the terrorists get their money and how
  they spend it. This is surprising given the size
  of the multi-billion dollar business that
  terrorism has become
• James Adams. (1986).The Financing of Terrorism.
• The Unholy Alliances project is an attempt to
  contribute to the research and literature on the
  political economy of terrorism. We use
  conventional research methodology including large
  number and comparative case studies. And, we rely
  on journalist articles, having in mind that
  perhaps some of the evidence is anecdotal.
  Despite methodological lapses however we believe
  that our project could provide some help in
  learning how terrorism has evolved from
  idealistic and poverty-stricken beginnings in the
  early 1970s, to the sophisticated multinational
  corporations that some terrorist groups resemble
  today. (Adams, 1986).

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Websites where the UAs working papers have been
published

• http//www.allacademic.com/meta/p254230_index.html
  
• http//www.allacademic.com/meta/p178915_index.html
  
• http//www.cidcm.umd.edu/publications/papers/unhol
  y_alliances.pdf

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Additional slides for the follow - up discussion
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Figure 2. Strategies of ethnopolitical
organizations, 1980-2004
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Figure 3. The Use of terror by organizations,
1980-2004
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

• Summary
• MAROB coding has shown that about ½ of all Middle
  East organizations being coded use violence as a
  strategy. MAROB coding has also shown that 1/3 of
  all organizations employ terrorism.
• Next, MAROB coding has shown that about 1/3 of
  all Mid East organizations use violence and
  operate across border. About 1/3 of the latter
  engage in criminal activities.
• Not least, MAROB study has indicated that the
  frequency of each crime -related variable, such
  as money laundering arms trade drug
  trafficking human trafficking smuggling
  robbery resource expropriation kidnapping etc.,
  has been relatively low.