The literature on Democracy

1
Diego Abente-Brun, June 7,
2007
2
Between a Rock and a Hard PlaceDilemmas of
Democracy in Paraguay

• byDiego Abente-BrunReagan-Fascell Democracy
  Fellow
• June 7, 2007
• National Endowment for Democracy

• Please note that the views expressed in this
  presentation represent the opinions and analysis
  of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect
  those of the National Endowment of Democracy.

3
The Third Wave of Democracy (1978- )and its
Challenges

• Electoral democracies, illiberal regimes.
• Low quality democracies

4
The Emerging Literature on Quality of Democracy

• ODonnell, Vargas Cullel, Iazetta, The Quality of
  Democracy, 2004
• Diamond Morlino, Assessing the Quality of
  Democracy, 2005
• Emphasis on
• Conceptual craftsmanship
• Studies of comparative dyads
• Missing
• A systematic inquiry into the causes

5
Defining Quality of Democracy

• The question to be addressed
• Distinguishes between nature and quality of
  democracy
• NOT how democratic a democracy is, or a
  polyarchy is (Rule of law, participation,
  competition, Accountability, Freedom, Political
  Equality, Responsiveness)
• but what is the quality of regimes that qualify
  as democratic (or polyarchic) in terms of their
  ability to address key issues.
• Three variables taken into account
• Legitimacy (Ability to generate support)
• Effectiveness (Ability to govern well/governance)
• Efficacy (Ability to deliver)

6
Quality of Democracy in South America1)
LEGITIMACY
OVERALL INDEX OVERALL INDEX DEMOCRACY DEMOCRACY
20002004 19952005 SUPPORT FOR SATISFACTION WITH
Paraguay 38 34 32 17
Ecuador 38 34 43 14
Bolivia 40 39 40 13
Peru 41 39 49 24
Colombia 41 41 46 29
Brazil 47 43 37 22
Venezuela 53 56 76 56
Chile 53 56 59 43
Argentina 59 57 65 34
Uruguay 66 68 77 63
Sources Frances Hagopian, 2005 (Support
Satisfaction with Democracy, Importance of
voting, Valid votes/VAP, Trust in Govt,
Democracy is the Best System), Latinobarómetro
2005.
7
Quality of Democracy in South America2)
GOVERNANCE
COUNTRY AVERAGE PoliticalStability GovernmentEffectiveness RegulatoryQuality Control ofCorruption
Venezuela -0.88 -1.00 -0.92 -0.68 -0.91
Paraguay -0.83 -0.76 -1.06 -0.44 -1.08
Ecuador -0.77 -0.89 -0.92 -0.39 -0.87
Colombia -0.58 -1.87 -0.13 0.11 -0.45
Bolivia -0.38 -0.50 -0.45 0.20 -0.76
Perú -0.28 -0.85 -0.32 0.34 -0.28
Argentina -0.17 -0.14 0.01 -0.13 -0.43
Brazil -0.03 -0.16 -0.07 0.18 -0.07
Uruguay 0.61 0.64 0.56 0.59 0.64
Chile 1.17 0.71 1.27 1.36 1.36
Source World Bank, Kauffman, Kraay, Mastruzzi,
Governance Matters. Data averaged for the
period 19962005.
8
Quality of Democracy in South America3)
SOCIOECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
COUNTRY POVERTY GAP POVERTY GDP GROWTH PC
Bolivia 34.40 62.40 0.90
Paraguay 30.30 61.00 -1.10
Colombia 24.10 50.60 0.30
Venezuela 22.10 48.60 0.90
Ecuador 20.80 49.00 1.10
Perú 20.60 54.70 1.60
Brazil 17.80 38.70 0.70
Argentina 12.20 29.40 1.40
Chile 6.30 18.70 3.00
Uruguay 4.50 15.40 1.00
Source CEPAL. Data from most recent year
available (ranges from 2001 to 2004).
9
The Quest for an Explanation

• Three hypotheses
• STRUCTURAL
• Socioeconomic matrix
• Stakeholders and nature of the political game
• INSTITUTIONAL
• Nature of the party system
• Rules of the political game, constitutional and
  legal
• SOCIO-CULTURAL
• Social capital of the population
• Associational predispositions horizontal
  relations

10
1) STRUCTURAL Socioeconomic Matrix
COUNTRY NON-AGRICULTURAL WORKFORCE NON-AGRICULTURAL WORKFORCE PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES WITH SOCIAL SECURITY PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES WITH SOCIAL SECURITY PERCENTAGE OF EMPLOYEES WITH SOCIAL SECURITY
Urban Agric.Workforce Informal Formal Informal Formal Overall
Bolivia 39.0 32.3 66.7 33.8 6.5 46.3 31.3
Ecuador 48.0 30.3 57.6 42.4 14.2 63.4 47.1
Paraguay 49.6 31.3 62.9 37.1 4.4 45.3 26.5
Peru 55.2 37.5 58.0 42.0 14.9 63.9 48.3
Brazil 58.4 19.6 44.6 55.4 34.2 83.8 69.2
Colombia 59.2 20.9 59.9 40.1 27.5 83.9 65.2
Venezuela 71.5 9.7 52.2 47.8 16.9 72.2 57.0
Chile 72.1 13.3 35.8 61.2 48.9 83.3 76.4
Uruguay 74.3 4.6 37.7 62.3 32.9 87.0 73.1
Argentina 74.9 1.1 44.3 55.7 17.5 66.8 51.5
Sources CEPAL, Intl Labor Organization. Data
from most recent available (20022004).
11
1) STRUCTURAL (continued)Effects of
Invertebrate Society

• Invertebrate society Lack of collective actors
  with collective interests that can structure the
  political game along issue-based lines
• This lack of social articulation favors the
  emergence of clientelistic politics
• Prevents the development of horizontal ties and
  furthers vertical, hierarchical, and in essence,
  exploitative relationships.
• Incorporates popular sectors as clients, but
  excludes them as citizens.

12
2) INSTITUTIONALClientelistic vs. Issue-Based
Parties
Social Base of Support Policy Bias Identity profile
Issue-BasedParties Constituencies Collectives Re-distributive Universalistic Progressive pro-labor or conservative, pro-business
Clientelistic Parties Constituents Individuals Distributive Particularistic Populist, conservative, personalistic
Correlates
Types of Parties
13
Effects of Clientelistic Parties on Quality of
Democracy

1. Favors particularistic policies that privilege
   individual party supporters.
2. Breeds dependence on small but organized
   groupsmainly public employeesthat interact not
   with each other but with state.
3. Reinforces rent-seeking behavior of powerful
   socioeconomic actors.
4. Increases both the weakness and centrality of the
   state.

14
(No Transcript)
15
Effects of Low Quality of Democracy

• GDP per-capita
• 1980 1,441
• 1989 1,442
• 2004 1,382
• 30 of population is rural and has no access to
  land
• 10 of overall population owns 66 of the
  available land
• Remaining 60 of population share 6 of the
  surface

19801988 19891999 20002005
Tax burden 7.7 10.5 10.9
Bureaucratic Burden 42.4 61.3 75.9
16
Growth in Public-Sector Employees
17
Growth in Public-Sector Salaries
18
The Trap of Clientelism

• On the one hand.
• 80 of voters belong to one of two traditional
  parties
• On the other hand
• 75 of the population considers political parties
  the least-trustworthy institution

19
3) SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORSAssociational
Predispositions

• Inspired by work of Tocqueville
• Interpersonal trust and associational behavior
  key to quality of democracy
• Interpersonal trust in Paraguay very low between
  1996 and 2004 (Latinobarómetro)
• In 2001, 56.9 of population didnt belong to any
  intermediate organization in 2005, 70.3
• Are these causes or consequences of low quality
  of democracy?

20
The Rock and Hard-Place Dilemma

• Low quality democracy vs. the neo-populist
  alternative
• Neo-populism
• No longer tied to specific social constituencies
  or economic policies (e.g. Peron, Vargas), but
  instead
• tied to a pattern of personalistic and
  anti-institutionalist politics rooted in the
  appeal and mobilization of marginalized masses by
  a charismatic, often authoritarian leader
• 19962003 the neo-populist temptation
  authoritarian formulas, Gen. Lino Oviedo.

21
The Unexpected

• Social-science explanations can never rule out
  the unexpected
• The unexpected came in March 2006 with a
  citizens demonstration led by Monsignor Fernando
  Lugo
• This confirms the old adage, There is no ill
  that lasts 100 years nor a Paraguayan willing to
  put up with it.

22
Hope Beyond Hope

• The chiliastic upsurge of former Bishop Fernando
  Lugo

23
(No Transcript)
24
Lugo, Chavez, Morales

• Lugo not a military leader, but a pastor who grew
  up in a tradition of horizontality, collective
  leadership, and anti-authoritarianism.
• Lugo not a Marxist or a neo-populist but an
  exponent of Catholic social progressism.
• Lugo not a leader of an ethnically divided
  society.
• Lugo is a catalyst who gathers support from a
  wide range of parties, from right to left.
• Lugo identifies himself as a centrist
  (mbytetepe, poncho juruicha) sees left as a
  movement for change rather than as an ideological
  platform.

25
Implications

• Ecuador
• Similar socioeconomic matrix, similar
  clientelistic parties (but not deeply rooted)
• Instability, development of a new politics of
  identity (Pachacutik)
• Emergence of populist-authoritarian alternatives
• Lucio Gutiérrez and Rafael Correa
• Bolivia
• Similar socioeconomic matrix, similar
  clientelistic parties (but not deeply rooted save
  MNR)
• Development of new politics of identity
• Emergence of radical alternatives
• Evo Morales

26
Corollaries

• Bolivia
• If established political elites do not make
  reform possible, they make revolutions
  inevitable.
• Evo Morales.
• Ecuador
• If established political elites do not make
  reform possible, they make instability
  inevitable.
• Mahuad, Gutiérrez, Palacios, Correa
• Paraguay
• If opposition political elites do not make
  reforms possible, they make one-party rule
  inevitable.
• Lugo?

27
Between a Rock and a Hard PlaceDilemmas of
Democracy in Paraguay

• Diego Abente-BrunReagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow

THE END