Libertarianism

1
Libertarianism
A Libertarian, such as Taylor Accepts
Incompatabilism i.e. accepts that if an action
is determined, then the action is not
free. Denies Determinism i.e. denies that all
actions are determined. Accepts Freedom
i.e. there are free actions. Pertinent Dr. Lee
Overhead DLO
2
Overview of what Taylor does in the reading

• The chief tenets of soft determinism theories.
• Soft determinism doesnt work, and why.
• Examples to illustrate the shadowy quality of
  soft determinism
• Soft determinism doesnt work, so should we
  simply deny determinism? No, indeterminism
  doesnt work either.
• Step back and examine whether the two theories of
  determinism and indeterminism are able to handle
  two very basic pieces of data they cannot.
• Taylors positive libertarian account theory of
  agency.

3
Soft Determinism

• Attempts to reconcile determinism with freedom,
  and thus with moral responsibility.
• The three claims of soft determinism
• All behavior arises from antecedent conditions,
  given which no other behavior is possible, i.e.
  all human behavior is caused and determined.
  (Accepts determinism. DLO)
• Behavior can nonetheless be free if it is
  voluntary and not externally constrained or
  impeded. (Accepts Compatabilism. Accepts Freedom.
  P did A freely P did A and Ps doing A was not
  compelled by external factors. DLO)
• The causes of such free, voluntary, unimpeded
  behavior are states, events and/or conditions
  within the agent. (P did A freely P's doing A
  had as its immediate cause a psychological state
  in the agent, not something external to the
  agent. DLO)

4
Soft Determinism doesnt work.

• no great acumen is needed to discover that far
  from solving any problem, soft determinism only
  camouflages it.
• Taylor questions the Compatabilist Internal
  Cause Account of Freedom (DLO) Butwhence
  arise those inner states that determine what my
  body shall do? Are they within my control or
  not? And this leads to a questioning of the
  Compatabilist Conditional Account of Freedom
  (DLO) Having made my choice or decision and
  acted upon it, could I have chosen otherwise or
  not?
• Taylor essentially says (in attacking the
  Internal Cause Account) So what if my actions
  are caused by my inner states, conditions, etc.?!
  If determinism is true, those inner states,
  conditions, etc., are a particular way because
  they themselves are caused to be so, and thus any
  actions that my inner states caused are
  determined, i.e. could not have been otherwise.
  DLO
• In attacking the Conditional Account, Taylor
  points out that one could have chosen otherwise
  (than what one actually did) only if something
  else (a set of antecedent conditions) had been
  different, but then we are forced to say that
  this set of antecedent conditions could not have
  been different because a further set of
  antecedent conditions would have had to be
  different for our first set to be different, ad
  infinitum. Perhaps the next slide will help make
  this clear.

5
Could I have chosen otherwise or not?

• Suppose Action A has a set of antecedent
  conditions B(which cause A)
• B ? A
• It seems to be that for A to have been different,
  B would have had to be different. But, B could
  not have been different unless a further set of
  antecedent conditions C had been different
• C ? B ? A
• But, then, C could not have been different unless
  a further set of antecedent conditions D had been
  different
• and so on ad infinitum D ? C ? B ? A
• We are, at each step, permitted to say could
  have been otherwise only in a provisional
  senseprovided, that is, something else had been
  differentbut must then retract it and replace it
  with could not have been otherwise as soon as
  we discover, as we must at each step, that
  whatever would have to have been different could
  not have been different

6
Examples

• The easiest way to see the shadowy quality of
  soft determinismis by means of examples.
• The Ingenious Physiologist Example. DLO
• To render a man your puppet, it is not necessary
  forcibly to constrain the motions of his limbs,
  after the fashion that real puppets are moved. A
  subtler but no less effective means of making a
  man your puppet would be to gain complete control
  of his inner states, and ensuring, as the theory
  of soft determinism does ensure, that his body
  will move in accordance with them.

7
Simple Indeterminism doesnt work either.

• Remember, an Indeterminist denies that all
  actions are determined, i.e. denies determinism.
  DLO
• The aim of this strategy of denying determinism
  (what the indeterminist has in mind) is to see a
  free action as one that did not have to be done
  or as one that could have been done differently
  If the free action was uncaused, then, even
  given the conditions under which it occurred and
  all that preceded, some other act was nonetheless
  possible, and the doer did not have to do what
  he did.
• The indeterminist thinks that the same strategy
  is applicable even if one thinks that actions are
  the inevitable consequences of inner states the
  inner states could have been otherwise.
• But does this simple denial of determinism work
  in giving us an account of free action?
• No. Behavior that is mine must be behavior that
  is within my control, but motions that occur from
  no causes are without the control of anyone. DLO

8
Two items of data

• Ok, lets step back for a second we seem to have
  shown that soft determinism and simple
  indeterminism produce troubling, perhaps absurd,
  results.
• Remember that theories such as soft determinism
  and simple indeterminism attempt to give an
  account of free action. Taylor, however, thinks
  that for a theory to succeed in coming up with an
  account of free action, the theory must
  preserve/not make impossible/be reconcilable with
  the following two data
• 1. My behavior is sometimes the outcome of my
  deliberation.
• 2. In these and other cases it is sometimes up
  to me what I do.
• Taylor thinks that determinism and indeterminism
  cannot be reconciled with this data.

9
Taylor Determinism, Indeterminism rule out
deliberation.

• I can deliberate only about my own future
  actions, and then only if I do not already know
  what I am going to do.
• But if determinism is truethen I can for
  everything I do know what I am going to do and
  cannot then deliberate about it. (Because I
  deliberate in order to decide what to do, not to
  discover what it is that I am going to do.)
• i.e. Taylor thinks that determinism rules out
  deliberation i.e. the theory of determinism
  cannot be reconciled with our first datum.
• Dr. Lee makes explicit Taylor's deliberation
  argument.
• Taylors second premise seems mistaken/problematic
  .
• It does seem more reasonable, however, to think
  that indeterminism rules out deliberation. (I
  cant deliberate about random, uncaused
  actions.)

10
Taylor Determinism is irreconcilable with our
second datum.

• Taylor tries to show how his second datum (that
  it is sometimes up to me what I do) is
  irreconcilable with determinism.
• Taylor says that for some action to be up to
  me, it has to be the case that there is a
  legitimate choice open to me as to whether or not
  to do the action each alternative course of
  action must be such that I can do it.
• But this is never so, if determinism is true,
  for on the very formulation of that theory
  whatever happens at any time is the only thing
  that can then happen, given all that precedes it.
  It is simply a logical consequence of this that
  whatever I do at any time is the only thing I can
  then do, given the conditions that precede my
  doing it. That is, determinism seems to say that
  what I do is never up to me.

11
Taylor Indeterminism is obviously irreconcilable
with our second datum.

• Whatever is not caused by anything is not caused
  by me, and nothing could be more plainly
  inconsistent with saying that it is nevertheless
  up to me what it shall be.

12
Theory of Agency

• The only conception of action which accords with
  our data is one according to which men are
  sometimes self-determining beings that is,
  beings which are sometimes the causes of their
  own behavior.
• Two strange metaphysical notions
• 1. The notion of a self or person for example,
  a man not as merely a collection of things or
  events, but as a self-moving being for on this
  view it is a man himself, and not merely some
  part of him or anything within him, that is the
  cause of his own activity.
• 2. A conception of causation according to which
  an agent, while not himself/herself an event,
  can nevertheless be the cause of an event.
• Taylor thinks that this account allows for
  deliberation and for my actions being up to me.

13
Possible problems with the Theory of Agency

• Seems strange, weird for the conception of men
  and their powers which is involved in it is
  strange indeed, if not positively mysterious.
• The data might simply be illusions It might
  in fact be that no man ever deliberates, but only
  imagines that he does, that from pure conceit he
  supposes himself to be the master of his behavior
  and the author of his acts.