2. Disutility of Calculating Kagan, 668 A to Q2b

1
2. Disutility of Calculating (Kagan, 66-8 A to
Q2b)

• Acting on consequentialism has bad consequences
  because if we were to take time to calculate
  before acting, we would frequently not be acting
  in a timely manner.
• According to consequentialism, it is wrong to act
  on consequentialism. Therefore, consequentialism
  refutes itself.

2
Disutility of Calculating

• Illustration the innocent child drowns while
  the good moralist calculates the overall goodness
  of actions.

3
A Note (Kagan, 66)

• Again, this alleged problem is not unique to
  consequentialism. If it is really a problem, it
  befalls to every position that admits that the
  value of the consequences of an action is a
  factor in determining the rightness of actions.
• Thus, this is a problem almost everyone should be
  concerned with.

4
An Analysis of the Argument

• Consequentialism (or any theory that takes
  consequences into account) holds that the
  rightness of an action depends on whether the
  consequences are comparatively good.
• Consequentialism (or any theory that takes
  consequences into account) holds that we should
  try to calculate the goodness of consequences
  every time before the action.
• If we try to calculate every time before acting,
  we would waste time and opportunities to do good.
• Therefore, acting on consequentialism (or any
  theory that takes consequences into account) has
  bad consequences.
• Because of (1) and (4), consequentialism (or any
  theory that takes consequences into account)
  tells us not to act according to the theory.
• (5) amounts to the self-refutation of the theory.

5
Reply Reject the Premise (2)

• In general, consequentialism (or any other theory
  that takes consequences into account) does NOT
  hold that we should try to calculate the goodness
  of consequences every time before the action.
• To understand this point, you need to understand
  two points
• 1. the distinction between the standard of
  rightness and the decision procedure and,
• 2. sometimes the effective way to meet a standard
  or achieve an aim is not directly trying to do
  so, but adopting indirect strategies.

6
1. The Standard of Rightness and the Decision
Procedure

• Consequentialism etc. provide the standard of
  rightness, which tells us by virtue of what right
  actions are right. That is, they provide the
  standard of rightness, according to which right
  actions are right by virtue of their
  consequences. (Thus, the premise (1) is true.)
• Consequentialism etc. are in themselves not the
  decision procedure, which tells agents what to do
  for each occasion of action, e.g., before every
  action, try to work out the best consequences,
  and pick the act with the best consequences.

7
Analogy to Games

• The standard of rightness is like the standard of
  winning in a game, while the decision procedure
  is like the strategies of the game.
• Consider games, such as chess, checkers etc.
• There is a standard of winning in any game. For
  example, in chess, you win if you checkmate the
  opponents king. The rule book provides the
  standard.
• However, no human can win a game merely with the
  standard of winning. If we can, the beginners can
  win as easily as the experienced can. In order to
  win, we need to use effective strategies (based
  on the generalization of experiences).

8
Analogy to Games (Continued)

• Consequentialism (or any theory that takes
  consequences into account) directly provides only
  the standard of rightness, as a rulebook provides
  only the standard of winning in a game.
• No human can act rightly merely with the standard
  of rightness (e.g., the best outcome makes the
  action right), as no human can win a game merely
  with the standard of winning.
• To take right actions, we need something
  analogous to strategies in games, which
  effectively guide us to actions with the best
  outcome. This is called the decision procedure.

9
2. Direct Strategies Sometimes Do Not Work Well.

• This distinction between the standard of
  rightness and the decision procedure is important
  because directly trying to meet the standard is
  not necessarily the most efficient decision
  procedure to meet the standard.
• This is why the consequentialist standard of
  rightness (an action is right in virtue of its
  best consequences) does not imply the decision
  procedure, Try to calculate the goodness of
  consequences every time before acting.

10
Direct Strategies Sometimes Do Not Work Well.

• This can seem initially paradoxical, but it is
  not.
• Some Examples
• Insomnia (Can you sleep by trying to sleep?)
• Ulysses and the Sirens
• Clyde the Cautious Investor
• All of these cases suggest that some standards or
  goals are best met indirectly.

11
Ulysses the Sirens

• Ulysses and the Sirens, 1891
• John William Waterhouse

The Sirens sink ships by luring the sailors by
their beautiful voices onto rocks. Ulysses aims
at both listening to their voices and safely
sailing through the sea. Ulysses knows that he
will fail if he directly tries to do so. Thus, he
tells his subordinates to put on earplugs, tie
him to the mast, and ignore him while the Siren
sing to him.
12
Clyde the Cautious Investor

• Clyde wants only to make as much money as
  possible.
• Clyde tells his investment broker to invest his
  money in the most beneficial way possible, but
  never to invest in commodity futures.
• The broker is puzzled, arguing that theres
  plenty of money to be made by investing in
  commodity futures.
• Clyde explains that considering that no one is
  knowledgeable enough to rationally expect to make
  money, not investing in them at all is the best
  policy in the long run.

13
The Failure of the Calculation Objection

• According to consequentialism etc., actions are
  right in virtue of their comparatively good
  consequences.
• As critics point out, directly trying to meet
  this standard i.e., trying to calculate the
  goodness of outcome at every occasion of action
  does not have good consequences. Therefore,
  consequentialism etc. tell us not to adopt this
  direct strategy as our decision procedure.
• Thus, the premise (2) is false, and the
  calculation argument fails.

14
The Decision Procedure of Consequentialsim

• The defenders of consequentialism generally hold
  that the decision procedure for us includes the
  adoption and and habituation of secondary rules
  that tell us to take the types of actions that
  tend to realize the best total value. Why?
• Usefulness of Generalizations based on
  Experience.
• Due to past experiences, observations and
  scientific theories, we have established
  generalizations about whether a type of actions
  tends to succeed or fail in realizing the best
  overall value.

15
Secondary Rules

• Secondary Rules are rules derived from
  Consequentialism and Empirical Generalization.
• Examples (Kagan, 67-8)
• Empirical generalization Killing someone almost
  always has had bad consequences overall.
• Then, consequentialists say, we should adopt and
  internalize a rule dont kill.
• Empirical generalization Keeping ones promise
  generally has had the best consequences overall.
• Then, consequentialists say, we should adopt and
  internalize a rule keep your promise.

16
The Use of Secondary Rules and The Places of
Calculation

• In normal circumstances, all the agent needs to
  do is to see which of these secondary rules
  applies in the given situation and follow the
  rules.
• Calculation is called for only in three cases
• In establishing and refining secondary rules
• In deciding which action to take when secondary
  rules conflict with each other
• Ex. when you need to lie to your child not to
  hurt him
• In deciding which action to take when following a
  secondary rule might have serious consequences.
• Ex. when you have promised to meet someone, but
  on the way to the appointed place you find
  someone with a grave injury

17
Two Attractions of Consequentialism (Kagan, 68
The Answers to Q3a Q3b)

• Consequentialism offers a unified and systematic
  basis and justification for various ordinary
  moral rules. All of them are derived from
  empirical generalizations and a more fundamental
  principle the requirement to pick the act with
  the best outcome.
• Consequentialism offers a way to evaluate, refine
  and systematize ordinary moral rules.

18
Consequentialist Refinement of Moral Rules

• The Example of Self-Defense (Kagan, 67-8)
• Consequentialists will refine a moral rule,
  Dont kill, so that it will have the exception
  clause for self-defense. Why?
• Self-defense has a deterrent effect on would-be
  aggressors, so it typically leads to the better
  results overall.
• Consequentialists will further refine the rule
  Dont kill except for self-defense. They will
  forbid you to kill in self-defense when the
  person trying to harm you is only defending
  herself from your unprovoked attack. Why?
• Because it will not lead to the better results
  overall if aggressors kill their victims to
  defend themselves.

19
Consequentialist Systematization of Moral Rules
(Kagan, 68)

• We find ordinary moral rules conflict in some
  situations.
• Ex. Dont tell a lie and Save a life
  conflict with each other when you need to lie to
  save lives.
• For these situations, Consequentialits can
  provide priority rules.
• Priority rules are rules that tell us what to do
  in cases where two or more rules conflict.
• Ex. A priority rule may well say that you should
  follow Save lives rather than Dont tell a
  lie when they conflict. This is because the good
  done by saving a life normally outweighs the
  damage done by lying.
• This capacity of systematically resolving the
  conflicts of moral rules is a big attraction of
  consequentialism.

20
Consequentialism and the Obligation to Aid

• One significant implication of accepting
  consequentialism appears about the obligation to
  aid the needy.
• Consequentialism is famous (or notorious) for the
  demanding requirement of the obligation to aid
  the needy.
• This is partly because consequentialism does not
  admit any intrinsic relevance to some
  distinctions we often make.

Eric Clapton Tears in Heaven
21
Distinctions to which Consequentialism admits no
intrinsic importance

• According to a Consequentialist Peter Singer, the
  following distinctions have no intrinsic
  significance (Q2)
• The difference between those in need here and
  those in need elsewhere.
• The difference between the cases where others
  cannot aid the needy and the cases where others
  can aid (but do not). (As Singer admits on p.303,
  if others really aid the needy, that is relevant
  according to consequentialism because the need
  will cease to exist or at least decrease, trying
  to aid might not have the best consequences.)

22
Other Distinctions to which Consequentialism
Admits No Intrinsic significance

• The difference between those in need now and
  those in need in the future.
• The difference between the needy whose identities
  are known to you (e.g., the drowning child you
  find) and the needy who remain mere faceless
  statistics.
• The difference between the needy who can be aided
  directly and immediately by your action and the
  needy who can be helped only indirectly and
  eventually.

23
Continued

• Consequentialism is concerned only with the
  overall goodness of outcomes.
• The above distinctions in themselves do not
  influence the overall goodness of outcomes.
• Thus, Consequentialism admits no intrinsic
  significance to these distinction.

24
Caution

• Consequentialism might admit that some of these
  distinctions might be a clue about which action
  has the best outcome. (Q3)
• Ex. You might be in a better position to know
  what is needed by a person near to you than
  person far away. You will more effectively aid
  those whose needs you know. If so, whether the
  needy is near or not might give a clue about
  whether to aid the needy or which needy to aid
  first. (Singer, 302)
• What Consequentialism denies is that whether the
  needy is near or not is significant in itself.

25
Consequentialism and The Obligation to Aid

• Partly because consequentialism gives no
  intrinsic significance to the above distinctions,
  it requires us to aid the needy far away (e.g.,
  in the third world) etc.
• According to consequentialism, such aid is
  obligatory.
• Partly because many people make these
  distinctions, they feel that they have the
  obligation to save the drawing child in front of
  you (if their risk is moderate), but not to save
  the needy far away etc.
• Of course, then the question is Which is
  correct, consequentialism or these people?

26
Are these Distinctions Relevant?

• As for 1 the difference between those in need
  here and those in need elsewhere
• It seems that in general, physical distance
  itself does not affect our obligation. Suppose
  that Makotos parents in Japan (far away) have
  financial problems. Suppose also that your
  parents (physically near you) also have financial
  problems.
• If physical distance itself matters, Makotos
  obligation to help his parents must be weaker
  than your obligation to help your parents. It
  seems, however, that as far as Makoto and you can
  help respective parents equally, we have the same
  level of obligation to help them.

27
Continued

• As for 2 the difference between the cases where
  others cannot aid and the needy and the cases
  where others can aid (but do not)
• Should I consider that I am less obliged to pull
  the drowning child out of the pond if on looking
  around I see other people, no further away than I
  am, who have also noticed the child but are doing
  nothing? (Singer, 302)

28
Continued

• As for 4 the difference between the needy whose
  identities are known to you (e.g., the drowning
  child you find) and the needy who remain mere
  faceless statistics
• Suppose Makoto finds that his sister, working for
  the charity organization the Double Cross, puts
  poison in 10 cans and is about to give them to
  the homeless. Makoto does not know what people in
  particular will be the victims, but he knows the
  poison will kill 10 of the people.
• Is the obligation for Makoto to stop his evil
  sister weaker than the obligation to help the
  drowning child he finds?

29
Continued

• Actually, the example can be used to criticize
  the relevance of 3. the difference between those
  in need now and those in need in the future.
• As for 5. the difference between the needy who
  can be aided directly and immediately by your
  action and the needy who can be helped only
  indirectly and eventually
• Suppose you have a kid. By putting her in a
  school, you can benefit her only indirectly
  (through teachers) and eventually (through the
  process of her learning there). However, is this
  less important than helping her in your home
  directly and immediately?

30
Is Consequentialism Plausible?

• Because of these criticisms, many philosophers
  tend to agree with consequentialism that these
  distinctions are not significant in themselves.
• Thus, they tend to agree that we have an
  obligation to aid the needy far away etc. as we
  have the obligation to save the drowning child in
  front of us.
• However, many of them still think that
  (maximizing) consequentialism is mistaken.
• They argue that (maximizing) consequentialism is
  too demanding it is extremely hard even for
  moderately conscientious people to live up to the
  standard consistently.

31
Consequentialism Requires Much

• Ex. Maxine, the Moral Movie-Goer
• Maxine is on her way to the theater when someone
  with a charity box points out that the money she
  is about to spend could be used to provide food
  for starving people or inoculations in the
  third-world children. Surely, the money spent
  that way will lead to the best account when
  everyones well-being is counted. So Maxine
  forgoes her entertainment and put the money to
  the charity box.
• The next day Maxine goes to the theater again.
  Once more she meets the guy a charity box.
  Considering which action produces the best
  outcome, she forges her entertainment and put the
  money to the charity box.
• Considering the best outcome, Maxine repeats the
  donation until she cannot make other people
  happy to the extent that outweighs the sacrifice,
  esp. the sacrifice of her well-being.

32
Apparently Excessive Demands The Diagnosis

• The Problem is Usually Attributed to
• Consequentialisms Not Giving Special weight to
  the Costs to the Agent , and/or
• Consequentialisms Insistence on Maximization

33
Apparently Excessive Demands The Solution

• Agent Prerogative Give Special Weight to Costs
  to Agent
• Reject Maximization
• Satisficing Consequentialism

34
Special Weight for Costs to Agent

• According to (maximizing) consequentialism, A is
  right.
• But if we give more weight to the agents good, C
  is right.

Overall Good
Good to the Agent
Weighted Good
Bad Good
A
C
Actions
35
Criticisms of Giving Special Weight to Costs to
Agent

• Illegitimate Double Counting
• The costs to the agent, insofar as these are
  morally relevant, have already been counted in
  the overall good.
• An Incorrect Answer
• The action A (the action that has the overall
  best consequences) is not wrong from the moral
  point of view, A is more recommendable than C.

36
The Illustration of the 2nd Point

• Consider two people, Alex and Makoto.
• Alex uses her spare time for helping the poor and
  the disadvantaged. She donates the large portion
  of her salary to Oxfam America.
• Makoto uses his spare time for enjoying himself.
  He spends the large part of his salary for eating
  fancy food, drinking beers, buying CDs and so on.
• Which person is morally superior?
• It seems Alex is morally superior to Makoto. And
  presumably that is because Alexs actions are
  more morally recommendable than Makotos.
• This comparison suggests an action that has the
  overall best consequences is morally
  recommendable even if it involves a great
  sacrifice to the agent. That action is morally
  superior to the action that has less good
  consequences with less cost to the agent.

37
What Does This Amount to?

• Maxine example suggests that consequentialism,
  which requires us to take the action with the
  overall best outcome, might be too demanding.
• Alex and Makoto comparison suggest that
  consequentialism gets one thing right while the
  agent prerogative view gets this wrong the
  action with the overall best outcome is morally
  ideal or exemplary.
• Thus, if some theory makes the action with the
  best overall outcome superogatory---morally
  exemplary but not required---the theory might be
  plausible.

38
Satisficing Consequentialism

• It is permissible to take any actions whose
  overall good are above some point M. C is not the
  best but good enough.
• It is forbidden to take any actions whose overall
  good are below M.
• Thus, C as well as A are right, but B is wrong.

Overall Good
Good to the Agent
Bad Good
M
A
C
Actions
B
39
A Criticism of Satisficing Consequentialism

• Arbitrary Threshold Objection Why is good
  enough good enough? Or, why not the best?
• Satisficing consequentialism put a threshold (M
  in the graph) in the level of good consequences.
  If the good consequences of an action is over the
  point, an action is right and if the good
  consequences of an action is under which, it is
  wrong.
• However, it seems arbitrary to put such a
  threshold except at the point where the
  consequences are the best.

40
Satisficing Consequentialism and The Obligation
to Aid

• Satisficing Consequentialism is less demanding
  than (Maximizing) Consequentialism because it
  does not requires us to take the action with the
  best consequences.
• However, Satisficing Consequentialism still
  admits no intrinsic significance to the
  distinctions we have mentioned.
• Thus, Satisficing Consequentialism will probably
  require your sacrifice to aid the need far away
  to a similar extent that it requires your
  sacrifice to aid the drowning child in front of
  you.