A Fourth Branch of Government?

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A Fourth Branch of Government?

• The Power of Bureaucracy Strength Through
  Obscurity

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Does Bureaucracy Matter? A Case Study

• "FEMA is not going to hesitate at all in this
  storm. We are not going to sit back and make this
  a bureaucratic process. We are going to move
  fast, we are going to move quick, and we are
  going to do whatever it takes to help disaster
  victims." -FEMA Director Michael Brown, Aug. 28,
  2005
• "I don't think anybody anticipated the breach of
  the levees. President Bush, September 1, 2005
• "Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job."
  President Bush, to FEMA director Michael Brown,
  while touring hurricane-ravaged Mississippi,
  Sept. 2, 2005

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A. The Damage Done
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(No Transcript)
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RELATIVE COST BURDEN ON LOUISIANA CITIZENS DWARFS
PREVIOUS DISASTERS
FEMA cost estimates for recent US disasters
(2005)
FEMA cost estimate ( Millions)
Affected population (Millions)
                                          
  Katrina and Rita Louisiana (2005)
37,100 4.5 8,244 World Trade Center
(2001) 8,140             19.0 428   Northridge
Earthquake (1994) 9,170                  29.8
308   Hurricane Andrew (1992) 2,500          
       12.9 194   Hurricane Iniki (1992) 360
1.1 329   Loma Prieta Earthquake
(1989) 1,360                23.7 57  
Cost/ capita
Disaster
Source FEMA, US Census 2000, cost estimates
adjusted for inflation using CPI
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State reported deaths fromHurricanes Katrina and
RitaIdentified and unidentified victims
(12/13/05)
207
NEARLY 5x AS MANY LOUISIANANS WERE KILLED BY
STORMS THAN ANY OTHER STATES CITIZENS
Doesnt account for 3,700 people still missing
1,071
113
2
14
AL
LA
MS
TX
FL
1,094 less 23 non-storm related
deaths Source Louisiana Department of Health and
Human Services, ABC News
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B. The Role of Federal Bureaucrats

• 1. The Long, Long Run Environmental and
  Development Policy

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History That Contributed to Tragedy

• 1879 Congress authorized ACE to build levees to
  prevent Spring flooding
• Oil Industry and other development drained,
  dredged, and built channels and canals throughout
  wetlands and marshes
• Mississippi River was channeled to empty at
  continental shelf

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Effects of Levees on Mississippi in Missouri
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Results

• New Orleans sank further below sea level as
  earlier sediments and deposits compacted and sank
  (no new sediments deposited)
• Mississippi Delta and Barrier Islands began to
  disappear erosion and subsidence
• Wetlands and marshes were fragmented, ripped up,
  and destroyed, leading to recession of coastline
  

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2. The Levees The Army Corps of Engineers
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New Orleans Areas Below Sea Level
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FORENSIC ENGINEERING AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA

• Army Corps of Engineers conducted the equivalent
  of a forensic investigation at the levees and
  floodwalls of New Orleans, drilling into the
  earth to examine the soil and reviewing the
  design of the structure.

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LEARNING FROM HURRICANE KATRINA

• An Army Corps of Engineers document showed that
  a five-foot layer of peat lies beneath the entire
  levee system.
• The layer of peat played a major role in the
  failure, becoming soft and wet and moving as the
  water level rose during the hurricane.

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FORENSIC ENGINEERING AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA

• The floodwaters simply pushed the entire Levee
  structure out of its way, sliding it in a way
  that allowed the water to flow out of Lake
  Ponchartrain into New Orleans.

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FORENSIC ENGINEERING AFTER HURRICANE KATRINA

• The conclusion is that faulty design, inadequate
  construction, or some combination of the two, are
  the likely causes of the breaching of the
  floodwalls along the 17th Street and London
  Avenue canals.
• These two breaches were the source of most of the
  flooding of New Orleans.

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CAUSES OF FAILURE

• Katrinas storm surge overtopped some levee
  sections.
• The cascade of water eroded soils from the base
  of the landward side of the levee, causing it to
  fail.

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CAUSES OF FAILURE

• In some levee sections, water percolated under
  the sheet pilings through layers of peat, sand,
  and clay and bubbled up on the other side.

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CAUSES OF FAILURE

• The percolation failures tended to occur where
  the pilings were driven only 3-4 m (10 or 11
  feet) into the ground.
• Where pilings were driven 8 m (25 feet), the
  levees kept the city safe.

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CAUSES OF FAILURE

• Percolation failures may have weakened other
  sections of the levee system that now appear to
  have survived Katrina.

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CAUSES OF FAILURE

• The junctions between different kinds of levees
  often were weak spots.
• "If it's earth versus concrete, the earth will
  lose.

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FLAWS IN CONSTRUCTION THAT NEED TO BE FIXED

• USE OF WEAK, POORLY COMPACTED SOIL
• INADEQUATE NUMBER OF STEEL PILINGS TO ANCHOR
  FLOOD WALLS TO SUBSURFACE STRATA

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3. The Response FEMA

• Initial Warnings Or CYA?

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a. Pre-Katrina FEMA

• 1993-2000 FEMA transformed from Cold War civil
  defense organization (gt50 of funds assigned to
  post-nuclear war missions) to disaster relief
  agency
• Northridge Quake-Response w/in 2 hours with
  troops and rations. Rebuilt w/in a week.
• Hurricane Camille (2nd worst) - Red Cross set up
  shelters for 85K before it hit. Cleared 11M tons
  of debris in months.
• Hurricane Andrew 5K troops deployed w/in 3 days.

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b. 2002 Reorganization Department of Homeland
Security

• Impetus was a 9/11 Terrorist Attack
• Shift in focus to terrorism vs. natural disaster
  created personnel/expertise issues.
• Created Additional Levels of Bureaucracy
• Lack of a Clear Plan FEMA Priority within DHS
• Delays in Navigating Chain of Commands
• Lack of Coordination and Communication between
  federal-state-local authorities.

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c. FEMA failures during/after Katrina

• Prior to the hurricane
• Little advance planning, stockpiling of
  necessaries (despite commitment to pre-supply
  water, ice, generators medicine)
• Only 7 of 28 SAR teams dispatched no personnel
  in N.O. until after Katrina passes
• Most supplies allocated to states other than
  Louisiana (esp. Alabama)
• After hurricane
• FEMA waits for specific state/local requests
  instead of mounting searches, busing evacuees
• Mismanagement of transportation and logistics (no
  buses, food for Superdome!)
• Hundreds of firefighters delayed by days of
  community relations/sexual harassment training
• FEMA requests non-response by other state/local
  agencies (!), fails to use available military
  resources

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II. Key Features of the Federal Bureaucracy
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A. History Created by the New Deal
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B. Orientation Dominated by Defense
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C. Size Smaller than State/Local Bureaucracies
Number in Millions
2002
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D. Composition Highest Ranks Filled By White
Males
2001
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E. Organization

• Key Dimension Access to President
• Order
• White House Staff Greatest Access (Informal
  Power)
• Executive Office of the President (EOP) Direct
  Access, Especially by Key Agencies
• Cabinet No longer a decision-making body.
  Access to President declining.
• Independent Agencies and Government Corporations
  Limited Access But Substantial Autonomy

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Overview The Executive Branch
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The White House Staff Informal Power
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Overview The Executive Branch
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The EOP First Line of Policy-Making
Council of Economic Advisors
National Economic Council
Domestic Policy Council
Office of Science And Technology Policy
Council on Environmental Quality
Office of the United States Trade Representative
National Security Council
The President
Office of Administration
Office of the Vice President
Office of Management And Budget
Office of National Drug Control Policy
Office of Faith-Based And Community Relations
Office of National AIDS Policy
White House Office
2005
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THE EOP Recent Trends
Bush II 2001 N65
Clinton 1993 N72
Bush 1989 N50
Reagan 1981 N61

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45
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Average Age
28
29
14
5
Women
11
8
8
3
Minorities
29
10
10
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Home State
Capitol Hill
Exec. Branch
Exec. Branch
Pres. Campaign
Most Common Experience
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Overview The Executive Branch
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Overview The Executive Branch
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The Outer Rim Other Bureaucracies

• Independent executive agencies
• Report directly to the president and are not
  under a cabinet secretary.
• Placed outside departments for political reasons
  including the president wanting to keep a closer
  eye on them or avoid interference, increase their
  effectiveness or make them more prestigious.
• Independent regulatory commissions
• Designed to be independent. Bipartisan with
  fixed terms.
• Can do things that would be politically unpopular
  (and thus very hard for the President and
  Congress to do).
• Government corporations
• When Congress puts the government in the business
  of providing services a private corporation might
  usually provide
• Often created when the services arent being
  provided and arent likely to be without
  government involvement

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Independent Agencies and Government Corporations
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III. How Much Autonomy Do Bureaucrats Have?

• The Principal-Agent Problem
• Problem Need for people (principals) to delegate
  some tasks to others (agents), but they may have
  own agendas
• Solution Incentives to make agents interest
  identical to principals interest
• Difficulties
• Individual accountability promotes backstabbing
  rather than teamwork
• Team accountability promotes free-riding
• Agents have more expertise than principals
• Agents are assigned multiple tasks rewarding
  one leads to poorer performance in other areas

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4. Implications

• Key to autonomy Who is the principal?
• Multiple principals (e.g. President and Congress)
  increase bureaucratic autonomy
• Larger gap in expertise between principal and
  agent increases autonomy

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B. History

• Early Republic Emphasis on respectability,
  individual incentives, long-term service
• Jacksonian Era Spoils system, emphasis on
  rotation and brief service. Intended to
  democratize system but leads to corruption and
  patronage.

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3. The Rise of Bureaucratization

• a. Bureaucratization solved problems of spoils
  system.
• Specialization and clearly defined jobs could be
  mastered more quickly.
• Hierarchies more closely monitored and controlled
  subordinate officers.
• Record keeping was meticulous.
• Government became more impersonal.
• And red tape was born.

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b. New Problems Civil Service and Delegation

• How do you keep an agent faithful? How do you
  avoid agency loss or capture by natives?
• Career bureaucrats develop their own personal and
  institutional interests, and often act on them.
• Can become non-responsive to citizens and elected
  officials. Difficult to punish such behavior.
• Agents become experts in their policy domains.
• Their actions are often shielded from outside
  oversight (hidden action).
• Civil servants have access to information that is
  not available to the public or to other branches
  of government
• They may not be willing to share this information
  if it goes against their goals (hidden
  information)

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C. Agency Capture 1. Iron Triangles (a.k.a.
Subgovernments)
Bureaucracy
Tobacco Division of the Department of Agriculture
Rulings on tobacco production and prices
Approve higher budget requests
Information about industry
Support for agencies budget request
Help with constituent complaints
Information
Congressional Subcommittees
Interest Groups
Campaign Contributions
Tobacco lobby, including both farmers and
manufacturers
Info about industry
Subcommittee of the House and Senate Agriculture
Committees
Legislation affecting tobacco farmers and other
members of the industry
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2. Clientele Agencies

• Directed by law to foster and promote the
  interests of a particular group or segment of
  American society
• Clients organize to support the agency, thus
  leading to the iron triangle
• Example Reagan promised to dismantle the
  Departments of Energy and Education. Why wasnt
  he successful?

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3. Capture Theory

• Thesis agencies are captured and controlled by
  the very interests theyre supposed to regulate.
• Reasons
• Weak agencies vulnerable to political pressure
• Special interest groups more powerful than
  general interest groups
• Underfunded/overworked agencies rely on
  cooperation for success, regulated industries for
  key information

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D. Marrying the Natives

• Once-loyal officials sometimes become agents of
  their departments.
• Bureaucratic culture persistent, patterned way
  of thinking about the central tasks of and human
  relationships within the organization.
• Bureaucrats imbued with their agencys culture
  come to dislike interference from outsiders
• More likely in final years of Presidential term
  officials future careers depend on personal
  success

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IV. Bureaucratic Decision-Making What do they do
with autonomy?

• Bureaucratic Politics
• Organizations shape preferences Where you stand
  depends on where you sit
• Individuals use informal power to fight
  organizational constraints Who you know
  determines pull
• Best predictor of bureaucratic decision is
  weighted median voter among stakeholders
  (bargaining produces coalitions)

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B. Pathologies of Bureaucracy

• Clientelism serving interest groups behind
  program
• Parochialism concentration on getting the
  agencys job done (blind to trade-offs)

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B. Pathologies of Bureaucracy

• Incrementalism slow implementation of new
  programs
• Arbitrariness use of Standard Operating
  Procedures (SOPs) (regularized procedures) for
  efficiency
• Satisficing Choosing good enough rather than
  pursuing perfection

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B. Pathologies of Bureaucracy

• Imperialism expanding agency operations and
  taking on more responsibilities
• Achesons Rule A memorandum is written not to
  inform the reader but to protect the writer

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8. 51-49 principle Decisions appear to be based
on overconfidence (incentive to misrepresent 51
certainty as 100 for bargaining purposes)
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9. Groupthink Hierarchic groups reinforce
conformity, produce poor decisions
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V. Controlling the Fourth Branch
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A. Redundancy Praiseworthy?

• General finding When two or more bureaucracies
  assigned same task, competition between them
  increases efficiency!
• Cost is unnecessary duplication of effort. (Save
  Slower, Less Satisfying Results)

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B. The Power of Procedural Rules

• The amended US Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
  Act of 1938 requires pharmaceutical companies to
  prove that a drug is safe and efficacious before
  marketing it.
• The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 requires
  that the EPA must prove that a new chemical is
  hazardous to human health or the environment
  before regulating it.
• Result few new drugs are approved and virtually
  no chemicals have been proven hazardous.

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C. Which branch exercises most control?

• Consensus Congress controls most effectively
  through parallel committee system
• Political appointees more likely to be controlled
  by President (loyal to President instead of
  organizations budget)
• Judicial review limited (Chevron deference)
  except where agencies act as courts (i.e.
  immigration judges)

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VI. How Do Bureaucrats Influence the President?

• Institutionalized EOP constrains President
  textbook (Chapter 9)
• How can Presidents de-institutionalize EOP?
• Political criteria for technocrats and scientists
• Reduce staff for Congress-mandated sections
• How do Presidents use the EOP and Cabinet?
• (next lecture Making Foreign and Domestic
  Policy)