Title: Developing a New System Safety Standard for U.S. Army Aviation
1Developing a New System Safety Standardfor U.S.
Army Aviation
Presented at the International Helicopter Safety
Symposium 2005 Montréal, Québec,
Canada September 28, 2005 David B. West, PE,
CSP, CHMM SAIC 6725 Odyssey Drive Huntsville, AL
35806 (256) 313-2091 david.b.west_at_saic.com
2Developing a New System Safety Standardfor U.S.
Army Aviation
OVERVIEW OF PRESENTATION
- Introduction the domain of U.S. Army Aviation
What it is, whos involved, and what they do
- Existing Standards and Regulations
From DoD Instruction 5000.2 on down
- The Current Situation and Its Challenges
Similarities and differences among the various
Army Aviation system safety programs
- Opportunities to Benefit from Standardization
3Introduction
U.S. Army Aviation
- Over 5000 Aircraft the largest fleet in the
world
- Helicopters, Fixed Wing Aircraft, UAVs
- Majority of helicopters
- CH/MH-47 Chinook
- UH/MH-60 Black Hawk
- AH-64 Apache/Longbow
- OH-58 Kiowa/Kiowa Warrior
- Fixed wing aircraft a variety, managed under a
single Army PM
- UAVs increasing in importance managed by a
separate PM
- Special Ops Aircraft managed by TAPO
4Introduction (cont.)
Whos Who of U.S. Army Aviation
- Aircraft Manufacturer (OEM) or Prime Contractor
- Foundation of each Army aviation program
- Provides the aircraft and after-market services
- PEO Aviation owns and manages all Army aircraft
- Program Managers (PMs) to manage each major
program (e.g., Cargo Helicopters, Utility
Helicopters, etc.) - In some cases, Product Manager reports to PM
(e.g., Fixed Wing Product Manager reports to PM
Aviation Systems) - RDE Command / AMRDEC / Aviation Engineering
Directorate (AED) - Matrix engineering support to programs
5Introduction (cont.)
Whos Who of U.S. Army Aviation (cont.)
- Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM)
- Airworthiness (per AR 70-62) delegated to AED
- Gatekeeper of System Safety Processes
- Issues Safety of Flight (SOF) / Aviation Safety
Action Messages (ASAM) - Coordinates and tracks all system safety risk
assessments (SSRAs) - Reviews and coordinates on AWRs, ECPs, MWOs,
RFD/RFWs, SARs, test plans, etc. - Developmental Test Command (DTC)
- Operates Aviation Technical Test Center (ATTC)
6Introduction (cont.)
Whos Who of U.S. Army Aviation (cont.)
- Combat Readiness Center (CRC)
- Formerly the U.S. Army Safety Center
- Conducts accident investigations maintains
accident data - Director of Army Safety is also CRC Commander
- Army Safety Action Team (ASAT)
- Senior Army leadership reviews Army-wide safety
issues - Developmental Test Command (DTC)
- Operates Aviation Technical Test Center (ATTC)
7Existing Standards and Regulations
- DoD Instruction 5000.2
- Single paragraph on ESOH in Enclosure 7 (HSI)
- PM must prevent ESOH hazards where possible,
and ... manage ESOH hazards where they cannot be
avoided. - Four risk levels and their acceptance authorities
- MIL-STD-882
- Tailorable selected application of
requirements - First published 1969 Rev. E to be published 2005
- AR 70-1, Army Acquisition Policy
- Specifies Armys risk management process
8Existing Standards and Regulations (cont.)
- AR 70-1 provides risk decision authority matrix
9Existing Standards and Regulations (cont.)
- AR 385-16, System Safety Engineering and
Management - Requires major Army programs to establish SSWGs
- Standardizes the system safety risk assessment
(SSRA) process
10Existing Standards and Regulations (cont.)
- PEO Aviation Policy Memo 05-14
11Existing Standards and Regulations (cont.)
- PEO Aviation Policy Memo 05-14 (cont.)
- Outlines responsibilities of PMs, AED, SSWGs for
all programs under PEO Aviation - Requires source-mechanism-outcome description of
hazards - Requires use of common risk matrix
12The Current Situation and Its Challenges
Similarities / Differences in Application of
System Safety to Army Aviation Programs
- Similarities the good news
- Some due to deliberate attempts (e.g., PEO Policy
Memo), such as common risk matrix, SSRAs,
ASAM/SOF - Some safety issues common due to general nature
of Army Aviation and helicopter design - Short duration, low altitude flight
- Engine failure autorotation
- Similar flight control and rotor system
mechanisms - Identical or similar weapon systems or auxiliary
systems on different platforms
13The Current Situation and Its Challenges (cont.)
Similarities / Differences (cont.)
- Differences in safety considerations
- Kiowa autorotation vs. Chinook or Black Hawk
autorotation - Single engine vs. multi-engine
- No. of crew/passengers 0 (UAVs) to 2 (Kiowa,
Apache) to 30 (Chinook) - Helicopter hazards vs. fixed wing hazards
- Common risk matrix, but different interpretations
- Considerable variations in SSPPs, Hazard Tracking
Systems - See Table 1 in paper
14Opportunities to Benefit from Standardization
Exemplary State-of-the-Art
Frequency of Practice
Minimum Acceptable
Consensus
CuttingEdge
Level of Detail and Accuracy
Source APT Research, Revising Draft
MIL-STD-882E Strawman Improvements and
Rationale. Presentation by Pat Clemens at the
110th meeting of the GEIA G-48 System Safety
Committee. 2005.
Goals (A) Improve mean practice (B) Decrease
spread in practices
(B)
(A)
15Opportunities to Benefit from Standardization
(cont.)
- Make life easier for Army leadership (e.g., ASAT)
that deal with all Army Aviation programs - Enhanced agility of work force
- Shared resources e.g., Hazard Tracking Systems
I-C Hazard
I-C Hazard
16Opportunities to Benefit from Standardization
(cont.)
Hazard Frequency (Mishaps per 100,000 Hrs (11.4
years))
TBD N
TBD M
TBD L
Frequent A
Probable B
Occasional C
Remote D
Improbable E
Very Improbable F
Extremely Improbable G
Incredibly Improbable H
Super Improbable I
TBD K
TBD J
Severity
1
10
0.01
0.001
0.0001
0.1
0.00001
1E-6
1E-7
1E-8
1E-9
1E-10
1E-11
13
End of Life on Planet Earth
Earth encounter with an asteroid
1B Fatal
2Q
Cataclysmic2
100M Fatal
200T
TBD 11
10M Fatal
20T
High
TBD 10
1M Fatal
2T
TBD 9
Serious
100K Fatal
200B
Disastrous 8
Medium
10K Fatal
20B
B-2
Catastrophic 7
Low
F-22, C-17
1K Fatal
2B
Catastrophic 6
100 Fatal
200M
AH-64, CH-47, UH-60
Catastrophic 5
10 Fatal
C-12, OH-58D
20M
Catastrophic 4
1 Fatal
2M
Small Unmanned Air Vehicles
Critical 3
200K
Marginal 2
20K
Negligible 1
2K
17Opportunities to Benefit from Standardization
(cont.)
- Specific Areas of Opportunities
- Risk Summation
- Risk Matrix Modernization
- Definitions
- Boilerplate SSMPs
- Minimum Requirements for Hazard Tracking Systems
- List of Generic Hazards
- Lessons Learned
- Online Access
18Recommendations
- Develop and publish a new standard for
application of System Safety to U.S. Army
Aviation - All affected organizations should be involved
- Incorporate specific opportunities cited herein