Team Shadow

1
Team Shadow

• Advising the Iraqi Army

3rd Brigade MiTT, 2nd Iraqi Army Division
2
Purpose

• To provide observations based upon experiences as
  an advisor to an Iraqi Brigade

Disclaimer

• Unofficial personal perspective
• One person in one area of Iraq during one period
  of time

3
Agenda

• MiTT Overview
• Operational Environment
• Tigris River Valley/Ninewah Province
• Counterinsurgency in Iraq
• Mission Observations
• Discussion

4
General MiTT Information

• Transition Teams (TTs)
• Types
• Military Transition Teams (MiTTs)
• Border Transition Teams (BTTs)
• Police Transition Teams (PTTs)
• National Police Transition Teams (NPTTs)
• Base Defense Units (BDUs)
• Garrison Support Units / Regional Support Units
  (GSUs/RSUs)
• 2 ½ months training in US, Kuwait, Iraq

5
MiTT Lines of Effort

• Advising Mentoring Iraqi Counterparts
• Liaison between US and Iraqi Forces
• Tactical Operations
• Support Non-lethal Actions
• Team Administration/Logistics

Iraqi Security Forces (ISF IA IP others)
Military Transition Teams (MiTTs)
Coalition Forces (CF)
6
MiTT Organization
FP
FP
FP
TM SHADOW
FP
FP
3rd Brigade
FP
D
FP
10 US Personnel, 5 Interpreters
D
FP
FP
D
PHANTOM
HARD ROCK
BABYLON
1st Battalion
2nd Battalion
3rd Battalion
D
D
D
11 US Personnel, 5 Interpreters
11 US Personnel, 5 Interpreters
11 US Personnel, 5 Interpreters
MBITR
D
Team Chief Operations Trainer Intelligence
Trainer Intelligence NCO Trainer Logistics
Trainer Logistics NCO Trainer Communications
Trainer HQ Service Company Trainer Effects
Trainer Effects NCO Trainer Medic
FP
M4 Carbines M9 Pistols M1114 HMMWVs .50 Cal
Machine Guns M240B Machine Guns Night Vision
Devices Radios Satellite Phones Blue Force Tracker
7
MNF-I Organization
CCDR USCENTCOM
SACEUR
SACT
US EMBASSY BAGHDAD
Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
CG MNF-I
COM JFC Naples
Dual Hat CG MNSTC-I COM NTM-I
CFLCC
CG MNC-I
MSCs


Iraq Assistance Group
MSCs
DCOM NTM-I(DEN)
DCG MNSTC-I (UK)
MSCs
MSCs
MSCs
Major Subordinate Commands
CG(US) Coalition Military Assistance Training
Team
CG(US) Civilian Police Assistance Training Team
CG(AUS) Joint HQs Advisory Support Team
Command
MiTTs
Coordination
8
Operational Environment
Dahuk

Bashur
Dahuk
Arbil
Al Kasik
Mosul
Irbil
Tal Afar
As Sulaymaniyah
Ninawa
At Tamim
Kirkuk
Salah ad Din
320 km
36
Euphrates R.
Diyala
Al Qaim
Tikrit
Samarra
KMTB
Taji
BAGHDAD
66
Fallujah
Al Anbar

Ar Ramadi
Ar Rutbah
Wasit
Babil

• Mosul key crossroads / major city
• Tigris River Valley
• Sunni Arab Kurdish Areas
• Turkish, Syrian, Iranian Influence
• Kurdistan
• Historical routes through sector
• Insurgent Spikes in 2004, 2008
• Cooler climate in Northern Iraq (hottest day 12
  Aug--120o)
• Mountainous terrain in North

An Numaniyah
5

Karbala
Karbala
56
Maysan
Al Kut
Al Hillah
An Najaf
Al Qadisiyah
As Samawah
Dhi Qar
An Najaf
An Nasiriyah
Al Basrah
Al Basrah
Al Muthanna
KUWAIT
9
Operational Environment
Zakhoe
Dahook
Tal Afar
Mosul

• Area of Operations
• 3rd IA Bde area
• US Artillery Bn area
• Area of Influence
• Mosul Area
• 2nd IA Div AO
• Security Vacuums South and NW of AO
• Area of Interest
• Baghdad
• Irbil/Kirkuk
• Syria/Iran/Turkey
• Arab World
• CONUS

Irbil
100 miles
80 miles
Qayyarah
Makmur
Q-West
Kirkuk
Al Hadr
Sharqat
Hechel
Bayji
10
Operational EnvironmentPMESII

• Political
• Military
• Economic
• Social
• Infrastructure
• Information

11
PMESIIPolitical

• Insurgents split between
• Former regime
• Dissatisfied Sunnis
• Foreigners
• Tribal rivalries
• Sunnis concerned about being disenfranchised
• Qayyarah, Makmur, Hadr districts 8 key
  subdistricts
• Ninewah Sal Al Adin Provinces

12
PMESIIMilitary

• Limited enemy capability avoid direct fighting
  unless necessary
• Approx 3-7 incidents per week in AO
• No US KIA
• Approx 10 incidents per day in Mosul
• Iraqi Army limitations
• Night Vision
• Technical Intelligence
• EOD
• Logistics
• Aviation

13
Logistics Base
14
3rd Bde Organization
OPCON
TACON?
3
1
7,13,18 SIBs
CG BG Baez DCG BG Faris
II
STRATEGIC INFRA-STRUCTURE BATTALION
1-3
6th SIB
(3rd BN-ADCON)
SECURITY
COMMAND GROUP G1,G2,G3,G4,G6 MEDICAL
SECTION MAINTENANCE PLT TRANSPORTATION
PLT COMMUNICATIONS PLT SUPPLY PLT FOOD SERVICE
SECTION COMPANY HQ
SECURITY
RECON
CO HQ
COMMAND GROUP G1,G2,G3,G4,G6 MEDICAL
SECTION MAINTENANCE PLT TRANSPORTATION
PLT COMMUNICATIONS PLT SUPPLY PLT FOOD SERVICE
SECTION COMPANY HQ
1st Bn Cdr COL Tawfiq 2nd Bn Cdr LTC Raad 3rd
Bn Cdr LTC Dildar 3/1 Bn Cdr LTC Achmed 6th SIB
Cdr LTC Sabhan
15
The Iraqi Army
16
Iraqi Army Challenges

• Higher level administrative/logistical systems
• Medical
• Pay (including Martyrs Pay)
• Supplies (esp fuel)
• Maintenance
• Contracting
• Home Guard Militia mentality
• Integration with/control of/support for non-Army
  security elements (police, para-military forces,
  militias, SIBs, CLCs)
• Negligible role of NCOs
• Switch from conscript military to volunteer
  military
• Corruption
• Neutralization of good Iraqis
• Political leaders vs professional leaders
• Dull, tired, and/or self-serving officers
• Over-centralization
• Top-heavy rank structure (4-6 LTCs in a
  battalion)
• Limited staff ability to handle multiple tasks
• Aversion to planning

17
Enemy Tactics

• IEDs
• Indirect Fire (Rockets, Mortars) (IDF)
• Small Arms Fire/ Precision Small Arms Fire
  (SAF/PSAF)
• Kidnappings
• Leaders, media, foreigners, family members
• Information Operations
• Intimidation
• Attack small, isolated units
• Convoys, checkpoints, small bases
• Complex Ambushes
• Suicide bombers
• Disguise as IA, IP, security contractors, or CF
• Attack prominent sites (oil facilities, mosques,
  government facilities, recruiting stations,
  police)
• Inside attacks
• Rescue Prisoners
• Threaten/attack families
• Spontaneous attacks with limited planning (vice
  deliberate attacks with extensive detailed
  planning)
• Possibility of WMD use (chem, bio, chlorine
  bombs)

18
PMESIIEconomic

• Financial support networks for insurgents
• Sources of income include extortion, fuel
  corruption
• Some insurgents economically motivated
• Economic development lagging increasing
  impatience with Iraqi government coalition
  (jobs)

19
PMESIISocial

• Tribalism clans adaptable for formation of
  insurgent cells
• Many insurgent actions based upon tribal and
  other rivalries
• Attempt to justify actions within Islamic context
• Roles of sheiks, fake sheiks, mukhtars, imams
• Relationships (Iraqi Security Forces have
  advantage over US)

20
Iraqi Customs

• Hand shaking / heart covering
• Man-kissing
• Name conventions
• Father Omar Hatim Mohammed--Dr. Omar)
• 1st Son Hatim Omar Hatim (Mohammed)--COL Hatim
• 2nd Son Ibrahim Omar Hatim--Ibrahim
• Smoking
• New Beginnings
• Inshallah

21
PMESIIInfrastructure

• Enemy facilities for training, logistics,
  coordination, preparation
• Key Infrastructure
• Highways paved roads
• Water sources
• Pipelines
• Refineries
• Power Plants
• Schools
• Medical clinics
• Bridges

22
PMESIIInformation

• Cell phones, posters, flyers
• Family tribal relationships
• Radios (Makmur radio station)
• Arab media (Satellite Dishes)
• Internet
• Rumor

23
Counterinsurgency

• Hearts and Minds
• Critical Factors Analysis
• 3rd Bde Counterinsurgency Campaign

24
Enemy Critical Factors
Center of Gravity
Critical Capabilities
Critical Requirements
Critical Vulnerabilities
Support of religious/tribal leaders
Internal divisions
Maintain religious, political legitimacy
No prosperous future for Iraq
Financial Backing
Actions contrary to Islam
Popular Support
Portray image of inevitable success
Intelligence
Material, personnel, facilitators, facilities,
drugs
Limited logistics, training, communications,
freedom of movement
Discredit US/new Iraqi Govt
Sanctuaries
The source of power that provides moral or
physical strength, freedom of action, or will to
act.
Intimidate population
Support from outside Iraq
Not well supported by local leaders or population
Communications
25
Friendly Critical Factors
Center of Gravity
Critical Capabilities
Critical Requirements
Critical Vulnerabilities
Maintain religious, political, economic legitimacy
Support of religious/tribal leaders
Iraqi corruption
Inadequate progress
Portray image of inevitable success
Intelligence
Soft targets
Popular Support
Security
Conduct effective CMO and IO
Tribal / ethnic / sect differences
Defeat insurgents, or convince them to end
conflict
Development / Progress
Animosity between Military and Police
C4
Enable Iraqi democracy and unity
Logistics
Arab suspicion of US motives and actions
Interagency Cooperation
Build effective Iraqi institutions
26
3rd Bde Counterinsurgency Campaign
Provide Security
Secure the Populace
Identify Neutralize AIF Cells
Counter Crime (Organized Petty)
Defuse Tribal Rivalries
Secure Bases CLPs
Develop Iraqi Security Forces
Objectives
Rebuild 2nd Bn
Develop 3rd Bn
Develop FOBs, COPs, TCPs
Improve IA Admin Logistics
Improve IP Effectiveness Integration with IA
Provide Essential Services

• 3rd Bde improves as a professional, capable
  military force.
• Insurgents activity is neutralized.
• Population is informed about and supports ISF,
  IG, and coalition.
• Region has essential services and economic growth

• COIN Operating Systems
• Movement and Maneuver
• Intelligence
• Precision Effects
• Protection
• Civil Military Operations
• Information Operations
• Unity of Effort
• Logistics
• Command and Control

Provide Kerosene for Heating
Provide Benzene Diesel
Provide Potable Water
Provide Power Sewage Treatment
Provide Medical Capability Schools
Support Good Governance
Capitalize on Support of Sheiks Mukhtars
Establish Effective Iraq National Provincial
Agencies
Establish Effective Justice System
Establish Rule of Law
Establish Effective Local Government
Support Economic Development
Develop Economic Activity (Manufacturing,
Services, Agriculture)
Implement Contracts
Rebuild Banking System
Support Thriving Free Market Economy
Generate Investment
Conduct Information Operations
Open Makmur Radio Station
Support Open, Free, Impartial Media
Neutralize Terrorist Channel
Inform Population with Billboards Flyers
Maintain OPSEC
27
The War
28
Operations
29
Mission Observations

• Non-Military Considerations
• Iraqi Security Forces
• Challenged
• Improving
• Key to Success
• Role of Contractors for IA and US
• Tensions

US Control
Iraqi Contol
Centralization
Local Power
(Bottom-Up)
(Top-Down)
Democracy
Tribalism
IA Home Guard
IA Professional Force
Iraqi Security Forces
Citizen Militias
30
Tensions
US Control
Iraqi Contol
Centralization
Local Power
(Bottom-Up)
(Top-Down)
Democracy
Tribalism
IA Home Guard
IA Professional Force
Iraqi Security Forces
Citizen Militias
30 / 38
31

• Discussion