The Demise of Demarcation

1
The Demise of Demarcation?

• November 21, 2008

2
Aristotles Demarcation

• Science reaches certainty. (Contrasted with mere
  opinion).
• Science comprehends first causes. (Contrasted
  with craft).
• Science is about know-why rather than
  know-how

• Criterion I is concerned with the epistemic
  standing of the statements of science.
• Criterion II is concerned with the kind of
  statements that science is concerned with.

3
Aristotles Demarcation

• Science reaches certainty. (Contrasted with mere
  opinion).
• Science comprehends first causes. (Contrasted
  with craft).
• Science is about know-why rather than
  know-how

4
Meta-demarcation Criteria

• MUST BE EPISTEMICALLY SIGNIFICANT.
• MUST GIVE NECESSARY SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS

5
Meta-demarcation Criteria

• MUST BE EPISTEMICALLY SIGNIFICANT.

We want to know what, if anything, is special
about the knowledge claims and the modes of
inquiry of the sciences. Because there are
doubtless many respects in which science differs
from nonscience, we must insist that any
philosophically interesting demarcative device
must distinguish the scientific and nonscientific
matters in a way which exhibits a surer epistemic
warrant or evidential ground for science than for
nonscience. (216)
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Meta-demarcation Criteria

• MUST GIVE NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS

Necessary If youre a science, then you do
this! (SCI x ? CRI x) This allows us to rule
out certain things as scientific, but we cant
say what is scientific. Sufficient If you do
this, then youre a science! (CRI x ? SCI
x) This allows us to rule in certain things as
scientific, but we cant say what isnt
scientific.
7
Meta-demarcation Criteria

• MUST BE EPISTEMICALLY SIGNIFICANT.
• MUST GIVE NECESSARY SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS

8
What are we demarcating?

• What makes science different from pseudoscience?
• 2. What makes science different from nonscience?
• 3. What makes good science different from
  fraudulent science?

9
Modern Proposals

• Two main types
• Semantic-based Demarcation.
• Success-based Demarcation.

• Positivist verifiability as demarcation
• Popper falsifiability as demarcation

• Science is well-tested.
• Science exhibits progress.
• Science exhibits cumulative progress.
• Science makes successful predictions.

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Semantic-Based Demarcation

• Positivist verifiability as demarcation
• Problem with Universal Laws.
• The Earth is flat is scientific.
• Popper falsifiability as demarcation
• Problem with singular statements.
• Thus flat Earthers, biblical creationists,
  proponents of laetrile or orgone boxes, Uri
  Geller devotees, Bermuda Triangulators, circle
  squarers, Lysenkoists, charioteers of the gods,
  perpetuum mobile builders, Big Foot searchers,
  Loch Nessians, faith healers, polywater dabblers,
  Rosicrucians, the-world-is-about-to-enders,
  primal screamers, water diviners, magicians, and
  astrologers all turn out to be scientific on
  Poppers criterion (219)

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Success-Based Demarcation

• Science is well-tested.
• All science claims are not well-tested. (Not
  Suff)
• Many nonscientific claims are better-tested
  carpentry, football strategy. (Not Nec)
• Science exhibits progress.
• Lots of disciplines make progress. (Not Nec)
• Science exhibits cumulative progress.
• Many sciences do not contain their predecessors.
  (Not Nec)
• Science makes successful predictions.
• ? ? ?

12
Laudans Positive Proposal

• Two Questions
• Q1. What makes a belief well-founded?
• Q2. What makes a belief scientific?
• Q2 is only interesting if it tells us something
  about Q1.
• But the answer to Q2 is either irrelevant to Q1,
  or it is unanswerable.

13
Laudans Positive Proposal

• Two Questions
• Q1. What makes a belief well-founded?
• Q2. What makes a belief scientific?
• Note Laudan can maintain that Q2 has an answer,
  it just wont be a philosophically interesting
  answer.
• Note We can accept Laudans argument and still
  use science as a way of answering Q1. It just
  prohibits us from using general criteria for
  scientific belief as a way of studying good ways
  to form belief.